Quantcast
Channel: Freedom House - China Media Bulletin
Viewing all 165 articles
Browse latest View live

中国媒体快报:社会信用诱因、菁英被关压、#我也是维吾尔人(Issue 133, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 中共正如何激励打压

新闻报道​​

重点反制:海外规范中共官方媒体

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:中共正如何激励打压

党的「社会信用」评分体系或以游戏面目出现,但结果可能致命般严重。

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

中共「社会信用体系」旨在为公民的行为打分并强制发生相应的后果。随着与此体系相关的各项计划逐步推行,报导和评论多集中在这种体系将如何侵犯隐私,将无辜的受害者放入黑名单,并惩罚中共异见人士。

然而,社会信用现象甚至还有更令人不安的一个面向,那就是:这些措施可能会激励群众成为威权党国统治的推手,协同打压他们的同胞。尽管全国范围内的这种体系尚未到位,但各种类似鼓励和刺激的实例已在中共的政策和实施方方面面表现出来。

宣传的奖励

本月,有一中共支持的奖励体系登上了许多媒体的头条,是关于一个名为「学习强国」的新款手机app,用来推广「习近平思想」和其它宣传。该app已经被下载了几千万次,伴随着源源不断的习语录和官方媒体报导,结合一些小测验和用户可以获取「学『习』点数」的机会来获得现实世界的奖品。重要的是,用户不仅可以通过接收其中的信息来赢得点数,也可以透过转发文章给朋友来获得 。

鼓励和刺激不仅限于这些,也不仅限于在中国的用户。官方《人民日报》英文版通过位于美国的苹果的iTunes商店来发布的一款app,用户只要阅读、点赞和分享该app里边的内容,就可赢得分数。而这些分数可以换成虚拟硬币,用于网络商店购物。

乍看之下,这样的用户参与好像相对无害。但是分享中国官方媒体内容可能意味着包含推广律师和记者的被胁迫的忏悔,或者是洗白在新疆大规模关押的「再教育营」政策这一类的信息。扭曲信息环境会对现实世界造成破坏。

奖励对少数民族的打压行为

与发展全国性的社会信用机制相关的各种试行方案和各式各样的系统包括有效鼓励镇压迫害宗教和少数民族的成分。比方说,Nectar Gan 2月19日在《南华早报》发布的一份调查,详细描述了在山东省荣城市,信息是如何被收集的以及点数是如何分配的。其中一例,一对夫妇因「他们的儿子在驻藏部队服役」而获得了10分,在西藏,中国维稳部队对藏人的基本权利强迫实施繁重限制。

2018年4月《外交政策》报导,发生同一城市的另一例是,那些得到「市一级奖励」者可挣得30分。虽然该文指出,通过「一件见义勇为的行为」就可赢得这样的奖励,但这样的奖励还被颁发给效忠压制当地居民权利的官员们。例如,安徽省合肥市2014年的一份官方文件指出,市里设立了一个奖项,专门奖励街道一级的官员们,因他们有效「转化」当地法轮功学员。「转化」:是强制人们放弃信仰的一种好听的说法,一般都是伴以对被「转化」者的身体折磨和精神摧残。

在荣城市,高点数带来的物质奖励包括租用自行车不用交押金、有取暖费折扣,和准予银行贷款。但是在新的社会信用体系之外也存在其他鼓励和刺激手段。 2017年自由之家发布的一份完整的关于中国宗教自由的研究发现,针对各种信仰,「金钱刺激在加强限制宗教自由方面扮演了直接的角色」,并且「在党国体制里,有效打压被迫害的宗教信仰团体和相关言行举止的办事员可以得到提升职位和奖励的好处。」

将共产党党内评估体系扩展到普罗大众

从很多方面来看,北京当局的社会信用计划,是对在后毛泽东时期一直就有的、详尽的、决定政府官员和干部政治生涯的绩效考评系统的数字化、扩大化。

那套体系的评分表和首要针对对象在鼓励人权侵犯方面扮演了关键角色。譬如,2002年来自广州的一份评分表,是由臭名昭著的「610」办公室发布的(「610」办公室是中共下属主管迫害法轮功的安保机构),该表提出了在天河区评估每个镇和小区的标准。表中列出28项减分指标,其中包括如果不能针对当地已知法轮功学员「组织再教育班」或「建立个人档案」,就会被减分。记分卡也列出得分的三个指标,其中包括如果成功「转化」一位法轮功学员,以及每次阻止发放支持法轮功资料的抓捕,那当地居民会被奖励5分。

关于各种指标针对人群,最优先针对的是那些所谓「一票否决」指标类别。如果在这些方面不达标,则其它所有方面的优良表现将被自动取消,还可能导致官员被免职或失去升职机会。根据自由之家2014年初的一份对省市级文件的调查,那时在习近平治下中共当局主要的「一票否决」类别是在维稳、人口与计划生育和党纪方面。

这些评估惯例对在计划实施的社会信用体系的影响是明显的。大多数的试行计划表明,已有的评分表中奖励和惩罚同在。此外,共产党的标准和评估术语已经开始出现在社会信用分数的条例中。根据2019年2月20日「信用中国」网站消息,在2018年4月财经部出台的一套关于会计师的指南中,已将「习近平思想」列为该体制的指导思想。该指南还要求对不诚信会计师进行「一票否决制」,同时提出建立一个会计行业统一的全国信用信息平台。

根据这些方方面面的联系,看起来有理由可预见,未来会计师们将不单会因欺诈或不诚实而受罚,而且会因信仰受政府迫害的宗教而受罚,会因呼吁官员申报他们的财产受罚,会因在网上发送嘲笑或挫败中共的帖子受罚,或因不满而向上一级当局机构请愿而受罚。

群众举报

一些已有的奖励和刺激体系在鼓励群众之间互相举报方面的做法是明目张胆的。

在新疆,对给当局提供维吾尔族宗教活动方面信息的举报者,金钱奖励是常事。 2014年4月,在新疆阿克苏地区政府网站上发布的一贴通知是这样的:对当地居民有任何53种被禁止行为进行举报者,举报人可获得高达5万元(相当于8000美金)的奖励。 53种指定行为中,有18种是与宗教信仰相关的,比方说在公共场合祈祷、举行伊斯兰尼卡汗式婚礼仪式,或在斋戒月禁食。在西藏,对与自焚抗议或其它有异见行为的僧人进行举报,官方会给予高达20万元(相当于31500美金)的奖励。

2012年,新浪微博推出了它自己的信用体系,开始时叫「微博信用」,后来在2016年改名为「阳光信用」。这套体系的一个功能是,它允许用户间互相举报,从骚扰到传播「不实信息」等各种行为。每被负面举报一此,该用户的信用分数将会降低,再低就会被贴上「低信用用户」的标签,直至低到帐户被注销。微博信用体系实施后一年,据新浪称收到1500多万关于有害信息的举报。很多是与垃圾信息有关,但至少有些很可能属于政治敏感性帖子。 2017年10月,一些用户投诉说信用体系被滥用了,因为有些女性裸露肌肤的照片也被删除了,包括一些明显不是色情性质的。如一位用户所言:「为何这么多帖子被举报的原因在于,每个监控员每月都被分配了指标配额。要想得到200元的补贴,他们必须要举报至少200条信息 。」

最近的一个例子是,1月14日,河北一个法院公布了一则题为「老赖地图」app的微信。据《中国日报网》报导:「该app用户可以在屏幕上看到一雷达,该雷达可以让他们发现在其附近方圆500米的圈子内,是否有人是欠债人。」如果谁觉得欠债人有能力偿还欠债,他们就可向当局举报而获奖。

这样的群众互相评分方式也被加入了一些社会信用体系的试行版中,在荣城,一个10人市代表小分队被任命人工登记相关行为,并给居民评分。在贵州省清镇市也有类似做法,据报列出的有1000项指标,用以据此来给民众打分,其中就有基于群众相互评分和社区监控的指标。

物质奖励和打压目标相结合,就会给当地政府和居民施加压力,使其有可能举报那些平和的但有不顺从的行为的邻居。上月,荣城市的一位居民,因就关于他母亲长达20年的医疗纠纷在网上发出1000份请愿信,而导致信用分数被扣了950点。该城市一个小区的居民,因违反其法律传播宗教,而导致在他们信用评估方面面临附加惩罚。

同时也不难看出,人们会被诱使而做不实举报。也许对某个人不满而进行个人报复就有可能这么做。讽刺的是,这类彻底破坏了中国社会人与人之间的诚信的行为——使人想起文化大革命时群众间人人相互检举揭发——正是社会信用系统想解决的问题。

官方道德 vs. 个人良心

要适当的理解中国政府各种各样的宣扬「好」和威懾「坏」的举动,我们必需将之放在一个威权政治体制逻辑的大前提下,而这种逻辑常常是反常理、反人性的。在此体制中,大多数人寻求社会变好的行为——譬如平和的曝光腐败官员、揭露侵权现象、调查健康医疗丑闻或捍卫宗教自由——是被严厉惩处和监牢伺候的。事实上,社会信用试验最核心的冲突之一是, 许多最值得信赖的人(用孔子的话来讲),在中国恰恰是在此中共扭曲的奖励刺激体制下最可能受到惩罚的人。

随着这些计划的进一步推行,中国用户们可能得三思,为了换得奖励他们愿意采取什么样的行动。他们理应考虑拒绝侵犯同胞权利或对中共受害人落井下石的行为,即便是这样的拒绝会冒自己人身安全之险。做社区服务、给小区的游乐场架个篮球筐、照顾年老的父母,通过这些行为来获得奖励点数,很显见有益于社会。然而,举报一位在斋戒月禁食、派发酷刑折磨法轮功学员的消息或分享了一则开习近平的玩笑的邻居,而去获得奖励分数,这样的行为并不有益于社会。一个真正有道德的社会,会呼吁社会的成员去锻炼自己明辨是非的能力,去择善而行并不计短期利益 。说到底,美德应该是善有善报的自然奖赏。

萨拉∙库克(Sarah Cook是自由之家东亚资深研究分析员,《中国媒体快报》负责人。本文已于2019年2月27日发表于Hong Kong Free Press

[图片说明:新「学习 强国」手机应用软件截图。资料来源:What’s on Weibo]


党的宣传 现代与传统 结果不尽相同

在习近平的领导下,中共的宣传攻势愈加强烈。一方面,对习的个人宣传,令人想起毛时代到处可见的广告牌上和各种传统平台上的大幅肖像;另一方面,在习本人的授意下,官方媒体和其它党的机关在手段上推陈出新,使中共的信息可以让年轻的、更倾向数字平台的受众能接收到并产生互动。结果是非常的不稳定。

  • 央视春晚:从1983年起,央视春晚就在农历新年的除夕夜播出。虽说它依然是个全国性的传统,也依然是世界观看人数最多的电视秀,但过去几年来,收视率直线下跌。今年的晚会是2月5日播出的,央视和其它国内媒体高唱赞歌,说其是巨大的成功。但是,SupChina网站的冯佳韵(音译)收集了对其差评,发出了她和官方媒体反调评批。冯佳韵留意到,尽管去年对春晚的批评在网上是被禁的,相比其它的在社交媒体上的搜索敏感词目录,今年的管制似乎有所放松。在网民的不满声中,演员吴秀波本来是定好了的晚会主持人之一,但在录播的视频中被很尴尬的剪掉了,原因是一月底,他被曝光有一系列的婚外情丑闻。网民还很不满的发现,冯巩的一个重头戏相声小品,据报因不符合审查要求也被砍掉了。除了这些小的不良插曲,今年的晚会的确是做到了没有引起像去年的黑脸非洲人那般的巨大争议。​
  • 宣扬「习近平思想」的App: 截至2月12日,苹果中国app 商店下载最多的一款app叫「学习强国」,据报该app是网络大公司阿里巴巴协助开发的。虽说数百万的智能手机用户据报是自愿下载了这款 app,中共党员则是必须下载并使用它,以免社会信用评分被减。该app内容除了主要是习语录和官方媒体的报导外,还有各种测验和机会让用户获得学「习」分数。这些点数可在现实世界兑换奖品。 「中国媒体项目(China Media Project)」和「微博动态(What's on Weibo)」对此app本身,以及它如何促成了一定程度上的用户和官方宣传的互动从而逃避该党,做了深度分析。据报一位年轻女士投诉了此app是如何造成对她母亲入侵性影响。她母亲是一位在学校工作的小职员,由于校方要求她每天必挣够一定分数,结果她所有的业余时间都扑在了学「习」上。该app的发布是紧跟习近平的大形势,在1月25日政治局所有七位常委都出席的学习大会上,习近平重申通过最精尖媒体技术「加快推动媒体融合发展,让主旋律更高昂」的需要。 2月10日「中国媒体项目」刊登文章,研究人员大卫·班德斯基(David Bandurski)着重提到,中共共青团也一直在评估其最近的宣传力度,确定有好好利用社交媒体平台来影响年轻观众群的需要。​
  • 猪年破坏维吾尔文化:在一直不断的对维吾尔文化的攻击中,最显著的就是关押了大约100万维吾尔族和突厥穆斯林的新疆「再教育营」网络。中亚学者戴任·拜乐(Darren Byler)在2月6日的一篇文章中指出,在新疆地区加强宣传以控制维族人的行为方面,有几种手段。尽管农历新年不是维吾尔族人文化中的典型节日,2019年猪年伊始,宣传口对此是大肆渲染。拜乐引用了一则报导维吾尔民族舞蹈的央视电视新闻,这舞的观众多数是监管一个大的集中营的汉族官方工作人员。他特别指出了维吾尔族人对猪年的敏感,因为伊斯兰民族是不吃猪肉的,一般维吾尔族人也保有这一禁忌。为了维持他们打压这种宗教和文化习俗的力度,中共官员看样子是在利用猪年的到来,宣扬吃非清真食品和养猪的好处。此举让年长的维吾尔人想起了当年文革时发生的景象。
  • 马克思动漫系列:1月28日,讲述德国社会主义学者卡尔·马克思生活的七集动漫系列 -《领风者》- 在中文媒体「哔哩哔哩弹幕视频网」网站推出。第一集在24小时内吸睛280万,但可能还是没有达到七预期的目标。据「六调(Six Tone)」网报导,「该动漫的推出,在中国网民中褒贬不一。人们多留意到的是动漫人物马克思的高颧骨和帅模样,而非其理论。」

審查近況:騰訊趨勢、外媒記者、取締澎湃新聞聚合平台 

  • 2018年腾讯审查:2月11日,香港大学WeChatscope项目研究人员对2018年腾讯微信平台做了公众帐号的审查制度分析报告。报告发现,相比微信管理员的删文(2950篇),更多的内容删除(8092篇)是来自用户的自我审查。这表明在越来越严苛的互联网环境下,虽着「红线」不断移位和帐户被关闭的风险日益增高,自我审查加强了。报告指出,许多审查最严的话题包括在加拿大抓捕华为首席财务官孟晚舟、进行中的中美贸易纷争、受争议的中国科学的人类基因改造,这些都是官方对媒体发出的要审查的内容,这是《中国数字时代(China Digital Times)》翻译的,彰显了微信审查员们是在执行当局的指令。 自由之家及其合作伙伴在发布这份媒体快报之中所做的努力,也表明腾讯在去年加强了对其电子邮件服务器QQ的控制,因为在2018年年底数月中,媒体快报发至QQ电子邮件信箱变得越来越靠不住了。​
  • 外媒记者的处境越来越差:外国驻华记者俱乐部的年度会员民意调查发现,较之去年,又一次,报导环境恶化了,而且最新的结果「勾勒出在人们在近些年的记忆中能想到的中国最黑暗的报导环境」。受调回应者中,绝大多数(91%)说担心他们的电话安全,半数以上(55%)认为情况在恶化,近半数(48%)说他们被跟踪或他们住宿的酒店房间有人未经允许闯入,27%曾到新疆旅行的受调回应者,其中只有三位说在新疆没有被干扰。过去三年中,首次有外国记者被以拒发签证的方式驱逐出境。对他们的中国籍助理和消息提供者,监控、拘留和其它的直接恐吓的情形在增多。在此调查回应中,一位美国媒体的首席代表说:「过去,是有打压,但你知道原因也期待那样的情形会有个头。我们现在面对的,是一种新的常态。」​
  • 取缔澎湃新闻聚合平台:据《中国数字时代》翻译的一份泄密指示,在针对官方媒体的一次不同寻常的行动中,从1月21日起30天内, 网络中心内容监管者禁止媒体发布来自澎湃新闻的聚合信息。澎湃新闻是由中共政府出资在2014年成立的纯数位新闻网站和手机app,旨在迎合年轻的、受过良好教育的、非此举则不会关注官方媒体报导的读者。香港《苹果日报》的报导指出,这一惩罚是因为澎湃新闻去年12月未经授权就发文确认前国务院发言人袁木的死讯。袁木因其在1989年对亲民主的抗议而发表的言论变得臭名昭著。一份2018年12月7日《中国数字时代》翻译的官方指示中,要求关于该话题,只有来自新华社和人民日报的报导才能被转载发表。即便是它有密切的官方背景,澎湃新闻的内容被勒令审查也非首次。过去泄密的官方指示中,澎湃新闻被限制的文章包括:一篇关于非法疫苗的发表在2016年3月的文章, 一篇关于电话欺诈团伙所用技术发表在2017年2月的文章,以及发表在2017年2月的一篇关于援引北京大学空气污染致死研究的文章。​

最近言论自由案例 党国矛头指向菁英层、知识界

尽管中共打压的受害人来自社会各阶层,据报过去两月的一波失踪、被捕和监禁针对象则是受过高等教育的菁英和专业人士。被拘留和监禁的人士中有律师、大学教授、知名学者和名牌大学的学生。这些案例所引起的反应是外国大学或专业人士团体如律师协会感受到压力,要重新审视他们同其在中国的代理人的关系,特别是由于至少两例指控发生,称其在中国的代理人接受了海外资助并以此将他们判刑入狱。

  • 环保人士:1月9日,律师兼环保维权人士陈武权被广东省法院以「寻衅滋事」判刑五年,其他五位共同被告分别被判刑1年到18个月不等。陈武权和其他人是一年前被拘留的,理由是他们协助抗议湛江市东海岛要求索回土地 。​
  • 知名人权律师:1月28日,知名人权律师王全璋在秘密拘禁、失联三年多后,被天津一法院判刑四年半入狱。对王全璋的审判是2018年12月26日进行的,他是2015年「黑色星期五」大抓捕中最后一位被判决的。据事发数日前《中国数字時代》翻译的一篇泄漏审查令显示,所有新闻网站都被告知要限制报导该审判。
  • 公民社会组织者:1月29日,湖北省一法院以「煽动颠覆国家政权」为罪名,对知名维权人士、《民生观察》网站创始人刘飞跃判刑五年,加罚人民币100万元(约15万美金),刘母指责法院背弃承诺,本来(政府方面)说只要她答应给儿子做「思想工作」就可以给他缓刑。
  • 教授:1月29日,广东​​技术师范天河学院45岁的商业学教授曾浩被判刑三年半,并加罚1万元(约1500美金)。 2017年8月,他因在腾讯QQ发布了几张与法轮功修炼团体有关的图片被拘留。曾浩被判刑时,没有他律师和家人在场。​
  • 澳大利亚作家:53岁的澳洲公民杨恒均博士是一位作家和博主,毕业于悉尼技术大学,1月19日到达广州机场后失踪,数日后被报因「参与危害国家安全的犯罪活动」而被拘留。杨恒均是前中国外交部工作人员,后成为一名间谍小说作家,在其著作中曾对中共持批评态度,但最近的文章不这样了。 2011年,杨恒均曾在中国旅行时被短暂拘留,后来那起事件被说成是「一场误会」。​
  • 马克思主义专业大学生:来自名牌大学北京大学和中国人民大学的7名马克思主义专业的大学生,1月21日被拘留最近数月,名牌大学的在校生和毕业生,因热衷参与工运而被打压,这七名大学生也是因此被拘。​
  • 维吾尔学者:在持续进行的对新疆维吾尔文化的攻击中,据1月28日「维吾尔族人权项目」发布的报吿详细指出,自2017年4月起,有388名知识分子被拘捕,其中包括61名大学教授和57名媒体从业人员。

香港:司法修订案可能让和平异议表达者获罪

对香港政府正在酝酿的两项司法修订,外界担心那会导致人们因非暴力的政治或宗教表达、甚至是讽刺(当局)而获罪入狱。

  • 国歌法案:1月23日,香港政府向立法会正式制定一项法案,对侮辱中华人民共和国国歌《义勇军进行曲》者,进行刑事处罚,可判高达3年的监禁和5万港币(6400美金)的罚款。如果立法通过,还将要求学校遵循关于如何教唱国歌的指南。此项提案是步其邻居澳门的后尘,澳门刚于1月26日通过了一项类似法案,对「国家象征符号」(包括国歌)有意不敬者,可处以三年监禁和高额罚款。在香港,亲民主的立法会议员批评该提案中的模糊语言,让人不清楚究竟何种行为构成「侮辱」。同时,亲民主团体「香港众志」在政府大楼外抗议该提案,他们打出的旗子上写着「不歌颂的自由」。回应批评,香港行政会议召集人陈智思在南华早报撰文指出,该法令将「不可能被违反,除非你公开且有意这么做」。但对陈智思文章的一封回函中强调,香港的这条法律将会如何使常见的讽刺都获罪。自从北京开始打压将国歌用于商业用途,并将与此相关的大陆的法令条款延伸至香港,且强制香港政府去试图将该条款加入当地法规起,该提案已提交讨论一年多。自从2014年在香港一场足球赛中,观众用对国歌的嘘声表达港民对北京当局侵犯香港自治的不满以来,此举是对这个趋势的明显回应。​
  • 修订引渡规则:本月,香港政府开始考虑修订《逃犯条例》和《刑事事宜相互法律协助条例》,旨在使在香港、澳门、台湾和中国大陆间的引渡更容易。该修订称是因应对谋杀案中香港不能拘押嫌犯而提出的,其中包括一名男子被指控去年在台湾谋杀一名20岁的香港籍女游客。在现有香港法律下,香港当局无法指控该男子,台湾当局亦不能将该男子从香港引渡到台湾。修订后的条令将可以准许香港当局将逃犯移交到目前尚无双边引渡协议的任何城市。每个引渡申请将按个案处理。乍看之下,香港的政治和宗教人士,不会因为和平表达异见而被引渡到大陆,因为该规定要求嫌疑在双边的司法管辖区域都犯了刑事罪。然而,法案修订的反对者们从两个基点上提出了担忧:其一,众所周知,北京一直就在以捏造的罪名如「欺诈」来惩罚媒体工作人员和维权人士,而「欺诈」在香港也是违法的;其二,大陆的刑事司法系统本身就有各种基本缺陷。如香港公民党议员郭荣铿(Dennis Kwok)写道:「我们真的放心把被指控者交到大陆审判吗?2015年,香港铜锣湾书店老板林荣基被失踪,继而在大陆的官方电视上「坦白交代」罪行,他告诉「公民新闻」(Citizen News)说,如果修正案通过,他将离开香港。在2月18日的一则博客中,知名中国法专家孔杰荣(Jerome Cohen)指出,那些修订将是一个「重大的改变」。他警告说,任何与中国签订的「引渡」协议,都「必需不能侵犯《公民与政治权利国籍公约》所保障的人权」。该公约在大陆没有法律约束力,但在香港是有的。

中國之外:针对新疆难民和文化审查的压力延伸至美国和欧洲

  • 新疆打压延伸到中国境外:在新疆对维吾尔族人和突厥穆斯林的打压中,有一些人流亡到了海外,但便是那样,他们依然处于被监控、恐吓或相关的外交角力中。哈萨克裔中国公民Sayragul Sauytbay在新疆的一个再教育营做教员,后来成为(中国)大规模关押系统的早期见证人,她去年逃到了哈萨克斯坦。但她在哈萨克斯坦的身分还是不确定,因为该国非常依赖中国的投资,导致她表达了自己可能会被遣送回中国的恐惧。同时, 沙曼(Qalymbek Shahman),另一位哈萨克裔中国公民,经过一场横跨亚洲的奥德赛式空中历险。1月4日,他从中国逃到了泰国,之后,他从泰国飞到了哈萨克斯坦,入关时被拒,接着他转飞往乌兹别克斯坦,当地的中共官员试图将他遣返。乌兹别克斯坦当局最终还是把他送回了泰国。逃离到海外的维吾尔人依然受到中国当局的监控和恐吓。《华盛顿邮报》 的一则报导,描述了一群身在澳大利亚的维吾尔族人,是如何害怕遭到人身威胁,因为中国当局通过威胁他们在新疆的家人而得到了他们在澳洲的详细住址。在加拿大,维吾尔活动人士托度希(Rukiye Turdush)在发表演说时,一些中国学生也入场,他们打断其讲话,并据报试图收集其他与会者的信息。此举据称是在当地中共领事馆的操控下而为。​
  • 维族流亡,美国穆斯林发声:海外维吾尔族人社区和其他穆斯林已开始发声,讲述在新疆的迫害。在推特上,「我也是维吾尔人(MeTooUyghur)」运动已开始一边引起公众注意,一边通过非官方的行动来保证那些被关押者的身心健康。那些帖子通常都是些他们家庭成员在集中营失踪特定的照片或视频,并呼吁中国当局确认他们的现状。这样做的部分原因是由于中国官员公布了一段视频,来反驳一则关于一位知名维吾尔族音乐家在关押中去世的报导。另外,在美国,130多名穆斯林牧师、学者和社区领袖签署了一封公开信,呼吁释放在新疆集中营内关押的维吾尔族人,并呼吁美国人停止购买有可能是在这些集中营中生产的产品。​
  • 西班牙剧院取消神韵演出:总部在纽约的神韵艺术团,本来计划从1月31日到2月2日,在西班牙马德里进行数场演出,不料在中国官员的压力下,原定演出突然被取消。神韵的许多演员修炼法轮功,神韵的一些节目,除了(中国)历朝历代的文化经典,也描述了法轮功在中国的被迫害。皇家剧院声称取消的原因是「技术困难」。然而,中共驻西班牙大使馆官员向一些自称是中国政府官员者承认,他曾给剧院施压,让其取消演出。在《大纪元》发表的这段电话录音中,那位官员解释了他如何以准入中国市场作为「丝绸之路线上剧院协议」为条件,换取剧院方的「政治」合作。自从神韵艺术团在2006年创团以来,就一直被中共官员骚扰,这样的相关事件在全世界有60多起记录在案,其中包括从威胁剧院和民选官员到网路攻击和扎(神韵巴士)的车胎,有些是在最后一分钟被取消。​
  • 文革电影在柏林电影节被撤销:中国电影制作人张艺谋的新作《一秒钟》原定是要在柏林电影节首映的,2月13日,在首映日的前两天被撤销。撤销的原因是「技术困难」。可是,这部电影的故事发生在文革时期,而且它可能没得到批准或是中国国家电影审查方面的额外程序出口签证,特别是考虑到中共在去年3月对娱乐圈官方重整,加强了直接控制。​
  • 美国艺术中心撤下习的画像:在北卡州加里(Gary)镇,有一场艺术展览,展出的是身在美国的艺术家翁冰的画作,就在展览于1月22日开展的前夕,其中三幅作品被撤下,两幅是把习近平画的不正面。据翁冰讲,该镇的文化艺术经理告诉她,他个人非常喜欢她的作品,也想保护言论自由,但是那几幅是「政治作品」,「政府部门得考虑各方意见」。暗示了可能是来自中国外交官或当地挺习华人的反弹。翁冰说她之所以受到激发而将更多的政治性画作加入展览,是因为她得知去年一位上海女士因涂抹习近平的画像,而被强行送入精神病院。

重点反制:海外规范中国官方媒体 

长期以来,中国的官方媒体就存在海外,而北京当局近年来更是寻求扩大其海外版图。但是,随着它们的势头渐长并引起了国际关注,宗主国政府正在加强相关法令和播出条例的执行,以规范这些媒体的活动。

今年2月1日,「中国环球电视网」(又称「中国国际电视台」)(China Global Television Network (CGTN)),在美国依据「外国代理人登记法」(Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA))登记注册。这一变化是据媒体报导去年九月美国司法部要求「中国环球电视网」和新华社登记注册为外国代理人, 缩小了 「外国代理人登记法」执法方面的长期差距。 (中共国家经营的在美国的发行公司《中国日报》在1983年登记注册)。在其登记时,「中国环球电视网」称其是中国国有的中央电视台的分公司,但也声称「本着与美国当局合作的精神」之下注册,但没有承认它正属于《外国代理人登记法FARA》的管辖范围。 「中国环球电视网」的新身份要求它定期向司法部上交报吿和增加在美国活动的透明度。

情况相似的是,社会人权活动者呼吁英国通讯监管机构Ofcom,审查中央电视台在英国的运作,并评估是否该台违背了国家广播职业操守——包括隐私和公正的规范——以及人权法案在播放政治犯被迫的认罪,至少一位是英国公民。 2018年11月,英国通讯监管机构称将调查这些投诉,但截止到二月尚未发表任何决定。

2018年12月,由国际人权组织「保护人权捍卫者」公布更新之前关于强迫电视认罪现象的報告,建议更多国家应审查「中国环球电视网」和中央电视台在他们的空中频道播放的节目。研究者发现涉及的106人的其中48个电视认罪者在中国电视播放,「其中至少29个电视认罪在世界其他国家播放,经常明显违反和明确违反播放规定国家电视法规」。在至少27个案例中,外国人被强迫认罪播放到了认罪本人所在的国家,包括加拿大、英国、瑞典和美国。在很多案例中,有问题的节目以中文播放,通过中国中央电视台中文国际频道(CCTV-4)播放给其他华裔侨民,中国中央电视台中文国际频道(CCTV-4)是一个独立经营并拥有自己的许可证的子公司。从这个观点看,去检查中央电视四台以及其他中国国有中文媒体的运作,如中国国际广播电台(China Radio International,CRI)和他们的外国分台,将使想寻求完全强制相关外国法律影响和电视播放职业道德的立法者得到很好的建议。

[图片说明:瑞典活动人士Peter Dahlin于2016年1月在中央电视台播出的强迫认罪截图]


未來看点

在「两会」期间的新闻审查和政策宣布:3月5日, 第十三届中国全国人民代表大会第二次会议将在北京举行,同时还有政协第十三届全国委员会第二次会议。在「两会」期间,留意官方对媒体报导的指示或对敏感话题的回避、对维权人士旅行的限制以及对媒体和网络政策的新立法,包括引起争论的强迫技术转让的惯例。

对西藏抗暴纪念日的限制:3月10日是达赖喇嘛从西藏流亡60周年,并且成為提醒人们2008年3月藏人抗议中共统治后引来的血腥镇压。在此敏感时期,留意增加的网络审查和去西藏的限制。据报,旅游经营者已宣布关闭外国人去西藏自治区旅游,直到4月1日。

华为公司在外国的前景:在过去几月,世界各国对允许中国华为参与该国电信基础设施发展,特别是下一代移动服务技术5G的发展,将带来的好处和潜在安全风险的辩论一直在继续。留意是否有个别国家或欧盟宣布对华为实施新禁令、各国如何试图降低公司参与5G项目的风险、过去存在问题的行为的新证据,以及华为公司和中国政府对批评者的回应。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin: Tencent complicity, surveillance upgrades, Reddit manipulation (No. 134)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: Worried about Huawei? Take a closer look at Tencent

The Chinese social media giant is a growing global force, and it does the bidding of the Communist Party.

By Sarah Cook

It has long been understood that Tencent—the Chinese company that owns WeChat and QQ, two of the world’s most widely used social media applications—facilitates Chinese government censorship and surveillance. But over the past year, the scale and significance of this activity have increased and become more visible, both inside and outside China.

During the last month alone, several events have illustrated the trend and Tencent’s close relationship with the Chinese authorities.

On March 2, Dutch hacker Victor Gevers revealed that the content of millions of conversations on Tencent applications among users at internet cafés are being relayed, along with the users’ identities, to police stations across China. Just three days later, the company’s founder and chief executive, Pony Ma, took his seat among 3,000 delegates to the National People’s Congress, the country’s rubber-stamp parliament. Ma reportedly raised the issue of data privacy even as security agencies were using data from his company’s applications to root out unauthorized religious activity.

On March 16, China watcher Chenchen Zhang shared an anecdote on Twitter about a member of the Uighur Muslim minority who was stopped at mainland China’s border with Hong Kong and interrogated for three days simply because someone on his WeChat contact list had recently “checked in” with a location setting of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The authorities apparently feared that the Uighur man had traveled on pilgrimage to Mecca without permission, warning that such a move could yield 15 years in prison.

As Tencent’s pattern of censorship and data sharing with China’s repressive government continues and intensifies, now is the time to consider actions that might help protect the basic rights of all users, regardless of their location and nationality.

Tencent’s role in China

Founded in 1998, Tencent and its popular applications have quickly emerged as ubiquitous elements of China’s communications, financial, and social fabric. In January, the company declared that WeChat alone had a billion active daily users.

While the company has been forced since its inception to comply with strict Chinese Communist Party information controls, the combination of growing government demands and WeChat’s near market saturation in China has increased the scope and impact of its complicity.

In the realm of censorship, media reports and expert research indicate that WeChat has been refining the use of artificial intelligence to identify and delete images, which netizens commonly employ to evade censorship and surveillance of text-based communications. The platform has also shuttered thousands of independently operated social media accounts that produced unauthorized news and analysis. These and other forms of censorship significantly distort the information received by Chinese users on vital topics. Analysis by researchers at Hong Kong University’s WeChatscope project, which tracks deletions from some 4,000 public accounts on the platform, found that among the most censored topics in 2018 were major news stories like the US-China trade dispute, the arrest in Canada of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, the #MeToo movement, and public health scandals.

Monitoring of user activity on the platform has been made simpler by enhanced enforcement of real-name registration requirements for mobile phones, the electronic payment features of WeChat, large-scale police purchases of smartphone scanners, and new rules facilitating public security agencies’ access to data centers. As indicated above, content from Tencent applications is being directly “spoon-fed” to police in some cases.

This surveillance is increasingly leading to legal repercussions for ordinary users. A sample of cases tracked in Freedom House’s China Media Bulletin over the past year feature penalties against numerous WeChat users for mocking President Xi Jinping, criticizing judicial officials, commenting on massive floods, sharing information about human rights abuses, or expressing views related to their persecuted religion or ethnicity, be they Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, or Falun Gong practitioners. The punishments have ranged from several days of administrative detention to many years in prison, in some cases for comments that were ostensibly shared privately with friends. These dynamics have inevitably encouraged self-censorship on the platform.

Global expansion

Although WeChat’s primary user base is in China, an estimated 100 to 200 million people outside the country use the messaging service. Among them are millions of members of the Chinese diaspora in countries like Canada, Australia, and the United States, but there is also broader expansion in much of Asia. Malaysia is reportedly home to 20 million users, out of a population of 31 million. In Thailand, an estimated 17 percent of the population has a WeChat account. In Mongolia, WeChat was the second most downloaded application in 2017. Merchants in Myanmar’s Shan State along the border with China have taken up the app, and the number of retailers in Japan that accept WePay (mostly when serving Chinese tourists) increased 35-fold last year.

Tencent recently purchased a $150 million stake in the popular news aggregator Reddit and is eyeing an entrance into the online video market in Taiwan, according to Taiwanese officials.

Evidence that politicized censorship and surveillance may affect Tencent users outside China has begun to emerge. A 2016 study by Citizen Lab found that conversations between an overseas user and a contact inside China were subject to certain forms of keyword censorship, and that once an account is registered with a Chinese phone number, it remains subject to mainland controls even outside the country.

In Australia, a more recent study of news sources available to the Chinese diaspora found negligible political coverage of China on the WeChat channels of Chinese-language news providers. Incredibly, between March and August 2017, none of the WeChat channels published a single article on Chinese politics, despite the run-up to the important 19th Party Congress that fall. In Canada, WeChat censors have deleted a member of Parliament’s message to constituents praising Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement protesters, manipulated dissemination of news reports related to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest, and blocked broader media coverage of Chinese government corruption and leading officials.

Amid a massive crackdown in Xinjiang, Chinese police have also harnessed WeChat to connect with overseas Uighurs, demand personal information or details about activists, and insert state monitors into private groups.

How to respond

Regardless of whether Tencent is a reluctant or an eager accomplice to the Chinese government’s repressive policies, the reality is that Tencent employees can be expected to censor, monitor, and report private communications and personal data, in many cases leading to innocent people’s arrest and torture.

This should be the starting point for anyone considering using, regulating, or investing in the company’s services.

For those inside China, it is nearly impossible today to function without using WeChat to some extent. But they would be well advised to exercise caution, restricting the application to its most practical functions and consulting available guides on enhancing digital security and accessing information on current affairs more safely. (Freedom House published a set of such resources last year.)

Users outside China, particularly those without family or friends on the mainland, should rethink whether WeChat is really essential to their daily lives. Individuals who do communicate with personal contacts in China can help protect them by directing them to more secure applications if a sensitive topic comes up, or using homonyms to replace potentially problematic terms, as some journalists have reported doing. Users in the Chinese diaspora should explore ways of expanding their sources of news and information beyond what is available on WeChat.

As governments around the world try to tackle problems related to “fake news,” political manipulation, and weak data protections on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, Chinese counterparts like WeChat should be subject to at least as much scrutiny and regulation—and be held accountable for any violations. Governments and corporations should also restrict usage of WeChat among their employees, particularly those who work with sensitive information, as the governments of Australia and India have recently done. Politicians communicating with their Chinese-speaking constituents should make sure to do so across a diversity of platforms, not just those that are subject to Chinese government control.

International civil society groups can assist both users and democratic governments by maintaining up-to-date digital security guides available in Chinese, documenting the extent to which content outside China is censored or monitored on WeChat, and exploring legal recourse for those whose rights may have been violated by Tencent’s practices.

Lastly, investors in Tencent should seriously consider the moral and political implications of their support for the firm. Anyone concerned about human rights, electoral interference by foreign powers, or privacy violations by tech giants should divest from the company, including retirement funds. Socially responsible investment plans should exclude Tencent from their portfolios if they have not already. Even from a purely financial perspective, Tencent shares may not be a wise purchase. The stock’s price has dropped 19 percent over the past year, at least in part because of tighter government controls on user communications. Given that Chinese regulators are now turning their attention to the gaming industry, the company’s most profitable area of activity, its value is likely to dip further. As stock analyst Leo Sun has warned, “investors in Chinese tech companies should never underestimate the government’s ability to throttle their growth.”

No amount of pushback from users, democratic governments, civil society groups, or investors is likely to change Tencent’s complicity with the Chinese government’s repressive activities. Its very survival depends on dutiful adherence to Communist Party directives. But the steps suggested above would do a great deal to limit the current and potential future damage caused by the company’s practices—for individual users, for the world’s open societies, and for the very concept of free expression in the digital age.  

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. This article was also published in the Diplomat on March 26, 2019.


Tighter information controls and flailing foreign propaganda greet congress, advisory sessions

This year’s “two sessions” of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), held March 5–15, arrived as President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were under unusual pressure due to a slowing economy, a continuing trade war with Washington, and mounting international criticism of the human rights crisis in Xinjiang. Beijing responded by tightening controls on speech and information and kicking its external propaganda machine into overdrive.

  • Tightened information controls: As is often the case preceding high-profile political meetings, authorities sought to preempt any independent commentary or protests by compelling Beijing-based human rights activists to travel outside the capital. Activist Hu Jia was among those escorted out of town for a forced holiday, as he has been in years past. Poet Hua Yong, who had previously been detained after criticizing the party online, shared a poem on Twitter on February 27, bidding his friends and home city goodbye as “they hold their meeting.” Beijing residents reported increased security measures throughout the city, including additional bag checks at transit hubs. Internet restrictions also tightened in early March, an apparent attempt to further control the news narrative surrounding the meetings. Companies running virtual private network (VPN) services noticed an increase in blocking efforts beginning on March 2, and one VPN staffer noted that the authorities appeared “to be using a combination of automation, likely artificial intelligence, and focused human monitoring” to block the tools that enable users to bypass website filtering. Meanwhile, a Twitter account that used artificial intelligence to analyze public information about Chinese officials deleted all of its content on March 6, apparently under police pressure, in keeping with a recent crackdown on critical Twitter users based in China, where Twitter is blocked. The account in question, @AirMovingDevice, focused in part on top officials’ plagiarism in their graduate degree theses, and it had more recently used facial recognition technology on NPC delegates ahead of this year’s two sessions. Some of the account’s previous tweets are archived at China Digital Times.
  • Foreign propaganda: Beijing’s English-language propaganda apparatus generated some laughable content in preparation for the two sessions, summed up by the China Media Project’s David Bandurski as “the inevitable outcome of a propaganda system that is cash-rich and culturally and intellectually bankrupt.” The official news agency Xinhua on March 3 posted a nationalistic English-language rap video celebrating China’s recent achievements. The video’s sometimes nonsensical lyrics, and the fact that it came amid official restrictions on hip-hop culture, earned the video an overwhelminglynegativereview from the international English-language press. Xinhua offered two other videos that were likely just as ineffective: One attempted Web 2.0–style news coverage, with two foreign “Xinhua correspondents” answering questions about the two sessions; the other had an American presenter extol the virtues of “Chinese democracy,” which “results in political stability and vitality” and is, supposedly, on full display at the two sessions. Other examples of state propaganda about the meetings may have been more successful. China Global Television Network (CGTN), the English-language channel of state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV), featured a “Who Runs China” interactive webpage that attempted to portray the legislative assembly as highly diverse and representative. The Global Times newspaper ran an article on March 15, the closing day of the sessions, that highlighted a large assembly of journalists from partner countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China’s controversial program of infrastructural investment—who contributed to positive coverage of the sessions and the BRI in their home publications.

Tech policy at the two sessions

  • Foreign investment law: On March 15, the National People’s Congress (NPC) voted almost unanimously (2,929 to 8) to approve a law on foreign investment that will go into effect on January 1, 2020. The law was rushed through the rubber-stamp legislature on the last day of its annual plenary session—held in parallel with that of the advisory Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC)—in what was read by analysts as an attempt to address concerns from foreign investors and governments about unfair market access, forced technology transfers, and the theft of commercial secrets from foreign businesses operating in China. Ahead of the law’s adoption, a March 7 post at Lawfare noted that the vague provisions in the draft fell far short of meeting the demands of the United States regarding technology transfers and investment restrictions, characterizing it as a “modest step in the direction of making China’s investment climate more appealing to and equitable for foreign investors.” The post noted that even with the law in place, the Chinese Communist Party’s unchecked power could still put foreign firms at a huge disadvantage and leave them exposed to security risks. While the new law does state that the government is not allowed to force foreign investors to transfer their technology, the imprecise language and lack of details in the adopted legislation is unlikely to satisfy foreign companies and US trade negotiators.
  • Artificial intelligence priority highlighted: For the thirdyear in a row, Premier Li Keqiang mentioned the development of the artificial intelligence (AI) industry in his work report at the opening of the two sessions on March 5. Li urged China to hasten the development of big data and AI technology in its efforts to build “smart cities.” One thing that Li conspicuously did not mention in his report was the government’s “Made in China 2025” industrial plan, which has been a key focus of concerns in Washington and the European Union. Throughout the annual meetings, it was made clear that AI development was high on the government agenda. The March 5 unveiling of the state budget showed that, despite slow economic growth, funds for science and technology would expand 13.4 percent compared with 2018. On the sidelines of the meetings, the official news agency Xinhua  debuted its AI “anchorwoman,” which helped to cover the NPC session. The new artificial presenter, dubbed “Xin Xiaomeng,” is an upgraded version of “Xin Xiaohao,” a virtual male anchor that made its debut at the World Internet Conference in November.
  • Tech entrepreneur participation: Technology entrepreneurs have played an increasingly prominent role in the two sessions from year to year, suggesting a closer relationship between their companies and the authorities. Several founders and chief executives of Chinese tech firms are NPC delegates, including Tencent’s Pony Ma, Xiaomi’s Lei Jun, and Gree’s Dong Mingzhu. Others, like Baidu’s Robin Li and Sogou’s Wang Xiaochun, are members of the CPPCC. These businesspeople added their voices to the discussion about AI, calling for further research, collaboration, and the industrialization of AI technology. As noted by TechNode and SupChina, the “internet of things,” 5G mobile technology, cybersecurity, and data protection were among the other topics mentioned by the participating tech executives.

Surveillance updates: Data leaks, gait recognition, expansion in Tibet

  • Data leaks show extent of surveillance, vulnerability of stockpiled information: Recent data leaks uncovered by a Dutch researcher shed light on the extent of Chinese surveillance programs, as well as the lack of data protection measures at some leading Chinese technology firms. On February 13, ethical hacker and security researcher Victor Gevers (@0xDUDE) found an exposed database belonging to Shenzhen-based SenseNets, a company specializing in artificial intelligence (AI) crowd analysis and facial recognition technology. The database, which Gevers claimed was “fully accessible to anyone,” contained information on 2.6 million people in Xinjiang—including their official identification numbers, birthdays, addresses, ethnicities, employers, and perhaps most chillingly, a list of their GPS locations over the past 24 hours. The database had been open since July, but it was locked by the company after Gevers reported the leak. A long-running crackdown in Xinjiang has led to the detention of an estimated one million or more ethnic Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in a network of internment camps. As a result of the campaign, Xinjiang has become a “laboratory” for testing cutting-edge surveillance technology that in some cases has spread to other parts of China or been exported abroad. On March 6, Gevers revealed on Twitter that the Microsoft platforms Github and Azure were being used in the SenseNets program. That, along with a SenseNets website that listed Microsoft as a partner, sparked speculation on whether Microsoft was knowingly or unknowingly allowing its services to be used for Xinjiang surveillance. Microsoft has since denied having a partnership with the Chinese firm. Separately, Gevers on March 2 reported that he had uncovered a similarly unprotected Chinese collection of over 300 million private social media messages that contained highly personal metadata. Later, on March 9, Gevers revealed a different cache of detailed personal information on over 1.8 million women in China, including a “BreedReady” column detailing their childbearing status.
  • Real-time gait recognition: Last month, news outlets began covering recent software advances made by Chinese AI start-up Watrix, including a program that is able to identify a person by analyzing physical movement from real-time video images. The company claims that its accuracy rate is above 96 percent, and that the software can identify a person from as far as 50 meters away. Unlike facial recognition software, which an individual can thwart by simply covering or altering his or her face, Watrix claims that its system can distinguish a fake limp from a real one. Police are piloting the software in large cities including Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, and the start-up is reportedly in contract talks with security companies from Singapore, India, Russia, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic.
  • US DNA tech firm halts sales in Xinjiang: As the human rights crisis in Xinjiang continues to garner international criticism, the US-based firm Thermo Fisher said on February 20 that it would stop selling DNA biodata collection equipment in Xinjiang.  Meanwhile, Kenneth Kidd, a prominent Yale University geneticist who had been providing Chinese officials with genetic material that was used to compare Uighur and Han Chinese DNA, told the New York Times that he had been unaware of how the Chinese side had been using his material, and had been led to believe that he was simply collaborating on research in keeping with ethical norms.
  • Chinese tech firms racing to Tibet: As Beijing attempts to further tighten its grip on Tibet in order to “maintain stability,” Chinese tech firms that specialize in AI and big data analysis are elbowing their way into the highly sensitive region. AI start-ups and tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent, and iFlyTek are establishing research and venture-capital units in Lhasa, taking advantage of government subsidies meant to promote economic growth in the region and increase the sector’s proximity to a population that Beijing seeks to control. News about the Tibetan tech rush came at an especially sensitive time in the region: March 10 marked the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan unrest and crackdown that led to the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, and March 14 was the anniversary of 2008 protests that sparked the largest crackdown in the Tibetan areas of China in decades.

HONG KONG: Pro-Beijing media outlets harass activists

In recent months, Beijing-controlled media outlets in Hong Kong have been “weaponized” to surveil and smear local activists in the semiautonomous region, once a haven for press freedom in East Asia. Staffers from outlets such as Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po have begun to follow democracy and independence advocates, then run feature stories about the targeted individuals’ supposed secret relationships or shady meetings. A February 26 report from the Globe and Mail describes the “paparazzi-style coverage” of activist Wayne Chan by the two Beijing-linked papers, which ran headlines presenting his lifestyle as indulgent and lacking in morals.

The two papers are also believed to be pursuing Hong Kong activists to Taiwan, as evidenced by detailed reports on several activists’ movements on the island during a January trip. A Reuters examination published on March 15 found that at least 25 people linked to causes disliked by Beijing had been the subject of such harassment when visiting Taiwan over the past three years. Rights activists have argued that the newspapers’ coverage should not be regarded as legitimate journalism, since it regularly involves intrusive surveillance and the publication of personal information about the targets and their families. Some Taiwanese officials concur, stating that the papers had committed “unlawful” acts, and that their journalists would be banned from traveling to Taiwan for several years if they do not provide “a reasonable explanation” for their activities. Similar tactics have been used on foreign critics of Beijing who visited Hong Kong, such as Australia-based American academic Kevin Caricco, as noted in the January 2019 issue of the China Media Bulletin.


BEYOND CHINA: Aggressive diplomats, Chinese printers, Reddit downvoting, propaganda in Taiwan

While Chinese Communist Party authorities keep a tight grip on the domestic media narrative through regular directives to editors and a sophisticated censorship apparatus that limits access to foreign news, Beijing also consistently seeks to influence external public opinion regarding China. This month, examples of its efforts included bullying by Chinese diplomats, domestic printers’ censorship of foreign clients’ orders, and an apparent trolling campaign on Reddit.

  • Chinese diplomats get aggressive in Sweden, Russia: On March 18, Reporters Without Borders condemned the Chinese embassy in Stockholm for its repeated harassment of Swedish journalists regarding their coverage of China. Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou and his staff had denounced several Swedish news outlets, most recently for publishing an op-ed by a Taiwanese representative advocating support for Taiwan’s democracy in the face of Beijing’s increasing aggression. Relations between Stockholm and Beijing have been strained since the extralegal 2015 cross-border abduction of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, who was again detained in January 2018 while traveling with Swedish diplomats in China. Sweden recalled its former ambassador to China and launched an inquiry into her conduct after she reportedly arranged meetings between two mysterious businessmen and Gui’s daughter on January 24–25. The men pressed Gui’s daughter to remain silent about her father’s case. Meanwhile, on March 5, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an editorial criticizing the Chinese embassy for threatening to blacklist a reporter over a February 28 article on China’s economy.
  • Chinese printers’ censorship affects foreign publishing: Chinese printers have been turning down books that contain certain words or may be deemed sensitive in China, even when the books are intended for foreign sales and audiences. Australian and New Zealand–based publishers are being denied services by Chinese printers or having timeline delays if their works include mentions of particular Chinese political figures, maps, political movements, religious or geographic keywords, or Chinese dissidents. The printing companies’ actions effectively make the production of such books more expensive by forcing publishers to print them elsewhere, influencing the global marketplace of ideas in Beijing’s favor.
  • Critical news on China is “downvoted” on Reddit: Users of the link-sharing website Reddit are reporting that the service has become inundated with pro-China accounts that collectively “downvote” critical links about China, or that troll streams with comments matching Beijing’s propaganda. The trend is evident throughout the service on news, geopolitics, and area-focus subreddits. In a March 14 BuzzFeed report, Sinocism publisher Bill Bishop said the phenomenon was part of an “upsurge” in Chinese government accounts “taking the battle overseas to the global internet” over the past 18 months. While many on Reddit have suggested that this is an outgrowth of the long-standing government strategy of deploying paid internet commentators known as the “50 cent party,” Bishop noted that it is impossible to know which comments represent government coordination and which are simply the product of Chinese nationalism.
  • New Chinese social media apps face foreign scrutiny: As Chinese social media firms innovate and their applications gain worldwide popularity, the services’ controversial activity and users’ fears about data privacy have foreign regulators sounding the alarm. The short-video-sharing app TikTok (the distinct international counterpart of Douyin in China, also owned by ByteDance) agreed on February 28 to pay the US Federal Trade Commission $5.7 million for illegally collecting personal information from children. In India, where Chinese apps now make up 44 of the 100 most downloaded apps in Google’s Playstore, TikTok is in the crosshairs of the state government of Tamil Nadu. Officials there have called for an all-out ban on the grounds that the app allowed users to share sexual material and advertise prostitution. Within India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, there have also been calls for a blanket ban of Chinese apps due to national security and data access concerns.
  • Taiwan regulator mulls action on Chinese propaganda sites, streaming platforms: As Chinese lawmakers reinforced official rhetoric on reunification with Taiwan, Taiwanese authorities voiced stark concerns about plans by Chinese tech giant Tencent to bring its video platform to the island. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stepped in on March 15 after the government learned that Beijing was encouraging new media services to expand overseas, with Taiwan as a primary target. The MAC said it was concerned that Beijing would attempt to use the Tencent Video platform as an avenue to disseminate political propaganda. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC) said on the same day that permission for mainland-based streaming media would depend on national security considerations, and it called an interministerial meeting to discuss the fate of Tencent and Youku Tudou streaming services in Taiwan. Earlier, on March 13, the NCC had announced that it would also decide whether to restrict www.31t.tw, a Taiwan-registered website that has been promoting content strikingly similar to Chinese government propaganda.

FEATURED PUSHBACK: Assertive journalists at the two sessions

Restrictions on the media at the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) this month were tight as usual, intended to preserve a carefully choreographed image of China’s leaders and political system. Nevertheless, Chinese and foreign journalists took advantage of the rare opportunity to get close to the country’s political and economic elite and ask provocative questions—also known as “doorstepping”—even when no answer was forthcoming. Videos and accounts of such efforts circulated on Twitter. Bill Birtles of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation shared a clip of a reporter asking Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “How many Taiwanese diplomatic allies will you take this year?” The Financial Times’ Yang Yuanfen shared a video of a Chinese reporter chasing down Tencent chief executive Pony Ma to ask, “Mr. Ma, at the Congress can you ask them not to block our account?”—presumably referring to censorship of his publication’s public WeChat account.

Although substantive replies to such questions are rare, other forms of official reaction can be equally telling. Xinjiang’s delegation to Beijing apparently arrived for their meeting an hour early in order to avoid 150 journalists who had gathered to report on it. As the delegates left, security officers cleared away reporters to prevent them from calling out questions, with one trying to seize the press pass of Agence France-Presse photographer Pak Yiu. After Cissy Wei Zhou from Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post pressed a CPPCC member on his view of the new foreign investment law, he reportedly covered his mouth and said, “My tongue is sick, cannot talk.”

In past years, subtle and not-so-subtle critiques of China’s media and propaganda system have emerged at the two sessions. In 2016, CPPCC delegate Zhu Zhengfu raised a proposal urging the party-state to be more prudent with the use of forced televised confessions, a trend that has accelerated under Xi Jinping’s leadership. And last year, an expressive eye-roll by one journalist in response to a colleague’s fawning question for a Chinese official went viral and provoked a whole new genre of internet memes. 


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

Implementation of Xi Jinping’s “media convergence” vision: On March 15, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), China’s top Communist Party policy journal, published the full text of a January speech that Xi made at a study session for members of the Politburo. Xi called for acceleration of media integration, a vision of propaganda tactics, regulation, and technology policy that goes far beyond the news sector to include “social, ideological, and cultural resources” and “social management big data,” as a means of achieving greater political control and influence over public opinion. Watch for specific policy measures adopted to implement Xi’s vision, including new efforts to incorporate artificial intelligence into news production and dissemination and initiatives to more effectively deliver party propaganda and narratives to mobile phone users inside and outside China.

Changes to proposed amendments of Hong Kong extradition rules: After the Hong Kong government introduced draft amendments that would ease criminal extraditions last month, local democrats and human rights groups criticized the changes, citing the risk of exposure to the mainland’s flawed justice system. Surprisingly, however, the normally proestablishment local and foreign business community, including the American Chamber of Commerce, have also voiced concerns. Watch for whether the amendments are passed in their current form; partially revised, for instance to exclude economic crimes; or dropped entirely.

Democracies’ responses to Chinese tech expansion: Regulators and internet users in the United States, Taiwan, India, Canada, and elsewhere are increasingly coming to terms with the fact that freedom of expression, electoral integrity, and user privacy may be threatened by the global expansion of applications like Tencent's WeChat and ByteDance's TikTok. Watch for any restrictions or penalties imposed in response, and for the ways in which government agencies in democratic settings try to strike a balance between open commerce on the one hand and national security and human rights on the other.


TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中国媒体快报:腾讯同谋、监控升级、Reddit操作(Issue 134, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 中国社交媒体巨头腾讯  不断发展的全球力量听命于中共

新闻报道​​​

重点反制:在两会中坚持提问的在两会中强势发声的记者们

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:中国社交媒体巨头腾讯  不断发展的全球力量听命于中共

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

长期以来,人们一直认为腾讯——这家拥有微信和QQ这两个世界上使用最广泛使用的两个社交软件的中国公司——在帮助中国政府的审查和监控。但在过去的一年多,这类活动的规模和影响在中国和海外都在增加,并且变得越来越浮出水面。

仅在上个月,几个事件就表明了这一趋势以及腾讯与中共当局的密切关系。

3月2日,荷兰黑客维克多·葛维斯(Victor Gevers)揭示了网吧用户在腾讯应用软件上数百万个对话内容以及用户的身份信息正在向中国各地的警察局传送。仅仅三天之后,该公司的创办人兼首席执行官马化腾(Pony Ma)就出席了有3000名代表的全国人民代表大会,也就是中国的橡皮图章议会。据报导,马化腾甚至在国家安全机构用其公司软件得到的数据来根除被官方禁止的宗教活动之际,于会上提出了数据隐私问题。

3月16日,中国观察员张晨辰(Chenchen Zhang)在推特上分享了一则关于少数民族维吾尔族穆斯林成员的事件。这位维吾尔人被拦截在中国大陆与香港边境,并可审讯了三天,仅仅因为他的微信联系人名单最近在沙特阿拉伯麦加的一个地点「签到」。当局显然是怕这位维族人未经许可私自到麦加朝圣,并警告说此等行为可导致被判刑入狱15年。

随着腾讯的审查模式和与中国压制性政府数据共享的持续和加剧,无论网络用户的所在地点和国籍,现在是时候考虑有所行动了,以帮助保护所有用户的基本权利。

腾讯在中国的角色

腾讯成立于1998年,其流行的应用程序很快成为中国通信,金融和社交网络中无处不在的元素。今年1月,该公司宣布仅微信就有10亿活跃的日常用户。

虽然腾讯自成立以来,一直被迫遵守严厉的中共信息控制,但日益增加的政府要求,加上微信在中国近乎市场饱和,增加了(其与中共)同谋共犯的范围和造成的影响。

在审查领域,媒体报导和专家研究表明,微信一直致力于优化人工智能的应用,以识别和删除图像,而网民通常采用这些图像来绕过对文字的通信审查和监视。该平台还关闭了 数千个独立运营的社交媒体账户,这些账户提供非官方新闻和分析。这些和其他形式的审查严重扭曲了中国用户在重要议题上收到的信息。香港大学WeChatscope项目的研究人员分析了该平台约4000个公共账户被删除的情况,发现2018年最受审查的新闻报导主题是美中贸易争端,华为首席财务执行官官孟晚舟在加拿大被捕,#METOO(我也是)运动和公共健康丑闻。

通过加强对移动电话的实名注册要求、微信的电子支付功能、大规模警察购买智能手机扫描仪以及促进公共安全机构准入数据中心的新规则,监控网络平台上的用户活动已经变得更加简单。如上所述,在某些情况下,来自腾讯软件的内容正在直接「喂」给警察。

这种监视越来越多地导致普通用户受到法律惩罚。过去一年,自由之家《中国媒体快报》中跟进的多个案例样本特别介绍过无数微信用户所受到的惩罚。这些微信用户开习近平主席一些玩笑、批评司法官员、评论大洪水、分享有关侵犯人权的信息,或表达与受迫害宗教或种族人士相关的观点,不管他们是维吾尔族穆斯林人西藏佛教徒,或法轮功修炼者。惩罚从几天的行政拘留到多年监禁,某些案例明显是与朋友私下分享的评论。这些动态不可避免地怂恿了平台上的自我审查

全球扩张

虽然微信的主要用户群在中国,但中国以外约有1亿至2亿人使用该通信服务。其中包括加拿大、澳大利亚和美国等国家数百万中国旅居侨民,但在亚洲大部分地区也有更 广泛的扩展。据报导,马来西亚在其3100万人口之中拥有2000万用户。在泰国,估计有17%的人口拥有微信账号。在蒙古,微信在2017年是被下载第二多的应用软件。缅甸的掸邦与中国接壤地区的商家已经在用此应用软件,以及接受微信支付WePay的日本零售商数量(主要是为中国游客服务)在去年增加了35倍。

腾讯最近购买了流行新闻链接公告栏系统书签交易的1.5亿美元股份,并据台湾官员称,腾讯正在考虑进入台湾的网络视频市场。

证据显现,政治化审查和监督可能影响中国以外的腾讯用户已经初见端倪。2016年多伦多大学公民实验室(Citizen Lab)的一项研究发现,海外用户与中国境内联系人之间的对话受到某些形式的关键字审查,一旦帐户注册了中国电话号码,即使在国外也受到大陆控制。

澳大利亚,最近对中国旅外居提供的新闻来源的一个研究发现,微信的中文新闻频道上关于中国政治的报导少得可怜。令人难以置信的是,2017年3月至8月期间,尽管重要的第十九届中共党代表大会将在秋季举行,微信频道没有发表过一篇关于中国政治的文章。在加拿大,微信审查机构删除了加拿大议会议员赞扬香港雨伞运动请愿者的信息、操纵传播有关孟晚舟被捕的新闻报导,并更广泛的封锁关于中国政府腐败和领导官员的媒体报导

新疆大规模镇压期间,中国警方还利用微信与海外维吾尔人联系,要求提供个人信息或维权人士的详细信息,并将政府公务员监视人安插入私人(家庭)群体中。

如何应对

无论腾讯是不情愿或热切同谋于中国政府的压制政策,现实情况是,腾讯员工可以被要求去审查,监控和报告私人通信和个人信息,而在许多情况下导致无辜人被捕和遭受酷刑。这理应是任何使用,管理或投资该公司服务者首先要考量到的。

对于那些居住在中国的人来说,或多或少,现在不使用微信几乎不可能工作生活。但建议他们谨慎行事,将应用软件限制在最实用的功能范围内,并想办法咨询有关如何增强数字安全性和如何更安全地获得时事信息的指南(自由之家去年发布了一系列此类资源)。

中国之外的用户,尤其是那些在大陆没有家人或朋友的用户,应该重新思考微信是否对他们的日常生活有必要。如果敏感话题出现时,那些与在中国的人保持私人联系者可以指导他们使用更安全的应用软件来保护他们, 或者使用同音异义词替换可能存在问题的敏感词,一些记者说他们是这样做的。中国旅居在海外的侨民应该探索如何扩展他们的在微信之外的新闻和信息来源。

随着世界各国政府试图解决与「假新闻」、政治操作以及脸书和推特等社交媒体上的弱数据保护相关的问题,像微信这样的中国同行理应接受至少是同等严格的审查和监管—— 并且对任何违规行为负责任。政府和企业也应该像澳大利亚和印度政府最近已经做的那样,限制员工使用微信,特别是那些做与敏感信息相关工作的员工。需要同讲中文的选民进行沟通的政治人物应该确保在多种平台上这样做,而不仅仅是那些受中国政府控制的平台。

国际公民社会团体可以通过维护中文版最新的数字安全指南、记录中国之外的内容在微信上受到审查或监控的程度,并为那些被腾讯做法侵犯权利的人们寻求法律援助来帮助用户和民主政府。

最后,腾讯的投资者应该认真考量他们支持该公司的道德和政治影响。任何关注有关人权、外国势力干涉选举或科技巨头违背隐私权的人都不应该再投资该公司,包括退休基金。对社会负责任的投资计划里应将腾讯从其投资组合中排除在外,如果他们还没有这样做的话。即使从纯粹的财务角度来看,腾讯股票也许不是明智的购买选项。该股票价格在过去一年中下跌了19%,至少部分原因是政府更为严格的控制用户沟通。鉴于中国监管机构现在正将目标转向游戏产业,那正是该公司最赚钱的活动范畴,其价值可能会进一步下跌。正如股票分析师利奥 • 孙(Leo Sun)警告的那样,「中国科技公司的投资者永远不应低估(中共)政府扼杀他们增长的能力。」

没有什么来自用户、民主政府、民间社会团体或投资者的抵制,可以改变腾讯与中共政府压制活动的共谋。恰恰它的生存取决于它对共产党指令的尽职尽责。但是,为了个人用户,为了世界开放社会以及为自由表达的数字时代,以上提出的措施将大大限制由腾讯公司的做法造成的当前和未来的损害。

萨拉∙库克(Sarah Cook是自由之家东亚资深研究分析员,《中国媒体快报》负责人。本文已于2019年3月30日发表于《風傳媒》


两会:更为严格的资讯控制与加大对海外宣传的力度

今年的两会,中国人民代表大会(NPC)以及中国人民政治协商会议(CPPCC),在3月5日~15日举行之时,由于经济放缓、连续同华盛顿的贸易战,以及不断增长的、针对其在新疆的人权侵犯危机国际谴责,习近平主席和中共面临着不同寻常的压力。北京以更严厉的言论和信息控制回应,并展加速开其的国际宣传。

  • 加紧的信息控制:与高调的政治会议之前的情况一样,当局迫使北京的人权活动家到首都以外的地方去旅游,以避免的任何独立评论或抗议活动。人权活动家胡佳是被带出去强迫假期旅游的人之一,正如他过去几年一样。曾在网上批评中共而被拘留的诗人华涌此前,于2月27日在推特上分享了一首诗,当「他们北京要开会」时,他同朋友和家乡城市北京告别。北京居民称增加的安全措施遍及北京,包括在交通中转站的额外的行李检查。互联网限制也在3月初收紧,显然是为了进一步控制围绕会议的新闻叙述。运行虚拟专用网络(VPN)服务的多家公司注意到,从3月2日增加的封堵工作,一名VPN员工注意到当局似乎「正在使用自动化,可能是人工智能结合人工监控」来封堵用户能够绕过网站过滤的工具。同时,一个用人工智能分析中国官员的公开信息的推特帐户,明显是在警方的压力下,于3月6日删掉其所有推文内容,以维持他们近期对在中国的有批评言论的推特用户的打压,该推特被封。该帐户@AirMovingDevice部分专注在高层官员在他们的研究生学位论文的抄袭,而且最近在今年两届会议之前,该帐户在人大会议代表身上使用了面部识别技术。「中国数字时代」网站保存了该帐户之前的一些推文。
  • 在国外的宣传: 北京英文宣传工具在准备两会时制造了一些笑料, 中国媒体研究计划网站(China Media Project)的David Bandurski将之总结为「一个现金充裕,而文化和智慧卻破产的宣传体系的必然结果。」3月3日,官方新华社发布了一则民粹主义的饶舌视频来庆祝中国近来的成就。该视频有时无厘头的歌词,加上视频发布于官方对嘻哈文化限制之时的事实,给其在国际英文媒体中赢得了一边倒负面评价。新华社还发布了另两则视频,结果是同样无效:一则是网络2.0版的新闻报导,其中两位外国「新华社通讯员」回答关于两会的问题;另一则是一位美国节目主持人赞美「中国民主」的种种好处,称其「「带来了政治稳定和活力」,按说应在两会期间到处播放。其它对两会的官方宣传可能更成功。中国环球电视网络(又称中国国际电视台)(CGTN),亦即官方电视台央视的英文频道,特别推出了《谁运营中国? 》的互动网页,企图将两会代表描述成高度多元和具有代表性的。3月15日两会闭幕那天,环球时报发表一篇文章,重点着墨于一大群来自「一带一路」伙伴国家的记者们是如何在他们的国家出版物中正面报导两会及「一带一路」 。「一带一路」是中国在基础建设投资方面发起的有争议的项目。

在两会上的技术政策

  • 《外商投资法》草案:3月15日,人民代表大会(NPC)几乎一致通过一项外国投资法案,2020年1月1日执行。该法案在该橡皮图章立法机构(注:指人大)的年度全体会议的最后一天匆忙通过——也和中共中国人民政治协商会议(CPPCC)同期举行——据分析人士解读,该法案是试图解决外国投资人和外国政府对市场准入的不公平性、强制技术转让和从驻华企业窃取商业机密等的担忧。在该法律通过之前,一篇3月7日发布在Lawfare上的贴子提到,法案草案中模糊不清的条款远远不能达到美国对技术转移和投资限制方面的要求,称其为「在使中国的投资气候对外国投资者更有吸引力和公平性方面的一小步。」 该贴子还提到,即使有该法案,由于中共不受限制的权力,外国公司仍会处于季度不利的情形,仍会有安全之虞。尽管新法案明文规定不允许政府强制外国投资这转移他们的技术,由于法律条文中不准确的语言和缺乏对应立法细节,终归不大可能让外国公司和美国贸易谈判者满意。​
  • 突出人工智能优先性:3月5日,总理李克强在两会开幕时的工作报告上提到了发展人工智能工业,这已经是连续第三个被提到的年度。李克强敦促中国加快发展大数据和人工智能技术,以建设「智能城市」。李克强在其报告中明确没有提到的一件事是中国政府的「2025中国制造」工业计划,该计划一直是华府和欧盟特别担忧关注的。整个两会期间,很明确发展人工智能是政府工作重要事项。 3月5日公布的国家预算表明,尽管经济发展放缓,与2018年相比,拨给发展科技的经费还是增长了 13.4% 。两会同时,官方新闻机构新华社的人工合成「女主播」初次登台,并协助报导人大。这个新的人工合成的名为「新小萌」的主播是「新小浩」的升级版。小「新小浩」是11月在世界网络大会中首次亮相的虚拟男主播。
  • 技术类企业的加入:年复一年,技术类企业在两会中扮演着越来越显著的角色。这意味着那些公司和官方的关系越来越近。几位中国技术公司的创始人和总裁是人大代表,其中包括腾讯的马化腾、小米的雷军和格力的董明珠。其他人如百度的李彦宏和搜狗的王小川是政协代表。这些商人在有关人工智能的讨论中发言,呼吁在人工智能方面有进一步的研究、合作和工业化。据TechNode e和SupChina报导,「物联网」、5G移动通讯技术、网络安全和数据保护是与会的技术公司代表们提出的话题。

监控更新:数据泄漏,步态识别和在西藏的扩张

  • 数据泄漏表明了监控的程度和存储信息的漏洞:最近一位荷兰研究者发现的数据泄漏使中国监控项目的程度略见端倪,同时也暴露了一些中国领先的技术公司在数据保护措施方面的缺失。 2月13日,有德行操守的黑客和安全研究者维克多•葛维斯(Victor Gevers) (@0xDUDE)发现了属于一家深圳公司SenseNets(深网视界有限公司)的泄漏数据,这家公司是专门研发人工智能人群分析和面部识别的。葛维斯称他们的数据是「任何人都可以全部获得的」,其中包含有260万新疆人的信息,包括他们的官方身分证号、生日、地址、种族、雇主,可能最令人胆寒的是他们超过前24小时的GPS 定位地址。自7月起,这数据库就是公开的,但在葛维斯泄漏报导后被公司关闭。在新疆的长期打压已经导致了估计约100万或更多的维族人和突厥裔穆斯林被拘禁在许多拘留营中。作为该行动的结果,新疆已成为测试最新监控技术的「实验室」,这些监控技术有时也用在中国其它地方乃至输出海外。 3月6日,葛维斯在推特上揭露,SenseNets项目中用到了微软的Github和Azure平台,这一点,再加上SenseNets在其网站上将微软列为合作伙伴,引发人们对微软的猜测,猜测其是否有意无意的允许其服务被用来监控新疆。微软一直否认它和这家中国公司的合伙关系。另一事件是,葛维斯在3月2日爆料称,说他发现了另一个类似的未经保护的中文平台,其中收集了3亿多条私人社交媒体信息,其中含有非常私人的信息。后来在3月9日,葛维斯披露了另一数据储存区,其中有180万中国妇女的个人信息,包括在「生育力成熟」栏目中详细列出的她们的生育状况。​
  • 实时人的步态识别:上个月,新闻媒体开始报导中国人工智能新秀Watrix的最新软件进展,包括其一个可以通过其肢体运动的实时影像来识别一个人的项目。该公司声称其辨识准确率超过96%,而且该软件能在50米外辨识一个人。这不同于面部识别软件,人们可以通过遮盖或易容来避开,Watrix声称它的系统能分辨出是真跛还是假跛。警察已经在一些大城市如北京、上海和重庆试行此软件,据报这家公司已经在与新加坡、印度、俄罗斯、荷兰和捷克的一些保安公司洽谈合约。​
  • 美国DNA技术公司停止在新疆销售:随着新疆的人权危机继续引发国际关注,位于美国的 Thermo Fisher 2月20日宣布,它将在新疆停止销售收集DNA生物信息的设备。同时,耶鲁大学的知名基因学家基德(Kenneth Kidd)告诉纽约时报,尽管他一直在为中国官员提供基因材料,但他不知道中国方面在用他的材料来比照维族人和汉人的DNA,也一直认为他只是在保持道德规范的研究方面和对方合作。​
  • 中国技术公司蜂拥至西藏:在北京试图进一步加紧其对西藏的控制来「维稳」的同时,中国致力于人工智能和大数据分析的技术公司争先恐后奔赴这一高度敏感区。新兴的人工智能公司和技术巨鳄如阿里巴巴、腾讯和iFlyTek都在拉萨建立他们的研究和投资单位,都在利用政府的补贴,补贴用来刺激该地区经济增长并加强对该地区附近的人口控制。西藏技术淘金热的消息在当地特别敏感的日子报出:3月10日是1959年西藏动荡及中共政府镇压西藏从而导致达赖喇嘛流亡至印度的纪念日;3月14日是2008年西藏人和平抗议,导致数十年间西藏地区最大规模程度被中共实施武力镇压的纪念日。

香港:亲北京媒体骚扰维权人士

最近数月,在香港受北京控制的媒体被「武装起来」,用以在这个半自治的地区监控和污蔑当地的维权人士。这里曾是东亚地区媒体自由的港湾。大公报和文汇报的员工开始跟踪民主和独立人士,然后报导这些人本应是秘密的关系或私下的会谈。 2月26日,加拿大环球邮报刊登报导,描述了两家与北京有关联的媒体对维权人士陈家驹(Wayne Chan(Ka-kui))的「狗仔报导」,报导标题说其生活方式腐化和不道德。

这两家报纸也据信到台湾追踪香港维权人士,其在一月份对几位维权人士在台湾行程的详细报导作为明证。 3月15日,路透社发表一份调查,发现在过去3年内,至少有25位港人,因参与不受北京喜欢的事情,而导致他们在台期间受到类似骚扰。维权人士称这种报导不应该被视为是真正的新闻,因为它们经常性的牵扯到入侵性的监视和公布报导对象的私人信息和家庭情形。一些台湾官员也认同此说,称这些报纸犯了「不合法」的行为,如果他们不能就此提供「合理的解释」,他们的记者可能会在几年内被禁止到台湾旅行。类似的作法也发生在外国驻北京记者访港期间,例如在澳洲的美国学者凯大雄(Kevin Caricco),这在「自由之家中国媒体快报」的2019年1月刊中指明过。


中國之外:气势汹汹的外交官们、中国印刷商们、Reddit负评按钮、在台湾宣传

虽然中共当局通过对编辑的定期指令和限制获取外国新闻的复杂审查机制来严格控制国内媒体的报导,但北京也持续试图影响对中国的外部舆论。本月,其努力的例子包括中国外交官的霸凌行为、国内印刷部门对外国客户订单的审查,以及在Reddit上明显的带风向。

  • 中共外交官在瑞典、俄国气势汹汹:3月18日,人权组织「无国界记者」谴责中国驻斯德哥尔摩大使馆停止其对瑞典记者关于中国报导的重复骚扰。中共驻瑞典大使桂聪友及其工作人员谴责了几家瑞典新闻媒体,最近一次是有关台湾代表发表的专栏评论,主张面对北京日益增长的侵略应支持台湾民主。自从2015年跨界绑架瑞典公民桂民海之后,瑞典斯德哥尔摩和北京的关系一直紧张。桂民海于2018年1月与瑞典外交官一起在中国旅行时被(几名中国安全官员)再次拘捕。瑞典召回其前驻华大使并展开对她的询问调查,事关她被报告安排了桂民海女儿于1月24日-25日同两个神秘中国商人的会面。两个商人强迫桂民海的女儿对她的父亲被拘捕保持缄默。同时,俄罗斯《独立报》Nezavisimaya Gazeta刊登编辑部文章,指责中共外交官向该报一俄罗斯记者施压要求撤下关于2月28日关于中国经济(放缓)的报导并威胁将他列入黑名单。
  • 中国印刷商的审查影响外国出版物中国印刷商拒绝印刷含有字词或可能在中国被认为敏感内容的书,即使这些书是打算向外国人和观众销售。澳大利亚(Australian)和新西兰(New Zealand)的出版商被中国印刷商拒绝服务或推迟印刷,如果他们的出版作品中包含提及了特别的中国政治人物、地图、多次政治运动多个宗教或诸多地理关键词,或中国的异见人士。印刷公司的行为使得这些书的印制更贵,通过强迫出版商印制其他的内容, 以北京口味的思路影响全球市场。
  • 批评中国的新闻在Reddit被按负评:链接分享网站Reddit的用户回报说,这项服务已经被亲中国帐户所淹没,这些帐户对关于中国的批评性链接合作式的「按负评」,或和那些配合北京宣传的评论轮流出现。在新闻、地缘政治和以地区为重点的 Reddit服务中,这种趋势显而易见。在3月14日的BuzzFeed报导中,Sinocism出版者比尔·毕晓普(Bill Bishop)表示,这一现像是过去18个月「将海外战争带到全球互联网」的中国政府账户的「高潮」的一部分。虽然Reddit上的许多人认为这是政府长期策划部署的产物,通过安排付费被称为「五毛党」的人员在互联网上贴帖子和评论,但Bishop指出,人们不可能知道哪些评论是政府统筹的,哪些是中国民族主义者的产品。​
  • 新的中国社交媒体应用程序面临外国审查:随着中国社交媒体公司的创新及其应用程序软件在全球普及,服务的有争议活动和用户对数据隐私的担忧让外国监管机构发出警报。共享短视频制作应用程序TikTok(明显的中国抖音短视频(Douyin)的国际对应软件,也由ByteDance拥有)于2月28日同意向美国联邦贸易委员会支付570万美元用于非法收集儿童的个人信息。在印度,中国应用软件现在占据了谷歌付款商店中100个下载量最多的应用软件中的百分之44个,TikTok正处在泰米尔纳德邦州政府的锁定目标中。那里的官员呼吁全面禁止那些允许用户分享性材料和宣传卖淫的应用软件。在印度执政的印度人民党(Bharatiya Janata Party)内,由于国家安全和获取数据问题,已经有呼吁要求全面禁止中国的应用软件。
  • 台湾监管机构正在考虑对中国宣传网站,流媒体平台采取行动:随着中国行政机构强迫台湾与之统一的官方言论,台湾当局对中国科技巨头腾讯将其视频平台带入台湾的计划表示严肃关切。在政府获悉北京鼓励新媒体服务向海外扩张,并以台湾为主要目标后,台湾的大陆委员会(陆委会)于3月15日介入。台湾陆委会表示担心北京会试图利用腾讯视频平台作为传播政治宣传的途径。台湾的国家通讯传播委员会(NCC)同一天表示,对来自大陆的流媒体平台的许可将取决于国家安全考量,并召集部际会议讨论台湾腾讯和优酷土豆流量媒体服务在台湾的命运。早些时候,3月13日,NCC宣布还将决定是否限制www.31t.tw,这是一个在台湾注册的网站,其推广的内容与中国政府宣传的内容相似地惊人。

重点反制:在两会中坚持提问的记者们 

人大和政协两会期间,对媒体的限制依然是和往年一样严,这都是意在​​维护中国领导人们和政治体系经过精心排演的形象。即使如此,中外记者们还是会抓住这难得的机会,接近这个国家的政商界名流,问一些挑战性的问题,所谓「堵问」,甚至明知没有答案也要问。这类努力的视频和记录在推特上流传。澳大利亚广播公司Bill Birtles分享了记者发问外交部长王毅的一则视频片段:「你要拿掉几个台湾邦交国啊?」英国《金融时报》的 Yang Yuan @YuanfenYang分享了一则视频,是一位中国记者追着腾讯总裁马化腾问:「马总,你能不能在会上提议一下,让他们不要封我们的号啊?」这帐号应是指对其旗下的微信公众号的审查。

尽管对类似问题的实质性回答很少见,但其它形式的官方回应也同样说明问题。新疆进京代表团早到一小时,以避开聚在一起的150名记者的发问。代表团离开时,保安人员将记者清场,以防止他们喊问,一名保安人员试图抓住法新社摄影师Pak Yiu的记者证。当香港南华早报的记者Cissy Wei Zhou追问一政协代表,问他怎么看新的外国投资法案时,该代表捂住了嘴说:「我舌头生病,不能说话。(my tongue is sick, cannot talk)」

过去一些年,不明显的或有些明显的对中国媒体和宣传系统的批评会在两会间浮现。 2016年,政协委员朱征夫(Zhu Zhengfu)提案敦促党国在采用强迫在电视上认罪的作法时更审慎些,这种作法在习近平领导下已经增加。去年,当一名记者听到其同仁向中国官员讨好性问问题时,她的一个非常说明问题的翻白眼镜头在网络上广为流传,并引发一系列全新的网路爆红题材。​


未來看点

执行习近平的「媒体报导」愿景:3月15日,中共的高层党媒《求是网》发表了习近平一月份在政治局委员一次学习会议上讲话的全文。习近平呼吁加速媒体整合,希望宣传手法、法规和技术政策远远超越新闻界的范畴,将「社会思想文化公共资源」和「社会治理大数据」整合起来,以期获得更大程度的政治控制和对公众舆论的影响。未来看点有看对执行习近平此愿景的具体政策措施,其中包括将人工智能加入新闻的制作和传播方面所做的努力,以及更有效的输送党的宣传和话语到国内外手机用户上的各种办法。

对已建议修订的香港《逃犯条例》的修改:在上月香港政府提出方便罪犯引渡的提案修订草案后,港内的民主和维权人士对此此该提出了批评,其中引述了有可能受大陆有缺陷的司法体制影响的风险。令人吃惊的是,通常都是挺建制派的香港和外国企业界,包括香港美国商会,也提出了他们的明确担忧。未来看点看修订案是否可以以现有内容通过,还是部分修改(譬如将经济犯罪除外),还是彻底撤销提案。

民主力量对中国技术扩张的反应:美国、台湾、印度、加拿大和世界其它地区的监管者和网民越来越就这一点达成一致,那就是:言论自由、选举公正、和用户隐私可能会受一些应用软件,如腾讯微信和ByteDance抖音之全球扩张的威胁。未来看点看因应而生的任何限制或惩罚,以及民主体制下的政府机构一边要开放商业,另一边要国家安全与人权,将如何采取措施达成平衡。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

中國媒體快報:騰訊同謀、監控升級、Reddit操作(Issue 134, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:擔憂華為嗎 ?且近觀騰訊

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制​在兩會中堅持提問的記者們

未來看點

行動起來!


本期分析:擔憂華為嗎?且近觀騰訊

中國社交媒體巨頭騰訊是一個不斷發展的全球力量,且它聽命於中共。

作者:薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook)

長期以來,人們一直認為騰訊 —— 這家擁有微信和QQ這兩個世界上使用最廣泛使用的兩個社交軟件的中國公司 —— 在幫助中國政府的審查和監控。但在過去的一年多,這類活動的規模和影響在中國和海外都在增加,並且變得越來越浮出水面。

僅在上個月,幾個事件就表明了這一趨勢以及騰訊與中共當局的密切關係。

3月2日,荷蘭黑客維克多·葛維斯(Victor Gevers)揭示了網咖用戶在騰訊應用軟體上數百萬個對話內容以及用戶的身份信息正在被傳送到中國各地的警察局。僅僅三天之後,該公司的創辦人兼首席執行官馬化騰(Pony Ma)就出席了有3000名代表的全國人民代表大會,也就是中國的橡皮圖章議會。 據報導,馬化騰甚至在國家安全機構用其公司軟體得到的數據來根除被官方禁止的宗教活動之際,於會上提出了數據隱私問題。

3月16日,中國觀察員張晨辰(Chenchen Zhang)在推特上分享了一則關於少數民族維吾爾族穆斯林成員的事件。這位維吾爾人被攔截在中國大陸與香港邊境,並被審訊了三天,僅僅因為他的微信聯繫人名單最近在沙特阿拉伯麥加的一個地點「打卡」。當局顯然是怕這位維族人未經許可私自到麥加朝聖,並警告說此等行為可導致被判刑入獄15年。

隨著騰訊的審查模式和與中國壓制性政府數據共享的持續和加劇,無論網路用戶的所在地點和國籍,現在是時候考慮有所行動了,以幫助保護所有用戶的基本權利。

騰訊在中國的角色

騰訊成立於1998年,其流行的應用程式很快成為中國通信、金融和社交網絡中無處不在的元素。 今年1月,該公司宣布僅微信就有10億活躍的日常用戶。

雖然騰訊自成立以來,一直被迫遵守嚴厲的中共資訊控制,但日益增加的政府要求,加上微信在中國近乎市場飽和,增加了(其與中共)同謀共犯的範圍和造成的影響。

在審查領域,媒體報導和專家研究表明,微信一直致力於優化人工智能的應用,以識別和刪除圖像,而網民通常採用這些圖像來繞過對文字的通信審查和監視。 該平台還關閉了數千個獨立營運的社交媒體帳戶,這些帳戶提供非官方新聞和分析。這些和其他形式的審查嚴重扭曲了中國用戶在重要議題上收到的資訊。 香港大學WeChatscope項目的研究人員分析了該平台約4000個公共帳戶被刪除的情況,發現2018年最受審查的新聞報導主題是美中貿易爭端、華為首席財務執行官官孟晚舟在加拿大被捕、#MeToo(我也是)運動和公共健康醜聞。

通過加強對行動電話的實名註冊要求、微信的電子支付功能、大規模警察購買智慧型手機掃描儀以及促進公共安全機構准入數據中心的新規則,監控網路平台上的用戶活動已經變得更加簡單。如上所述,在某些情況下,來自騰訊軟體的內容正在直接「餵」給警察。

這種監視越來越容易使普通用戶受到法律懲罰。過去一年,自由之家《中國媒體快報」中跟進的多個案例樣本特別介紹過無數微信用戶所受到的懲罰。這些微信用戶開習近平主席一些玩笑、批評司法官員、評論大洪水、分享有關侵犯人權的資訊,或表達與受迫害宗教或種族人士相關的觀點,不管他們是維吾爾族穆斯林人西藏佛教徒、或法輪功修煉者。懲罰從幾天的行政拘留到多年監禁,某些案例明顯是與朋友私下分享的評論。這些動態不可避免地慫恿了平台上的自我審查

全球擴張

雖然微信的主要用戶群在中國,但中國以外約有1億至2億人使用該通信服務。其中包括加拿大、澳洲和美國等國家數百萬中國旅居僑民,但在亞洲大部分地區也有更廣泛的擴展。據報導,馬來西亞在其3100萬人口之中擁有2000萬用戶。在泰國,估計有17%的人口擁有微信帳號。 在蒙古,微信在2017年是被下載第二多的應用軟體。緬甸的撣邦與中國接壤地區的商家已經在用此應用軟體,以及接受微信支付WePay的日本零售商數量(主要是為中國遊客服務)在去年增加了35倍。

騰訊最近購買了流行新聞鏈接公告欄系統Reddit的1.5億美元股份,以及據台灣官員稱,騰訊正在考慮進入台灣的線上影片市場。

證據顯現,政治化審查和監督可能影響中國以外的騰訊用戶已經初見端倪。2016年多倫多大學公民實驗室(Citizen Lab)的一項研究發現,海外用戶與中國境內聯繫人之間的對話受到某些形式的關鍵字審查,一旦帳戶註冊了中國電話號碼,即使在國外也受到大陸控制。

澳洲,最近對中國旅外居民提供的新聞來源的一個研究發現,微信的中文新聞頻道上關於中國政治的報導少得可憐。令人難以置信的是,2017年3月至8月期間,儘管重要的第十九屆中共黨代表大會將在秋季舉行,微信頻道沒有發表過一篇關於中國政治的文章。 在加拿大,微信審查機構刪除了加拿大議會議員讚揚香港雨傘運動請願者的言論、操縱傳播有關孟晚舟被捕的新聞報導,並更廣泛的封鎖關於中國政府腐敗和領導官員的媒體報導

新疆大規模鎮壓期間,中國警方還利用微信與海外維吾爾人聯繫,要求提供個人資訊或維權人士的詳細信息,並將政府公務員監視人安插入私人(家庭)群體中。

如何應對

無論騰訊是不情願或熱切同謀於中國政府的壓制政策,現實情況是,騰訊員工會被要求去審查、監控和報告私人通信和個人資訊,而在許多情況下導致無辜人被捕和遭受酷刑。這理應是任何考慮使用、管理或投資該公司服務者首先要考慮到的。

對於那些居住在中國的人來說,或多或少,現在不使用微信幾乎不可能工作生活。 但建議他們謹慎行事,將應用軟體限制在最實用的功能範圍內,並想辦法諮詢有關如何增強數位安全性和如何更安全地獲得時事資訊的指南(自由之家去年發佈了一系列此類資源)。

中國之外的用戶,尤其是那些在大陸沒有家人或朋友的用戶,應該重新思考微信是否對他們的日常生活有必要。如果敏感話題出現時,那些與在中國的人保持私人聯繫者可以指導他們使用更安全的應用軟體來保護他們,或者使用同音異義詞替換可能存在問題的敏感詞,一些記者說他們是這樣做的。中國旅居在海外的僑民應該探索如何擴展他們在微信之外的新聞和資訊來源。

隨著世界各國政府試圖解決與「假新聞」、政治操作以及臉書和推特等社交媒體上的弱數據保護相關的問題,像微信這樣的中國同行理應接受至少是同等嚴格的審查和監管 —— 並且對任何違規行為負責任。政府和企業也應該像澳洲和印度政府最近已經做的那樣,限制員工使用微信,特別是那些做與敏感資訊相關工作的員工。需要同講中文的選民進行溝通的政治人物應該確保在多種平台上這樣做,而不僅僅是那些受中國政府控制的平台。

國際公民團體可以通過維護中文版最新的數位安全指南、記錄中國之外的內容在微信上受到審查或監控的程度,並為那些被騰訊做法侵犯權利的人們尋求法律援助來幫助用戶和民主政府。

最後,騰訊的投資者應該認真考慮他們支持該公司的道德和政治影響。任何關注有關人權、外國勢力干涉選舉或科技巨頭違背隱私權的人都不應該再投資該公司,包括退休基金。對社會負責任的投資計劃裡應將騰訊從其投資組合中排除在外,如果他們還沒有這樣做的話。即使從純粹的財務角度來看,騰訊股票也許不是明智的購買選項。該股票價格在過去一年中下跌了19%,至少部分原因是政府更為嚴格的控制用戶溝通。鑑於中國監管機構現在正將目標轉向遊戲產業,那正是該公司最賺錢的活動範疇,其價值可能會進一步下跌。 正如股票分析師利奧 • 孫(Leo Sun)警告的那樣,「中國科技公司的投資者永遠不應低估(中共)政府扼殺他們增長的能力。」

沒有什麼來自用戶、民主政府、民間社會團體或投資者的抵制,可以改變騰訊與中共政府壓制活動的共謀。恰恰它的生存取決於它對共產黨指令的盡職盡責。但是,為了個人用戶,為了世界開放社會以及為自由表達的數位時代,以上提出的措施將大大限制由騰訊公司的做法造成的當前和未來的損害。

薩拉庫克(Sarah Cook)是自由之家東亞資深研究分析員,《中國媒體快報》負責人。本文已於2019年3月30日發表於《風傳媒》


兩會:更為嚴格的資訊控制與加大對海外宣傳的力度

今年的兩會,中國人民代表大會(NPC)以及中國人民政治協商會議(CPPCC),在3月5日~15日舉行之時,由於經濟放緩、連續同華盛頓的貿易戰,以及不斷增長的、針對其在新疆的人權侵犯危機國際譴責,習近平主席和中共面臨著不同尋常的壓力。北京以更嚴厲的言論和資訊控制回應,並加速展開國際宣傳。

  • 加緊的資訊控制:與高調的政治會議之前的情況一樣,當局迫使北京的人權活動家到首都以外的地方去旅遊,以避免任何獨立評論或抗議活動。人權活動家胡佳是被帶出去強迫假期旅遊的人之一,正如他過去幾年一樣。曾在網上批評中共而被拘留的詩人華湧,於2月27日在推特上分享了一首詩,當「他們北京要開會」時,他同朋友和家鄉城市北京告別。北京居民稱增加的安全措施遍及北京,包括在交通中轉站的額外的行李檢查。網路限制也在3月初收緊,顯然是為了進一步控制圍繞會議的新聞敘述。運行虛擬專用網絡(VPN)服務的多家公司注意到,從3月2日增加的封堵工作,一名VPN員工注意到當局似乎「正在使用自動化,可能是人工智慧結合人工監控」來封堵用戶能夠繞過網站過濾的工具。同時,一個用人工智慧分析中國官員公開資訊的推特帳戶,明顯是在警方的壓力下,於3月6日刪掉其所有推文內容,以維持他們近期對在中國的有批評言論的推特用戶的打壓。該帳戶@AirMovingDevice部分專注在高層官員在他們的研究所學位論文的抄襲,而且最近在今年兩會之前,該帳戶在人大會議代表身上使用了人臉識別技術。「中國數字時代」網站保存了該帳戶之前的一些推文。
  • 在國外的宣傳:北京英文宣傳工具在準備兩會時製造了一些笑料, 中國媒體研究計畫網站(China Media Project)的David Bandurski將之總結為「一個現金充裕,而文化和智慧卻破產的宣傳體系的必然結果。」3月3日,官方新華社發佈了一支民粹主義的饒舌影片來慶祝中國近來的成就。該影片有時無釐頭的歌詞,加上影片發布於官方對嘻哈文化限制之時的事實,給其在國際英文媒體中贏得了一邊倒負面評價。新華社還發佈了另外兩支影片,結果是同樣無效:一則是網絡2.0版的新聞報導,其中兩位外國「新華社通訊員」回答關於兩會的問題;另一支是一位美國節目主持人讚美「中國民主」的種種好處,稱其「帶來了政治穩定和活力」,按說應在兩會期間到處播放。其它對兩會的官方宣傳可能更成功。中國環球電視網絡(又稱中國國際電視台)(CGTN),亦即官方電視台央視的英文頻道,特別推出了《誰運營中國? 》的互動網頁,企圖將兩會代表描述成高度多元和具有代表性的。3月15日兩會閉幕那天,環球時報發表一篇文章,重點著墨於一大群來自「一帶一路」夥伴國家的記者們是如何在他們的國家出版物中正面報導兩會及「一帶一路」。「一帶一路」是中國在基礎建設投資方面發起的有爭議的項目。

在兩會上的技術政策

  • 外商投資法草案3月15日,人民代表大會(NPC)幾乎一致通過一項外國投資法案,2020年1月1日執行。該法案在該橡皮圖章立法機構(注:指人大)的年度全體會議的最後一天匆忙通過———— 也和中共中國人民政治協商會議(CPPCC)同期舉行 ————據分析人士解讀,該法案是試圖解決外國投資人和外國政府對市場准入的不公平性、強制技術轉讓和從駐華企業竊取商業機密的擔憂。在該法律通過之前,一篇3月7日發佈在Lawfare上的貼文提到,法案草案中模糊不清的條款遠遠不能達到美國對技術轉移和投資限制方面的要求,稱其為「在使中國的投資環境對外國投資者更有吸引力和公平性方面的一小步。」 該貼文還提到,即使有該法案,由於中共不受限制的權力,外國公司仍會處於季度不利的情形,仍會有安全之虞。儘管新法案明文規定不允許政府強制外國投資這轉移他們的技術,由於法律條文中不準確的語言和缺乏對應立法細節,終歸不大可能讓外國公司和美國貿易談判者滿意。​
  • 突出人工智慧優先性:3月5日,總理李克強在兩會開幕時的工作報告上提到了發展人工智慧產業,這已經是連續第三個被提到的年度。李克強敦促中國加快發展大數據和人工智慧技術,以建設「智慧城」。李克強在其報告中明確沒有提到的一件事是中國政府的「2025中國製造」工業計劃,該計劃一直是華府和歐盟特別擔憂關注的。整個兩會期間,很明確發展人工智慧是政府工作重要事項。3月5日公佈的國家預算表明,儘管經濟發展放緩,與2018年相比,撥給發展科技的經費還是增長了 13.4% 。兩會同時,官方新聞機構新華社的人工合成「女主播」初次登台,並協助報導人大。這個新的人工合成的名為「新小萌」的主播是「新小浩」的升級版。小「新小浩」是11月在世界互聯網大會中首次亮相的虛擬男主播。​
  • 技術類企業的加入:年復一年,技術類企業在兩會中扮演著越來越顯著的角色。這意味著那些公司和官方的關係越來越近。幾位中國技術公司的創始人和總裁是人大代表,其中包括騰訊的馬化騰、小米的雷軍和格力的董明珠。其他人如百度的李彥宏和搜狗的王小川是政協代表。這些商人在有關人工智慧的討論中發言,呼籲在人工智慧方面有進一步的研究、合作和工業化。據TechNodeSupChina報導,「物聯網」、5G移動通訊技術、網路安全和數據保護是與會的技術公司代表們提出的話題。。​

監控更新:數據洩漏,步態識別和在西藏的擴張

  • 數據洩漏表明了監控的程度和存儲信息的漏洞:最近一位荷蘭研究者發現的數據洩漏使中國監控項目的程度略見端倪,同時也暴露了一些中國領先的科技公司在數據保護措施方面的缺失。2月13日,有德行操守的黑客和安全研究者維克多•葛維斯(Victor Gevers) (@0xDUDE)發現了屬於一家深圳公司SenseNets(深網視界有限公司)的洩漏數據,這家公司是專門研發人工智能人群分析和人臉識別的。葛維斯聲稱他們的數據是「任何人都可以全部獲得的」,其中包含有260萬新疆人的信息,包括他們的官方身分證號、生日、地址、種族、雇主,可能最令人膽寒的是他們前24小時的GPS 定位地址。自7月起,這數據庫就是公開的,但在葛維斯洩漏報導後被公司關閉。在新疆的長期打壓已經導致了估計約100萬或更多的維族人和突厥裔穆斯林被拘禁在許多拘留營中。作為該行動的結果,新疆已成為測試最新監控技術的「實驗室」,這些監控技術有時也用在中國其它地方乃至輸出海外。3月6日,葛維斯在推特上揭露,SenseNets項目中用到了微軟的Github和Azure平台,這一點,再加上SenseNets在其網站上將微軟列為合作夥伴,引發人們對微軟的猜測,猜測其是否有意無意的允許其服務被用來監控新疆。微軟一直否認它和這家中國公司的合夥關係。另一事件是,葛維斯在3月2日爆料稱,說他發現了另一個類似的未經保護的中文平台,其中收集了3億多條私人社交媒體資訊,其中含有非常私人的資料。後來在3月9日,葛維斯披露了另一數據儲存區,其中有180萬中國婦女的個人資料,包括在「生育力成熟」欄目中詳細列出的她們的生育狀況。
  • 即時的步態識別:上個月,新聞媒體開始報導中國人工智能新秀Watrix的最新軟體進展,包括其一個可以通過其肢體運動的即時影像來識別一個人的項目。該公司聲稱其辨識準確率超過96%,而且該軟件能在50米外辨識一個人。這不同於人臉識別軟件,人們可以通過遮蓋或易容來避開,Watrix聲稱它的系統能分辨出是真跛還是假跛。警察已經在一些大城市如北京、上海和重慶試行此軟體。據報這家公司已經在與新加坡、印度、俄羅斯、荷蘭和捷克的一些保安公司洽談合約。
  • 美國DNA技術公司停止在新疆銷售:隨著新疆的人權危機繼續引發國際關注,位於美國的跟 Thermo Fisher 2月20日宣布,它將在新疆停止銷售收集DNA生物資訊的設備。同時,耶魯大學的知名基因學家基德(Kenneth Kidd)告訴紐約時報,儘管他一直在為中國官員提供基因材料,但他不知道中國方面在用他的材料來比照維族人和漢人的DNA,也一直認為他只是在保持道德規範的研究方面和對方合作。
  • 中國技術公司蜂擁至西藏:在北京試圖進一步加緊其對西藏的控制來「維穩」的同時,中國致力於人工智慧和大數據分析的技術公司爭先恐後奔赴這一高度敏感區。新興的人工智慧公司和技術巨鱷如阿里巴巴、騰訊和iFlyTek都在拉薩建立他們的研究和投資單位,都在利用政府的補貼,補貼用來刺激該地區經濟增長並加強對該地區附近的人口控制。西藏技術淘金熱的消息在當地特別敏感的日子報出:3月10日是1959年西藏動盪及中共政府鎮壓西藏從而導致達賴喇嘛流亡至印度的紀念日;3月14日是2008年西藏人和平抗議,導致數十年間西藏地區最大規模程度被中共實施武力鎮壓的紀念日。

香港:親北京媒體騷擾維權人士

最近數月,在港受北京控制的媒體被「武裝起來」,用以在這個半自治的地區監控和污衊當地的維權人士。這裡曾是東亞地區媒體自由的港灣。大公報和文匯報的員工開始跟蹤民主和獨立人士,然後報導這些人本應是秘密的關係或私下的會談。2月26日,加拿大環球郵報刊登報導,描述了兩家與北京有關聯的媒體對維權人士陳家駒(Wayne Chan(Ka-kui))的「狗仔報導」,報導標題說其生活方式腐化和不道德。

這兩家報紙也據信到台灣追蹤香港維權人士,其在一月份對幾位維權人士在台灣行程的詳細報導作為明證。3月15日,路透社發表一份調查,發現在過去3年內,至少有25位港人,因參與不受北京喜歡的事情,而導致他們在台期間受到類似騷擾。維權人士稱這種報導不應該被視為是真正的新聞,因為它們經常性的牽扯到入侵性的監視和公佈報導對象的私人資訊和家庭情形。一些台灣官員也認同此說,稱這些報紙犯了「不合法」的行為,如果他們不能就此提供「合理的解釋」,他們的記者可能會在幾年內被禁止到台灣旅行。類似的作法也發生在外國駐北京記者訪港期間,例如在澳洲的美國學者凱大雄(Kevin Caricco),這在自由之家《中國媒體快報》的2019年1月刊中指明過。


中國之外:氣勢洶洶的外交官們、中國印刷商們、Reddit負評按鈕、在台灣宣傳

雖然中共當局通過對編輯的定期指令和限制獲取外國新聞的複雜審查機制來嚴格控制國內媒體的報導,但北京也持續試圖影響對中國的外部輿論。本月,其努力的例子包括中國外交官的霸凌行為、國內印刷部門對外國客戶訂單的審查,以及在Reddit上明顯的帶風向。

  • 中共外交官在瑞典、俄國氣勢洶洶:3月18日,人權組織「無國界記者」譴責中國駐斯德哥爾摩大使館停止其對瑞典記者關於中國報導的重複騷擾。中共駐瑞典大使桂聰友及其工作人員譴責了幾家瑞典新聞媒體,最近一次是有關台灣代表發表的專欄評論,主張面對北京日益增長的侵略應支持台灣民主。自從2015年跨界綁架瑞典公民桂民海之後,瑞典斯德哥爾摩和北京的關係一直緊張。桂民海於2018年1月與瑞典外交官一起在中國旅行時被(幾名中國安全官員)再次拘捕。瑞典召回其前駐華大使並展開對她的詢問調查,事關她被報告安排了桂民海女兒於1月24日-25日同兩個神秘中國商人的會面。兩個商人強迫桂民海的女兒對她的父親被拘捕保持緘默。同時,俄羅斯《獨立報》Nezavisimaya Gazeta刊登編輯部文章,指責中領館向該報一俄羅斯記者施壓要求撤下關於2月28日關於中國經濟(放緩)的報導並威脅將他列入黑名單。​​​
  • 中國印刷商的審查影響外國出版物:中國印刷商拒絕印刷含有字詞或可能在中國被認為敏感內容的書,即使這些書是打算向外國觀眾銷售。澳洲(Australian和紐西蘭(New Zealand的出版商被中國印刷商拒絕服務或推遲印刷,如果他們的出版作品中包含提及了特別的中國政治人物、地圖、多次政治運動多個宗教或諸多地理關鍵詞,或中國的異見人士。印刷公司的行為使得這些書的印製更貴,通過強迫出版商印製其他的內容,以北京口味的思路影響全球市場。
  • 批判中國的新聞在Reddit被按負評:連結分享網站Reddit的用戶回報說,這項服務已經被親中國帳戶所淹沒,這些帳戶對關於中國的批評性鏈接合作式的「按負評」,或用配合北京宣傳的評論帶風向。在新聞、地緣政治和以地區為重點的 Reddit服務中,這種趨勢顯而易見。 在3月14日的BuzzFeed報導中,Sinocism的出版者比爾·畢曉普(Bill Bishop)表示,這一現像是過去18個月 「將海外戰爭帶到全球互聯網」的中國政府賬戶的「高潮」的一部分。雖然Reddit上的許多人認為這是政府長期策劃部署的產物,通過安排付費被稱為「五毛黨」的人員在互聯網上貼帖子和評論,但Bishop指出,人們不可能知道哪些評論是政府統籌的,哪些是中國民族主義者的產品。
  • 新的中國社交媒體應用程式面臨外國審查:隨著中國社交媒體公司的創新及其應用程式在全球普及,服務的有爭議活動和用戶對數據隱私的擔憂讓外國監管機構發出警報。共享短影片製作應用程式TikTok明顯是中國抖音短影片(Douyin)的國際對應軟體,也由ByteDance擁有)於2月28日同意向美國聯邦貿易委員會支付570萬美元用於非法收集兒童的個人資訊。在印度,中國應用軟體現在佔據了谷歌付款商店中100個下載量最多的應用軟體中的44個,TikTok正處在泰米爾納德邦州政府的鎖定目標中。那裡的官員呼籲全面禁止那些允許用戶分享性材料和宣傳賣淫的應用軟體。在印度執政的印度人民黨(Bharatiya Janata Party)內,由於國家安全和獲取數據問題,已經有呼籲要求全面禁止中國的應用軟體。​
  • 台灣監管機構正在考慮對中國宣傳網站、影音串流平台採取行動:隨著中國行政機構強迫台灣與之統一的官方言論,台灣當局對中國科技巨頭騰訊將其影音平台帶入台灣的計劃表示嚴肅關切。在政府獲悉北京鼓勵新媒體服務向海外擴張,並以台灣為主要目標後,台灣的大陸委員會(陸委會)於3月15日介入。陸委會表示擔心北京會試圖利用騰訊影音平台作為散播政治宣傳的途徑。台灣的國家通訊傳播委員會(NCC)同一天表示,對來自大陸的影音串流平台的許可將取決於國家安全考慮,並召集部際會議討論騰訊和優酷土豆影音串流服務在台灣的命運。3月13日,NCC宣布還將決定是否限制www.31t.tw,這是一個在台灣註冊的網站,其推廣的內容與中國政府宣傳的內容相似地驚人。

重點反制:在兩會中堅持提問的記者們

人大和政協兩會期間,對媒體的限制依然是和往年一樣嚴,這都是意在維護中國領導人們和政治體系經過精心排演的形象。即使如此,中外記者們還是會抓住這難得的機會,接近這個國家的政商界名流,問一些挑戰性的問題,所謂「堵問」,甚至明知沒有答案也要問。這類努力的視頻和記錄在推特上流傳。澳大利亞廣播公司Bill Birtles分享了記者發問外交部長王毅的一支影片片段:「你要拿掉幾個台灣邦交國啊?」英國《金融時報》的Yang Yuan @YuanfenYang分享了一支影片,是一位中國記者追著騰訊總裁馬化騰問:「馬總,你能不能在會上提議一下,讓他們不要封我們的號啊?」這帳號應是指對其旗下的微信公眾號的審查。

儘管對類似問題的實質性回答很少見,但其它形式的官方回應也同樣說明問題。新疆進京代表團早到一小時,以避開聚在一起的150名記者的發問。代表團離開時,保安人員將記者清場,以防止他們喊問,一名保安人員試圖抓住法新社攝影師Pak Yiu的記者證。當香港南華早報的記者Cissy Wei Zhou追問一政協代表,問他怎麼看新的外國投資法案時,該代表捂住了嘴說:「我舌頭生病,不能說話。(my tongue is sick, cannot talk)」

過去一些年,不明顯的或有些明顯的對中國媒體和宣傳系統的批評會在兩會間浮現。2016年,政協委員朱征夫(Zhu Zhengfu提案敦促黨國在採用強迫在電視上認罪的作法時更審慎些,這種作法在習近平領導下已經增加。去年,當一名記者聽到其同仁向中國官員討好性提問時,她的一個非常說明問題的翻白眼鏡頭在網路上廣為流傳,並引發一系列全新的網路爆紅題材。​


未來看點

執行習近平的「媒體報導」願景:3月15日,中共的高層黨媒《求是網》發表了習近平一月份在政治局委員一次學習會議上講話的全文。習近平呼籲加速媒體整合,希望宣傳手法、法規和技術政策遠遠超越新聞界的範疇,將「社會思想文化公共資源」和「社會治理大數據」整合起來,以期獲得更大程度的政治控制和對公眾輿論的影響。未來看點有看對執行習近平此願景的具體政策措施,其中包括將人工智慧加入新聞的製作和傳播方面所做的努力,以及更有效的輸送黨的宣傳和話語到國內外手機用戶上的各種辦法。

對已建議修訂的香港《逃犯條例》的修改:在上月香港政府提出方便罪犯引渡的提案修訂草案後,港內的民主和維權人士對此此該提出了批評,其中引述了有可能受大陸有缺陷的司法體制影響的風險。令人吃驚的是,通常都是挺建制派的香港和外國企業界,包括香港美國商會,也提出了他們的明確擔憂。未來看點有看修訂案是否可以以現有內容通過,還是部分修改(譬如將經濟犯罪除外),還是徹底撤銷提案。

民主力量對中國技術擴張的反應:美國、台灣、印度、加拿大和世界其它地區的監管者和網民越來越就這一點達成一致,那就是:言論自由、選舉公正、和用戶隱私可能會受一些應用軟體,如騰訊微信和ByteDance抖音之全球擴張的威脅。未來看點有因應而生的任何限制或懲罰,以及民主體制下的政府機構一邊要開放商業,另一邊要國家安全與人權,將如何採取措施達成平衡。


行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

China Media Bulletin: Student indoctrination, surveillance innovation, GitHub mobilization (No. 135)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: The Chinese Communist Party’s Latest Propaganda Target: Young Minds

Indoctrination, censorship, and surveillance are robbing a generation of their right to free thought.

By Sarah Cook

Chinese president Xi Jinping wants children and students not just to obey, but to love the Communist Party. At an April 19 conference organized by the Politburo to mark the 100th anniversary of the student-led anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement, he said, “We need to … strengthen political guidance for young people, guide them to voluntarily insist on the party’s leadership, to listen to the party and follow the party.”

Political indoctrination has long been a required component of the curriculum at all levels of education in China. Under Xi, however, new steps are being taken to tighten the Communist Party’s ideological control over universities, schools, teachers, and students.

Disciplining teachers

The party’s system for influencing students depends in large part on their teachers and professors. In a speech at a Beijing seminar attended by teachers from across the country in March, Xi called on educators to instill patriotism in the country’s youth and reject “wrong ideas and ideology.” He also emphasized that teachers themselves “should have strict self-discipline, be consistent in class and out of class, online and offline, should consciously carry forward the main melody and actively convey positive energy.”

In recent months, a number of teachers have faced dismissal, detention, and other penalties after falling short of these expectations. On March 25, the Financial Times reported that prominent constitutional law professor Xu Zhangrun had been barred from teaching at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. He had written numerous essays that sharply and eloquently criticized the top leadership’s decisions, often drawing on ancient Chinese philosophy, literature, and political theory to make his arguments. Xu was subsequently stripped of his other positions and teaching responsibilities. On April 8, scholar Yu Jianrong, known for his research on China’s peasants, had his Sina Weibo microblogging account, which had 7.2 million followers, silenced such that he could no longer post comments, only read others’ messages.

In two other cases, educators have faced jail time for sharing information about the persecuted Falun Gong spiritual group in their private capacities. In January, Zeng Hao, a business professor at Tianhe College in Guangdong Province, was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison after posting images related to Falun Gong on Tencent’s QQ messaging platform. On April 15, Amnesty International issued an urgent action for high school chemistry teacher Chen Yan, who is expected to face trial for handing out a calendar with information about Falun Gong to someone on a Beijing street.

In early March, the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report outlining the details of 386 Uighur scholars, students, and other intellectuals who have been swept into detention amid a massive reeducation effort targeting Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

Surveillance inside and outside the classroom

In an April 8 article, Radio Free Asia noted increased efforts to monitor Chinese university students. Reporters found online documents showing how institutions like Wuhan University of Science and Technology are continually recruiting students to act as informants on their classmates and teachers, typically submitting reports to authorities every two weeks. One former professor said the recruitment began in earnest in 2014, shortly after surveillance cameras began being widely installed on campuses in 2013.

More recently, surveillance cameras linked to facial recognition software and brainwave-detecting headbands have appeared in elementary and secondary schools, provoking nervousness and anger among some pupils. Although the monitoring is ostensibly for the purpose of tracking students’ focus and study habits, it could also be used to detect ideological transgressions by teachers or students.

Universities, government agencies, and private companies are increasingly trying to gain access to students’ social media accounts and other online information. Officials at universities in Beijing and Anhui Province have reportedly asked students to register the details of their private and public accounts on Tencent’s WeChat and QQ platforms. In February the company China Youth Credit Management (CY Credit), working with the Communist Youth League, launched an application called “Unictown,” which aims to serve as the foundation for a specialized social credit system for China’s youth. The app is meant to track young adults’ behavior and incentivize activities that are considered positive or socially beneficial. The South China Morning Post reports that the firm has already collected data from 70 million people, is building a database of 90 million youth league volunteers, and aspires within a few years to cover all 460 million Chinese aged 18 to 45.

Curriculum controls and direct indoctrination

The Unictown app is not the only new party-linked mobile application targeting China’s youth. When the “Study Xi, Strengthen China” app was launched in January by the party’s propaganda department, a corresponding version for young people also sprung up on the website, mobile app, and social media accounts of the party’s media mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. According to the South China Morning Post, the app requires “schoolchildren to study texts related to Xi’s political ideology.”

In Xinjiang, young Muslim minority children are more directly exposed to indoctrination. Those whose parents have been detained for “reeducation” are themselves placed in state-run orphanages, where they are reportedly required to speak Chinese, eat pork, and read slogans like “I’m Chinese; I love my country.” In some instances children are being used to inform on their parents. An April 4 multimedia report by the New York Times on conditions in the ancient city of Kashgar included a chilling account of kindergarteners being interrogated. As one interviewee described it, “My daughter had a classmate who said, ‘My mom teaches me Quran.’ The next day, they are gone.”

In addition to indoctrinating students on Communist Party ideology, the authorities are clamping down on access to alternative ideas, including those associated with democratic governance. Over the past year, China’s Education Ministry has conducted countrywide audits of constitutional law textbooks, and books by reform-minded professors have reportedly been removed from online booksellers. A series of foreign academic publishers have come under pressure to remove certain articles from collections available in China, and at least some have complied.

Global reach

The Communist Party’s watchful gaze also follows Chinese students who study abroad, whether through student informants, consulate-linked Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, or monitoring of WeChat accounts. One 2018 survey by Cheryl Yu, then a graduate student at the University of Washington, found that among 72 Chinese respondents from at least 31 American universities, 58 percent were aware of potential Chinese government surveillance in the United States. Yu also found that 80 percent of the students reported self-censoring (whether or not they demonstrated awareness of official surveillance) by choosing not to attend university events on politically sensitive topics, discuss such topics with large groups of fellow Chinese, or even admit to a willingness to learn about the issues.

Students who overstep the party’s redlines while abroad risk serious reprisals. On April 10, Mirror Media published an emotional account by Li Jiabao from Shandong Province, who had criticized China’s authoritarian system in a live-stream broadcast while studying in Taiwan. Soon afterward, he found that his QQ, WeChat, Taobao, and Alipay accounts were all deleted. As he counted down the days before he had to return to China, he reported having nightmares.

Impact and ramifications

Recent activism by Marxist students from elite universities on behalf of exploited Chinese workers hints at the ways in which ideological indoctrination could backfire for the party, whose actual governance is often in conflict with its loftier principles. Many other young people may reject or disregard the stilted propaganda entirely, and even high school students have balked at the onerous surveillance being imposed on them, in at least one case dismantling their classroom cameras.

Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities’ efforts to shape students’ minds have clearly had some success. Young Chinese studying abroad are often unwilling to explore forbidden topics, and domestic graduates who are employed as censors require crash courses on events like the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, suggesting that they have large blind spots in their knowledge of the world and their country.

China’s youth, in other words, are growing up in a more manipulated information environment than their parents’ generation or their foreign counterparts. There is a very real danger that this generation will be less open-minded, more nationalistic, more supportive of authoritarian rule, and more isolated from a common set of facts and norms that previously facilitated peaceful international exchanges.

To mitigate such an outcome, foreign educational institutions should reexamine the terms of their partnerships with Chinese universities, safeguard the academic freedom and security of their Chinese students, and find alternative channels for engaging students in China with the full spectrum of ideas necessary for a 21st-century education. 

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. This article was also published in the Diplomat on April 25, 2019.

Photo caption: Children in an elementary school in Zhejiang wear brainwave-reading headbands that reportedly monitor their attention levels in class. Credit: SupChina

Authorities escalate crackdown on Twitter and virtual private networks

A police crackdown on users of Twitter and virtual private networks (VPNs) that was first reported in late 2018 appears to be expanding and escalating, with relatively low-profile individuals facing reprisals for previously tolerated activities like opening an account, following overseas news, “liking” posts, or using VPN software on mobile phones. It remains unclear what has triggered the crackdown or how Chinese authorities have been able to trace accounts to individual users, but the shift suggests tighter enforcement of a 2017 ban on unauthorized VPN services and an effort to silence and isolate independent Chinese voices on a global social media platform. Specifically, the Financial Times, Radio Free Asia, and other outlets have reported the following cases from at least five different provinces, most within the past two months:

  • Zhu Xiuyuan, a lawyer from Haining in Zhejiang Province, was warned by police in March that he had “liked many harmful posts that insulted the party.”
  • An anonymous lawyer who had registered but never used “anti-China software” was cautioned for violating regulations governing the professional conduct of attorneys.
  • An editor at a provincial state broadcaster in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, was demoted and docked pay for registering a Twitter account and following “harmful information from illegal overseas websites.”
  • Sun Yuanping of Hebei Province was detained by police on March 22 for “disorderly behavior” after he forwarded content that was critical of the Chinese government via his personal Twitter account; he was then sentenced to seven days’ administrative detention.
  • On March 25, police warned a man in Pengxi, Sichuan Province, “not to use illegal channels to access the international internet,” having found VPN software on his mobile phone.
  • A man in Guangdong Province was fined 1,000 yuan ($148) in December 2018 for using the circumvention app Lantern Pro.

Meanwhile, in late March, Google confirmed that it had long had a policy of banning VPN providers from purchasing banner ads in China and other “countries where such servers are illegal.” Users wishing to continue using Twitter may consider ensuring that no personally identifying information is publicly available on their profiles or removing their phone number from the account and using the application only on a computer.


Surveillance updates: Uighur faces, prisoners, street cleaners, rental homes

As artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced surveillance technologies spread across China and are used in ever more intrusive ways, new questions are being raised—internationally and by Chinese citizens themselves—about the systems’ ethical implications, and investors are under pressure to disassociate themselves from surveillance companies as a result.

  • AI and racial profiling: An April 14 article by the New York Timesrevealed that Chinese authorities have been using facial recognition technology since 2018 to surveil the minority Uighur population, not only in Xinjiang but throughout China. The AI software that powers the system has been trained to recognize the facial features of Uighurs and distinguish them from those of China’s ethnic Han majority. According to the website of CloudWalk, one of the Chinese AI companies that developed the product, the system is able to alert police if there is an unexpected increase in the number of Uighurs living in a neighborhood. Police departments in 16 provinces have expressed interest in acquiring the technology to monitor their local Uighur populations. In the city of Sanmenxia in Henan Province, local law enforcement officials conducted half a million face scans over the course of a single month to test the capacity of the system to register Uighur faces.
  • AI and a ‘smart prison’: A high-security prison in Yanjiao, Hebei Province, has installed a security camera system and hidden sensors powered by artificial intelligence. A joint product of surveillance technology company Tiandy and domestic public research institutes, the system is purportedly able to monitor each of the prison’s 1,600 detainees simultaneously and register any abnormal activity, all without the assistance of a human operator. Facial recognition and movement analysis capacities allow the system to track individuals throughout Yancheng prison—home to numerous high-profile detainees, including former Chongqing mayor Bo Xilai’s wife, Gu Kailai—and produce comprehensive daily reports. While project representatives have claimed that the system will make prison breaks a thing of the past, critics have noted that it could violate the dignity and impact the mental health of prisoners subjected to round-the-clock surveillance. A 2017 Freedom House study and accounts by human rights lawyers indicate that in some cases, local police have been more lenient with religious and political prisoners who gain their sympathy than their supervisors would likely approve; widespread use of this type of surveillance could undermine the limited protection that such prisoners occasionally receive.
  • Street-cleaner monitoring: Chinese netizens have responded with anger to reports that street cleaners in the city of Jiangsu have been required since March to wear wristbands that monitor their location and warn them against “slacking off.” The wristbands are part of a local government effort aimed at promoting “intelligent cleaning” through real-time tracking of the city’s public cleaners and the issuing of warnings to any wearer who remains in one place for more than 20 minutes. China’s urban street cleaners are widely considered to be underpaid and overworked, and Chinese internet users ridiculed the plan as a waste of public resources, with some recommending that the program instead be applied to lazy government officials.
  • Surveillance of rental properties: The online magazine Bitter Winterreports that since November a number of landlords in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, have been ordered by local authorities to install security cameras in the living rooms of rental units. Police are said to be conducting inspections of local units to ensure that security cameras have been installed, and have been issuing fines of 500 yuan ($75) to landlords who fail to comply. Gated communities have also been ordered to install surveillance cameras in elevators, and cameras equipped with facial recognition software at entrances to the community. The moves have been justified on the grounds of “maintaining public security”, though residents have already complained about violations of their privacy.
  • Pressure grows on surveillance company investors: The Financial Times reported on March 29 that two of the largest US pension funds—the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—have stakes in Hikvision, a partly state-owned Chinese surveillance company linked to the network of detention camps for Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. In another form of apparent complicity, research collaborations on AI projects between the People’s Liberation Army’s University of Defense Technology and the US companies Google and Microsoft were reported in recentweeks. Writing in a March 19 piece in Foreign Policy, Lindsay Gorman and Matt Schrader of the Alliance for Securing Democracy warned that foreign investors may “end up owning some of the responsibility for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere” if they fail to fully understand the plans of their Chinese partners. While Chinese companies often seem immune to foreign criticism, on April 15 the Financial Times reported that Chinese AI company SenseTime had sold its 51 percent stake in the joint venture Tangli Technologies, which is building surveillance systems targeting Uighurs, out of concern that its association with the controversial program would alienate potential foreign investors in the run-up to its initial public offering.

Censorship updates: ‘People’s Daily’ innovations, streamer purges, music and drama culls

  • ‘People’s Daily’ aids other media with censorship: On March 28, Reuters reported that the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily is increasing the number of AI-assisted internet censors working for its website, People.cn. The Shanghai-listed People.cn is also earning income and attracting investors as other websites and mobile applications turn to its staff for guidance amid stricter censorship rules, taking advantage of its special relationship with the party and presumed grasp of top leaders’ redlines. News aggregator Jinri Toutiao and tech company Liangziyun are among those that have signed lucrative deals with People.cn to help delete content that violates state and party guidelines. This news comes on the heels of a March 26 report from Supchina that People.cn had partnered with the municipal government of Jinan, Shandong Province, to turn the city into a hub for a new unit dedicated to enhancing the website’s censorship capabilities.
  • Influential bloggers, live-streamers banned: An April 15 report on Technode highlights the disappearance of thousands of Chinese live-streaming accounts in the latest example of tightening government controls on such media. In 2018, government censors deleted roughly 5,000 channels for allegedly promoting “vulgar” content, while platforms were told to engage in greater self-censorship. The deleted channels included some of China’s most popular live-streamers, like Li Tianyou, Lu Benwei, Chen Yifa, and Yang Kaili, each of whose followers numbered in the tens of millions. Some were banned for using profane language, while others mocked the national anthem or relayed an unofficial narrative on the 1937–38 Nanjing Massacre. According to a March 16 report in the New York Times, recent targets have also included influential bloggers like Ma Ling, whose lifestyle blog was shuttered on February 21 for spreading “false news.” Commentator Wang Yongzhi told the Times that “the party simply can’t tolerate anyone who has a big influence on society.”
  • Hong Kong singers and dramas censored: A Jacky Cheung song released 30 years ago to comment on the Tiananmen massacre of June 4, 1989, has been removed from Apple Music’s mainland Chinese platform. According to a Standnews report from April 7, the removal of the 1990 song “The Path of Man” seems to have occurred after March 28. Two Hong Kong singers and prodemocracy activists, Denise Ho and Anthony Wong, have also had their music removed from Apple Music’s mainland China services. The two celebrities have been persona non grata in mainland China since 2014, after they publicly offered support to the Occupy Central protests in Hong Kong. Separately, one of China’s most popular television shows, Yanxi Palace, has been pulled from the airwaves after it and other period dramas were criticized in state media for “propagating a luxurious and hedonistic lifestyle, encouraging admiration for imperial life and a glorification of emperors overshadowing the heroes of today,” according to a February 8 report by the BBC. Other costume dramas have also fallen afoul of China’s media controls. An episode of Qin Empire 3, aired on China Central Television on February 29, was partially censored after netizens circulated screenshots showing a two-second clip in which a character reads a list of “traitors” that includes the names of Xi Jinping and other top party leaders.

HONG KONG: Amid Umbrella Movement convictions, new threats to free speech emerge

On April 8, a Hong Kong judge convicted nine democracy activists—including Pastor Chu Yiu-ming and Professors Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man—for their role in the 2014 Occupy Central or Umbrella Movement protests. The group was sentenced on April 24, with four heading to jail for between eight and 16 months (including Tai and Chan), while others received suspended sentences, community service, or sentencing postponement The judge rejected the defendants’ free speech claims, finding that the occupation of some of the city’s busiest intersections “impinge[d] unreasonably upon the rights of others.”

A series of other recent developments also suggest that freedom of speech is in serious danger in Hong Kong:

  • Museum commemorating 1989 Tiananmen Massacre vandalized: A museum in Hong Kong commemorating the June 1989 massacre of prodemocracy protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and other locations was vandalized earlier this month. Staff at the museum, which was set to open on April 26, alerted the police after discovering on April 7 that the lock on the front door had been removed, electrical outlets and a fuse box had been splashed with salt water, and holes had been punched in a chair. Speaking to reporters, Albert Ho, chair of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democracy Movements in China, which established the museum, said “those who did this must be wanting to please those in power.” Security cameras have since been installed at the museum.
  • ‘Apple Daily’ advertisers intimidated: Reporters Without Borders has called on Hong Kong’s former chief executive, C.Y. Leung, to cease his attacks on the prodemocracy newspaper Apple Daily and its advertisers. Since February, Leung—in his current capacity as vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a mainland government advisory body—has been using his Facebook page to denounce companies by name for taking out advertisements in Apple Daily. Leung has a history of press intimidation. In 2018, he brought a defamation suit against a journalist who had written about his possible links with organized crime. In August of that year, Leung denounced the Foreign Correspondents Club of Hong Kong for hosting a talk by a proponent of Hong Kong independence. Apple Daily has also faced interference with its advertising in the past. The paper has long been the subject of an ad boycott by the powerful and pro-Beijing real-estate industry, and in 2014, Apple Daily reported that the London-based banks HSBC and Standard Chartered had pulled their ads under pressure from the Chinese government.
  • Electronic ID contract given to mainland tech firm: It was announced on April 2 that mainland Chinese firm Ping An Technology had been awarded a contract to build an electronic identification (eID) system for the Hong Kong government. As part of the territory’s “Smart City Blueprint,” the eID system will allow residents to access a hundred online services, like registering for public housing or a vehicle license plate. The Hong Kong government claims that the system will not store personal data and that measures have been taken to ensure the privacy of the city’s residents. Yet Human Rights Watch’s Hong Kong office has noted the possibility that eID may become a tool of government surveillance.

BEYOND CHINA: Australia and Taiwan meddling, 1989 ad, Uighurs trolled, Zambia broadcasting

  • WeChat use by Australian politicians, media outlets: Concerns have been raised that politicians in Australia may be forced to self-censor when communicating on Tencent’s WeChat messaging service. Many Australian politicians—including the prime minister and the head of the opposition—use the Chinese application to reach out to Chinese-speaking Australian voters. Yet critics allege that use of WeChat may lead Australian politicians to avoid discussing subjects that are considered politically sensitive by the Chinese government, in order to avoid losing access to their accounts. Several of the accounts are registered with Chinese phone numbers, increasing the risk that WeChat itself or the Chinese person or company that was used to create the account could alter content under Chinese government pressure. Professor John Fitzgerald of Swinburne University said, “We are entering uncharted territory. WeChat was not designed to work in a democracy, and a democracy can’t work with WeChat.”
  • Local Australian council ends partnership with independent Chinese media: China’s consulate in Sydney stands accused of bullying a local council into banning an Australian Chinese-language newspaper from sponsoring a Chinese New Year event. Over a 14-month period ending in January 2018, Georges Rivers Council received eight warnings from the Chinese consulate about Vision China Times, a newspaper that regularly publishes critical news about China’s government. The consulate claimed that ties between the council and the paper, if allowed to continue, would damage Sino-Australian relations. The council subsequently restricted the paper’s sponsorship.
  • China attempts to influence Taiwan elections through social media: Suspected Chinese government agents have made quiet offers to buy popular pro-Taiwan Facebook pages in the run-up to next year’s general elections in Taiwan. Recruitment advertisements for live-streamers with pro-unification views have also emerged online. The efforts seem to be part of a coordinated attempt by the Chinese government to influence Taiwan’s elections. The Taiwan government has responded by placing greater restrictions on video streaming services from the Chinese companies Baidu and Tencent.
  • Leica backs away from Tiananmen ad: German camera company Leica has backed away from a promotional video that depicts the iconic “Tank Man” who attempted to block a Chinese military crackdown on prodemocracy protesters in 1989. A report by the South China Moring Post on April 19 notes that discussion of Leica was banned on Chinese social media following the release of the video. The company soon issued a public disavowal of the short film, which was produced by the public relations firm F/Nazca Saatchi Saatchi. The video arrived just weeks before the 30th anniversary of the 1989 massacre.
  • Coordinated troll attack on Uighur activists’ Facebook pages: On April 10, pro-Beijing trolls launched a coordinated attack against Uighur rights groups on Facebook, bombarding their pages with hostile comments. In a tweet on April 10, the World Uyghur Congress noted that many of the comments simply pasted text from a Communist Party white paper on Xinjiang. That same day, the campaign received enthusiastic coverage from state-run tabloid Global Times, which praised the attackers as “patriotic Chinese netizens” fighting against “terrorists” and “separatists.”
  • Digital migration in Zambia: Chinese investment in the Zambian state broadcaster’s move from analog to digital transmission has raised concerns about the impact of growing Chinese influence in the country. The partnership between Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and Chinese service provider StarTimes to create a joint venture—TopStar—reportedly violates domestic laws against any single media entity having licenses for both content transmission and content creation. The deal was also made without approval from either ZNBC’s board or Zambia’s parliament, leading to suspicions of corruption. Zambia is not the only regional market StarTimes has entered. It has actively partnered with state broadcasters across Africa as part of a soft-power drive by the Chinese government. 

FEATURED PUSHBACK: Chinese engineers mobilize on GitHub

The widely used code-sharing site GitHub has become a platform for Chinese tech employees to expose and protest exploitative working conditions. The site, used by 31 million software developers worldwide, is accessible in China. The movement began in late March, when a user posted a repository complaining about the 996 work schedule—9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week—and naming two e-commerce firms that required it. The post used the term 996.ICU (based on a joke that the harsh schedule will land workers in a hospital’s intensive care unit), which has since become the movement’s moniker. Within two days, the post had garnered over 30,000 stars, a function that allows GitHub users to bookmark a project they like, pushing it to the top-ranked spot on the site’s trending page.

By mid-April, the number of stars had reached 230,000, and the activism had evolved in a more sophisticated and international direction. Developers began posting firsthand accounts about particular companies that employed the 996 schedule. They argued that such practices violate China’s labor laws, which limit work weeks to 44 hours or require overtime payments. Meanwhile, Shanghai-based programmer Suji Yan and his wife, Katt Gu, designed a free software license for the 996.ICU GitHub campaign. It allows companies to signal that they follow labor laws. Yan told National Public Radio that within 48 hours “a lot of small and medium companies started to put all their work in the anti-996 license to show that they are a good company.”

The campaign has also encountered some backlash. The web browsers of several big Chinese tech firms like Tencent and Xiaomi have reportedly blocked the page. This may be because they are among the companies that employ the harsh 996 schedule. Chinese government censors so far have not taken action to block the site, however, because doing so would cut off a wide array of content and collaboration that is critical to innovation in the country.

But fears remain that the government will instead put pressure on Microsoft, which owns GitHub and has extensive business interests in China, to remove the page. In an effort to preempt such a move, employees from Microsoft and other international tech firms like Google and TripAdvisor posted an open letter on GitHub on April 22 expressing solidarity with the campaign and encouraging “Microsoft and GitHub to keep the 996.ICU GitHub repository uncensored and available to everyone.” By April 24, the letter had garnered 250 signatures from software engineers and other tech workers around the world.


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

Run-up to Tiananmen anniversary: Watch for increased censorship, surveillance, and harassment or “forced vacations” for activists, particularly in Beijing, in advance of the 30th anniversary of the army’s suppression of prodemocracy protests on June 4, 1989. Outside China, watch for various events and public statements by foreign governments and civil society groups to commemorate those killed in the crackdown.

GitHub censorship: Watch for any steps by the Chinese government to limit access to GitHub or compel Microsoft to remove the 996.ICU page.

More pressure on teachers, students: As more educational institutions, tech companies, and local party cadres seek to implement Xi Jinping’s orders to raise a generation of young people who are fiercely loyal to the Communist Party, watch for new examples of reprisals, surveillance, and indoctrination aimed at instructors, college students, and children.


TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中國媒體快報:灌輸學生、監控手段創新、GitHub動員(Issue 135, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:中國共產黨的最新宣傳目標:年輕人的思想

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制​中國工程師們在GitHub上的動員

未來看點

行動起來!


本期分析:中國共產黨的最新宣傳目標:年輕人的思想

灌輸、審查和監視正在剝奪一代人的思想自由權利。

作者:薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook)

中共國家主席習近平希望兒童和學生不僅要服從,而且要熱愛共產黨。 4月19日,在政治局組織的紀念學生主導的反帝國主義五四運動100週年會議上,他:「我們需要...... 加強對廣大青年的政治引領,引導廣大青年自覺堅持黨的領導,聽黨話,跟黨走。」

長期以來,政治灌輸一直是中國各級教育課程的必要組成部分。 然而,在習近平治理之下,正在採取新的措施來加強共產黨對眾多大學、學校、教師們和學生們的意識形態控制。

懲罰教師們

中國共產黨影響學生的系統在很大程度上取決於他們的老師和教授。3月,在習近平於全國各地教師參加的北京研討會的講話中,他呼籲教育工作者要在國家青年人中灌輸愛國主義,拒絕「錯誤的思想和意識形態」。他還強調教師自己「自律要嚴,做到課上課下一致,網上網下一致,自覺弘揚主旋律,積極傳遞正能量。 」

最近幾個月,一些教師在達不到這些期望後面臨解僱、拘留和其他處罰。 3月25日,《金融時報》報導,知名的憲法法學教授許章潤在聲望高的清華大學被停職任教。他撰寫了大量文章,尖銳而雄辯地批評了最高領導層的決定,經常利用中國古代哲學思想、文學和政治理論來表達他的觀點。許章潤教授隨後被剝奪了他的其他職位和教學任務。以研究中國農民而聞名的學者于建嵘,擁有新浪微博帳戶,該網站曾擁有720萬粉絲,4月8日該帳戶沉默了,不能再發表評論,只能讀別人的留言。

在另外兩起案件中,教育工作者面臨著以個人身份分享受迫害的法輪功信仰團體資訊而被監禁。今年1月,廣東省技術師範天河學院商業學教授曾浩在騰訊QQ消息平台發布與法輪功相關的圖片後,被判處有期徒刑3.5年。 4月15日,國際特赦組織為高中化學老師陳燕(Chen Yan音譯)發出緊急呼籲行動,她在北京街道向某人派發日曆含法輪功資訊,預計她將面臨審判。

3月初,總部設在華盛頓的維吾爾人權項目發表一份報告,概述了386名維吾爾族學者、學生們和其他知識分子的詳細情況,在針對新疆穆斯林少數民族的大規模再教育措施中,這些人已被送入拘留所。

教室內外的監控

在4月8日的一篇文章中,自由亞洲電台注意到對中國大學生的監控力度被加大了。記者在網上找到的文件顯示了武漢科技大學等機構如何不斷招募學生作為同學和老師的線人,通常向當局每兩周提交一份報告。 一位前教授說,在2013年在校園開始廣泛安裝監控攝影機不久,2014年一開始,招聘線人就開始了。

最近,在小學和中學出現了與臉部識別軟體和腦波檢測頭帶相關的監控攝影機,引起了一些學生的緊張和憤怒。雖然監測表面上是為了追蹤學生的注意力和學習習慣,但它也可以用來檢測教師或學生的意識形態違規行為。

大學、政府機構和私營公司越來越多地試圖獲得學生的社交媒體帳戶和其他線上資訊。據報導,北京和安徽省的大學的官員要求學生在騰訊微信和QQ平台上註冊他們的私人和公共帳戶的詳細資料。 2月,中青年信用管理公司(CY Credit)與共青團合作,推出了一項名為「Unictown」的申請,目標成為中國青年專業社會信用系統的基礎。 該應用程式旨在跟蹤年輕人的行為並激勵被認為是積極或有益社會的活動。據《南華早報》報導,該公司已經收集了7000萬人的數據,正在建立一個擁有9000萬青年志願者聯盟的數據庫,並且希望在幾年內覆蓋所有4.6億中國18至45歲的中國人。  

課程控制和直接灌輸

Unictown應用程式不是唯一一款針對中國年輕人的與黨有關的新手機應用程式。當中共宣傳部門於1月推出「學習強國」應用程式時,黨的媒體喉舌《人民日報》的網站、移動應用程式和社交媒體帳號上也出現了相應的年輕人版本。據《南華早報》報導,該應用程式要求「學童學習與習近平政治意識形態相關的文本」。   

在新疆,年輕的穆斯林少數民族兒童更直接接受灌輸。那些父母因「再教育」而被拘留的兒童自己被安置在國營的孤兒院,據報在那裡他們要說中文、吃豬肉,並且讀「我是中國人,我愛我的國家」這樣的口號。在某些情況下,孩子們被用來告發他們的父母。4月4日《紐約時報》的一篇關於古城喀什(Kashgar)情況的多媒體報導,其中包括一個令人不寒而慄的關於幼兒園兒童被審訊的報導。正如一位受訪者所描述的那樣,「我的女兒有一位同學說,『我的媽媽教我古蘭經。』第二天,他們就不見了。」

除了向學生灌輸共產黨意識形態外,當局還在箝制獲取其他思想,包括與民主治理相關的思想。在過去的一年裡,中國教育部對憲法教科書進行了全國范圍內審計,據報導,有改革思想的教授們所撰寫的書籍已從網路書商中被刪除。 一系列外國學術出版商遭受壓力,要在中國從某些收集作品中刪除某些文章,至少一些書商已經服從

全球範圍

共產黨的注視還都跟隨著出國留學的中國學生,無論是通過學生線人、領事館聯繫的中國學生和學者協會,還是監控微信帳號。在2018年華盛頓大學研究生Cheryl Yu進行的一項調查發現,在至少31所美國大學的72名中國受訪者中,有58%的人有意識到中共政府在美國的潛在監控情況。Yu還發現,80%的學生回覆了他們的自我審查(無論他們表明是否意識到有官方監督與否),透過選擇不參加政治敏感話題的大學活動、不與大批中國同學討論這些話題,或者甚至不承認有意願了解這些議題。

在國外的學生若超越中共紅線會有遭到嚴重報復的風險。 4月10日,《鏡報》在山東省的李家寶發表了一篇富有感情的報導,他在台灣留學期間在直播媒體上批評了中共專制系統。不久之後,他發現他的QQ、微信、淘寶和支付寶帳號都被刪除了。在他不得不返回中國的倒數前幾天,他說他做了噩夢。

影響和後果

最近來自菁英大學的馬克思主義系所的學生代表被剝削的中國工人的激進主義行為暗示了意識形態灌輸可能讓中共後院起火,他們的實際管理常常與其(所宣稱的)更為崇高的原則相衝突。許多其他年輕人可能完全拒絕或無視這種笨拙的宣傳,甚至高中學生已經阻止施加在他們身上的繁重監視,至少有一例是他們拆除了教室的攝影機。

儘管如此,中國當局努力塑造學生思想顯然取得了一些成功。年輕的中國海外留學生往往不願意探討被禁話題,而被聘為審查員的國內畢業生需要參加像1989年天安門廣場大屠殺等事件的速成課程,這表明他們對世界和國家的知識有很大的盲點。

換句話說,中國的年輕人成長在一個比他們父母一代或外國同齡人更加被操縱的資訊環境中。這一代人的思想將更不開放、更民族主義、更加支持專制統治、更加孤立在以往促進和平國際交流的事實規範的共同環境之外,這是一個非常真實的危險。

為了緩解這種後果,外國教育機構應該重新審視與中國大學的合作條款,保障他們的中國學生的學術自由和安全,並找到其他渠道讓中國學生能夠參與到21世紀教育所需的各種想法中。

薩拉庫克(Sarah Cook)是自由之家東亞資深研究分析員,《中國媒體快報》負責人。本文已於2019年4月30日發表於《風傳媒》


中共當局對推特和虛擬私人網絡的打擊升級

2018年底首次出現的警察打壓推特和虛擬私人網絡用戶(VPN)情形似乎正在擴大和升級。相對低調的用戶正在面臨報復,而那些行為以前可以被容忍,如開設帳戶、跟進海外新聞、 幫貼文按讚,或在手機上使用VPN軟體。目前尚不清楚是什麼觸發了打壓行動,或者中國當局怎麼追蹤個人帳戶,但這種轉變表明執行2017年禁止未經授權的VPN服務更為嚴厲,在全球社交媒體平台上消音和孤立中國獨立的聲音。具體而言,《金融時報》、自由亞洲電台和其他媒體已經報導了以下至少五個不同省市的案例,大多數出現在過去兩個月內:

  • 竺修遠,浙江省海寧市律師 3月份遭到警方警告他「幫多條侮辱黨和國家領導人的有害信息按讚」。
  • 一名已註冊但從未使用過「反華軟件」的匿名律師被警告,因其違反官方管理律師職業行為的規定。
  • 江蘇省蘇州市省級國家廣播公司的一名編輯被降級並扣去薪水,因為其註冊推特帳戶並跟進「非法海外網站的有害信息」。
  • 3月22日,河北省孫願平在他通過個人推特帳戶轉發了批評中國政府的內容之後,被公安以「尋釁滋事罪」拘留;他被判處七天行政拘留。
  • 3月25日,警方警告四川省蓬溪市的一名男子「不要使用非法渠道訪問國際網路」, 因在他的手機上找到了VPN軟件
  • 2018年12月,廣東省一名男子因使用規避應用程式Lantern Pro而被罰款1,000元(148美元)。

同時,在3月下旬,谷歌證實,長期以來一直有政策禁止VPN供應商在中國和其他「 非法使用此類服務器的國家/地區」 購買橫幅廣告 。希望繼續使用Twitter的用戶們可以考慮確保個人識別資訊不會在其個人簡介中被公開獲取,或從帳戶中刪除其電話號碼,並僅在電腦上使用該應用程式。


監視更新:維吾爾族面孔、被監禁者、街道清潔工、出租房屋

隨著人工智慧(AI)和其他先進的監控技術在中國傳播並被用在越來越多種入侵性方式上,新的問題也被提出 — 國際上和中國公民們也在提出 — 關於系統的道德含義。投資者面臨把他們自己和監控公司撇清關係的壓力。

  • 人工智慧和種族相貌歸類:《紐約時報》4月14日的一篇文章揭示,自2018年以來,中共當局一直在使用人臉識別技術來監視維吾爾族少數民族,不僅在新疆,而且遍及中國。人工智慧軟體驅動該系統訓練去識別維吾爾人的臉部特徵,並將其與中國漢族人群的臉部特徵區分開來。根據開發該產品的中國人工智能公司CloudWalk網站,如果鄰里居住的維吾爾人數意外增加,該系統能夠警告警方。16個省的警察部門表示有興趣獲得監測他們當地維吾爾族人口的技術。在河南省三門峽市,當地執法官員在一個月內的過程中進行了50萬次臉部掃描,以測試該系統登記維吾爾族面孔的能力。
  • 人工智能和「智能監獄」:河北省燕郊鎮的一座高規格監視監獄,已經安裝了一個安全攝像系統和由人工智能驅動的隱藏式傳感器。監控技術公司Tiandy和國內公共研究機構的聯合產品,據標榜稱能同時監控該監獄中1600名每一名被監禁者並記錄任何異常活動,而所有這些都不需要操作人員輔助。臉部識別活動分析能力使該系統能夠跟蹤鹽城監獄 — 眾多高層被拘留者的家中的個人,包括前重慶市市長薄熙來的妻子谷開來 — 並製作詳盡的每日彙報。 雖然項目代表聲稱該系統將使越獄成為過去,但批評人士指出,它可能違反尊嚴並影響受到全天監視囚犯的心理健康。 2017年自由之家的一項研究和人權律師的記錄表明,在某些情況下,當地警察對於他們同情的宗教和政治良心犯更為寬容,比他們的上司能批准的程度更高; 而廣泛使用此類型監視可能會破壞這些被監禁者偶爾得到的有限保護。
  • 監控清掃街道:中國網民憤怒地回應報導稱,自3月份以來,江蘇城市的街道清潔工已被要求佩戴手環,用來監控他們的位置並警告他們不要「怠工」。該手環是當地政府的一部分措施,以期通過實時跟蹤城市的公共清潔工以及向任何佩戴者在一個地方停留超過20分鐘就發出警告,來促進「智能清潔」。 中國的城市街道清潔工被普遍認為工資過低和工作過度,中國網路用戶嘲笑該計劃是浪費公共資源。一些人建議該計劃反而應該用在懶惰的政府官員身上。
  • 監督出租物業:網絡雜誌《寒冬》報導,自11月以來,地方當局已經命令浙江省杭州市一些房東在出租房屋的客廳安裝監視錄影機。據說警方正在對當地單位進行檢查確保安裝了安全錄影機,並向未遵守規定的房東罰款500元(75美元)。 封閉式社區還被命令在電梯中安裝監控錄影機,並在社區入口處裝有配備臉部識別軟體的錄影機。儘管居民已經抱怨侵犯了他們的隱私,這些措施一直以「維護公共安全」為理由。
  • 監管公司投資者的壓力越來越大:英國《金融時報》3月29日報導稱,美國最大的兩家養老金—紐約州教師退休系統和加州州立教師退休系統 — 持有海康威視的股份,海康威視是部分中共國家擁有的中國監控公司,同拘禁新疆穆斯林少數民族再教育營的網絡相關。在另一種明顯的合作形式中, 中國解放軍國防科技大學與美國公司谷歌和微軟的合作研究人工智能項目報告在最近幾週發表出來。在3月19日的外交政策文章中,林賽. 戈爾曼研究員(Lindsay Gorman)和「保衛民主聯盟」(Alliance for Securing Democracy)的馬特. 施拉德(Matt Schrader)警告說,如果外國投資者不能完全認識到他們的中國合作者的計畫,他們可能「最終承擔在新疆或其他地區侵犯人權的責任」。 雖然中國企業通常似乎不理會外國批評,但英國《金融時報》4月15日報導,中國人工智能公司商湯科技(SenseTime)已賣掉了其51%股權,合資企業湯立科技(Tangli Technologies) 的股權,湯立科技該公司正在建立針對維吾爾族的監控系統,商湯科技出於擔心牽連上這項備受爭議的計劃將疏遠他們首次公開募股的潛在外國投資者。​

審查更新:《人民日報》 革新,流媒體清洗,音樂和電視劇的揀選

  • 《人民日報》幫助其他媒體進行審查:3月28日,據路透社報導,共產黨喉舌《人民日報》正在增加為其網站People.cn工作的人工智能輔助網絡審查人員。 在上海上市的People.cn利用其與中共的特殊關係,也在賺取收入並吸引投資者。在有更嚴格的審查規則之時,其他網站和手機程式轉向其員工尋求指導,並推測其了解最高領導人的紅線。新聞平台《今日頭條》(Jinri Toutiao)和科技公司量子雲Liangziyun與People.cn簽署賺大錢交易,來幫助刪除違反中共的指導方針的內容。 此消息是在Supchina於3月26日發表報導之後出現的,報導稱People.cn與山東省、濟南市政府合作,將該市變為提升網站審查能力的新樞紐中心。
  • 有影響力的博主,直播流媒體被禁止:4月15日有關Technode的報導強調了數千個中國直播流媒體帳戶的消失,這是最近政府加強對此類媒體控制的例子。 2018年,政府審查機構刪除了大約5,000個涉嫌宣傳「粗俗」內容的頻道,同時其他眾平台被告知要進行更大程度的自我審查。刪除的頻道包括一些中國最受歡迎的直播流媒體,如李天佑(Li Tianyou),盧本偉(Lu Benwei),陳一發(Chen Yifa)和楊凱莉(Yang Kaili),他們的粉絲數量達到數千萬。 有些人被禁是使用了低俗語言,而其他人則嘲笑國歌或者傳播了1937-38年南京大屠殺的非官方敘述。根據《紐約時報》3月16日發布的一份報導,最近的目標還包括有影響力的部落客,如馬凌,其生活部落格於2月21日因傳播「假新聞」而被關閉。評論員王永智告訴《紐約時報》說「該黨就是不能夠容忍任何對社會產生重大影響的人。」
  • 香港歌手和電視劇受審查:30年前發行的張學友歌曲,疑似隱喻1989年6月4日的天安門大屠殺,已從蘋果音樂Apple Music的中國大陸平台上下架。 根據4月7日的立場新聞報導,1990年的歌曲刪除《人间道》似乎發生在3月28日之後。兩位香港歌手和民主活動家,何韻詩(Denise Ho)和黃耀明(Anthony Wong) ,他們的音樂從 Apple Music的中國大陸分店被刪除。這兩位名人此前公開支持香港的「佔中」抗議活動,自2014年以來一直在中國大陸不受歡迎。 另外,據英國廣播公司2月8日報導,中國最受歡迎的電視節目之一《延禧攻略》被下架播出。《延禧攻略》與其他時期的電視劇被官方媒體批評為「熱衷追崇王族生活方式, 不吝美化帝王臣相,淡化今朝英模光輝」。其他古裝戲劇也與中國媒體控制相悖。 2月29日在中共中央電視台播出《大秦帝国之崛起》被部分審查,此前網友發布截圖顯示一個兩秒鐘的影片片段,其中一個劇中人物讀出「叛徒」名單,包含習近平和其他中共高層領導人的名字。

香港:雨傘運動的判決  出現對言論自由的新威脅

4月8日,香港一家法院對香港和平佔中九名人士的案件作出判決  — 包括朱耀明牧師、戴耀廷教授和陳健民— 因為他們在 2014年和平佔中或雨傘運動中起到的作用。這九名人士在4月24日被宣判,其中四位實時入獄8至16個月,其他人接受緩刑、社區服務或延後判決。法官駁回被告的言論自由申訴,認為佔據該市最繁忙的十字路口是「無理地侵犯了他人的權利」。最近的一系列其他事態發展也表明,香港的言論自由正處於嚴重危險之中。

  • 紀念1989年天安門大屠殺博物館遭到蓄意破壞:本月早些時候,香港一紀念館遭到蓄意破壞,該館紀念在北京天安門廣場和其他地區的1989年6月大屠殺民主抗議者。博物館工作人員準備在4月26重新開放時,得到報警的警察4月7日發現前門上的鎖已被拆除,多個電源插座和總開關被鹽水淋濕, 一把椅子被打洞。香港支聯會主席何俊仁告訴記者說「做這些事情的人一定很想討好當權者。」支聯會建立了這個博物館。此後,博物館安裝了安全攝影機。
  • 蘋果日報廣告商受到恐嚇:無國界記者組織呼籲香港前特首梁振英(C.Y. Leung)停止攻擊親民主報紙《蘋果日報》(Apple Daily)及其廣告商。 自二月以來,梁振英目前擔任中共中國人民政治協商會議副主席,一個大陸政府諮詢機構 —一直在用他的臉書頁面指責該公司名字,以期他們從《蘋果日報》撤下來他們的廣告。 2018年,他向一名記者提起誹謗訴訟,該記者撰寫了他可能與組織犯罪有關的文章。同年8月,梁振英譴責香港外國記者俱樂部,因其主持一位香港獨立支持者的演講。《蘋果日報》過去也面臨對其廣告的干擾。這份報紙長期以來一直受到強大的親北京房地產行業廣告抵制的影響。2014年,《蘋果日報》報導稱,總部位於倫敦的匯豐銀行和渣打銀行在中國政府的壓力下撤回了廣告。
  • 大陸科技公司被給予電子身份證合約:據宣佈,4月2日,中國大陸平安科技公司獲得一合約,為香港政府建立電子身份識別系統(eID)。作為該地區「智慧城市藍圖」的一部分,eID系統將允許居民訪問一百種線上服務,例如登記公共住房或車輛牌照。 香港政府聲稱該系統不會存儲個人數據,並已採取措施確保該市居民的隱私。 然而,人權觀察香港辦事處已經註意到eID可能成為政府監控工具。

中國之外:插手澳洲和台灣,1989廣告,維吾爾人被網路言論攻擊,尚比亞廣播

  • 澳洲政界人士、媒體使用微信:已有人表示擔心澳洲政界人士在用騰訊微信服務進行溝通時,可能會被迫進行自我審查。 許多澳洲政界人士 — 包括總理和反對派負責人 - 都使用中國軟體來與講中文的澳洲選民溝通。然而批評者稱,使用微信可能會導致澳洲政客避免討論被中共政府視為政治敏感的議題,以避免失去其帳戶。 其中一些帳戶是使用中國電話號碼註冊的,增加了微信本身或用於建帳戶的中國人或公司可能在中共政府壓力下改變內容的風險。 斯威本大學的John Fitzgerald教授說:「我們正在進入未知領域。 微信不是為民主而設計的,民主也不能與微信合作。」
  • 澳洲當地議會終止與中國獨立媒體的合作:中共駐悉尼領事館被控施壓地方議會禁止澳洲中文報紙贊助中國新年活動。截止2018年1月的14個月期間,喬治河市政廳(Georges River Council)收到中共領事館關於《看中國》(Vision China Times的八次警告,該報定期發表有關中共政府的評論性新聞。該領事館聲稱市政廳和媒體合作關係,如果得到允許繼續合作,將損害中澳兩國關係。喬治河市政廳隨後限制了該報刊(對中國新年活動)的贊助。
  • 中國試圖通過社交媒體影響台灣選舉:在明年台灣大選之前,疑似中共政府特工已經秘密購買了受歡迎的親台臉書頁面。在網上也出現了具有親統一觀點的實時流媒體招聘廣告。這些努力似乎是中共政府影響台灣選舉的協調部署一部分。台灣政府已經對中國公司百度和騰訊的視頻流媒體服務實施了更大的限制
  • 徠卡公司撤掉天安門廣告:德國相機公司徠卡已經撤掉宣傳影片,該影片描繪了1989年試圖阻止中共軍方鎮壓民主抗議者的標誌性「坦克人」。《南華早報》(South China Moring Post的報導 4月19日,該影片發佈後,中國社交媒體禁止對徠卡公司的討論。該公司很快公開否認這部由公關公司F / Nazca Saatchi Saatchi製作的短片。影片剛好出現在1989年大屠殺30週年前幾周。
  • 共同攻擊維吾爾維權人士臉書頁面:4月10日,親北京網痞們在臉書上發起了針對維吾爾族維權人士團體的共同攻擊,用惡意仇恨評論轟炸他們的網頁。 在4月10日的一則推文中,世界維吾爾代表大會指出,許多評論僅僅貼出中共關於新疆的白皮書中的文字。同一天,該運動得到了國營小報《環球時報》的熱絡報導,該報稱襲擊者是「愛國的中國網民」與「恐怖分子」和「分裂分子」作鬥爭。
  • 在尚比亞媒體數位化變遷:中共投資尚比亞國家廣播公司從模擬到數位傳輸的轉變引發了對中共影響力日益增強的關注。據報導,尚比亞國家廣播公司(ZNBC)與中國服務提供商StarTimes建立合資企業— TopStar — 合作夥伴關係違反了該國國內法律,該國法律反對一個單一媒體實體擁有的許可證,既是內容傳播又是內容創造。該交易也未經ZNBC董事會或尚比亞議會批准,導致有腐敗嫌疑。尚比亞不是StarTimes進入的唯一地區市場。 作為中共政府軟實力的一部分,StarTimes積極與非洲各國的廣播公司合作

重點反制:中國工程師們在 GitHub上的動員

廣泛使用的代碼共享網站、軟件項目託管平台GitHub已成為中國科技職員揭露和抗議剝削性工作條件的平台。 該網站由全球3100萬軟件開發人員使用,包括中國。 這個運動始於3月下旬,當時一位用戶發布了一個存儲庫,抱怨關於996工作時間表 — 每週六天,上午9點到下午9點 — 並指名兩個需要這樣做的電子商務公司。 這篇文章使用的術語是996.ICU(基於一個笑話,即嚴厲的工作時間表會將把工人們送到醫院的重症監護室),這已成為該運動的綽號。在兩天之內,該貼文已經獲得了超過30,000顆星,這個星功能允許GitHub用戶標記他們喜歡的項目,將其推送到網站熱門頁面的頂端位置。 

到4月中旬,該貼文的星星的數量達到了23萬,並且活動向更加成熟和國際方向發展。程式開發人員開始發佈有關特別採用996工作時間表的那些公司的直接描述。 他們主張這種措施違反了中國的勞動法,這些法律將工作時間限制在44小時或者需要加班費。與此同時,上海的軟體工程師閻晗(Suji Yan)和他的妻子顧紫翬Katt Gu為996.ICU GitHub活動設計了一個免費軟件許可證。它允許公司標示出他們遵守勞動法。閻晗Yan告訴美國公共廣播電台National Public Radio,在48小時內,「許多中小型公司開始將他們的所有工作放在反996許可證上,以證明他們是一家好公司。」 

該活動也遇到了一些強烈反對。據報導,騰訊和小米等幾家大型中國科技公司的網絡瀏覽器已經封鎖了這一頁面。這可能是因為他們是採用嚴苛的996時間表的公司。到目前為止,中國政府的審查機構還沒有採取措施封鎖該網站,因為這樣做會切斷對中國的創新至關重要的大範圍系列內容和合作。

但人們仍憂慮中共政府會向擁有GitHub並在中國擁有廣泛商業利益的微軟公司施加壓力,去刪除該網頁。 為先發制人,微軟員工們和其他國際科技公司(如谷歌和TripAdvisor)的員工們於4月22日在GitHub上發表一封公開信,表達了他們和在中國的活動團結一致,並鼓勵「微軟和GitHub保持996.ICU GitHub存儲庫不受審查,每個人都可以使用。 」到4月24日,這封信已經獲得了全球軟體工程師和其他技術職員們的250個簽名


未來看點

天安門週年紀念日:在1989年6月4日中共鎮壓民主抗議活動30週年紀念日到來之前,觀察對維權人士,尤其是北京的人權活動家所增加的審查、監視、騷擾或「強迫休假」。在中國之外,留意外國政府和民間社會團體為紀念在鎮壓中遇難者們所舉辦的各種活動和公開聲明。

GitHub審查:未來看點為中共政府限制獲得GitHub或強迫微軟刪除996.ICU頁面的任何手段。

對教師和學生施加的越來越大的壓力:隨著越來越多的教育機構、科技公司和地方黨員幹部試圖實施習近平的命令,培養一代極度忠誠於共產黨的年輕人,未來看點為留心新的報復、監視手段、以及針對教師、大學生和兒童的灌輸。


行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

中国媒体快报:对学生的灌输,监督革新,在GitHub上的动员(Issue 135, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 中国共产党的最新宣传目标:年轻人的思想

新闻报道​​​

重点反制:中国工程师们在GitHub上的动员

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:中国共产党的最新宣传目标:年轻人的思想

灌输、审查和监视正在剥夺一代人的思想自由权利。

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

中共国家主席习近平希望儿童和学生不仅要服从,而且要热爱共产党。 4月19日,在政治局组织的纪念学生主导的反帝国主义五四运动100周年会议上,他:「我们需要...... 加强对广大青年的政治引领,引导广大青年自觉坚持党的领导,听党话,跟党走。」

长期以来,政治灌输一直是中国各级教育课程的必要组成部分。然而,在习近平治理之下,正在采取新的措施来加强共产党对众多大学、学校、教师们和学生们的意识形态控制。

惩罚教师们

中国共产党影响学生的系统在很大程度上取决于他们的老师和教授。 3月,在习近平于全国各地教师参加的北京研讨会的讲话中,他呼吁教育工作者要在国家青年人中灌输爱国主义,拒绝「错误的思想和意识形态」。他还强调教师自己「自律要严,做到课上课下一致,网上网下一致,自觉弘扬主旋律,积极传递正能量。 」

最近几个月,一些教师在达不到这些期望后面临解雇、拘留和其他处罚。 3月25日,《金融时报》报导,知名的宪法法学教授许章润在声望高的清华大学被停职任教。他撰写了大量文章,尖锐而雄辩地批评了最高领导层的决定,经常利用中国古代哲学思想、文学和政治理论来阐明他的观点。许章润教授随后被剥夺了他的其他职位和教学任务。以研究中国农民而闻名的学者于建嵘,拥有新浪微博帐户,该网站曾拥有720万粉丝,4月8日该帐户沉默了,不能再发表评论,只能读别人的留言。

在另外两起案件中,教育工作者面临着以个人身份分享受迫害的法轮功信仰团体信息而被监禁。今年1月,广东省技术师范天河学院商业学教授曾浩在腾讯QQ消息平台发布与法轮功相关的图片后,被判处有期徒刑3.5年。 4月15日,国际特赦组织为高中化学老师陈燕(Chen Yan音译)发出紧急呼吁行动,她在北京街道向某人派发日历含法轮功信息,预计她将面临审判。

3月初,总部设在华盛顿的维吾尔人权项目发表一份报告,概述了386名维吾尔族学者、学生们和其他知识分子的详细情况,在针对新疆穆斯林少数民族的大规模再教育措施中,这些人已被送入拘留所。

教室内外的监控

在4月8日的一篇文章中,自由亚洲电台注意到对中国大学生的监控力度被加大了。记者在网上找到的文件显示了武汉科技大学等机构如何不断招募学生作为同学和老师的线人,通常向当局每两周提交一份报告。一位前教授说,在2013年在校园开始广泛安装监控摄像头不久,2014年一开始,招聘线人就开始了。

最近,在小学和中学出现了与脸部识别软件和脑波检测头带相关的监控摄像头,引起了一些学生的紧张和愤怒。虽然监测表面上是为了追踪学生的注意力和学习习惯,但它也可以用来检测教师或学生的意识形态违规行为。

大学、政府机构和私营公司越来越多地试图获得学生的社交媒体帐户和其他在线信息。据报导,北京和安徽省的大学的官员要求学生在腾讯微信和QQ平台上注册他们的私人和公共帐户的详细信息。 2月,中青年信用管理公司(CY Credit)与共青团合作,推出了一项名为「Unictown」的申请,目标成为中国青年专业社会信用系统的基础。该应用程式旨在跟踪年轻人的行为并激励被认为是积极或有益社会的活动。据《南华早报》报导,该公司已经收集了7000万人的数据,正在建立一个拥有9000万青年志愿者联盟的数据库,并且希望在几年内覆盖所有4.6亿中国18至45岁的中国人。

课程控制和直接灌输

Unictown应用程式不是唯一一款针对中国年轻人的与党有关的新手机应用程式。当中共宣传部门于1月推出「学习强国」应用程式时,党的媒体喉舌《人民日报》的网站、移动应用程式和社交媒体账号上也出现了相应的年轻人版本。据《南华早报》报导,该应用程式要求「学生学习思想课程吸收习近平思想 」。

在新疆,年轻的穆斯林少数民族儿童更直接接受灌输。那些父母因「再教育」而被拘留的儿童自己被安置在国营的孤儿院,据报在那里他们要说中文、吃猪肉,并且读「我是中国人,我爱我的国家」这样的口号。在某些情况下,孩子们被用来告发他们的父母。 4月4日《纽约时报》的一篇关于古城喀什(Kashgar)的情况的多媒体报导,其中包括一个令人不寒而栗的关于幼儿园儿童被审讯的报导。正如一位受访者所描述的那样,「我的女儿有一位同学说,『我的妈妈教我古兰经。』第二天,他们就不见了。 」

除了向学生灌输共产党意识形态外,当局还在钳制获取其他思想,包括与民主治理相关的思想。在过去的一年里,中国教育部对宪法教科书进行了全国范围内审计,据报导, 有改革思想的教授们所撰写的书籍已从网路书商中被删除。一系列外国学术出版商遭受压力,要在中国从某些收集作品中删除某些文章,至少一些书商已经服从

全球范围

共产党的注视还都跟随着出国留学的中国学生,无论是通过学生线人、领事馆联系的中国学生和学者协会,还是监控微信帐号。在2018年华盛顿大学研究生Cheryl Yu进行的一项调查发现,在至少31所美国大学的72名中国受访者中,有58%的人有意识到中共政府在美国的潜在监控情况。Yu还发现,80%的学生说他们会自我审查(无论他们表明是否意识到有官方监督与否),透过选择不参加政治敏感话题的大学活动、不与大批中国同学讨论这些话题,或者甚至不承认有意愿了解这些议题。  

在国外的学生超越中共红线可能会有遭到严重报复的风险。 4月10日,《镜报》Mirror Media在山东省的李家宝发表了一篇富有感情的报导,他在台湾留学期间在直播流媒体上批评了中共专制系统。不久之后,他发现他的QQ、微信、淘宝和支付宝账号都被删除了。在他不得不返回中国的倒数前几天,他说他做了噩梦。

影响和後果

最近来自精英大学的马克思主义专业的学生代表被剥削的中国工人的激进主义行为暗示了意识形态灌输可能让中共后院起火,他们的实际管理常常与其(所宣称的)更为崇高的原则相冲突。许多其他年轻人可能完全拒绝或无视这种笨拙的宣传,甚至高中学生已经阻止施加在他们身上的繁重监视,至少有一例是他们拆除了教室的摄相机。

尽管如此,中国当局努力塑造学生思想显然取得了一些成功。年轻的中国海外留学生往往不愿意探讨被禁话题,而被聘为审查员的国内毕业生需要参加像1989年天安门广场大屠杀等事件的速成课程,这表明他们对世界和国家的知识有很大的盲点。

换句话说,中国的年轻人成长在一个比他们父母一代或外国同龄人更加被操纵的信息环境中。这一代人将思想更不开放、更民族主义、更加支持专制统治、更加孤立在以往促进和平国际交流的事实规范的共同环境之外,这是一个非常真实的危险。

为了缓解这种后果,外国教育机构应该重新审视与中国大学的合作条款,保障他们的中国学生的学术自由和安全,并找到其他渠道让中国学生能够参与到21世纪教育所需的各种想法中。

萨拉∙库克(Sarah Cook是自由之家东亚资深研究分析员,《中国媒体快报》负责人。本文已于2019年4月30日发表于《風傳媒》


中共当局对推特和虚拟私人网络的打击升级

2018年底首次出现的警察打压推特和虚拟私人网络用户(VPN)情形似乎正在扩大和升级。相对低调的用户正在面临报复,而那些行为以前可以被容忍,如开设帐户、跟进海外新闻、 帮贴文按赞,或在手机上使用VPN软体。目前尚不清楚是什么触发了打压行动,或者中国当局怎么追踪个人帐户,但这种转变表明执行2017年禁止未经授权的VPN服务更为严厉,在全球社交媒体平台上消音和孤立中国独立的声音。具体而言,《金融时报》、自由亚洲电台和其他媒体已经报导了以下至少五个不同省市的案例,大多数出现在过去两个月内:

  • 竺修远,浙江省海宁市律师 3月份遭到警方警告他「帮多条侮辱党和国家领导人的有害信息按赞」。
  • 一名已注册但从未使用过「反华软件」的匿名律師被警告,因其违反官方管理律师职业行为的规定。
  • 江苏省苏州市省级国家广播公司的一名编辑被降级并扣去薪水,因为其注册推特帐户并跟进「非法海外网站的有害信息」。
  • 3月22日,河北省孙愿平在他通过个人推特帐户转发了批评中国政府的内容之后,被公安以「寻衅滋事罪」拘留;他被判处七天行政拘留。
  • 3月25日,警方警告四川省蓬溪市的一名男子「不要使用非法渠道访问国际网路」, 因在他的手机上找到了VPN软件
  • 2018年12月,广东省一名男子因使用规避应用程式Lantern Pro而被罚款1,000元(148美元)。

同时,在3月下旬,谷歌证实,长期以来一直有政策禁止VPN供应商在中国和其他「 非法使用此类服务​​器的国家/地区」 购买横幅广告 。希望继续使用Twitter的用户们可以考虑确保个人识别资讯不会在其个人简介中被公开获取,或从帐户中删除其电话号码,并仅在电脑上使用该应用程式。


监视更新:维吾尔族面孔、被监禁者、街道清洁工、出租房屋

随着人工智能(AI)和其他先进的监控技术在中国传播并被用在越来越多种入侵性方式上,新的问题也被提出— 国际上和中国公民们也在提出— 关于系统的道德含义。投资者面临把他们自己和监控公司撇清关系的压力。

  • 人工智能和种族相貌归类:《纽约时报》4月14日的一篇文章揭示,自2018年以来,中共当局一直在使用人脸识别技术来监视维吾尔族少数民族,不仅在新疆,而且遍及中国。人工智慧软体驱动该系统训练去识别维吾尔人的脸部特征,并将其与中国汉族人群的脸部特征区分开来。根据开发该产品的中国人工智能公司CloudWalk网站,如果邻里居住的维吾尔人数意外增加,该系统能够警告警方。 16个省的警察部门表示有兴趣获得监测他们当地维吾尔族人口的技术。在河南省三门峡市,当地执法官员在一个月内的过程中进行了50万次脸部扫描,以测试该系统登记维吾尔族面孔的能力。
  • 人工智能和「智能监狱」:河北省燕郊镇的一座高规格监视监狱,已经安装了一个安全摄像系统和由人工智能驱动的隐藏式传感器。监控技术公司Tiandy和国内公共研究机构的联合产品,据标榜称能同时监控该监狱中1600名每一名被监禁者并记录任何异常活动,而所有这些都不需要操作人员辅助。脸部识别活动分析能力使该系统能够跟踪盐城监狱 — 众多高层被拘留者的家中的个人,包括前重庆市市长薄熙来的妻子谷开来 — 并制作详尽的每日汇报。虽然项目代表声称该系统将使越狱成为过去,但批评人士指出,它可能违反尊严并影响受到全天监视囚犯的心理健康。 2017年自由之家的一项研究和人权律师的记录表明,在某些情况下,当地警察对于他们同情的宗教和政治良心犯更为宽容,比他们的上司能批准的程度更高; 而广泛使用此类型监视可能会破坏这些被监禁者偶尔得到的有限保护。
  • 监控清扫街道:中国网民愤怒地回应报导称,自3月份以来,江苏城市的街道清洁工已被要求佩戴手环,用来监控他们的位置并警告他们不要「怠工」。该手环是当地政府的一部分措施,以期通过实时跟踪城市的公共清洁工以及向任何佩戴者在一个地方停留超过20分钟就发出警告,来促进「智能清洁」。中国的城市街道清洁工被普遍认为工资过低和工作过度,中国网路用户嘲笑该计划是浪费公共资源。一些人建议该计划反而应该用在懒惰的政府官员身上。
  • 监督出租物业:网络杂志《寒冬》报导,自11月以来,地方当局已经命令浙江省杭州市一些房东在出租房屋的客厅安装监视录影机。据说警方正在对当地单位进行检查确保安装了安全录影机,并向未遵守规定的房东罚款500元(75美元)。封闭式社区还被命令在电梯中安装监控录影机,并在社区入口处装有配备脸部识别软体的录影机。尽管居民已经抱怨侵犯了他们的隐私,这些措施一直以「维护公共安全」为理由。
  • 监管公司投资者的压力越来越大:英国《金融时报》3月29日报导称,美国最大的两家养老金—纽约州教师退休系统和加州州立教师退休系统— 持有海康威视的股份,海康威视是部分中共国家拥有的中国监控公司,同拘禁新疆穆斯林少数民族再教育营的网络相关。在另一种明显的合作形式中, 中国解放军国防科技大学与美国公司谷歌和微软的合作研究人工智能项目报告在最近几周发表出来。在3月19日的外交政策文章中,林赛. 戈尔曼研究员(Lindsay Gorman)和「保卫民主联盟」(Alliance for Securing Democracy)的马特. 施拉德(Matt Schrader)警告说,如果外国投资者不能完全认识到他们的中国合作者的计画,他们可能「最终承担在新疆或其他地区侵犯人权的责任」。虽然中国企业通常似乎不理会外国批评,但英国《金融时报》4月15日报导,中国人工智能公司商汤科技(SenseTime)已卖掉了其51%股权,合资企业汤立科技(Tangli Technologies) 的股权,汤立科技该公司正在建立针对维吾尔族的监控系统,商汤科技出于担心牵连上这项备受争议的计划将疏远他们首次公开募股的潜在外国投资者。

审查更新:《人民日报》 革新,流媒体清洗,音乐和电视剧的拣选

  • 《人民日报》帮助其他媒体进行审查:3月28日,据路透社报导,共产党喉舌《人民日报》正在增加为其网站People.cn工作的人工智能辅助网络审查人员。在上海上市的People.cn利用其与中共的特殊关系,也在赚取收入并吸引投资者。在有更严格的审查规则之时,其他网站和手机程式转向其员工寻求指导,并推测其了解最高领导人的红线。新闻平台《今日头条》(Jinri Toutiao)和科技公司量子云Liangziyun与People.cn签署赚大钱交易,来帮助删除违反中共的指导方针的内容。此消息是在Supchina于3月26日发表报导之后出现的,报导称People.cn与山东省、济南市政府合作,将该市变为提升网站审查能力的新枢纽中心。
  • 有影响力的博主,直播流媒体被禁止:4月15日有关Technode的报导强调了数千个中国直播流媒体帐户的消失,这是最近政府加强对此类媒体控制的例子。 2018年,政府审查机构删除了大约5,000个涉嫌宣传「粗俗」内容的频道,同时其他众平台被告知要进行更大程度的自我审查。删除的频道包括一些中国最受欢迎的直播流媒体,如李天佑(Li Tianyou),卢本伟(Lu Benwei),陈一发(Chen Yifa)和杨凯莉(Yang Kaili),他们的粉丝数量达到数千万。有些人被禁是使用了低俗语言,而其他人则嘲笑国歌或者传播了1937-38年南京大屠杀的非官方叙述。根据《纽约时报》3月16日发表的一份报导,最近的目标还包括有影响力的部落客,如马凌,其生活部落格于2月21日因传播「假新闻」而被关闭。评论员王永智告诉《纽约时报》说「该党就是不能够容忍任何对社会产生重大影响的人。」
  • 香港歌手和电视剧受审查:30年前发行的张学友歌曲,疑似隐喻1989年6月4日的天安门大屠杀,已从苹果音乐Apple Music的中国大陆平台上下架。根据4月7日的立场新闻报导,1990年的歌曲删除《人间道》似乎发生在3月28日之后。两位香港歌手和民主活动家,何韵诗(Denise Ho)和黄耀明(Anthony Wong) ,他们的音乐从 Apple Music的中国大陆分店被刪除。这两位名人此前公开支持香港的「占中」抗议活动,自2014年以来一直在中国大陆不受欢迎。另外,据英国广播公司2月8日报导,中国最受欢迎的电视节目之一《延禧攻略》被下架播出。 《延禧攻略》与其他时期的电视剧被官方媒体批评为「热衷追崇王族生活方式, 不吝美化帝王臣相,淡化今朝英模光辉」。其他古装戏剧也与中国媒体控制相悖。 2月29日在中共中央电视台播出《大秦帝国之崛起》被部分审查,此前网友发布截图显示一个两秒钟的影片片段,其中一个剧中人物读出「叛徒」名单,包含习近平和其他中共高层领导人的名字。

香港:雨伞运动的判决 出现对言论自由的新威胁

4月8日,香港一家法院对香港和平占中九名人士的案件做出判決  — 包括朱耀明牧师、戴耀廷教授和陈健民— 因为他们在 2014年和平占中或雨伞运动中起到的作用。这九名人士在4月24日被宣判,其中四位实时入狱8至16个月,其他人接受缓刑、社区服务或延后判决。法官驳回被告的言论自由申诉,认为占据该市最繁忙的十字路口是「无理地侵犯了他人的权利」。最近的一系列其他事态发展也表明,香港的言论自由正处于严重危险之中。

  • 纪念1989年天安门大屠杀博物馆遭到蓄意破坏:本月早些时候,香港一纪念馆遭到蓄意破坏,该馆纪念在北京天安门广场和其他地区的1989年6月大屠杀民主抗议者。博物馆工作人员准备在4月26重新开放时,得到报警的警察4月7日发现前门上的锁已被拆除,多个电源插座和总开关被盐水淋湿, 一把椅子被打洞。香港支联会主席何俊仁告诉记者说「做这些事情的人一定很想讨好当权者。」支联会建立了这个博物馆。此后,博物馆安装了安全摄影机。
  • 《苹果日报》广告商受到恐吓:无国界记者组织呼吁香港前特首梁振英(C.Y. Leung)停止攻击亲民主报纸《苹果日报》(Apple Daily)及其广告商。自二月以来,梁振英目前担任中共中国人民政治协商会议副主席,一个大陆政府咨询机构 —一直在用他的脸书页面指责该公司名字,以期他们从《苹果日报》撤下来他们的广告。 2018年,他向一名记者提起诽谤诉讼,该记者撰写了他可能与组织犯罪有关的文章。同年8月,梁振英谴责香港外国记者俱乐部,因其主持一位香港独立支持者的演讲。 《苹果日报》过去也面临对其广告的干扰。这份报纸长期以来一直受到强大的亲北京房地产行业广告抵制的影响。 2014年,《苹果日报》报导称,总部位于伦敦的汇丰银行和渣打银行在中国政府的压力下撤回了广告。
  • 大陆科技公司被给予电子身份证合约: 据宣布,4月2日,中国大陆平安科技公司获得一合约,为香港政府建立电子身份识别系统(eID)。作为该地区「智慧城市蓝图」的一部分,eID系统将允许居民访问一百种线上服务,例如登记公共住房或车辆牌照。香港政府声称该系统不会存储个人数据,并已采取措施确保该市居民的隐私。然而,人权观察香港办事处已经注意到eID可能成为政府监控工具。

中國之外:插手澳洲和台湾,1989广告,维吾尔人被网路言论攻击,赞比亚广播

  • 澳洲政界人士、媒体使用微信:已有人表示担心澳洲政界人士在用腾讯微信服务进行沟通时,可能会被迫进行自我审查。许多澳洲政界人士 — 包括总理和反对派负责人 - 都使用中国软体来与讲中文的澳洲选民沟通。然而批评者称,使用微信可能会导致澳洲政客避免讨论被中共政府视为政治敏感的议题,以避免失去其帐户。其中一些帐户是使用中国电话号码注册的,增加了微信本身或用于建帐户的中国人或公司可能在中共政府压力下改变内容的风险。斯威本大学的John Fitzgerald教授说:「我们正在进入未知领域。 微信不是为民主而设计的,民主也不能与微信合作。」
  • 澳洲当地议会终止与中国独立媒体的合作:中共驻悉尼领事馆被控施压地方议会禁止澳洲中文报纸赞助中国新年活动。截止2018年1月的14个月期间,乔治河市政厅(Georges River Council)收到中共领事馆关于《看中国》(Vision China Times)的八次警告,该报定期发表有关中共政府的评论性新闻。该领事馆声称市政厅和媒体合作关系,如果得到允许继续合作,将损害中澳两国关系。乔治河市政厅随后限制了该报刊(对中国新年活动)的赞助。
  • 中国试图通过社交媒体影响台湾选举:在明年台湾大选之前,疑似中共政府特工已经秘密购买了受欢迎的亲台脸书页面。在网上也出现了具有亲统一观点的实时流媒体招聘广告。这些努力似乎是中共政府影响台湾选举的协调部署一部分。台湾政府已经对中国公司百度和腾讯的视频流媒体服务实施了更大的限制。   
  • 徕卡公司撤掉天安门广告:德国相机公司徕卡已经撤掉宣传影片,该影片描绘了1989年试图阻止中共军方镇压民主抗议者的标志性「坦克人」。 《南华早报》(South China Moring Post)的报导 4月19日,该影片发布后,中国社交媒体禁止对徕卡公司的讨论。该公司很快公开否认这部由公关公司F / Nazca Saatchi Saatchi制作的短片。影片刚好出现在1989年大屠杀30周年前几周。
  • 共同攻击维吾尔维权人士脸书页面:4月10日,亲北京网痞们在脸书上发起了针对维吾尔族维权人士团体的共同攻击,用恶意仇恨评论轰炸他们的网页。在4月10日的一则推文中,世界维吾尔代表大会指出,许多评论仅仅贴出中共关于新疆的白皮书中的文字。同一天,该运动得到了国营小报《环球时报》的热络报导,该报称袭击者是「爱国的中国网民」与「恐怖分子」和「分裂分子」作斗争。
  • 在赞比亚媒体数位化变迁:中共投资尚比亚国家广播公司从模拟到数位传输的转变引发了对中共影响力日益增强的关注。据报导,尚比亚国家广播公司(ZNBC)与中国服务提供商StarTimes建立合资企业— TopStar — 合作伙伴关系违反了该国国内法律,该国法律反对一个单一媒体实体拥有的许可证,既是内容传播又是内容创造。该交易也未经ZNBC董事会或尚比亚议会批准,导致有腐败嫌疑。尚比亚不是StarTimes进入的唯一地区市场。作为中共政府软实力的一部分,StarTimes积极与非洲各国的广播公司合作

重点反制:中国工程师们在 GitHub上的动员

广泛使用的代码共享网站、软件项目托管平台GitHub已成为中国科技职员揭露和抗议剥削性工作条件的平台。该网站由全球3100万软件开发人员使用,包括中国。这个运动始于3月下旬,当时一位用户发布了一个存储库,抱怨关于996工作时间表 — 每周六天,上午9点到下午9点 — 并指名两个需要这样做的电子商务公司。这篇文章使用的术语是996.ICU(基于一个笑话,即严厉的工作时间表会将把工人们送到医院的重症监护室),这已成为该运动的绰号。在两天之内,该贴文已经获得了超过30,000颗星,这个星功能允许GitHub用户标记他们喜欢的项目,将其推送到网站热门页面的顶端位置。

到4月中旬,该贴文的星星的数量达到了23万,并且活动向更加成熟和国际方向发展。程式开发人员开始发布有关特别采用996工作时间表的那些公司的直接描述。他们主张这种措施违反了中国的劳动法,这些法律将工作时间限制在44小时或者需要加班费。与此同时,上海的软体工程师阎晗(Suji Yan)和他的妻子顾紫翚(Katt Gu)为996.ICU GitHub活动设计了一个免费软件许可证。它允许公司标示出他们遵守劳动法。阎晗Yan告诉美国公共广播电台National Public Radio,在48小时内,「许多中小型公司开始将他们的所有工作放在反996许可证上,以证明他们是一家好公司。」

该活动也遇到了一些强烈反对。据报导,腾讯和小米等几家大型中国科技公司的网络浏览器已经封锁了这一页面。这可能是因为他们是采用严苛的996时间表的公司。到目前为止,中国政府的审查机构还没有采取措施封锁该网站,因为这样做会切断对中国的创新至关重要的大范围系列内容和合作。

但人们仍忧虑中共政府会向拥有GitHub并在中国拥有广泛商业利益的微软公司施加压力,去删除该网页。为先发制人,微软员工们和其他国际科技公司(如谷歌和TripAdvisor)的员工们于4月22日在GitHub上发表一封公开信,表达了他们和在中国的活动团结一致,并鼓励「微软和GitHub保持996.ICU GitHub存储库不受审查,每个人都可以使用。 」到4月24日,这封信已经获得了全球软体工程师和其他技术职员们的250个签名。​


未來看点

天安门周年纪念日:在1989年6月4日中共镇压民主抗议活动30周年纪念日到来之前,观察对维权人士,尤其是北京的人权活动家所增加的审查、监视、骚扰或「强迫休假」。在中国之外,留意外国政府和民间社会团体为纪念在镇压中遇难者们所举办的各种活动和公开声明。

GitHub审查:未来看点为中共政府限制获得GitHub或强迫微软删除996.ICU页面的任何手段。

对教师和学生施加的越来越大的压力:随着越来越多的教育机构、科技公司和地方党员干部试图实施习近平的命令,培养一代极度忠诚于共产党的年轻人,未来看点为留心新的报复、监视手段、以及针对教师、大学生和儿童的灌输。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin: The survival of dissent, WeChat monitoring, smuggled videos (No. 136)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: The Remarkable Survival of Free Thought and Activism in China

The regime’s repressive efforts are increasing, but they are also failing in important ways.

By Sarah Cook

Thirty years ago this week, thousands of students occupied Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, engaging in a hunger strike to call for political and economic reform. Other citizens across the country—professors, workers, even party cadres—were slowly joining in their demands for democracy and transparency. The movement was violently crushed on the night of June 4, 1989, but over the decades that followed, a budding civil society sector began to develop and professionalize, investigative journalism and legal advocacy provoked policy changes, and the country experienced a religious revival.

Political repression, surveillance, and censorship have all intensified since 2012 under the leadership of Communist Party head Xi Jinping. Even so, various forms of protest and activism have survived and continue to emerge.

The following trends point to an environment that is highly restrictive but also more complex, and potentially less stable, than it first appears.

The chilling effect is real

Running a nonprofit advocacy organization, working as an investigative journalist, practicing one’s faith, or simply sharing a political joke with friends on social media is more difficult and risky in today’s China than it was even three years ago. Some long-standing civil society groups are closing their doors, prominent journalists are changing careers, and ordinary Chinese are more careful about their online communications.

Numerous factors have contributed to this change, but tightening controls on Tencent’s ubiquitous WeChat messaging application—including several rounds of large-scale account deletions over the past 18 months, often for relatively minor political infractions—have played a unique role in encouraging users to self-censor. Unlike with the Sina Weibo microblogging platform, which was the focus of a fierce crackdown in 2013–14, a shuttered WeChat account does not just silence the user’s public commentary. It also cuts the individual off from an entire network of contacts as well as from options for electronic payment, seriously affecting his or her ability to function normally in modern Chinese society. This powerful deterrent is far more common than other penalties like imprisonment, though jail sentences have also increased in recent years.

Self-censorship in the online world is slowly spilling over into face-to-face conversations. “It’s a dead end with friends. Nobody wants to talk about anything even remotely political,” according to one expatriate who has lived in China for over 20 years. “Today most families are careful about what they say, even to loved ones.” Foreign scholars who have attended conferences in China in recent years have similarly remarked on the narrowed space for academic discussion and the increased reticence of Chinese counterparts to frankly relay their views.

‘Dissent is not dead’

Despite this chill, scholar Elizabeth Economy wrote in an article published last month that “in critical respects, the political values and spirit of collective action embodied in the 1989 democracy movement have endured and even thrived.” She notes that despite the narrowing room for dissent under Xi, scholars continue to pen widely circulated articles calling for a political opening, and broad social movements have emerged around issues like women’s rights, labor rights, and the environment. Thousands of public protests take place across China each year, including some 1,700 documented workers’ strikes in 2018.

Another China specialist, Teresa Wright, pointed out in her 2018 book on popular protest in China that “the Chinese public is far from passive, obedient, or complacent. To the contrary, Chinese citizens often boldly, defiantly, and doggedly confront authority when they feel that their rights have been violated or that they have been treated unjustly.”

Dissent in China takes many forms and reflects a range of views. The more intellectual commentators tend to critique Xi’s policy choices and call for a return to the more open economy and society associated with some of his predecessors. Bolder activists seek to challenge the legitimacy of Communist Party rule or directly explore political alternatives. The latter have typically garnered the harshest penalties, but as repression expands to individuals who seek to improve party-state governance without challenging the system itself—including public interest lawyers and liberal economists—the prospects for such modest reform are dimming.

Meanwhile, as the screws have tightened on formal civil society organizations, the latest activist campaigns have featured loose networks of individuals joining together to call for change, often from populations that have traditionally remained silent. In fact, every time there appears to be a lull in dissent, a new source of criticism or mobilization makes itself known. Recent examples include efforts by Marxist students at top universities to assist striking workers, engineers at tech companies organizing to push back against a grinding 996 schedule (9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week), and the #MeToo movement, which at one point drew 30 million Chinese in a single month to discuss sexual harassment online.

Religious resistance on the rise

The relative potency of decentralized networks of dissent and the way in which expanding repression can generate pushback from new sources come together in another underappreciated trend: Resistance among religious believers is growing even as religious persecution increases. A key finding from a 2017 Freedom House report on religion in China was that “members of all faith communities have responded to official controls with creativity and with courage, at times scoring significant victories.”

Millions of believers defy official restrictions in their daily lives, some openly and others with great secrecy. Chinese Buddhists have resisted efforts to exploit holy sites for economic purposes. Christians and Falun Gong adherents advocate for the release of detained coreligionists. Tibetan Buddhists have marched through marketplaces calling for the return of the Dalai Lama. Uighur Muslims have used various means to document and expose harsh conditions in Xinjiang.

Some efforts extend beyond an individual religious community in an attempt to influence the beliefs and behaviors of the broader Chinese public, including party and state officials. Registered and underground church leaders have worked with rights lawyers to challenge arrests and property disputes in court. Activists have conducted trainings to increase legal awareness among congregants and made phone calls to police in an effort to discourage them from violating believers’ rights under Chinese law.

Since 2004, Falun Gong practitioners and supporters have, as a 2015 scholarly study noted, encouraged “citizens to issue ‘tuidang’ (‘withdraw from the party’) statements, symbolically severing their affiliations with the party, youth league, or young pioneers as a form of catharsis and a way to clear the conscience.” Focused as it is on the realms of spirit and culture, the “tuidang movement” does not necessarily aim to overthrow the Communist Party, but rather encourages Chinese to imagine a future without it and to renounce support for its violent tendencies. The campaign has spread by word of mouth, messages written on paper currency, and via social media and overseas websites accessible through virtual private networks (VPNs).

Resilience through technology

Both religious and secular dissidents in China confront the world’s most sophisticated system of information control. They have responded by developing complex workarounds to achieve the basic level of free communication that people in many countries take for granted.

Simply accessing uncensored news has become more difficult thanks to tightening restrictions on VPN use. Nevertheless, partial data from several developers indicate that at least 20 to 30 million people in China jumped the so-called Great Firewall in 2018. The technologists who develop and maintain the necessary circumvention tools are continually innovating to serve their users as efficiently, consistently, and securely as possible. Meanwhile, some Chinese citizens have risked prison to help install satellite dishes capable of receiving overseas content for their neighbors or to secure unregistered SIM cards.

As censorship, surveillance, and legal liabilities have increased on popular social media platforms like Sina Weibo and WeChat, netizens have turned to other spaces to mobilize and communicate with the outside world. In two examples from the past year, users posted open letters in metadata accompanying blockchain transactions, and tech workers used GitHub—an unblocked global code-sharing site—to protest harsh working conditions, garnering notable support from their international colleagues. Online crowdfunding has also helped support specific initiatives, like subway ads denouncing sexual harassment, or the broader operations of Chinese civil society organizations.

An uncertain future

People in China may be increasingly reluctant to voice public criticism of the Communist Party or Xi Jinping, or even to share politically sensitive information, but no one should underestimate the actual level of dissatisfaction with Xi’s heavy-handed rule. The sheer scale of censorship and spikes in netizen efforts to jump the Great Firewall at politically significant moments—such as the period surrounding the removal of presidential term limits in 2018—hint at a notable degree of latent dissent. Indeed, Xi’s obsession with tightening control and his tendency to abandon the party’s own past strategies for political survival belie deep insecurities within the regime.

Thirty years ago, over a million Chinese people from every walk of life took to the streets to call for greater freedom and better governance. Although it is hard to imagine a repeat of those events today, the desire for a freer, more just China lives on in the hearts and daily actions of many.

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House, director of its China Media Bulletin, and author of the Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping.This article was also published in the Diplomat on May 23, 2019.


Nationalist rhetoric, strict censorship shape coverage of US-China trade war

Over the past month, Chinese government censors remained busy stifling open discussion of the escalating trade war with the United States. In a leaked censorship directive published by China Digital Times and dated May 6, the Ministry of Public Security and the Cyberspace Administration of China ordered local public security and internet management departments to “organize personnel to control and delete rumors related to increased American tariffs on China.” Another directive from the same day prohibited all websites from “publishing news and commentary on the China-US trade war.” Such moves are not new. As tensions between the two countries rose last year, the trade war became the most heavily censored topic in a large sample of public WeChat accounts, according to researchers at the University of Hong Kong. Censorship has only increased as ongoing bilateral talks fail to bear fruit.

In addition to the impact on ordinary news consumers, state censorship has harmed China’s retail investors, according to a May 8 article from Reuters. When US president Donald Trump threatened on May 5 to raise tariffs on Chinese goods from 10 percent to 25 percent, his comments went unreported in Chinese state media despite the ensuing 5 percent plunge in Chinese stock benchmarks, leaving many individual investors in the dark about the catalyst for the drop. More sophisticated investors have also felt the effects of state censorship. A May 15 report in MarketWatch cited quantitative investors who said that media controls undermined the accuracy of algorithms they used to sift through Chinese social media posts for signals of retail investor sentiment.

As the Chinese government threatened on May 13 to respond to higher US tariffs with $60 billion in new tariffs of their own, Chinese media suddenly became increasingly vocal, nationalistic, and defensive, performing an about-face after days of conciliatory rhetoric from official sources. In a segment on the flagship evening news program of state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) that subsequently went viral, a news anchor declared, “If the US wants to fight, we’ll be with them until the end.” A May 13 editorial prominently featured by Xinhua News Agency was similarly direct: “The American side fights because of greed and arrogance.... China is fighting back to protect its legitimate rights and interests.”

State propaganda “appears to be preparing the public for a protracted and costly trade war,” wrote professor Jessica Chen Weiss in the Washington Post on May 15. Part of this preparation has involved drawing on nationalist historical narratives. For example, CCTV’s movie channel replaced regular programming with films on fighting the United States during the Korean War. According to a May 14 piece in the New York Times, “commentators have drawn comparisons between the current trade dispute and China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign powers during the colonial era.” Some netizen content has echoed the nationalistic tone, with many users sharing a privately produced militant song about the trade war.

Despite these bold words, China may be in a weaker position than the Communist Party would like to admit. Writing in the New York Times on May 7, Hong Kong commentator and professor Yi-Zheng Lian speculated that in the first great test of Sino-US ties, President Xi Jinping may have mismanaged the situation by overreaching in his attempt to challenge the United States, which could undermine his legitimacy.


Surveillance updates: Xinjiang police app, new data leaks, WeChat keyword monitoring

  • Reverse-engineered policing app from Xinjiang: On May 2, Human Rights Watch released a reverse-engineered version of an application that Chinese police use to categorize and surveil the population in Xinjiang. The app, which is connected to the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, allows police to collect the personal data of ethnic minority Muslims in the region, including blood type, political affiliation, and whether a person’s phone includes secure communications applications like WhatsApp or Telegram, or tools used to jump China’s so-called Great Firewall and reach the uncensored internet. People are classified according to 36 suspicious personality types, which include those who have stopped using smartphones, people who enthusiastically collect donations for mosques, and even those believed to be “using an abnormal amount of electricity.” According to Human Rights Watch, “based on these broad and dubious criteria, the system generates lists of people to be evaluated by officials for detention.” It adds that although the Xinjiang-based tracking and database system is particularly intrusive, its basic design matches others that police are planning to implement throughout China.
  • Beijing smart-city data leak: In the latest example of a public surveillance system with shoddy data security, researcher John Wethington discovered an unsecured Chinese smart-city database hosted by Alibaba, as Tech Crunch reported on May 3. The database contains the personal information of hundreds of people in two housing districts in eastern Beijing, including facial recognition files that collate individuals based on approximate age and even ethnicity. The system also reportedly pulls in data from police to alert managers about people of interest or criminal suspects, with labels such as “drug addict.” In a May 3 tweet, Beijing correspondent Emily Feng of US National Public Radio noted that the database is also linked to sensors that scan mobile devices and computers in the neighborhood.
  • Keywords trigger WeChat monitoring inside, outside China:On April 22, researcher Victor Gevers of GDI Foundation revealed that WeChat is filtering billions of messages for “review” based on keyword triggers. He noted that “not all the dialogues were in Chinese or only had GPS coordinates in China.” For example, on March 18 alone, 3.6 billion messages in Chinese, 59 million in English, and 26 million in other languages were captured and routed to operators. Keywords triggering capture of the entire conversation included “Xi Jinping,” “CCP,” “1989,” and “Tibet.” While the majority of the messages were sent in China, some 19 million English-language messages were captured from users around the globe, including people in North America, Europe, South America, Taiwan, and Australia. 

Censorship updates: Tiananmen anniversary run-up, labor activism, Sichuan earthquake

  • Internet censorship and “rectification” on rise ahead of June 4 anniversary: Chinese authorities are expanding supervision of online and social media platforms as they attempt to crack down on illicit and politically sensitive content in the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, in which the military opened fire on peaceful Beijing protesters on June 4, 1989. The website of the photo and media agency Visual China Group was relaunched on May 12 after undergoing “rectification” and establishing a content review agreement with the Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily. As part of the agreement, users will be able to report “harmful” material, including political content, to the agency. This follows reports that on May 11, mobile dating applications Momo and Tantan suspended their social newsfeed functions for a month on orders from the government. Access to uncensored material beyond China’s so-called Great Firewall has also been curtailed. The Chinese government has shut down hundreds of virtual private network (VPN) servers over the last month, according to a May 6 report on Blokt, although many free circumvention tools continue to function. The BBC reported on May 14 that versions of Wikipedia in all languages have been blocked in China since late April. Previously, only the Chinese-language version and non-Chinese articles related to sensitive topics like the Dalai Lama were inaccessible in the country.
  • Censors, police target online labor-rights activism: The censorship and repression of labor activists has intensified under President Xi Jinping. Wei Zhili, editor of the labor rights website ilabour.net, was arrested on March 19 in Guangzhou for “disturbing public order.” His colleague Ke Chengbing has disappeared and is believed to be held by police, while Yang Zhengjun, editor in chief of the workers’ rights website New Generation, has been detained since January 8. Other activists have also disappeared. Wuqiong Wenqing, the former editor of a left-wing feminist website whose work focused heavily on workers’ rights, has been missing since May 8 after being detained by police in Beijing. On May 12, the South China Morning Post reported that police in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen raided the offices of civil society organizations focused on worker and migrant rights, with members of each organization arrested. Government authorities instructed media outlets on April 21 not to report or comment on the case of Marxist student activists detained by police for their support of Jasic Technology workers in Shenzhen. Censors have even blocked material satirizing Alibaba founder and Communist Party member Jack Ma’s support for the “996” work pattern; a broader movement has lobbied against the schedule, which entails working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. each day and six days a week. Alongside students, workers notably played an important role in the 1989 prodemocracy protests, whose anniversary may be contributing to this new wave of official wariness about labor activism.
  • Sichuan earthquake still sensitive 11 years later: Official media have played down the 11th anniversary of the deadly 2008 Sichuan earthquake. On May 11 parents of students killed in the earthquake attempted to publicly commemorate the tragedy in Dujiangyan, a county-level city within Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, but they were surrounded and beaten by local authorities, with many subsequently hospitalized. Parents who agreed to media interviews in the past have been placed under round-the-clock surveillance by the police in the lead-up to the anniversary. Despite government efforts to present the quake in a positive light as the beginning of a new era of “volunteerism” in China, censorship of online discussion about the disaster remains pervasive.

HONG KONG: Tensions rise over extradition law amendments

Proposed revisions to Hong Kong ordinances that would facilitate extradition to mainland China have elicited fierce resistance from Hong Kong civil society. As many as 130,000 protesters took to the streets on April 28 to protest the amendments, which, if passed, would permit Hong Kongers and foreigners working or living in the territory to be sent to face trial in China's notoriously flawed judicial system. Members of the local artistic community have also expressed fear that the agreement could undermine creative freedom in the territory. Scuffles between opponents and supporters of the bill broke out in the Hong Kong legislature on May 11, with one member of the prodemocracy camp falling and being taken away on a stretcher. Despite the opposition, the South China Morning Post reported on May 14 that Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam is “doubling down” on her support for the bill, believing that failure to pass it would undermine her authority. For its part, the Chinese government has defended the bill, with the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Zhang Xiaoming, describing it as “necessary, appropriate, lawful, and reasonable” during a meeting with a Hong Kong think tank on May 15.

Concerns about the bill have also been raised by the US government. On May 7, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a brief criticizing the proposed amendments, noting that they may negatively affect US interests in Hong Kong. Local opponents of the bill have also brought their message to Washington. Testifying before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Hong Kong Democratic Party founder and former lawmaker Martin Lee warned that the bill could permit the kidnapping and extradition to China of American citizens living in Hong Kong. In a May 15 op-ed for the Washington Post, Lee called on “the world to act to protect Hong Kong’s free society and legal system.”

Against this backdrop, members of Hong Kong's 2014 Umbrella Movement continue to be jailed, reinforcing fears that politically motivated charges may increase should the extradition bill come into force. An estimated 100 such activists have been convicted by Hong Kong courts, and one of them, former protest leader Joshua Wong, is scheduled to return to prison for two months following the recent rejection of his appeal. In a sign of the deteriorating international reputation of Hong Kong’s judicial system, news emerged on May 21 that Germany had granted asylum to two political activists wanted by Hong Kong police.


BEYOND CHINA: US TV drama, NGO landlord, Taiwan and Dutch media, Ecuador cameras, Nepal journalists

  • CBS censors The Good Fight segment: The US television network CBS decided to censor an episode of the legal drama The Good Fight out of concern that it would offend Chinese authorities, the New York Times reported on May 8. An animated segment in the program—which discussed Chinese government censorship of sensitive topics like the Tiananmen Square massacre and deceased Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo—was removed and replaced with a black screen and text reading “CBS has censored this content.” Despite the network’s self-censorship, the episode (and in some cases, the whole season) has reportedly been removed from streaming websites in China, such as Douban and American Drama Everyday, because of its depiction of mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang. The Good Wife, another CBS program of which The Good Fight is a spinoff, was banned from online streaming platforms in China in 2014.
  • Chinese firm vetoes Amnesty International office lease in New York: According to a May 13 report in the New York Times, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, has refused to rent office space in a building they own in New York City to the US branch of Amnesty International. The organization regularly publishes research on human rights abuses in China. A representative of a Cosco subsidiary reportedly informed Amnesty that it was “not the best tenant for a building owned by a Chinese SOE.”
  • Taiwan media execs attend China gathering:Dozens of representatives from Taiwanese media organizations attended the Chinese government’s Fourth Cross-Strait Media People Summit in Beijing on May 10. The summit aimed to discuss how media in China and Taiwan could promote “peaceful reunification” and the “1992 Consensus.” Participants came from a range of television, radio, print, and online media outlets, including major pro-China entities like United Daily News, China Times, TVBS, and CTiTV, as well as members of local and national press and broadcast associations. In response, the deputy director of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, Ko Cheng-heng, stated that the Chinese government did not have the right to direct the activities of Taiwanese media.
  • Dutch publisher censors Xinjiang book review: Timothy Grose, a professor of Chinese studies, claimed in a May 13 article in the Los Angeles Review of Books’ China Channel that his review of a book about Xinjiang was censored by the editors of an academic journal at the respected Dutch publishing house Brill. While the review of Tom Cliff's Oil and Water was originally commissioned by the journal, China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies, in early 2018, it was ultimately rejected for publication due to Grose’s explicit discussion of the reeducation camps in Xinjiang. The editor of the journal, Han Xiaorong, is a professor at Hong Kong Polytechnic University with a history of defending Communist Party policies in Xinjiang.
  • Ecuador using Chinese surveillance tech: China has supplied Ecuador with an extensive system of 4 200 security cameras that can be used to surveil the country’s population, the New York Times reported on April 24. The system, built by Chinese state-backed companies CEIEC and Huawei, is similar to those already deployed in China. Activists have expressed fears that such surveillance networks would allow authoritarian-leaning governments to engage in greater acts of domestic repression. The cameras in Ecuador have reportedly been ineffective at reducing crime, their stated purpose, partly because that would require far more police manpower to monitor video feeds. However, evidence indicates that under former president Rafael Correa, national intelligence agencies known for persecuting government opponents had access to the Chinese-built system. Similar networks have reportedly been sold to governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Angola.
  • Nepal state media investigating journalists over Dalai Lama reference: According to a May 14 report by the Hong Kong Free Press, Nepal’s national news agency RSS is investigating three journalists for circulating a news item about the Dalai Lama’s discharge from a hospital in April. The investigation comes as diplomatic and economic ties are growing between Nepal and China. The chairman of RSS, Hari Adhikari, was quoted by Hong Kong Free Press as saying, “We don’t carry news that is against the foreign policy of our country and affects the relationship with our neighbors.” RSS has long had a content-exchange agreement with China’s official Xinhua News Agency. 

FEATURED PUSHBACK: Smuggled video footage

On May 20, Fox News aired a television segment about a Chinese family trying to retrieve the body of a relative who had been killed in police custody in China after being detained for practicing Falun Gong, the banned spiritual movement. The segment included secretly recorded video of the deceased woman’s brother-in-law confronting officials and being told that the body would be released if the family admitted that she died “naturally.” The report also covered a more recent episode from November 2018, showing video of a wife crying over the frail body of her husband, also a Falun Gong adherent, in a hospital where he had died after abuse in custody. Yu Ming, an entrepreneur who recently fled China for the United States, recorded these clips as well as others from inside organ transplant hospitals and the notorious Masanjia labor camp. He displayed for reporters a watch and car keys that held hidden cameras.

Yu’s videos are part of a larger effort by Chinese activists and foreign journalists to obtain sensitive footage from within China, particularly of detention facilities and prisoners of conscience, and circulate it abroad. On May 7, CNN posted a segment by China correspondent Matt Rivers showing the high walls and barbed wire of various camps in Xinjiang where an estimated one million members of Muslim minorities are being held for “reeducation.” The piece also depicts police efforts to obstruct the journalists, including a forced dinner with officials replete with folk music. It is clear that some of the video was filmed secretly with a device other than a visible professional television camera. Other recent examples can be found on the YouTube channel of Bitter Winter, a religious freedom website with a network of contacts in China. They include a series of videos of church demolitions in Henan Province earlier this month that show believers crying, praying, and confronting authorities; images of Buddhist statues that have been plastered over to prevent believers from worshipping; and a mosque demolition in Gansu Province.

Foreign journalists who record secretly risk being briefly detained, having their work destroyed, and being denied future visas to cover the world’s second-largest economy. Chinese citizens engaging in this activity face far greater repercussions, including potential imprisonment and torture. Despite the risks, however, Chinese activists continue to smuggle out first-hand video footage of abuse, in part because of its potential utility for raising international awareness and even ending repression if used to pressure the Chinese government.


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

Censorship related to Wang Quanzhang’s condition in prison: On May 20, the wife of jailed Chinese human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang met with authorities at Linyi Prison in an effort to see her husband. Wang was detained in July 2015 and held incommunicado for over three years before being sentenced in January to 4.5 years in prison for his work defending dissidents. Li was denied access to Wang but told reporters that officials showed her a disturbing three-minute video in which he appeared thinner, with greying hair, nervous gestures, and a stammer. Watch for increased international pressure on Chinese authorities to permit Li to see Wang and any censorship related to new information on his condition.

Huawei access to US technology: In the latest blow to Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s reputation and operations, on May 16 the Trump administration added the company to a blacklist of firms with restricted access to American technology. Within days, Google announced that it would be suspending any business with Huawei that requires the transfer of hardware, software, and technical services other than those involving open-source licensing, a move that could hobble Huawei’s global smartphone business. On May 21, the US Department of Commerce issued a notice that Huawei would be allowed to support existing products for 90 days. Watch for the company’s final status on the blacklist and the practical ramifications should its US business dealings be restricted.

CGTN investigations in Britain: On May 8, British regulators launched an investigation into whether the confession of a British man on Chinese national television, aired in China and abroad, violated the British Broadcasting Code. The following day, a second investigation was launched based on a complaint filed by Angela Gui, daughter of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, who made several confessions on Chinese state television after being abducted from Thailand amid a larger crackdown on Hong Kong booksellers in 2015; he remains in Chinese custody. Such televised confessions by journalists, lawyers, businesspeople, and others have emerged as a common phenomenon under Xi Jinping’s rule. The British investigations center on China Global Television Network (CGTN), the international arm of state broadcaster China Central Television. Watch for the outcome of the probes and potential penalties for CGTN, which may include revocation of its broadcast license and large fines. 


TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中國媒體快報:異見的倖存、監控微信、秘密錄影(Issue 136, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:倖存於中國:令人矚目的自由思想與維權行動

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制​秘密錄像

未來看點

行動起來!


本期分析:倖存於中國:令人矚目的自由思想與維權行動

中共政權的箝制手段正在增加,但也在重要方面走入敗相。

作者:薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook) 

三十年前的這一週,數千名學生佔領了北京市中心的天安門廣場,參加了絕食抗議,要求中國政治和經濟改革。全國各地的其他公民 — 教授、工人,甚至是中共黨內幹部 — 慢慢加入到他們對民主和透明度的訴求中。1989年6月4日晚,該運動遭到暴力鎮壓,但在接下來的幾十年裡,一個正在萌芽的民間社會團體開始發展和專業化,調查性新聞工作和法律倡議引發政策改變,並經歷了一個宗教信仰的復甦。

自2012年共產黨領導人習近平上台後,政治鎮壓、監控和審查都在加劇。即便如此,各種形式的抗議和維權行動仍然存在並持續出現。

以下趨勢指出中國目前的環境具有高度限制性,但比其表面上看来更複雜和具潛在不穩定性。

不寒而慄的影響是真實的

在今天的中國,經營一個非營利性的倡議組織、做為一名調查記者、實踐一個人的信仰,或者只是在社交媒體上與朋友分享一個政治玩笑,比三年前更加困難和冒險。一些長期維持的民間社會團體正在關門、著名的記者們正在改變職業,而普通中國人對他們網路上的溝通更加小心謹慎。

眾多因素促成了這一變化,但在騰訊無處不在的微信通訊軟體上所加緊的控制 — 包括過去18個月,針對通常相對較小的政治違規的幾輪大規模帳戶刪除— 已在鼓勵用戶自我審查方面發揮了獨特的作用。新浪微博平台是2013 -14年嚴厲箝制的重點,與新浪微博平台不同,一個關閉的微信賬號不僅僅讓用戶的公開評論沉默消音,還切斷其與整個網路的聯絡以及電子支付選擇,嚴重影響他或她在現代中國社會中正常生活的能力。這種強大的威懾力遠比像監禁等其他懲罰手段更普遍,雖然近年來監獄刑罰也有所增加。

網路世界的自我審查正逐漸蔓延到面對面的對話中。「這和朋友來說是個死胡同。 沒有人願意談論任何事情哪怕是和政治沾一點邊的問題,」據一位在中國生活了20多年的外籍人士稱,「今天,大多數家庭都對他們所說的話非常小心,甚至是對親人。」近年來在中國參加會議的外國學者也同樣察覺到學術討論的狹窄空間以及中國同行更加沈默,不願意坦率表達他們的觀點。

不同見解並未死亡」

儘管存在這種不寒而慄,學者伊麗莎白·易科那米(Elizabeth Economy)在上個月發表的一篇文章中寫道,「在重要方面,1989年民主運動所體現的集體行動的政治價值觀和精神已經堅持下来,甚至茁壯成長。」她指出,儘管在習近平治理期間允許異議的空間有所縮小,但學者們繼續撰寫廣泛流傳的文章,呼籲政治開明,也出現了廣泛的圍繞婦女權利、勞工權利和環境保護等議題的社會運動。每年在中國各地發生數以千計的公眾抗議活動,其中包括2018年1700次紀錄在冊的工人罷工

另一位中國專家特蕾莎·賴特(Teresa Wright)在她2018年出版的書《中國民眾的抗議(Popular Protest in China)》中指出,「中國民眾遠非消極、順從或自满。相反,當他們感到他們的權利受到侵犯或受到不公正對待時,中國公民經常大膽、反抗、頑強地面對強權。」

在中國的不同見解有多種形式,反映了一系列觀點。更多的知識分子評論員傾向於批評習近平的政策選擇,並呼籲回歸於與一些前國家領導人執政時期相關的更開放的經濟和社會。大膽的維權人士試圖挑戰共產黨統治的合法性或直接探索其他的政治選擇。後者通常會獲得最嚴厲的懲罰,但隨著壓制擴大到尋求改善黨國治理而不挑戰制度本身的個人—包括公共利益律師和自由派經濟學家—這種溫和改革的前景是黯淡的。

同時,當箝制對正式的公民社會團體收緊時,後來的維權活動主要是在鬆散的個人網路互動來呼籲改變,經常來自傳統上保持沉默的人群。事實上,每當一些異議看起來暫時平息時,新的批評或動員的消息都會讓人知道。最近的例子包括頂尖大學的學習馬克思主義的學生為幫助罷工工人們所做的努力,包括科技公司的工程師們組織反擊難以忍受的996工作制(上午9點到晚上9點,每週六天),以及#MeToo運動,#MeToo運動在僅一個月內吸引了3000萬中國人在網上討論性騷擾問題。

宗教信仰抗爭日益增加

將異議人士的聯繫網絡分散化和對他們擴展的打壓活動,是相對有力的,但這也能催生來自新源頭的抗爭,這些源頭聯合起來形成另一種被作用低估的趨勢:當宗教迫害還在加劇時,宗教信徒的抵制卻在增強。一份2017年「自由之家報告」對中國宗教的主要發現表明,「因應官方的控制,所有信仰團體成員的回應是既有創意又具勇氣,有時還取得了顯著的勝利。」

數百萬計的信眾在他們的日常生活中違抗官方限制,有些是公開的,有些是在極度保密的情形下進行的。中國佛教徒已在抵制利用宗教聖地來斂財的做法。基督徒法輪功學員要求釋放被拘留的教友。西藏佛教徒在各集市遊行,要求達賴喇嘛歸來。新疆維吾爾人用各種辦法來記錄和揭露新疆的嚴苛形勢。

一些做法超出了一個單一的宗教社區,目的是影響更多中國公眾 - 包括黨和國家幹部 - 的信仰和行為。註冊的教會和地下教會的領袖與維權律師一道,在法庭上挑戰逮捕和財產糾紛。維權人士組織培訓來增加群眾的法律意識,並打電話給警察,根據中國的法律勸阻他們不要再做違背信仰權利的事情。

如劍橋大學出版書刊登的2015年學者研究所述,自2004年起,法輪功的學員和支持者已在鼓勵「公民發表退黨聲明,形式上斷絕他們和共產黨、共青團或少先隊的關係,以求淨化自己和良心清白。」 就其本身而言,三退運動是集中在精神與文化領域,並未一定旨在推翻共產黨,而更多是在鼓勵中國人去想像沒有共產黨的中國是什麼樣,並拒絕支持中共的種種暴力行徑。這場運動是通過口耳相傳、在紙幣上寫相關短句,以及透過社交媒體和以虛擬個人網絡(VPN)登入眾多海外網站來傳播的。

技術助力的頑強抗爭

中國的宗教和民間異議人士都在對抗這個世界上最精密的資訊控制體系。他們已通過開發複雜的反封鎖方法來得到在許多國家理所當然的基本水平的溝通自由。  

由於當局對虛擬私人網絡(VPN)使用的限制加強,僅僅是得到不受審查的新聞已變得日益困難。儘管如此,從幾家開發者的部分數據顯示,在2018年,至少有兩、三千萬的中國網民翻過了所稱的 「網路長城」。那些開發和維護必要翻牆軟體的技術人員們不斷創新,以使得他們的用戶們能夠有效地、持續地、安全地突破封鎖。一些中國公民冒著坐牢的風險,幫助他們的鄰居安裝可以接收海外內容的衛星天線,或幫他們加強未註冊的上網卡的安全性。

隨著在一些通用的社交媒體平台如新浪微博和微信上的審查、監視和吃官司的增加,網民們轉到其它空間來動員和與外部世界聯絡。去年有兩起例子,一起是用戶們在進行區塊鏈(blockchain)交易的大數據平台上發布公開信;另一起是技術員工利用未被封鎖的全球程序共享網站GitHub來抗議惡劣的工作環境,都引起了他們的國際同仁顯著的支持。網路眾籌資金也在幫助支持一些特定的行動,如地鐵廣告譴責性騷擾,或是中國公民社會組織的更廣泛的運作。

不明確的未來

在中國的人們可能越來越不願表達他們對共產黨或習近平的公開批評,甚至也不願分享政治敏感資訊,但任何人都不應該低估人們對習近平的鐵腕政策的實際不滿程度。單是在政治敏感時期的審查規模和此時網民們翻過防火牆的次數劇增—如2018年取消國家主席任期期限—就暗示潛在的不滿到了引人注目的程度。事實上,習近平致力於加緊控制和他拋棄中共過去在政治上度過危機的策略,已暴露了這個政權的不安定。

三十年前,來自社會各行業的超過一百萬中國人走上街頭,呼籲有更多的自由和更好的政府。儘管還很難想像今天會有同樣的情形再現,但渴望更自由、更法治的中國,一直長存於許多中國人的內心和日常行動中。

薩拉庫克為自由之家東亞事務資深研究分析員兼其《中國媒體快報》主任、《中國靈魂爭奪戰:習近平治下的宗教復興、壓制和抵抗》作者。本文已於5月28日發表於《風傳媒》

圖片說明: 2019年3月家長們抗議在四川省成都市一所學校發現的發霉食品。圖片來源Weibo via SCMP


民族主義言論、嚴格的審查制度影響美中貿易戰的報導

在過去一個月中,中共政府審查機構仍在忙著封殺與美國不斷升級的貿易戰的公開討論。在《中國數字時代》發表於5月6日的洩密審查指令中,中共公安部和中共國家互聯網信息辦公室命令當地公安部門和網路管理部門「接此通知,立刻組織人手控制和刪除有關美國加徵中國關稅的一切傳言和謠言」。同一天的另一項指令禁止所有論壇和網站「各網站禁止發布中美貿易戰有關的任何消息和評論」,這些舉動並非新鮮事。據香港大學的研究人員稱,由於去年兩國之間的緊張局勢有所上升,貿易戰成為大量公共微信帳戶中審查最嚴重的話題。由於正在進行的雙邊談判未能取得成果,審查只能增加。

除了對普通新聞讀者的影響之外,國家審查還損害了中國的零售投資者。據路透社5月8日一篇文章稱, 當美國總統川普於5月5日稱要將中國商品的關稅從10%提高到25%時,儘管隨後中國股市基準價格暴跌5%,但川普的言論在中共官方媒體中沒有得到報導,令許多個人投資者被蒙在鼓裏,不知是什麼造成了這樣的下跌。更成熟的投資者們也感受到了國家審查的影響。Market Watch發表的 5月15日的報告引用量化投資者們的話,他們表示媒體的控制破壞了他們用來篩選中國社交媒體貼文算法的準確性,以期尋找零售投資者觀點的信號。

由於中國政府在5月13日威脅要以600億美元新關稅回應美國關稅上漲,中共媒體突然變得越來越強硬、民族主義和戒備,在官方的和解言論發布幾天之後變臉。在國家電視台中共中央電視台(CCTV)的晚間新聞節目隨後在網路爆傳,一新聞主播宣稱:「面對美國的軟硬兩手,中國也早已給出答案:談,大門敞開;打,奉陪到底。」。新華社顯著刊登5月13日社論同樣直截了當:「當美國為『貪婪和傲慢」而戰時,中國為捍衛『其合法權益」而戰。」

國家宣傳「似乎正在為公眾進行長期和昂貴的貿易戰做準備」,《華盛頓郵報》在5月15日發表的傑西卡·陳·威斯(Jessica Chen Weiss)教授文章寫道。這些準備一部分已經涉及借鑒民族主義的歷史敘事。 例如,中央電視台的電影頻道以在朝鮮戰爭期間與美國作戰的電影取代了常規節目。據《紐約時報》5月14日的一篇文章,「評論家們將目前的貿易爭端與中國在殖民時代的外國勢力手中被羞辱進行了比較。」一些網友的內容與民族主義基調相呼應,許多用戶分享關於貿易戰的私人製作的激進歌曲

儘管使用這些大膽的語言,中國可能處於比共產黨願意承認的更弱的位置。香港時事評論員和教授練乙錚(Yi-Zheng Lian)於5月7日在《紐約時報》撰文時推測,在中美關係的第一次重大考驗中,習近平主席可能因為試圖過度挑戰美國而對形勢處理失當,這或許會破壞他的合法性。


監視更新:新疆警方應用程式、新數據洩露、微信關鍵詞監控

  • 來自新疆的逆向工程警務應用程式5月2日,人權觀察發佈了一個逆向工程版本的應用程式,中國警方用它來對新疆人口進行分類和監視。該應用程式與綜合聯合操作平台相連,允許警方收集該地區少數民族穆斯林的個人數據,包括血型、政治派別,以及某人的電話是否包含安全的通信應用程式WhatsApp或Telegram等,或者有用來翻越中國「長城防火牆」的工具來接觸未經審查的網路資訊。人們被依照36種可疑的的特性進行分類,其中包括已停止使用智能手機的人、熱心收集清真寺捐款的人,甚至那些被認為「使用大量電力」的人。根據人權觀察,「基於這些廣泛而可疑的標準,該系統生成了將由官員評估拘留的人員名單」。它補充說,雖然新疆的跟蹤和數據庫系統特別具有侵入性,但其基本設計與警方計劃在全中國實施的其他設計相匹配。
  • 北京智能城市數據洩露:據Tech Crunch於5月3日報導,最新的由劣等數據安全組成的公共監控系統示例中,研究人員John Wethington發現了一個由阿里巴巴主辦的不安全的中國智能城市數據庫。該數據庫包含北京東部兩個住宅區數百人的個人數據庫資料,包括人臉識別文件,根據大致的年齡甚至種族來比對不同的人。據報導,該系統還從警察處獲取數據,通知管理人員針對感興趣的人或犯罪嫌疑人,並標有「吸毒者」等標籤。在一條5月3日推文中,美國國家公共廣播電台的北京記者Emily Feng指出,該數據庫也連接到會掃描社區的手機和電腦的傳感器。
  • 關鍵詞觸發中國境內和境外的微信監控:4月22日,GDI基金會研究員Victor Gevers透露,微信正在根據關鍵詞觸發器過濾數十億條該被「審核」的訊息。 他指出,「並非所有的對話都是中文的,也並非只有GPS定位在中國[的訊息會被過濾]。」例如,僅在3月18日,就有36億條中文訊息、5900萬條英文訊息和2600萬條其他語言訊息被捕獲並發送至運營者。促使整個對話被擷取的關鍵詞包括「習近平」、「中共」、「1989」和「西藏」。雖然大部分訊息是在中國發送出的,但是大約有1900萬條被捕獲的英文訊息來自全球用戶,包括在北美、歐洲、南美、台灣和澳洲的人。​

審查更新:天安門週年紀念、勞工維權活動、四川地震

  • 網路審查和「糾正」在6月4日週年前增加:中共當局正在擴大對網路和社交媒體平台的監管,因為他們試圖封殺被禁的和政治上敏感的內容,在即將到來的天安門廣場大屠殺事件30週年,也就是1989年6月4日中共軍隊向和平的北京請願者們開槍。圖片和媒體機構「視覺中國」(Visual China Group)於 5月12日結束整改,重新啟動網站運營,並與中共報紙《人民日報》簽署一內容審查協議。作為協議的一部分,用戶將能夠向該機構報告「有害的」資料,包括含政治內容的材料。這是繼5月11日的報導,在中國的約會應用程式陌陌和探探,根據政府的命令暫停了用戶在其平台上發送社交新聞的功能一個月。在審查嚴密的中國「長城防火牆」之外訪問不受審查的資料也受到了限制。據5月6日 Blokt上的報導,中共政府已經在上個月關閉了數百個虛擬私人網絡(VPN)服務器,儘管許多免費翻牆工具仍在繼續開通。英國廣播公司(BBC)於5月14日報導,自4月下旬以來,維基百科所有語言的版本在中國都被封鎖。此前,只有中文版和像達賴喇嘛等敏感話題有關的非中文文章在中國無法訪問。
  • 審查者、警察瞄準線上勞工維權活動:在習近平主席治理之下,對勞工維權活動家的審查和鎮壓在加劇。中國勞工維權網站(ilabour.net)的編輯危志立於3月19日在廣州因「涉嫌擾亂公共秩序」被捕。他的同事柯成冰已經失蹤,據信被警察拘留。而楊鄭君,勞工維權網站《新生代》的編輯自1月8日起已被拘捕。其他維權人士也已被失蹤。吳瓊文倩,女權網站 《破土網》前主编,其工作重點關注工人權利,自5月8日被北京警方拘留後已被失蹤。 5月12日,《南華早報》報導,北京、廣州和深圳的警方突擊搜捕了以工人和移民權利為重點的民間團體辦公室,並逮捕了每個成員。中共當局於4月21日指示媒體不要報導或評論被警方拘留的馬克思主義學生維權人士對深圳佳士科技公司工人的支持。審查員甚至封堵了諷刺阿里巴巴創辦人和共產黨員馬雲支持「996」工作制的訊息;封堵了一個更廣泛的反對996工作制運動,此工作制為從上午9點工作到晚上9點,每週六天。同學生一起,工人在1989年的民主抗議活動中發揮了重要作用,1989年周年紀念活動可能助長官方對勞工維權的新一輪防範。
  • 四川地震在11年後仍然敏感:官方媒體已經刻意淡化了2008年四川發生的致命性地震11週年。5月11日,地震中遇難的學生家長們試圖公開去現場紀念發生在四川省首府成都市的縣級城市,都江堰市,的悲劇,但他們被當地官方人士圍堵和毆打,其中許多人在之後住院治療。過去同意接受媒體採訪的家長們在周年紀念日前已被警方全天候監視。儘管政府努力以積極的態度展現地震,開始中國新時代「志願服務」,但關於這場災難的網路討論的審查仍然無所不在

香港:《逃犯條例》修正案引起緊張局勢升級

將協助引渡至中國內地的香港《逃犯條例》修正案引起香港公民社會的強烈抵制。4月28日,多達13万抗議者走上街頭抗議這些修正條例,如果通過修正案,將允許香港人和在該地區工作或生活的外國人在中國臭名昭著的有缺陷的司法系統中受審。當地藝術社團成員也表示憂慮,該協議可能破壞香港的創作自由。 5月11日,香港立法會的反對者和支持者之間爆發衝突,民主陣營的一名成員摔倒並被擔架抬走。儘管遭到反對,《南華早報》於5月14日報導香港特首林鄭月娥「加倍支持」該法案,據信如果未能通過該法案將破壞她的職權和仕途。就此方面,中共政府已袒護這項法案,中共國務院港澳事務辦公室主任張曉明在5月15日會晤香港智庫人士時將其描述為「必要的、適當的、合理合法的」。

美國政府也對該法案表示擔憂。5月7日,美中經濟與安全審查委員會(US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,USCC)發表了一份批評《逃犯條例》修正案的簡報,指出這些修正案可能對美國構成極大風險。該法案的當地反對者也向華盛頓傳達了他們的信息。在美國國會及行政當局中國委員會(Congressional-Executive Commission on China,CECC)作證時,香港民主黨創黨成員兼前香港立法會議員李柱銘(Martin Lee)警告說,該法案可能允許將居住在香港的美國公民綁架和引渡到中國。在5月15日的《華盛頓郵報》專欄文章中,李柱銘呼籲「世界採取行動保護香港的自由社會和法律體系」。

罔顧此國際趨勢,香港2014年雨傘運動成員繼續被判入獄,加劇了人們的恐懼,即如果《逃犯條例》修正案生效,政治動機的指控可能會增加。據估計,有100名此類維權人士被香港法院定罪,其中一名前抗議領袖黃之峰(Joshua Wong)在最近上訴被拒絕後,被判即時重返監獄兩個月。由於香港司法系統國際聲譽日益惡化,5月21日有消息稱,德國已批准兩名被香港警方通緝的政治維權活動人士的庇護。


中國之外:美國電視劇、非政府組織地房東、台灣和荷蘭媒體、厄瓜多爾相機、尼泊爾記者

  • CBS審查《傲骨之戰The Good Fight》片段:據《紐約時報》5月8日報導,美國電視公司哥倫比亞廣播公司(CBS)決定審查一律政題材的電視劇《傲骨之戰(The Good Fight)》中的一集,原因是擔心冒犯中共當權者。在電視中有一段動漫— 其中談到了中共政府對敏感話題如天安門大屠殺和已故諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波 — 該動漫被刪除,用黑屏來取代,屏幕上打出字幕:「CBS已審查了這段內容」。儘管CBS做了自我審查,據報導該劇目(有些時候甚至是整個季的系列)依然從中國的流媒體網站被刪除,如「豆瓣」和「天天美劇」,因為該劇還談到了在新疆的維吾爾族人被大範圍關押。《傲骨賢妻(The Good Wife)》是 CBS 從《傲骨之戰》中分離出去的另一部電視劇,2014年也在中國的網路流媒體平台被禁止播出
  • 中國公司否決國際特赦組織在紐約的辦公室租約:根據5月13日《紐約時報》的一篇報導,中國國企中國遠洋運輸(集團)公司(China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company,COSCO)拒絕國際特赦組織美國分部在其擁有的位於紐約市的一座大樓租用辦公室。國際特赦組織定期發表關於中國人權受迫害的研究報告。一位Cosco下屬機構的代表告知國際特赦組織,稱他們「對中國國營企業擁有的大樓來說,不是最好的房客」。
  • 台灣媒體高管出席中共媒體峰會:數十位台灣媒體機構代表出席了中國政府5月10日在北京召開的「第四屆海峽兩岸媒體人峰會」。峰會旨在討論中國大陸和台灣的媒體如何促進「和平統一」和「九二共識」。與會者來自各電視、廣播、報刊雜誌和網絡媒體平台,包括主要的親中媒體如《聯合報》、《中國時報》、《東森電視台》、TVBS、《中天電視》以及各級地方和全國範圍的出版與廣播公司協會成員。作為回應,台灣中華民國國家安全局副局長柯承亨表示,中共政府沒有權利指導台灣媒體的活動。
  • 荷蘭出版商審查有關新疆的評論:研究中國的教授提姆·葛羅斯(Timothy Grose)聲稱,在5月13日《洛杉磯書評》(Los Angeles Review of Books’)中國頻道的一篇文章中,他的一本關於新疆的評論,在荷蘭一家受人尊敬的出版社(Brill)旗下的一學術期刊被編輯們審查了。儘管這篇關於湯姆·克利夫(Tom Cliff)所著的《油與水》 (Oil and Water的書評最初得到該期刊早在2018年初的邀約,最終還是因葛羅斯在其中明顯討論在新疆的再教育營而被拒絕。該期刊的名字是《中國和亞洲:在歷史研究方面之學刊》(China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies)。該期刊的編輯韓孝榮(Han Xiaorong)是香港理工大學的一名教授,他多年來維護中共在新疆的政策。
  • 厄瓜多採用中國的監控技術:據《紐約時報》4月24日報導,中國為厄瓜多提供了一套擁有4,200安全攝像頭的龐大系統來監控其國民。該系統是由中共國家扶植的公司如中國電子進出口有限公司(CEIEC)和華為研製的,與其已在中國投入的監控系統類似。維權人士已表達了擔憂,害怕此類監控網絡允許有專制傾向的政府進行更多國內打壓行動。據報導,在厄瓜多安裝的這些攝像頭在所聲稱的降低犯罪的功能方面沒有效果,部分原因是此舉要求太多的警力來監控影像內容。然而,證據表明在厄國前總統拉菲爾·柯羅亞(Rafael Correa)統治時期,以迫害政府反對者著稱的該國國家情報部門獲得了中共製造的這套系統。據報導,類似監控網絡也被出售到了其他國家政府如委內瑞拉、玻利維亞和安哥拉。
  • 尼泊爾國家媒體調查參與達賴喇嘛報導的記者們:據5月14日《香港自由新聞》( Hong Kong Free Press)的報告,尼泊爾國家新聞機構RSS正在調查三位記者,原因是他們傳播了一則關於達賴喇嘛4月出院的消息。該調查是在尼泊爾與中國的外交與經濟關係增強的背景下出現的。《香港自由新聞》援引RSS主席哈里·阿迪卡裡(Hari Adhikari)的話說:「我們不報導違反我們國家外交政策和影響我們與鄰國關係的新聞。」尼泊爾國家新聞機構長期以來一直和中共官方媒體新華社有內容交換協約。

重點反制:秘密錄像

5月20日,福克斯新聞(Fox News)播出了一個電視片段,關於一個中國家庭試圖找回他們一名在中國被警察拘捕而被殺害的親人的屍體,該親人因修煉被禁的法輪功精神信仰被拘捕。該影像片段包括秘密錄製的這位已故女性的姐夫與官員對證的影片,並被告知,如果家人承認她「自然死亡」,屍體就能被領取。該報導還包括2018年11月最近的影片片段,顯示一名妻子在一家醫院裡為她虛弱的丈夫哭泣,也是一名法輪功學員,在監獄裡被迫害致死。 于瞑(Yu Ming),這位最近逃到美國的中國企業家,錄製了這些影像片段以及其他來自器官移植醫院內部和臭名昭著的馬三家勞教所的片段。他向記者展示了一個隱藏起針孔攝像機的手錶和車鑰匙。

于瞑的影片是中國維權人士和外國記者為從中國境內獲取敏感鏡頭的更大努力的一部分,尤其是關於看守所和監獄裡的良心犯的畫面鏡頭,並將這些傳播到海外。 5月7日,美國有線電視新聞網(CNN)播出了中國記者馬特·里弗斯(Matt Rivers)的一段片段,展示了新疆各種集中營的高牆和鐵絲網,那裏估計有100萬穆斯林少數民族正在接受「再教育」。該片還描繪了警方阻撓記者們的各種努力,包括強迫他們在充滿民族音樂中與官員們共進晚餐。很明顯,有些影片是用一種設備秘密拍攝的,而不是可見的專業電視攝影機。最近的其他例子可以在《寒冬》(Bitter Winter)的YouTube頻道上找到,這是一個宗教自由網站,在中國有一個聯繫網絡。這些包括本月早些時候公佈的在河南省一系列教堂被拆毀的影片,影片可看到信眾們在哭泣、祈禱和對抗官方人員;還有佛教雕像被塗抹,以防止信眾們敬奉;還有甘肅省清真寺被拆毀

秘密錄像的外國記者面臨著危險、被短暫拘留、工作被破壞,並被拒絕得到報導這個世界第二大經濟國家的簽證。參與這項活動的中國公民面臨更大的危險,包括可能的監禁和酷刑。然而,儘管冒著危險,中國維權人士繼續秘密拍攝現場受迫害影片,部分原因在於這些可能有助於提高國際上的認知,甚至如果能給中國政府壓力,也可能制止迫害 。


未來看點

與王全璋獄中狀況有關的審查:5月20日,被監禁的中國人權律師王全璋的妻子在臨沂監獄會見官方人士要求面見她的丈夫。王全璋在2015年7月被拘捕,並無法與外界接觸三年多,之後因為他為持不同政見者辯護而在1月份被判處4.5年徒刑。李文足被拒絕與王全璋面見,但告訴記者,官員向她展示了一個令人不安的三分鐘影片,其中看起來王全璋更瘦,頭髮灰白,手勢緊張,講話遲鈍。關注中共當局面臨允許李文足能和王全璋見面越來越大的國際壓力,以及任何對他的獄中狀況新資訊的審查。    

華為獲得美國技術:在對中國電信大廠華為公司的聲譽和運營的最新重擊中,美國川普政府於5月16日將華為列入了限制得到美國技術的公司的黑名單。幾天之內,谷歌宣布將暫停與華為任何與需要轉讓硬件、軟件和技術服務,還有那些涉及開放源代碼許可相關的業務。此舉可能綑綁住華為全球手機生意。 5月21日,美國商務部發佈通吿,對華為提供90天的「寬限」。 關注華為在黑名單中的最終狀況以及美國業務交易受到限制的實際後果。

英國調查中國環球電視網CGTN:5月8日,英國廣播監管機構開始調查英國男子在中國和海外播出的中國國家電視台上的被迫認罪是否違反英國廣播法。接著,根據瑞典公民桂民海的女兒Angela Gui提交的訴訟啟動了第二次調查,桂民海在2015年香港書商遭到大規模打擊而在被泰國綁架後,出現在中國國家電視台做了幾次被認罪;他仍在中國被拘留。在習近平的治理下,記者、律師、商人和其他人的這種電視被迫認罪已成為一種普遍現象。英國調查中心注意力集中在中國環球電視網(China Global Television Network,CGTN),即中共國營電視台中央電視台的國際部門。關注英國對中國環球電視網CGTN的調查結果和其可能得到的處罰,可能包括撤銷其廣播執照和巨額罰款。


行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

中国媒体快报:异见的幸存、监控微信、秘密录影(Issue 136, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 幸存于中国:令人瞩目的自由思想与维权行动

新闻报道:​​​

重点反制:秘密录像

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:幸存于中国:令人瞩目的自由思想与维权行动

中共政权的钳制手段正在增加  但也在重要方面走入败相。

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

三十年前的这一周,数千名学生占领了北京市中心的天安门广场,参加了绝食抗议,要求中国政治和经济改革。全国各地的其他公民 — 教授,工人,甚至是中共党内干部 — 慢慢加入到他们对民主和透明度的诉求中。1989年6月4日晚,该运动遭到暴力镇压,但在接下来的几十年里,一个正在萌芽的民间社会团体开始发展和专业化,调查性新闻工作和法律倡议引发政策改变,并经历了一个宗教信仰的复苏。

自2012年共产党领导人习近平上台后,政治镇压、监控和审查都在加剧。即便如此,各种形式的抗议和维权行动仍然存在并持续出现。

以下趋势指出中国目前的环境具有高度限制性,但比其表面上看来更复杂和具潜在不稳定性。

不寒而栗的影响是真实的

在今天的中国,经营一个非营利性的倡议组织、做为一名调查记者、实践一个人的信仰,或者只是在社交媒体上与朋友分享一个政治玩笑,比三年前更加困难和冒险。一些长期维持的民间社会团体正在关门、著名的记者们正在改变职业,而普通中国人对他们的网络上的交流更加小心谨慎。

众多因素促成了这一变化,但在腾讯无处不在的微信消息应用程序上所加紧的控制 —包括过去18个月,针对通常相对较小的政治违规的几轮大规模帐户删除 — 已在鼓励用户自我审查方面发挥了独特的作用。新浪微博平台是2013-14年严厉钳制的重点,与新浪微博平台不同,一个关闭的微信账号不仅仅让用户的公开评论沉默消音,还切断其与整个联络网络以及电子支付选择,严重影响他或她在现代中国社会中正常生活职能的能力。这种强大的威慑力远比像监禁等其他惩罚手段更普遍,虽然近年来监狱刑罚也有所增加。

网络世界的自我审查正逐渐蔓延到面对面的对话中。「这和朋友来说是个死胡同。没有人愿意谈论任何事情哪怕是和政治沾一点边的问题,」据一位在中国生活了20多年的外籍人士称,「今天,大多数家庭都对他们所说的话非常小心,甚至是对亲人。」近年来在中国参加会议的外国学者也同样觉察到学术讨论的狭窄空间以及中国同行更加沉默,不愿意坦率表达他们的观点。

「不同见解并未死亡」

尽管存在这种不寒而栗,学者伊丽莎白·易科那米(Elizabeth Economy)在上个月发表的一篇文章中写道,「在重要方面,1989年民主运动所体现的集体行动的政治价值观和精神已经坚持下来,甚至茁壮成长。」她指出,尽管在习近平治理期间允许异议的空间有所缩小,但学者们继续撰写广泛流传的文章,呼吁政治开明,也出现了广泛的围绕妇女权利、劳工权利和环境保护等议题的社会维权活动。每年在中国各地发生数以千计的公众抗议活动,其中包括2018年1700次纪录在册的工人罢工

另一位中国专家特蕾莎·赖特(Teresa Wright)在她2018年出版的的书《中国民众的抗议(Popular Protest in China)》中指出「中国民众远非消极、顺从或自满。相反,当他们感到他们的权利受到侵犯或受到不公正对待时,中国公民经常大胆、反抗、顽强地面对强权。」

在中国的不同见解有多种形式,反映了一系列观点。更多的知识分子评论员倾向于批评习近平的政策选择,并呼唤回归于与一些前国家领导人执政时期相关的更开放的经济和社会。大胆的维权人士试图挑战共产党统治的合法性或直接探索其他的政治选择。后者通常会获得最严厉的惩罚,但随着压制扩大到寻求改善党国治理而不挑战制度本身的个人 — 包括公共利益律师和自由派经济学家 — 这种温和改革的前景是黯淡的。

同时,当钳制对正式的社会维权团体收紧时,后​​来的维权活动主要在松散的个人网络互动来呼吁改变,经常来自传统上保持沉默的人群。事实上,每当一些异议看起来暂时平息时,新的批评或动员的消息都会让人知道。最近的例子包括顶尖大学的学习马克思主义的学生为帮助罢工工人们所做的努力,包括科技公司的工程师们组织反击难以忍受的996工作制(上午9点到晚上9点,每周六天) ,以及「#我也是」运动,「#我也是」运动在仅一个月内吸引了3000万中国人在网上讨论性骚扰问题。

宗教信仰抗争日益增加

将异议人士的联系网络分散化及对他们扩展的打压活动,是相对有力的,但这也能催生来自新源头的抗争,这些源头联合起来形成另一种被作用低估的趋势:甚至当宗教迫害还在加剧时,宗教信徒的抵制却在增强。2017年一份年「自由之家报告」对中国宗教的主要发现表明,「因应官方的控制,所有信仰团体成员的回应是既有创意又具勇气,有时还取得了显著的胜利」。

数百万计的信众在他们的日常生活中违抗官方限制,有些是公开的,有些是在极度保密的情形下进行的。中国佛教徒已在抵制利用宗教圣地来敛财的做法。基督徒法轮功学员要求释放被拘留的教友。西藏佛教徒在各集市游行,要求达赖喇嘛归来。新疆维吾尔人用各种办法来记录和揭露新疆的严苛形势。

一些做法超出了一个单一的宗教社区,目的是影响更多中国公众,包括党和国家干部的信仰和行为。注册的教会和地下教会的领袖与维权律师一道,在法庭上抗议抓捕和侵占财产。维权人士组织培训来增加群众的法律意识,并打电话给警察,根据中国的法律劝阻他们不要再做违背信仰权利的事情。

如剑桥大学出版书刊登的一篇2015年学者研究所述,自2004年年起,法轮功的学员和支持者已在鼓励「公民发表退党声明,形式上断绝他们和共产党,共青团或少先队的关系,以求净化自己和良心清白。」就其本身而言,三退运动是集中在精神与文化领域,并未一定就在推翻共产党,而更多是在鼓励中国人去想像没有共产党的中国是什么样,并拒绝支持中共的种种暴力行径。这场运动是通过口耳相传、在纸币上写相关短句,以及透过社交媒体和以虚拟个人网络(VPN)登入众多海外网站来传播的。

技术助力的顽强抗争

中国的宗教和民间异议人士都在对抗这个世界上最精密的信息控制体系。他们已通过开发复杂的反封锁方法来得到在许多国家理所当然的基本水平的沟通自由。

由于当局对虚拟私人网络(VPN)使用的限制加强,仅仅是得到不受审查的新闻已变得日益困难。尽管如此,从几家开发者的部分数据显示,在2018年,至少有两、三千万的中国网民翻过了所称的 「网络长城」。那些开发和维护必要翻墙软件的技术人员们不断创新,以使得他们的用户们能够有效地、持续地、安全地突破封锁。一些中国公民冒着坐牢的风险,帮助他们的邻居安装可以接收海外内容的卫星天线,或帮他们加强未注册的上网卡的安全性。

随着在一些通用的社交媒体平台如新浪微博和微信上的审查、监视和吃官司的增加,网民们转到其它空间来动员和与外部世界联络。去年有两起例子,一起是用户们在进行区块链(blockchain)交易的大数据平台上发布公开信;另一起是技术员工利用未被封锁的全球程序共享网站GitHub来抗议恶劣的工作环境,都引起了他们的国际同仁显示的支持。网络众筹资金也在帮助支持一些特定的行动,如地铁广告谴责性骚扰,或是中国公民社会组织的更广泛的运作。

不明确的未来

在中国的人们可能越来越不愿表达他们对共产党或习近平的公开批评,甚至也不愿分享政治敏感信息,但任何人都不应该低估人们对习近平的铁腕政策的实际不满程度。单是在政治敏感时期的审查规模和此时网民们翻过了中国的长城防火墙的次数剧增 —如2018年围绕关于取消国家主席任期限期期间—就暗示潜在的不满到了引人注目的程度。事实上,习近平致力于加紧控制和他抛弃中共过去在政治上度过危机的策略,已暴露了这个政权的不安定。

三十年前,来自社会各行业的超过一百万中国人走上街头,呼吁有更多的自由和更好的政府。尽管还很难想像今天会有同样的情形再现,但渴望更自由,更法治的中国,一直长存于许多中国人的内心和日常行动中。

萨拉库克为自由之家东亚事务资深研究分析员兼其《中国媒体快报》主任、《中国灵魂争夺战:习近平治下的宗教复兴、压制和抵抗》作者。本文已于5月28日发表于《风传媒》

图片说明:2019年3月家长们抗议在四川省成都市一所学校发现的发霉食品。图片来源Weibo via SCMP


民族主义言论、严格的审查制度影响覆盖了美中贸易战的报导

在过去一个月中,中共政府审查机构仍在忙着封杀与美国不断升级的贸易战的公开讨论。在《中国数字时代》发表于5月6日的泄密审查指令中,中共公安部和中共国家互联网信息办公室命令当地公安部门和网络管理部门「接此通知,立刻组织人手控制和删除有关美国加征中国关税的一切传言和谣言 」。同一天的另一项指令禁止所有论坛和网站「各网站禁止发布中美贸易战有关的任何消息和评论」,这些举动并非新鲜事。据香港大学的研究人员称,由于去年两国之间的紧张局势有所上升,贸易战成为大量公共微信账户中审查最严重的话题。由于正在进行的双边谈判未能取得成果,审查只能增加。

除了对普通新闻读者的影响之外,国家审查还损害了中国的零售投资者。据路透社5月8日一篇文章称,当美国总统特朗普于5月5日称要将中国商品的关税从10%提高到25%时,尽管随后中国股市基准价格暴跌5%,但特朗普的言论在中共官方媒体中没有得到报导,令许多个人投资者被蒙在鼓里,不知是什么造成了这样的下跌。更成熟的投资者们也感受到了国家审查的影响。《市场观察》(Market Watch)发表的5月15日的报告引用量化投资者们的话,他们表示媒体的控制破坏了他们用来筛选中国社交媒体贴文算法的准确性,以期寻找零售投资者观点的信号。

由于中国政府在5月13日威胁要以新关税600亿美元回应美国关税上涨,中共媒体突然变得越来越强硬,民族主义和戒备,在官方的和解言论发布几天之后变脸。在国家电视台中共中央电视台(CCTV))的晚间新闻节目随后在网络爆传,一新闻主播宣称:「面对美国的软硬两手,中国也早已给出答案:谈,大门敞开;打,奉陪到底。」新华社显著刊登5月13日社论同样直截了当:「当美国为『贪婪和傲慢』而战时,中国为捍卫『其合法权益』而战。」

国家宣传「似乎正在为公众进行长期和昂贵的贸易战做准备」,《华盛顿邮报》在5月15日发表的杰西卡·陈·威斯(Jessica Chen Weiss)教授文章写道。这些准备一部分已经涉及借鉴民族主义的历史叙事。例如,中央电视台的电影频道以在朝鲜战争期间与美国作战的电影取代了常规节目。据《纽约时报》5月14日的一篇文章,「评论家们将目前的贸易争端与中国在殖民时代的外国势力手中被羞辱进行了比较。」一些网友的内容与民族主义基调相呼应,许多用户分享关于贸易战的私人制作的激进歌曲

尽管使用这些大胆的语言,中国可能处于比共产党愿意承认的更弱的位置。香港时事评论员和教授练乙铮(Yi-Zheng Lian)于5月7日在《纽约时报》撰文时推测,在中美关系的第一次重大考验中,习近平主席可能因为试图过度挑战美国而对形势处理失当,这或许会破坏他的合法性。


监控更新:新疆警方应用程序、新数据泄露、微信关键词监控

  • 来自新疆的逆向工程警务应用程序:5月2日,人权观察发布了一个逆向工程版本的应用程序,中国警方用它来对新疆人口进行分类和监视。该应用程序与综合联合操作平台相连,允许警方收集该地区少数民族穆斯林的个人数据,包括血型、政治派别,以及某人的电话是否包含安全的通信应用程序WhatsApp或Telegram等,或者有用来翻越中国「长城防火墙」的工具来接触未经审查的网络信息。人们被依照36种可疑的特性进行分类,其中包括已停止使用智能手机的人、热心收集清真寺捐款的人,甚至那些人被认为「使用大量电力」的人。根据人权观察,「基于这些广泛而可疑的标准,该系统生成了将由官员评估拘留的人员名单」。它补充说,虽然新疆的跟踪和数据库系统特别具有侵入性,但其基本设计与警方计划在全中国实施的其他设计相匹配。       
  • 北京智能城市数据泄露:据Tech Crunch于5月3日报导,最新的由劣等数据安全组成的公共监控系统示例中,研究人员John Wethington发现了一个由阿里巴巴主办的不安全的中国智能城市数据库。数据库包含北京东部两个住宅区数百人的个人数据库信息,包括面部识别文件,根据大致的年龄甚至种族来比对不同的人。据报导,该系统还从警察处获取数据,通知管理人员针对感 兴趣的人或犯罪嫌疑人,并标有「吸毒者」等标签。在一条5月3日推文中,美国国家公共广播电台的北京记者Emily Feng指出,该数据库也链接到会扫描附近小区的移动手机和计算机的传感器。
  • 关键词触发中国境内和境外的微信监控:4月22日,GDI基金会研究员Victor Gevers透露,微信正在根据关键词触发器过滤数十亿条该被「审核」的信息。他指出,「并非所有的对话都是中文的,也并非只有GPS定位在中国的[的讯息会被过滤]。」例如,仅在3月18日,就有36亿条中文信息、5900万条英文信息和2600万条其他语言信息被捕获并发送至运营者。促使整个对话被撷取的关键词包括「习近平」、「中共」、「1989」和「西藏」。虽然大部分信息是在中国发送出的,但是大约有1900万条被捕获的英文信息来自全球用户,包括在北美、欧洲、南美、台湾和澳大利亚的人。

审查更新:天安门周年纪念、劳工维权活动、四川地震

  • 网絡审查和「纠正」在6月4日周年前增加:中共当局正在扩大对网络和社交媒体平台的监管,因为他们试图封杀被禁的和政治上敏感的内容,在即将到来的天安门广场大屠杀事件30周年,也就是1989年6月4日中共军队向和平的北京请愿者们开枪。图片和媒体机构「视觉中国」(Visual China Group)于5月12日结束整改,重新启动网站运营,并与中共报纸《人民日报》签署一内容审查协议。作为协议的一部分,用户将能够向该机构报告「有害的」资料,包括含政治内容的材料。这是继5月11日的报导,在中国的约会应用程序陌陌和探探,根据政府的命令暂停了用户在其平台上发送社交新闻的功能一个月。在审查严密的中国「防火长城」之外获得不受审查的资料也受到了限制。据5月6日Blokt上的报导,中共政府已经在上个月关闭了数百个虚拟私人网络(VPN)服务器,尽管许多免费翻墙工具仍在继续开通。英国广播公司(BBC)于5月14日报导,自4月下旬以来,维基百科所有语言的版本在中国都被封锁。此前,只有中文版和像达赖喇嘛等敏感话题有关的非中文文章在中国无法访问。
  • 审查者、警察瞄准网络劳工维权活动:在习近平主席治理之下,对劳工维权活动家的审查和镇压在加剧。中国劳工维权网站(ilabour.net)的编辑危志立于3月19日在广州因「涉嫌扰乱公共秩序」被捕。他的同事柯成冰已经失踪,据信被警察拘留。而杨郑君,劳工维权网站《新生代》的编辑自1月8日起已被拘捕。其他维权人士也已被失踪。吴琼文倩,女权网站《破土网》前主编,其工作重点关注工人权利,自5月8日被北京警方拘留后已被失踪。5月12日,《南华早报》报导,北京,广州和深圳的警方突击搜捕了以工人和移民权利为重点的民间团体办公室,并逮捕了每个成员。中共当局于4月21日指示媒体不要报导或评论被警方拘留的学习马克思主义学生维权人士对深圳佳士科技公司工人支持。审查员甚至封堵了讽刺阿里巴巴创办人和共产党员马云支持「996」工作制的讯息;封堵了一个更广泛的反对996工作制运动,此工作制为从上午9点工作到晚上9点,每周六天。同学生一起,工人在1989年的民主抗议活动中发挥了重要作用,1989年周年纪念活动可能助长官方对劳工维权的新一轮防范。
  • 四川地震在11年后仍然敏感:官方媒体已经刻意淡化了2008年四川发生的致命性地震11周年。5月11日,地震中遇难的学生家长们试图公开去现场纪念发生在四川省首府成都市的县级城市,都江堰市,的悲剧,但他们遭到当地官方人士围堵和殴打,其中许多人在之后住院治疗。过去同意接受媒体采访的家长们在周年纪念日前已被警方全天候监视。尽管政府努力以积极的态度展现地震,开始中国新时代「志愿服务」,但关于这场灾难的网络讨论的审查仍然无所不在

香港:《逃犯条例》修正案引起紧张局势升级

将协助引渡至中国内地的香港《逃犯条例》修正案引起香港公民社会的强烈抵制。4月28日,多达13万抗议者走上街头抗议这些修正条例,如果通过修正案,将允许香港人和在该地区工作或生活的外国人在中国臭名昭著的有缺陷的司法系统中受审。当地艺术社团成员也表达忧虑,该协议可能破坏香港的创作自由。 5月11日,香港立法会的反对者和支持者之间的冲突爆发,民主阵营的一名成员摔倒并被担架抬走。尽管遭到反对,《南华早报》于5月14日报导香港特首林郑月娥「加倍支持」该法案,据信如果未能通过该法案将破坏她的职权和仕途。就此方面,中共政府已袒护这项法案,中共国务院港澳事务办公室主任张晓明在5月15日会晤香港智库人士时将其描述为「必要的、适当的、合理合法的」

美国政府也对该法案表示担忧。 5月7日,美中经济与安全审查委员会(US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,USCC)会发表了一份批评《逃犯条例》修正案的简报,指出这些修正案可能对美国构成极大风险。该法案的当地反对者也向华盛顿传达了他们的信息。在美国国会及行政当局中国委员会(Congressional-Executive Commission on China,CECC)作证时,香港民主党创党成员兼前香港立法会议员李柱铭(Martin Lee)警告说,该法案可能允许将居住在香港的美国公民绑架和引渡到中国。在5月15日的《华盛顿邮报》专栏文章中,李柱铭呼吁「世界采取行动保护香港的自由社会和法律体系」。

罔顾此国际趋势,香港2014年雨伞运动成员继续被判入狱,加剧了人们的恐惧,即如果《逃犯条例》修正案生效,政治动机的指控可能会增加。据估计,有100名此类维权人士被香港法院定罪,其中一名前抗议领袖黄之峰(Joshua Wong)在最近上诉被拒绝后,被判即时重返监狱两个月。由于香港司法系统国际声誉日益恶化,5月21日有消息称,德国已批准两名被香港警方通缉的政治维权活动人士的庇护。


中國之外:美国电视剧、非政府组织房东、台湾和荷兰媒体、厄瓜多尔相机、尼泊尔记者

  • CBS审查《傲骨之战The Good Fight》片段:据《纽约时报》5月8日报导,美国电视公司哥伦比亚广播公司(CBS)决定审查一律政题材的电视剧《傲骨之战(The Good Fight)》中的一集,原因是担心冒犯中共当权者。在电视中有一段动漫— 其中谈到了中共政府对敏感话题如天安门大屠杀和已故诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波— 该动漫被删除,用黑屏来取代,屏幕上打出字幕:「CBS已审查了这段内容」。尽管CBS做了自我审查,据报导该剧目(有些时候甚至是整个季的系列)依然从中国的流媒体网站被删除,如「豆瓣」和「天天美剧」,因为该剧还谈到了在新疆的维吾尔族人被大范围关押。 《傲骨贤妻(The Good Wife)》是 CBS 从《傲骨之战》中分离出去的另一部电视剧,2014年也在中国的网路流媒体平台被禁
  • 中国公司否决国际特赦组织在纽约的办公室租约:根据5月13日《纽约时报》的一篇报导,中国国企中国远洋运输(集团)公司(China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company,COSCO)拒绝国际特赦组织美国分部在其拥有的位于纽约市的一座大楼租用办公室。国际特赦组织定期发表关于中国人权受迫害的研究报告。一位Cosco下属机构的代表告知国际特赦组织,称他们「对中国国营企业拥有的大楼来说,不是最好的房客」。
  • 台湾媒体高管出席中共媒体峰会:数十位台湾媒体机构代表出席了中国政府5月10日在北京召开的「第四届海峡两岸媒体人峰会」。峰会旨在讨论中国大陆和台湾的媒体如何促进「和平统一」和「九二共识」。与会者来自各电视、广播、报刊杂志和网络媒体平台,包括主要的亲中媒体如《联合报》、《中国时报》、《东森电视台》、TVBS、《中天电视》以及各级地方和全国范围的出版与广播公司协会成员。作为回应,台湾中华民国国家安全局副局长柯承亨表示,中共政府没有权利指导台湾媒体的活动。
  • 荷兰出版商审查有关新疆的评论:研究中国的教授提姆·葛罗斯(Timothy Grose)声称,在5月13日《洛杉矶书评》(Los Angeles Review of Books')中国频道的一篇文章中,他的一本关于新疆的评论,在荷兰一家受人尊敬的出版社(Brill)旗下的一学术期刊被编辑们审查了。尽管这篇关于汤姆·克利夫(Tom Cliff)所著的《油与水》 (Oil and Water)的书评最初得到该期刊早在2018年初的邀约,最终还是因葛罗斯在其中明显讨论在新疆的再教育营而被拒绝。该期刊的名字是《中国和亚洲:在历史研究方面之学刊》(China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies)。该期刊的编辑韩孝荣(Han Xiaorong)是香港理工大学的一名教授,他多年来维护中共在新疆的政策。
  • 厄瓜多尔采用中共的监控技术:据《纽约时报》4月24日报导,中国为厄瓜多尔提供了一套拥有4 200安全摄像头的庞大系统来监控其国民。该系统是由中共国家扶植的公司如中国电子进出口有限公司(CEIEC)和华为研制的,与其已在中国投入的监控系统类似。维权人士已表达了担忧,害怕此类监控网络允许有专制倾向的政府进行更多該国国内打压行动。据报导,在厄瓜多尔安装的这些摄像头在所声称的降低犯罪的功能方面没有效果,部分原因是此举要求太多的警力来监控视频内容。然而,证据表明在厄国前总统拉菲尔·柯罗亚(Rafael Correa)统治时期,以迫害政府反对者著称的该国国家情报部门获得了中共制造的这套系统。据报导,类似监控网络也被出售到了其他国家政府如委内瑞拉、玻利维亚和安哥拉。
  • 尼泊尔国家媒体调查参与达赖喇嘛报导的记者们:据5月14日《香港自由新闻》( Hong Kong Free Press)的报告,尼泊尔国家新闻机构RSS正在调查三位记者,原因是他们传播了一则关于达赖喇嘛4月出院的消息。该调查是在尼泊尔与中国的外交与经济关系增强的背景下出现的。 《香港自由新闻》援引RSS主席哈里·阿迪卡里(Hari Adhikari)的话说:「我们不报导违反我们国家外交政策和影响我们与邻国关系的新闻。」尼泊尔国家新闻机构长期以来一直和中共官方媒体新华社有内容交换协约。

重点反制:秘密录像

5月20日,福克斯新闻(Fox News)播出了一个电视片段,关于一个中国家庭试图找回他们一名在中国被警察拘捕而被杀害的亲人的尸体,该亲人因修炼被禁的法轮功精神信仰被拘捕。该视频片段包括秘密录制的这位已故女性的姐夫与官员对证的视频,并被告知,如果家人承认她「自然死亡」,尸体就能被领取。该报导还包括2018年11月最近的视频,显示一名妻子在一家医院里为她虚弱的丈夫哭泣,也是一名法轮功学员,在监狱里被迫害致死。于瞑(Yu Ming),这位最近逃到美国的中国企业家,录制了这些视频片段以及其他来自器官移植医院内部和臭名昭著的马三家劳教所的片段。他向记者展示了一个隐藏针孔摄像机的手表和车钥匙。

于瞑的视频是中国维权人士和外国记者为从中国境内获取敏感镜头的更大努力的一部分,尤其是关于看守所和监狱里的良心犯的画面镜头,并将这些传播到海外。 5月7日,美国有线电视新闻网(CNN)播出了中国记者马特·里弗斯(Matt Rivers)的一段片段,展示了新疆各种集中营的高墙和铁丝网,那里估计有100万穆斯林少数民族正在接受「再教育」。该片还描绘了警方阻挠记者们的各种努力,包括强迫他们在充满民族音乐中与官员们共进晚餐。很明显,有些视频是用一种设备秘密拍摄的,而不是可见的专业电视摄像机。最近的其他例子可以在《寒冬》(Bitter Winter)的YouTube频道上找到,这是一个宗教自由网站,在中国有一个联系网络。这些包括本月早些时候公布的在河南省一系列教堂被拆毁的视频,视频可看到信众们在哭泣、祈祷和对抗官方人员;还有佛教雕像被涂抹,以防止信众们信奉;还有甘肃省清真寺被拆毁

秘密录像的外国记者面临着危险、被短暂拘留、工作被破坏,并被拒绝得到报导这个世界第二大经济国家的签证。参与这项活动的中国公民面临更大的危险,包括可能的监禁和酷刑。然而,尽管冒着危险,中国维权人士继续秘密拍摄现场受迫害视频,部分原因在于这些可能有助于提高国际上的认知,甚至也为如果能给中国政府压力,也可能制止迫害。​


未來看点

与王全璋狱中状况有关的审查:5月20日,被监禁的中国人权律师王全璋的妻子在临沂监狱会见官方人士要求面见她的丈夫。王全璋在2015年7月被拘捕,并无法与外界接触三年多,之后因为他为持不同政见者辩护而在1月份被判处4.5年徒刑。李文足被拒绝与王全璋面见,但告诉记者,官员向她展示了一个令人不安的三分钟视频,其中看起来王全璋更瘦,头发灰白,手势紧张,讲话迟钝。关注越来越大的国际压力施加给中共当局,允许李能面见王全璋以及任何对他的狱中状况新信息的审查。

华为获得美国技术:在对中国电信大厂华为公司的声誉和运营的最新重击中,美国特朗普政府于5月16日将华为列入了限制得到美国技术的公司的黑名单。几天之内,谷歌宣布将暂停与华为的任何与需要转让硬件、软件和技术服务,还有那些涉及开放源代码许可相关的业务。此举可能捆绑住华为全球手机生意。5月21日,美国商务部发布通吿,对华为提供90天的「宽限」。关注华为在黑名单中的最终状况以及美国业务交易受到限制的实际后果。

英国调查中国环球电视网CGTN:5月8日,英国广播监管机构开始调查英国男子在中国和海外播出的中国国家电视台上的被迫认罪是否违反英国广播法。接着,根据瑞典公民桂民海的女儿Angela Gui提交的诉讼启动了第二次调查,桂民海在2015年香港书商遭到大规模打击而在被泰国绑架后,出现在中国国家电视台做了几次被认罪;他仍在中国被拘留。在习近平的治理下,记者、律师、商人和其他人的这种电视被迫认罪已成为一种普遍现象。英国调查中心注意力集中在中国环球电视网(China Global Television Network,CGTN),即中共国营电视台中央电视台的国际部门。关注英国对中国环球电视网CGTN的调查结果和其可能得到的处罚,可能包括撤销其广播执照和巨额罚款。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin: Worsening summer censorship, Hong Kong protests, Huawei spying in Serbia (No. 137)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: China’s Long, Hot Summer of Censorship

June has been a terrible month for internet freedom in China. July may be even worse.

By Sarah Cook

Every year in June, China’s censors go into overdrive to prevent citizens from discussing, commemorating, or learning about the prodemocracy protests that took place across the country in 1989 and the brutal military action that brought them to an end.

But this year, the combination of the 30th anniversary of those events, an escalating trade war with the United States, massive antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and the availability of a more technologically advanced information-control system has driven the Chinese Communist Party’s censorship efforts to unprecedented extremes. With even more sensitive anniversaries approaching in July, the escalation is likely to continue.

New upgrades to existing censorship

Not surprisingly, the national internet filtering system known as the Great Firewall expanded its reach this month. Within the first week of June, the websites of 12 major international news outlets from five different countries were blocked, including CNN, the Washington Post, the Guardian, the Intercept, the Toronto Star, The Age in Australia, and New Zealand’s Newsroom. These joined others like the New York Times, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal, which have long been inaccessible within China.

Meanwhile, the country’s most popular social media applications—Sina Weibo and Tencent’s WeChat—deployed novel technologies and penalties to prevent information about the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre from circulating. Censors at top Chinese tech companies told Reuters that the artificial intelligence used to detect and delete banned content had reached “unprecedented levels of accuracy.” Those caught communicating about the events of 1989 risked being shut out of their WeChat accounts; to log back in, they would have to acknowledge that they had “spread malicious rumors” and provide a face print, as BBC journalist Stephen McDonell experienced first-hand. Manya Koetse notes that on Weibo there was more airtight censorship this year surrounding the word “Tiananmen” itself, and not only in combination with dates or terms that would link it to 1989. In another first, Apple reportedly removed several Chinese-language podcasts from its online store in China, affecting one of the few Apple services in the country that had until then avoided censorship.

Expansion to apolitical spaces

Even somewhat dated entertainment content has not escaped the censors’ attention. In the most prominent example, major Chinese streaming platforms have removed music by rock star Li Zhi since April, and the musician’s Weibo account, WeChat public account, and Douban musician page have been deleted. Although Li’s recent music has been apolitical or even progovernment, a few older pieces alluded to the 1989 protests. In the run-up to the June anniversary, regulators ordered the deletion of any audio or video content related to these songs.

A more unexpected move has been the full or partial suspension of live-streaming, dating, and celebrity gossip services due to “system upgrades” or “maintenance,” all commencing in May and scheduled to end in June. At least nine such cases were documented, including Momo (a hook-up and live streaming app with 113 million users), video-sharing site Bilibili (100 million users), China’s largest dating app Tantan (90 million users), LGBT social media app Blued (27 million users), and Dingtalk, a business communication app. In most instances the service was not entirely shuttered, with suspensions focusing instead on features that enable real-time communication and might be difficult for censors to keep up with—such as “bullet chat” commentary that runs along a video. YY, a popular live-streaming platform, announced this type of restriction in late May, shortly after adding over 300 new keywords related to June 4 and Hong Kong to its blacklist.

The companies’ statements explained that their efforts were initiated at the behest of “the relevant government authority,” an apparent reference to the powerful Cyber Administration of China (CAC). They had little choice but to comply with the agency’s demands. The financial news service Refinitiv, which distributes Reuters content via Eikon terminals, was reportedly warned by CAC officials that it could lose its news dissemination license if it refused to omit articles related to the Tiananmen anniversary. In a sign of the regime’s broader anxiety about the economy and associated topics, on June 10 the CAC reportedly ordered the suspension of the website and mobile app of Wallstreet.cn, a financial news aggregator that had garnered an estimated 180 million global users.

In fact, the jump in censorship over the past month is perhaps most remarkable for the sheer scale of the media types and user bases affected. Hundreds of millions of people have experienced a sudden decline in their ability to access or share information, even if in some cases they remain unaware of the reasons behind the restriction.

Temporary or permanent?

Given that the upgraded censorship seems to have been triggered largely by the Tiananmen anniversary, one might assume that most of the new measures are temporary. But the evidence suggests that such an assumption would be a mistake.

Freedom House’s tests of the 12 foreign news sites that were blocked in early June—conducted on GreatFire.org’s URL analyzer—show that apart from CNN, all remained blocked as of June 18. Other innovations deployed over the past month, such as social media filtering aided by artificial intelligence, can be expected to expand rather than contract in the coming years. Any information about problematic WeChat users that was collected during this sensitive period will be retained for future reference.

And if China’s censors were busy in June, the month of July will be no picnic either. July 1 marks the anniversary of Hong Kong’s transfer from British to Chinese rule, which could easily prompt another round of mass protests. Then there is July 5, the 10th anniversary of ethnic violence in the Xinjiang region that led to a harsh and ongoing crackdown on its large Muslim population. The very next day, July 6, is the Dalai Lama’s birthday, and July 13 is the second anniversary of the death of democracy advocate and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. Finally there is July 20, the 20th anniversary of the Communist Party’s ban on the Falun Gong spiritual practice and the beginning of a massive and often violent campaign to eradicate it.

Unlike the more historically focused June 4 anniversary, some of July’s sensitive dates are closely tied to current events, including the most egregious human rights abuses and most important examples of dissent taking place in China today. Over the last week alone, news emerged that a prominent Uighur writer had died due to detention in a Xinjiang “reeducation” camp, an independent inquiry in London concluded that prisoners of conscience in China—including Falun Gong and potentially Uighur detainees—have been killed so that their organs can be used in transplant operations, and the Hong Kong government suspended its controversial extradition bill after mass protests.

Most people in China may be completely unaware of these developments, even though they are making international headlines and could have real repercussions for the country. Despite this information isolation, however, hope is not lost. Numerous accounts published this month by young Chinese explain how they learned the truth about the events of 1989 and highlight some of the cracks in the regime’s censorship system. Data from at least two circumvention tools show an increase in users from China in June compared with the previous month, around both the June 4 anniversary and the large protests in Hong Kong.

People in China clearly want to know what the government is not telling them. As the coming month propels Beijing’s information control efforts to even greater extremes, international actors should be prepared to support ordinary individuals’ quest for access to uncensored news.

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House, director of its China Media Bulletin. This article was also published in the Diplomat on June 24, 2019.


US and Chinese companies feel the chill of a ‘Tech Cold War’

The US administration’s proposed ban on the sale of American hardware and software to the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei due to national security concerns, announced on May 16, is already taking a toll on the company. Overseas sales of Huawei smartphones have dropped by 40 percent since the US Department of Commerce said last month that it intended to place the firm on a list of companies considered a threat to US national interests. Huawei has warned that the ban may cost it $30 billion in revenue, despite the potential that it could in some cases receive special permission from the US government to buy American components and technology. US suppliers are also facing massive financial losses. US chipmaker Broadcom, which made $900 million in direct sales to Huawei in 2018, has reportedly already felt the impact of the ban.

Compounding these losses are US tech companies’ decisions to sever ties with Huawei out of fear of violating the proposed restrictions. On June 7, Reuters reported that Facebook will no longer allow its mobile application to be preinstalled on Huawei phones, while Google will stop providing Huawei with Android operating software in August.

China, however, looks set to respond in kind. The Ministry of Commerce announced in late May that it was compiling its own “Unreliable Entities List.” It is not yet clear which companies will be designated, but a ministry spokesperson's reference to companies that “block or cut supplies to Chinese firms for noncommercial reasons” suggested that US tech companies would be among the first targets. On June 8, the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had already summoned representatives from Microsoft, Dell, and South Korea’s Samsung to warn them against cooperating with the US ban.

Not all countries have been convinced by US assertions that Huawei poses a national security threat, for example by using its role in building fifth-generation (5G) mobile infrastructure to facilitate espionage on behalf of the Chinese state. Chile and Brazil have indicated that they would not exclude Huawei from plans to introduce 5G technology in their respective territories, and Russia’s largest telecom provider signed a deal with Huawei on June 5 to build that country’s 5G network.


Chinese state media, censors respond to protests in Hong Kong

Over the past month, Hong Kong has been gripped by mass protests in opposition to draft legal amendments that would enable the extradition of accused criminals to mainland China. The assemblies have featured episodes of violence, including police assaults against protesters on June 12, but also massive and peaceful marches, such as a demonstration on June 16 that brought an estimated two million of Hong Kong’s seven million people into the streets. Mainland Chinese media have avoided extensive coverage of the protests, with the flagship evening news program of China Central Television (CCTV) on June 17 making no mention of the historic turnout for the previous day’s demonstration.

But Chinese state media and Hong Kong government supporters have not been entirely silent about the public dissent. Disinformation regarding the protests has spread online, much of it promoted by Chinese state media. Among the false reports were a June 10 China Daily article claiming that 800,000 people had taken part in an online signature campaign to voice their support for the extradition bill and a June 17 assertion that parents in Hong Kong had marched against “US meddling.” Some of this content has spread outside China via Chinese-language media. In one example that emerged in New Zealand, the Chinese New Zealand Herald came under criticism for reprinting distorted information from the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, leading it to retract the article.

Chinese state media also attempted to dismiss opposition to the bill as the result of “some Hong Kong residents being hoodwinked by the opposition camp and its foreign allies,” as a June 9 editorial in the China Daily put it. The same editorial warned that the protests could undermine the “credibility and reputation” of the city. A June 13 Global Times commentary struck an even more belligerent note, denouncing expression of support for the protesters from US lawmakers like Nancy Pelosi as “a stark provocation.” A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman tried to justify police brutality against protesters by claiming on June 13 that the demonstration in question was “not a peaceful rally, but a blatant, organized riot.”

Meanwhile, Chinese censors have been busy trying to stop mainland news consumers and netizens from learning about the political crisis and demonstrations in Hong Kong. China Digital Times published a leaked June 16 government directive instructing websites to “find and delete video content related to Hong Kong antiextradition protests.” Censors at Tencent and other Chinese social media companies have worked to comply with such orders, for example by removing a song from the musical Les Misérables from a popular Chinese music-streaming platform. The Economist reported that the song “Do You Hear the People Sing?”—adopted as one of the anthems of the protest movement—was no longer available on QQ Music. However, the Christian pop song “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord,” another unofficial anthem, was still available. Censors for Sina’s Weibo microblogging platform have also worked to remove discussion of the Hong Kong protests. Posts or comments voicing support for the movement have been deleted from Weibo. 


Tiananmen anniversary: Surveillance, harassment, and recollections of learning the truth

In addition to censorship of the news media and other communication tools, the Chinese government intensified its direct repression of key critics ahead of the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Radio Free Asia reported that police had placed members of the Tiananmen Mothers—relatives of people killed in 1989—under greater technical and physical surveillance, primarily to prevent them from speaking to foreign journalists. Ding Zilin, one of the more outspoken mothers, and prominent activist Hu Jia were taken on an enforced “vacation” outside Beijing. Chinese Human Rights Defenders reports that at least 37 activists and artists were taken into custody, forced to travel, or placed under house arrest in connection with the sensitive anniversary. Among them was Sichuan-based independent filmmaker Deng Chuanbin, who was detained by police after tweeting a photograph of a bottle of liquor with a label that commemorated the massacre. Former student leader Feng Congde, who now lives abroad, was denied entry to Hong Kong on June 2.

Separately, many writers who grew up in China after 1989 used overseas media to reflect on the moment they first learned about an event that has been wiped from their country’s history books. In one compilation of such accounts published by ChinaFile, writers described coming home to see family members secretly watching a banned documentary about the massacre, stumbling upon a Wikipedia entry after using circumvention tools to reach the uncensored internet, learning that a favorite teacher was denied promotion because of some past involvement in the “Tiananmen disturbance,” or encountering online censorship of an innocuous word in late May and being told it was related to the upcoming anniversary of liusi (6/4). In most cases, the writers subsequently found opportunities to learn more about what had happened, for example after leaving China to study abroad, by asking their parents, or through persistent digging for banned content online.

In a testimony to the power of film, many of those recounting these experiences emphasized watching video footage or documentaries about the 1989 events, including real-life images of students protesting and going on hunger strike, followed by tanks driving into Beijing and bloodied civilians. As one anonymous contributor wrote about watching the 2006 film Summer Palace, “I was born in 1990. This was the first time I had seen protesters with Chinese faces. The movie left me speechless.”


HONG KONG: Journalist assaults, cyberattacks, surveillance fears accompany protests

As millions of Hong Kong residents faced off with their government in recent weeks over proposed legal amendments that would enable the extradition of criminal suspects to mainland China, a number of restrictions or fears related to free speech and privacy rights emerged:

  • Police attack journalists covering protests: The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) protested police harassment of journalists covering demonstrations on June 10 and subsequent dates. According to the HKJA, police officers verbally and physically assaulted reporters, with some suffering burns from pepper spray, and prevented them from safely covering the events even when they presented their press cards. There were at least 27 cases of reported violence or harassment against members of the media covering protests during June, as outlined in a detailed HKJA complaint to police.
  • Surveillance fears: Protesters in Hong Kong are reportedly using the encrypted messaging application Telegram, disabling the location tracking on their phones, and deleting chat records to avoid potential government surveillance and future punishment for participating in protests. Despite these efforts, on June 11 police arrested the administrator of a Telegram chat group on charges of “conspiring to commit a public nuisance,” according to Global Voices. Police searched Ivan Ip's apartment and downloaded chat records from his phone pertaining to a group of over 20,000 members. According to the New York Times, in the wake of Ip’s arrest, many protesters began using pay-as-you-go SIM cards or foreign numbers to avoid being found by police on the basis of their phone numbers.
  • Cyberattack on Telegram: The Chinese government is suspected of launching a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Telegram during the height of the recent protests. On June 12, a large number of “garbage requests” overwhelmed Telegram’s servers and temporarily disabled the app, reports Engadget. Telegram chief executive Pavel Durov confirmed on his personal Twitter account that most of the internet protocol addresses linked to the attack were in China. Such tactics are not new. Durov said that past attacks of similar sizes had coincided with protests in Hong Kong.

BEYOND CHINA: Support for Hong Kong, Twitter suspensions, Uighur refugees, Huawei spying in Serbia

  • Foreign leaders speak out on Hong Kong bill, protests: Officials from democratic governments around the world have expressed deep concern about Hong Kong’s extradition bill and support for the protesters opposing it. Those speaking out include cabinet ministers and lawmakers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia. If passed, the bill would expose Hong Kong residents as well as expatriates and visitors to detention and trial in China's notoriously flawed judicial system. In one of the strongest steps taken thus far, a bipartisan group of US lawmakers reintroduced the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act on June 13. The draft law would, among other actions, require the US government to annually reassess the territory’s autonomy from Beijing and its related special trading status. It would also enable personal sanctions against officials who are found to be “complicit in suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong, including … rendition of individuals … to mainland China.”
  • Under Chinese pressure, Australian councilor withdraws motion commemorating June 4: A city councilor for Melbourne withdrew at the last minute a motion to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, apparently in response to pressure from the Chinese consulate. Councilor Jackie Watts later expressed regret for her decision to bow to “political influence” and told the media that remaining silent about the anniversary “was contrary to the very democracy that we hold dear.”
  • Twitter suspends Chinese dissidents’ accounts ahead of Tiananmen anniversary: Twitter suspended the accounts of at least 100 Chinese political commentators, and by some estimates thousands, days before the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Rights lawyers, activists, and college students in China as well as intellectuals based abroad were affected. Responding to what has been dubbed the #TwitterMassacre, many observers, including US senator Marco Rubio, accused the company of acting as a censor for the Chinese government or responding to suspected fake complaints about the accounts. Twitter soon apologized and claimed that the suspensions were the unintentional result of a periodic “routine action” to crack down on spam, not a reaction to Chinese government requests. Many of the accounts were soon functioning again, but users and activists remain unsatisfied with Twitter’s explanation and are urging more transparency. Writing in Forbes, Kalev Leetaru argued that the social media company’s reluctance to allow external monitoring of its enforcement actions raised “grave questions about Twitter’s commitment to freedom of speech.”
  • Foreign help in Uighur crackdown criticized: The Belgian government has come under fire for an incident in late May in which it allowed Chinese police to detain a Uighur family seeking assistance at the country’s Beijing embassy. Wureyetiguli Abula was seeking visas for herself and her four children, aged 5 to 17, in order to join her husband in Brussels, where he had been granted asylum. After a disagreement over the travel documents, consular officials permitted police to enter the embassy and remove the family, who have since been placed under house arrest in Xinjiang. Writing in Foreign Policy, acquaintances of the family referred to a 2018 case in Germany in which a bureaucratic error led to the deportation of a 22-year-old Uighur man, who has not been heard from since. After that incident, Germany and Sweden ordered a halt to any deportations of Uighurs to China. Separately, the United Nations counterterrorism chief, Russian diplomat Vladimir Voronkov, has been criticized for making a trip to Xinjiang in mid-June and failing to mention the mass detention of Uighurs in “reeducation” camps. US deputy secretary of state John Sullivan condemned the visit as an endorsement of the Chinese government's efforts to depict “its repressive campaign against Uighurs and other Muslims as legitimate counterterrorism efforts when it is not.”
  • Chinese facial-recognition technology deployed in Serbia, Tajikistan: The Serbian government has announced that it will be installing hundreds of Huawei-made cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology across the capital, Belgrade, reports Foreign Policy. The article cites a now-deleted Huawei study in which “the company boasted that it had already deployed its Safe City system in 230 cities around the world, for more than 90 national or regional governments.” Indeed, according to a June 17 report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), similar technology is being installed in cities across Tajikistan as part of a Safe City program funded in large part by a loan from China. The move, which has raised concerns within the human rights community, recalls the use by Ecuadorean authorities of Chinese-made technology in that country’s expanding system of domestic surveillance. Serbia is rated Partly Free and Tajikistan is rated Not Free in Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World report. The export of such technologies is just one example of the way China’s technological and media reach could strengthen autocrats and challenge democratic governance and press freedom worldwide—a theme explored in a new report, Freedom and the Media, published by Freedom House in early June.

FEATURED PUSHBACK: Songs, wordplay aid Hong Kong protesters and Chinese netizens

Photo Credit: Mary Hui

Mass outbreaks of song and Cantonese wordplay have been a recurring feature of the protest movement against Hong Kong’s extradition bill, which would enable criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China. Perhaps the most prominent example has been the Christian hymn “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord,” which became an anthem for the movement even though most Hong Kongers are not Christians. The hymn first gained prominence when a group of Christian students sang religious songs to provide legal cover for the protests, relying on the fact that religious gatherings can be held in Hong Kong without a permit. The song caught on and can often be heard at protest sites, with some participants noting that it helps reduce tensions with the police, conveying an air of calm and sending the message that the protest is intended to be peaceful.

Various types of satirical wordplay in Cantonese, the dialect of Chinese spoken by most Hong Kongers, have also appeared, serving as a way to assert a sense of identity distinct from that of mainland China. Several internet memes have played off of insults hurled by police at protesters and journalists that were caught on camera and went viral. Similarly, protesters have been seen carrying dolls of the Pokémon character Pikachu, a mocking reference to the Cantonese name of Hong Kong’s secretary of security (Lee Ka-chiu), one of the fiercest proponents of the extradition bill and a key target of protester ire.

Across the border in mainland China, aggressive censorship has prevented photos and discussion of the Hong Kong protests and related police violence from circulating widely, although there has reportedly been a spike in the number of users searching for information about Hong Kong. (Searches on Tencent’s WeChat for “Hong Kong” reportedly reached 32 million on June 12, up from 12 million the week before, for example.) Chinese netizens have also turned to songs and coded references to express their opinions. Specifically, two songs about Hong Kong from the 1980s and 1990s—“Pearl of the Orient” and “Queen’s Road East”—have been used as code to refer to the city. Users posted lyrics from the songs alongside expressions of support for protesters, like “Jiayou!” ("Add oil!"), a common Chinese term of encouragement that has also been heard at the protest sites.


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

Increased censorship and surveillance in July: As another month of sensitive religious and political anniversaries begins, watch for new instances of censorship innovation or intensified restrictions, especially those targeting key populations like Uighurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, or known democracy advocates and friends of Liu Xiaobo.

Hong Kong protest fallout: With demonstrations continuing in Hong Kong, and new evidence confirming police brutality during past protests, watch for whether the controversial extradition bill is fully withdrawn, Carrie Lam resigns as chief executive, police are held accountable for assaults on journalists, and protest leaders or participants face repercussions, including prosecutions based on digital surveillance.

‘Safe City’ projects aiding repression globally: With Chinese facial-recognition technology and video surveillance equipment spreading to dozens of countries around the world, including deeply autocratic states like Tajikistan and backsliding democracies like Serbia, watch for new information on whether and how the recipient security forces may be using the new tools for political repression in addition to crime control. 


TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中國媒體快報:越來越糟的夏季審查、香港抗議、華為在賽爾維亞的間諜活動(Issue 137, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:中國漫長且燥熱的夏季審查

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制​歌曲、文字遊戲幫助香港抗議者和中國網民

未來看點

行動起來!


本期分析:中國漫長且燥熱的夏季審查

六月對中國的網路自由是很糟的月份。七月或許更糟。

作者:薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook) 

每年六月,中國的審查機構都加速審防,以阻止公民討論、紀念或了解1989年中國各地發生的民主抗議活動以及使他們終止的殘暴軍事行動 。

但今年,種種活動,譬如(1989年民主活動)30週年紀念日、與美國的貿易戰升級、香港發生的大規模反送中抗議,以及擁有技術更先進的資訊控制系統,已驅使中國共產黨的審查手段達到了前所未有的極端。 隨著7月份更加敏感的各種紀念日來臨,審查的升級可能還會繼續。

對現有審查制度的新升級

毫不意外的,全中國網路過濾系統「長城防火牆」 本月擴大了其範圍。在6月的第一周內,來自五個不同國家的12個主要國際新聞媒體的網站都被封鎖,包括CNN、《華盛頓郵報》、《衛報》、the Intercept、《多倫多星報》、澳洲的《世紀報》和紐西蘭的Newsroom。這些媒體加入了諸如《紐約時報》、《路透社》和《華爾街日報》等在中國長期無法登陸的媒體行列。

同時,中國最受歡迎的社交媒體應用程式— 新浪微博和騰訊微信 — 部署了新技術和處罰措施,以防止有關天安門廣場大屠殺6月4日週年紀念日的資訊流傳。中國最好的科技公司的監管機構告訴路透社,用於探測和刪除被禁內容的人工智慧達到了「前所未有的準確度」。那些被發現交流有關1989年那些事件的人冒著微信帳號被拒之門外的風險;當重新登錄時,他們將不得不承認他們「傳播惡意謠言」並接受人臉識別掃描,如BBC記者斯蒂芬·麥克唐納(Stephen McDonell)親身經歷的那樣。瑪雅·寇茨(Manya Koetse) 注意到,在微博上,圍繞「天安門」一詞,今年的審查可謂滴水不漏,並且不僅限於會聯繫到1989的日期和詞語的組合。另一個先例是,據報道蘋果公司從其網絡商店刪除了幾個中文播客,影響到一項蘋果在中國少有的服務,過去這項服務一直是避免受審查的。

擴展到非政治空間

有些過時的娛樂內容也沒有逃過審查機構的注意。最突出的例子是,自4月以來,中國主要的影音串流平台已經把搖滾明星李志的音樂刪除,還有這位音樂人的微博帳號、微信公眾號和豆瓣音樂人頁面都已被刪除。雖然李志的近期音樂已是非政治性的甚至是親政府的,但是一些較舊的曲目暗示了1989年的抗議活動。 在六月紀念日之前,監管機構下令刪除與這些歌曲相關的任何影音內容。

一個更意想不到的舉動是,以「系統升級」或「維護」為名,全部或部分暫停直播、約會和名人八卦節目的服務。這些「系統升級」或「維護」都是從5月開始,並預定6月結束。至少9個這樣的案例被記錄在案,包括Momo(一個有1.13億用戶的溝通和直播的應用程式)、影片共享網站哔哩哔哩(1億用戶)、中國最大的約會應用程式探探(9000萬用戶)、同志社交媒體應用程式Blued(2700萬用戶)和Dingtalk,一個商業通信應用程式。在大多數情況下,社交媒體服務並沒有完全關閉,而是暫停並著重在有即時通信功能、且可能使審查人員難以追蹤的特性上 — 例如隨影片播出的即時評論。 YY,一個受歡迎的直播平台,在將6月4日和香港的300多個新關鍵詞添加到黑名單中不久之後,於5月下旬宣布了這種類型的限制

這些公司的聲明解釋說,他們的辦法是在「相關政府機構」的命令下開始的,這顯然是指中國國家互聯網信息辦公室(網信辦)。 他們幾乎別無選擇,只能遵守該機構的要求。據報導,網信辦官員警告財經新聞服務Refinitiv說,如果它拒絕刪除與天安門週年紀念相關的文章,將會失去新聞傳播許可證。Refinitiv經由Eikon終端來傳播路透社內容。標誌著該政權對經濟和相關話題的更為廣泛的焦慮,6月10日,網信辦報導稱,該公司已經下令暫停使用Wallstreet.cn網站和手機應用程式,該金融新聞信息系統已吸引了大約1.8億全球用戶。

事實上,上一個月的審查激增,單從所涉及媒體種類和用戶層面的規模來說,也許是最引人矚目的一次。數億的用戶感覺到了他們突然間能獲取的或分享資訊減少了,即便在一些情形下他們並沒有覺察到限制背後的原因是什麼。

臨時的,還是永久的?

考慮到審查升級似乎主要是由於天安門大屠殺紀念日所觸發的,人們可能會認為許多新的審查措施只是臨時的。但是,證據表明這樣的假設是個錯誤。

自由之家測試了六月份被封的12家外國新聞網站 — 利用GreatFire.org’s的網址分析器 — 結果表明除了CNN,其它網站截至6月18日依然被封。其它上個月推出的新發明的封網手段,譬如在人工智慧輔助下的社交媒體過濾,可以預期在未來數年只有擴張而不會縮減。在這次敏感時段收集到的任何有問題的微信用戶的資料會被保留成為未來參考。

如果說中國的審查員們六月份很忙,那七月份他們也不會閒著。7月1日是香港主權從英國移交中國週年,屆時可能很容易就促發另一輪大規模抗議。然後就是7月5日,是新疆種族抗議暴力10週年紀念日,那次事件導致了嚴酷和持續的對該地區大批穆斯林的鎮壓。接著第二天,7月6日,是達賴喇嘛的生日,而7月13日是民主人士和諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波的兩週年忌日。最後是7月20日,是中共取締法輪功精神信仰並開始大範圍的、曠日持久暴力滅絕性迫害20週年。

不像「六四」紀念日重在回顧歷史,7月的一些敏感日都與當今事件密切相關,其中包括最過份的人權迫害和最重要的異見之聲,都在今天的中國發生著。僅在過去一週多,就有新聞報導說一位著名的維族作家在被拘留新疆的「再教育營」期間死亡;在倫敦的一項獨立調查得出結論:中國的良心犯 — 包括法輪功學員和可能包括被關押的維族人士 — 被殺害以便他們的器官可用於移植手術;在大規模的群眾抗議後,香港政府擱置了其備受爭議的送中法案。

在中國的大多數人可能完全不知道這些事件進展,即便這些事件是國際媒體的頭條,而且在中國可以產生真實反響。然而,雖然有這樣的資訊隔離,希望並未消失。本月中國的年輕人發了無數的文,說他們如何了解了1989年天安門事件的真相,也強調了中共政權審查系統的種種漏洞。從至少兩個翻牆軟件得到的數據表明,在「六四」紀念日前後以及香港大規模民眾抗議期間,與前一月相比,六月份來自中國的用戶增加。

中國人民明確想知道政府不告訴他們的事情。隨著下個月到來,北京的資訊控制措施將會被推向更極端。國際社會應該準備好支持普通中國民眾得到不受過濾的真實新聞的渴求。

薩拉•庫克為自由之家東亞事務資深研究分析員兼其《中國媒體快報》主任。本文已於6月28日發表於《風傳媒》


美國和中國公司感覺到技術冷戰的寒意

由於國家安全問題,美國政府於5月16日宣布禁止向中國電信大廠華為出售美國硬件和軟件,這已經對該公司造成損失。華為智能手機的海外銷售額下降了40%,因為美國商務部上月表示,計畫將華為列入被認為對美國國家利益構成威脅的公司名單。華為已警告稱,該禁令可能會使其收入損失300億美元,儘管在某些情況下可能會獲得美國政府特別許可購買美國組件和技術。美國供應商也面臨巨額財務損失。 美國芯片製造商Broadcom在2018年向華為直接銷售了9億美元,據報已經感受到禁令的影響。

使這些損失更為加重的是美國科技公司決定與華為斷絕關係,出於他們害怕違反提出的限制。 6月7日,路透社報導稱,Facebook將不再允許在華為手機上預裝其移動應用程式,而谷歌將在8月停止向華為提供安卓(Android)操作軟件。

然而,中國似乎準備有所回應。 中國商務部於5月底宣佈,它正在編制自己的「不可靠實體清單」。目前尚不清楚將定義哪些公司,但商務部發言人提到「因非商業原因阻止或削減對中國公司供應的公司」 ,使人聯想到美國科技公司將成為首批目標。 6月8日,《紐約時報》報導稱,中國官員已經召集了微軟、戴爾(Dell)和韓國三星的代表,警告他們不要與美國的禁令合作。

並非所有國家都相信美國聲稱的華為構成國家安全威脅,如利用其在建立第五代(5G)移動基礎設施的角色來代表中國國家進行間諜活動。智利和巴西表示,他們不會排除華為在他們的領土上推出5G技術的計劃,俄羅斯最大的電信商於6月5日與華為簽署協議,建設該國的5G網路。


中國官方媒體、審查機構回應香港抗議活動

過去一個多月,香港一直以大規模抗議活動扣人心弦,港人抗議將被控罪犯引渡到中國大陸的修訂草案。 這些集會涉及了警方暴力事件,包括6月12日警察襲擊抗議者和大規模和平遊行,如6月16日700萬人的香港居民中,有200萬人走上街頭請願。中國大陸媒體已避免廣泛報導抗議活動,中央電視台(CCTV)的最大晚間新聞節目於6月17日沒有報導前一天香港民眾抗議的歷史性參加人數。

但對香港民眾的不同意見,中共官方媒體和香港政府支持者並沒有完全緘默。有關抗議活動的假消息已在網路上傳播,其中大部分都是由中共官方媒體宣傳的。在這些虛假報導中,6月10日《中國日報》的一篇文章稱,有80萬人參加了網絡簽名活動表達對引渡法案的支持。以及6月17日假報導宣稱,香港的父母們遊行反對「美國插手」。 這些內容通過中文媒體傳播到中國境外。在紐西蘭出現的一個例子中,《新西蘭中文先驅報》受到了批評,因為它重印了共產黨喉舌《人民日報》中的歪曲資訊,導致其撤回該文章。

如《中國日報》一篇6月9日 社論所說,中共官方媒體也試圖駁回對該法案的反對,因為「一些香港居民被反對派及其外國支持力量矇騙」。同一篇社論警告稱,抗議活動可能會破壞香港的「信譽和聲譽」。 6月13日《環球時報》評論發表了一篇更為好戰的言論,譴責美國議員如南希·佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)對抗議者表示支持是「一種明顯的挑釁行為。」中國外交部發言人試圖通過6月13日聲明來證明警察野蠻暴力對待抗議者的行為是正當的,試圖證明示威活動有問題,「不是和平集會,而是公然、有組織地發動暴動。」

與此同時,中國審查機構一直在努力阻止大陸新聞消費者和網民了解香港的政治危機和請願遊行。《中國數字時代》(China Digital Times發布了6月16日洩露的政府指令,指示「各網站:查刪香港反送中相關遊行視頻,查刪《海闊天空》《真的愛你》《皇后大道東》等香港歌曲下面的不良評論。」騰訊和其他中國社交媒體公司的審查機構已經努力遵守這些命令,例如從流行的中國音樂流媒體平台中刪除音樂劇《悲慘世界》中的一首歌。 《經濟學人》報導稱,雨果《悲慘世界》歌曲《你聽到人民在唱歌嗎?》— 改編成香港抗議活動主題歌之一 — 在QQ音樂上已經不再出現了。然而,基督教流行歌曲《唱哈利路亞讚美主》,另一首非正式的聖歌,仍然在傳唱。新浪微博平台的審查機構也努力刪除對香港抗議活動的討論。微博已經刪除了對該運動表示支持的貼文或評論。


天安門事件紀念日:監控、騷擾和了解真相的回憶

除了審查新聞媒體和其他通訊工具外, 在天安門大屠殺30週年紀念日之前,中共政府加強了對主要批評者的直接鎮壓。 《自由亞洲電台》報導,警方已將天安門母親親屬成員 — 1989年遇害人的親屬 — 置於更嚴格的技術和身體監視之下,主要是為了阻止她們與外國記者交談。丁子霖,最敢言的母親之一,和著名的維權活動家胡佳被帶到北京以外的地方強制「度假」。非政府組織「中國人權捍衛者」(Chinese Human Rights Defenders) 報導,至少有37名維權活動家和藝術家被關押、被迫旅行或被軟禁,都與敏感的周年紀念日有關。其中包括四川的獨立電影拍攝者鄧傳彬,他在推文發表了一張帶有標記大屠殺的「銘記八酒六四」的酒瓶照片後,被警方拘留。現旅居國外的前學生領袖封從德於6月2日被拒絕入境香港

另外,1989年以後在中國長大的許多作者們都經由海外媒體來反思他們第一次了解一個已經從他們國家的歷史書中消失的事件。在一份由網站「中參館」(ChinaFile出版的此類帳戶彙編中,作者們描述回家後看到家人秘密觀看關於天安門大屠殺的被禁紀錄片;在使用翻牆工具接觸到未經審查的網絡,偶然看到維基百科條目;得知一位喜歡的老師被拒晉升是由於過去參與了「天安門事件」;或者在5月下旬遭遇網絡審查一個無意冒犯之詞,並被告知這與即將到來的六四(6/4)周年紀念日有關。在大多數情況下,作者們隨後找到機會了解更多發生的事情,比如在離開中國出國留學之後,透過詢問他們的父母,或者經由網絡持續探索被封禁的內容。

為了證明電影的力量,很多人都在重述這些經歷,他們強調觀看有關1989年事件的錄像或紀錄片,包括抗議和絕食抗議的學生的真人照片,隨後是開往北京的坦克和血腥的平民。 正如一位匿名撰稿人寫的關於觀看2006年電影《頤和園》的文章,「我出生於1990年。這是我第一次看到有中國面孔的抗議者。 這部電影讓我無語。」


香港:伴隨反送中抗議活動的襲擊記者、網絡攻擊、監視恐嚇

最近幾週,由於數百萬香港居民因香港政府提出的將犯罪嫌疑人引渡到中國大陸的法律修正案,因此出現了一系列與言論自由和隱私權有關的限制或擔憂:

  • 警方襲擊報導抗議活動的記者:香港記者協會(HKJA)抗議警方在6月10日及之後對報導示威活動的記者進行騷擾。據香港記者協會所說,警察侵犯記者們以語言暴力和對身體上的暴力,其中一些人受到胡椒噴霧的灼傷,甚至當他們出示記者證時仍阻止他們安全報導事件。據香港記者協會向警方提交的詳細報告所述,6月份至少有27起案件報導抗議活動的媒體成員遭到警方暴力或騷擾。
  • 監視恐嚇:據報導,香港抗議者正在使用加密的短信應用程式電報、關閉手機上的位置跟蹤、刪除聊天記錄以避免潛在的政府監視和未來因參與抗議而遭受的懲罰。據網站《全球之聲》(Global Voices)報導,儘管做出了這些努力,警方於6月11日逮捕了一名電報聊天小組的管理員,罪名是「陰謀妨害公眾」。 警察搜查了Ivan Ip的公寓,並從他的手機上下載了一組超過20,000名成員的聊天記錄。據《紐約時報》報導,在Ip被捕後,許多抗議者開始使用現收現付的SIM卡或外國號碼,以免被警方因他們的電話號碼而發現。
  • 對電報的網路攻擊:中共政府涉嫌在最近的抗議活動高潮期間對電報發起大規模的分散式阻斷服務攻擊(DDoS)。 據Engadget報導,6月12日,大量「垃圾申請」淹沒了電報服務器並暫時關閉該應用程式。 電報首席執行官帕維爾·杜羅夫(Pavel Durov)在其個人推特賬戶中證實,與此次襲擊相關的大多數網絡地址都在中國。這種策略並非新見。杜羅夫說,過去類似規模的網絡攻擊事件也都恰逢香港的抗議活動。

中國之外:支持香港、Twitter暫停、維吾爾族難民、華為在塞爾維亞從事間諜活動

  • 外國領導人就香港法案發表講話抗議:世界各地民主政府的民選官員對香港的引渡法案表達深切關注,並支持抗議者。那些發言者包括來自美國、英國、加拿大、德國、台灣、日本和澳大利亞的內閣部長和立法議員們。如果該法案通過,香港居民以及外籍人士和旅客將可能會遭到拘捕,被帶到中國接受聲名狼藉的有缺陷的中共司法系統的審判。在迄今為止採取的最強有力的措施中,一個由兩黨組成的美國議員組織於6月13日重新提出了「香港人權與民主法案」(Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act。該法律草案將要求美國政府每年從北京重新評估該領土的自治權,及其相關的特殊貿易狀況。 該法律草案還將對被發現「同謀壓制香港基本自由,包括......強迫謀害遵循國際公認權利的人,送去中國大陸被拘或受審......」的官員實施個人制裁。
  • 在中國的壓力下,澳大利亞議員撤回紀念6月4日的議案:墨爾本市議員在最後一分鐘撤回了紀念天安門廣場大屠殺30週年的動議,顯然是回應於中國領事館的壓力。市議員傑姬·沃茨(Jackie Watts)後來對她決定屈服於「政治影響」表示遺憾,並告訴媒體,對六四週年紀念日保持沉默是「與我們所珍視的非常民主相悖」。
  • Twitter在天安門週年紀念日之前暫停中國持不同政見者的帳戶:據估計在天安門廣場大屠殺30週年前數千天,Twitter暫停了至少100名中國政治評論員的帳戶。中國的維權律師、人權活動家和大學生以及國外的知識分子都受到了影響。針對被稱為#TwitterMassacre的內容,包括美國參議員馬克·盧比奧(Marco Rubio)在內的許多觀察人士指責該公司成為中共政府審查員或回應涉嫌虛假投訴的帳戶。Twitter很快就道歉,聲稱暫停是定期「打擊」垃圾郵件的「常規行動」的無意結果,而不是對中共政府要求的回應。 許多帳戶很快再次開通,但用戶和維權活動家仍對Twitter的解釋不滿意,並敦促其提高透明度。Kalev Leetaru在《福布斯》雜誌上撰文指出,社交媒體公司不願允許對其執法行動進行外部監控,這引發了「對Twitter關於對言論自由承諾的嚴重質疑」。
  • 外國幫助鎮壓維吾爾族人受批評:比利時政府因5月下旬發生的事件而受到抨擊,該事件允許中國警方在該國駐北京大使館拘留尋求幫助的維吾爾族家庭Wureyetiguli Abula為自己和她的四個5至17歲的孩子尋求簽證,以便與她的丈夫一起在布魯塞爾獲得庇護。在否決了旅行證件後,領事允許中共警察進入大使館,並帶走曾在新疆遭軟禁的這個家庭。在美國學術刊物《外交政策》報告中,這個家庭的熟人提到了德國2018年的一起案件,其中因一個官僚錯誤導致一名22歲的維吾爾族男子被驅逐出境,此後他杳無音訊,生死不明。在那次事件之後,德國和瑞典下令停止將維吾爾人驅逐到中國。另外,聯合國反恐部長,俄羅斯外交官弗拉基米爾·沃羅恩科夫(Vladimir Voronkov)因六月中旬到新疆旅行,而沒有提到在「再教育營」大規模拘留新疆維吾爾人而遭受批評。美國副國務卿約翰·沙利文(John Sullivan)譴責這次訪問成為對中共政府的各種企圖的認可,中共試圖描繪「其對維吾爾族人和其他穆斯林人的鎮壓行動是合法的反恐努力,而事實並非如此」。
  • 中國部署在塞爾維亞、塔吉克的人臉識別技術:據《外交政策》報導,塞爾維亞政府已宣布將在首都貝爾格萊德(Belgrade)安裝數百台華為製造的配備有面部識別技術的攝像機。這篇文章引用了一項現已被刪除的華為研究報告,其中「該公司宣稱它已經在全球230個城市部署了安全城市系統,為90多個國家或地區政府提供了支持。」事實上,據自由歐洲電台/自由電台(RFE/RL)6月17日的一份報告,塔吉克各城市正在安裝類似技術,作為其安全城市計劃的一部分,該計劃部分資金來自中國貸款。此舉引起了人權界的關注,回顧厄瓜多當局在該國不斷擴大的國內監督系統中使用中國製造的技術。塞爾維亞被評為部分自由,塔吉克斯坦在自由之家的《2019年世界自由報告》中被評為不自由。 這些華為技術的出口只是中共技術和媒體加強獨裁者並挑戰全球民主和新聞自由的一個例子 — 這一主題曾在6月初出版的自由之家 新報告《自由與媒體》中進行了探討。

重點反制:歌曲、文字遊戲幫助香港抗議者和中國網民

大規模爆發的歌曲和粵語文字遊戲已成為反復迴盪的特徵,出現在抗議香港引渡法案運動中,引渡法案將使犯罪嫌疑人被送往中國大陸。或許最突出的例子是基督教讚美詩《唱哈利路亞讚美主》成為運動的主題曲,即使大多數香港人不是基督徒。當一群基督徒學生唱響宗教歌曲為抗議活動提供合法掩護時,這首讚美詩歌最先獲得矚目,依據事實宗教聚會可以在無許可證的情況下在香港舉行。這首歌流行起來,經常可以在抗議地點聽到,一些參加者註意到這有助於減輕警察的緊張情緒,傳達一種平靜的氣氛,並傳遞旨在和平抗議訊息。

各種類型的粵語諷刺文字遊戲,大多數香港人所使用的漢語方言,作為一種顯示區別於中國大陸身份的方式也已經出現。 一些網紅們播放所拍攝下來的警察向抗議者和記者投擲侮辱的視頻在網絡上走紅。同樣,看到抗議者攜帶神奇玩偶皮卡丘(Pikachu),諷刺香港保安局局長李家超(Lee Ka-chiu)的粵語名字,他是引渡法案中最凶悍的支持者之一,也是抗議者們的主要目標。

在中國大陸的邊境地區,凶猛的審查制度使得香港抗議活動和相關警察暴力事件的照片和討論無法廣泛傳播,儘管據報導搜索香港信息的用戶數量激增。 (例如,6月12日騰訊微信對「香港」的搜索量達到3200萬,而前一周則為1200萬。)中國網民也轉向歌曲和暗諷引用來表達他們的意見。尤其是,從20世紀80年代和90年代兩首關於香港的歌曲 — 《東方之珠》和《皇后大道東》—  已被用作有關香港的暗諷 。 用戶們發表了歌曲中的歌詞以及對抗議者的支持,例如「加油!」,常見的在抗議現場上已聽到的中文鼓勵專詞。

Photo credit: Mary Hui


未來看點

7月增加的審查和監督:隨著下一個月的敏感宗教和政治紀念日開始,請關注審查的新情況或加劇的限制,特別是針對那些重點人群,如維吾爾族人、西藏人和法輪功學員等,或知名的民主倡議者和劉曉波的朋友們。

香港抗議事件的餘波:隨著香港抗議活動的繼續,以及在過去的抗議活動中證實警察暴行的新證據,請關注備受爭議的引渡法案是否得到全部撤回,是否林鄭月娥(Carrie Lam)辭去香港特首的職務,是否警方對襲擊記者承擔責任,抗議發起人或參與者是否面臨秋後算帳,包括來自數字監控的迫害。

助箝制全球為虐的「平安城市」項目:隨著中共面部識別技術和視頻監控設備向全球數十個國家擴散,包括塔吉克斯坦等極端專制國家和塞爾維亞等民主倒退的國家,請關注新的關於這些安全設備的接受們是否以及如何使用新的政治壓制工具,包括控制犯罪。


行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

中国媒体快报:夏季越来越糟的审查、香港抗议、华为在赛尔维亚的间谍活动(Issue 137, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 中国漫长而躁熱的夏季审查

新闻报道:​​​

重点反制:歌曲、文字游戏帮助香港抗议者和中国网民

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:中国漫长而躁熱的夏季审查

六月对中国的网路自由是很糟的月份。七月或许更糟。

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

每年六月,中国的审查机构都加速审防,以阻止公民讨论,纪念或了解1989年中国各地发生的民主抗议活动以及使他们终止的残暴军事行动。

但今年,种种活动,譬如(1989年民主活动)30周年纪念日,与美国的贸易战升级,香港发生的大规模反送中抗议,以及拥有技术更先进的资讯控制系统,已驱使中国共产党的审查手段达到了前所未有的极端。随着7月份更加敏感的各种纪念日来临,审查的升级可能还会继续。

对现有审查制度的新升级

毫不意外的,全中国网路过滤系统「长城防火墙」本月扩大了其范围。在6月的第一周内,来自五个不同国家的12个主要国际新闻媒体的网站都被封锁,包括CNN、《华盛顿邮报》、《卫报》、the Intercept、《多伦多星报》、澳洲的《世纪报》和新西兰的Newsroom。这些媒体加入了诸如《纽约时报》、《路透社》 和《华尔街日报》等在中国长期无法登陆的媒体行列。

同时,中国最受欢迎的社交媒体应用程式 - 新浪微博和腾讯微信 - 部署了新技术和处罚措施,以防止有关天安门广场大屠杀6月4日周年纪念日的资讯流传。中国最好的科技公司的监管机构告诉路透社,用于探测和删除被禁内容的人工智能达到了「前所未有的准确度」。那些被发现交流有关1989年那些事件的人冒着微信帐号被拒之门外的风险;当重新登录时,他们将不得不承认他们「传播恶意谣言」并接受人脸识别扫描,如BBC记者斯蒂芬·麦克唐纳(Stephen McDonell)亲身经历的那样。玛雅·寇茨(Manya Koetse)注意到,在微博上,围绕「天安门」一词,今年的审查可谓滴水不漏,并且不仅限于会联系到1989的日期和词语的组合。另一个先例是,据报道苹果公司从其网络商店删除了几个中文播客,影响到一项苹果在中国少有的服务,过去这项服务一直是避免受审查的。

扩展到非政治空间

有些过时的娱乐内容也没有逃过审查机构的注意。最突出的例子是,自4月以来,中国主要的影音串流平台已经把摇滚明星李志的音乐删除,还有这位音乐人的微博帐号、微信公众号和豆瓣音乐人页面都已被删除。虽然李志的近期音乐已是非政治性的甚至是亲政府的,但是一些较旧的曲目暗示了1989年的抗议活动。在六月纪念日之前,监管机构下令删除与这些歌曲相关的任何影音内容。

一个更意想不到的举动是,以「系统升级」或「维护」为名,全部或部分暂停直播、约会和名人八卦节目的服务。这些「系统升级」或「维护」都是从5月开始,并预定6月结束。至少9个这样的案例被记录在案,包括莫莫(一个有1.13亿用户的沟通和直播的应用程式)、影片共享网站哔哩哔哩(1亿用户)、中国最大的约会应用程式探探(9000万用户)、同志社交媒体应用程式Blued(2700万用户)和Dingtalk,一个商业通信应用程式。在大多数情况下,社交媒体服务并没有完全关闭,而是暂停并着重在有即时通信功能,且可能使审查人员难以追踪的特性上 - 例如随影片播出的即时评论。YY,一个受欢迎的直播平台,在将6月4日和香港的300多个新关键词添加到黑名单中不久之后,于5月下旬宣布了这种类型的限制。

这些公司的声明解释说,他们的办法是在「相关政府机构」的命令下开始的,这显然是指中国国家互联网信息办公室(网信办)。他们几乎别无选择,只能遵守该机构的要求。据报导,网信办官员警告财经新闻服务Refinitiv说,如果它拒绝删除与天安门周年纪念相关的文章,将会失去新闻传播许可证。Refinitiv经由的Eikon终端来传播路透社内容标志着。该政权对经济和相关话题的更为广泛的焦虑,6月10日,网信办报导称,该公司已经下令暂停使用Wallstreet.cn网站和手机应用程式,该金融新闻信息系统已吸引了大约1.8亿全球用户。

事实上,上一个月的审查激增,单从所涉及媒体种类和用户层面的规模来说,也许是最引人瞩目的一次。数亿的用户感觉到了他们突然间能获取的或分享资讯减少了,即便在一些情形下他们并没有觉察到限制背后的原因是什么。

临时的,还是永久的?

考虑到审查升级似乎主要是由于天安门大屠杀纪念日所触发的,人们可能会认为许多新的审查措施只是临时的。但是,证据表明这样的假设是个错误。

自由之家测试了六月份被封的12家外国新闻网站 - 利用GreatFire.org的网址分析器 - 结果表明除了CNN,其它网站截至6月18日依然被封。其它上个月推出的新发明的封网手段,譬如在人工智慧辅助下的社交媒体过滤,可以预期在未来数年只有扩张而不会缩减。在这次敏感时段收集到的任何有问题的微信用户的资料会被保留成为未来参考。

如果说中国的审查员们六月份很忙,那七月份他们也不会闲着。7月1日是香港主权从英国移交中国周年,届时可能很容易就促发另一轮大规模抗议。然后就是7月5日,是新疆种族抗议暴力10周年纪念日,那次事件导致了严酷和持续的对该地区大批穆斯林的镇压。接着第二天,7月6日,是达赖喇嘛的生日,而7月13日是民主人士和诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波的两周年忌日。最后是7月20日,是中共取缔法轮功精神信仰并开始大范围的,旷日持久暴力灭绝性迫害20周年。

不像「六四」纪念日重在回顾历史,7月的一些敏感日都与当今事件密切相关,其中包括最过份的人权迫害和最重要的异见之声,都在今天的中国发生着。仅在过去一周多,就有新闻报导说一位着名的维族作家在被拘留新疆的「再教育营」期间死亡;在伦敦的一项独立调查得出结论:中国的良心犯 - 包括法轮功学员和可能包括被关押的维族人士 - 被杀害以便他们的器官可用于移植手术;在大规模的群众抗议后,香港政府搁置了其备受争议的送中法案。

在中国的大多数人可能完全不知道这些事件进展,即便这些事件是国际媒体的头条,而且在中国可以产生真实反响。然而,虽然有这样的资讯隔离,希望并未消失。本月中国的年轻人发了无数的文,说他们如何了解了1989年天安门事件的真相,也强调了中共政权审查系统的种种漏洞。从至少两个翻墙软件得到的数据表明,在「六四」纪念日前后以及香港大规模民众抗议期间,与前一月相比,六月份来自中国的用户增加。

中国人民明确想知道政府不告诉他们的事情。随着下个月到来,北京的资讯控制措施将会被推向更极端。国际社会应该准备好支持普通中国民众得到不受过滤的真实新闻的渴求。

萨拉库克为自由之家东亚事务资深研究分析员兼其《中国媒体快报》主任。本文已于6月28日发表于《风传媒》


美国和中国公司感觉到「技术冷战」的寒意

由于国家安全问题,美国政府于5月16日宣布禁止向中国电信大厂华为出售美国硬件和软件,这已经对该公司造成损失。华为智能手机的海外销售额下降了40%,因为美国商务部上月表示,计画将华为列入被认为对美国国家利益构成威胁的公司名单。华为已警告称,该禁令可能会使其收入损失300亿美元,尽管在某些情况下可能会获得美国政府特别许可购买美国组件和技术。美国供应商也面临巨额财务损失。美国芯片制造商Broadcom在2018年向华为直接销售了9亿美元,据报已经感受到禁令的影响。

使这些损失更为加重的是美国科技公司决定与华为断绝关系,出于他们害怕违反提出的限制。 6月7日,路透社报导称,Facebook将不再允许在华为手机上预装其移动应用程式,而谷歌将在8月停止向华为提供安卓(Android)操作软件。

然而,中国似乎准备有所回应。中国商务部于5月底宣布,它正在编制自己的「不可靠实体清单」。目前尚不清楚将定义哪些公司,但商务部发言人提到「因非商业原因阻止或削减对中国公司供应的公司」 ,使人联想到美国科技公司将成为首批目标。 6月8日,《纽约时报》报导称,中国官员已经召集了微软、戴尔(Dell)和韩国三星的代表,警告他们不要与美国的禁令合作。

并非所有国家都相信美国声称的华为构成国家安全威胁,如利用其在建立第五代(5G)移动基础设施的角色来代表中国国家进行间谍活动。智利和巴西表示,他们不会排除华为在他们的领土上推出5G技术的计划,俄罗斯最大的电信商于6月5日与华为签署协议,建设该国的5G网络。


中国官方媒体、审查机构回应香港抗议活动

过去一个多月,香港一直以大规模抗议活动扣人心弦,港人抗议将被控罪犯引渡到中国大陆的修订草案。这些集会涉及了警方暴力事件,包括6月12日警察袭击抗议者和大规模和平游行,如6月16日700万人的香港居民中,有200万人走上街头请愿。中国大陆媒体已避免广泛报导抗议活动,中央电视台(CCTV)的最大晚间新闻节目于6月17日没有报导前一天香港民众抗议的历史性参加人数。

但对香港民众的不同意见,中共官方媒体和香港政府支持者并没有完全缄默。有关抗议活动的假消息已在网络上传播,其中大部分都是由中共官方媒体宣传的。在这些虚假报导中,6月10日《中国日报》的一篇文章称,有80万人参加了网络签名活动表达对引渡法案的支持。以及6月17日假报导宣称,香港的父母们游行反对「美国插手」。这些内容通过中文媒体传播到中国境外。在新西兰出现的一个例子中,《 新西兰中文先驱报》受到了批评,因为它重印了共产党喉舌《人民日报》中的歪曲信息,导致其撤回该文章。

如《中国日报》一篇6月9日 社论所说,中共官方媒体也试图驳回对该法案的反对,因为「一些香港居民被反对派及其外国支持力量蒙骗」。同一篇社论警告称,抗议活动可能会破坏香港的「信誉和声誉」。 6月13日《环球时报》评论发表了一篇更为好战的言论,谴责美国议员如南希·佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)对抗议者表示支持是「一种明显的挑衅行为。」中国外交部发言人试图通过6月13日声明来证明警察野蛮暴力对待抗议者的行为是正当的,试图证明示威活动有问题,「不是和平集会,而是公然、有组织地发动暴动。 」

与此同时,中国审查机构一直在努力阻止大陆新闻消费者和网民了解香港的政治危机和请愿游行。《中国数字时代》(China Digital Times)发布了6月16日泄露的政府指令,指示「各网站:查删香港反送中相关游行视频,查删《海阔天空》《真的爱你》《皇后大道东》等香港歌曲下面的不良评论。」腾讯和其他中国社交媒体公司的审查机构已经努力遵守这些命令,例如从流行的中国音乐流媒体平台中删除音乐剧《悲惨世界》中的一首歌。 《经济学人》(Economist )报导称,雨果《悲惨世界》歌曲《你听到人民在唱歌吗? 》— 改编成香港抗议活动主题歌之一 — 在QQ音乐上已经不再出现了。然而,基督教流行歌曲《唱哈利路亚赞美主》,另一首非正式的圣歌,仍然在传唱。新浪微博平台的审查机构也努力删除对香港抗议活动的讨论。微博已经删除了对该运动表示支持的帖子或评论。


天安门事件纪念日:监视、骚扰和了解真相的追忆

除了审查新闻媒体和其他通讯工具外, 在天安门大屠杀30周年纪念日之前,中共政府加强了对主要批评者的直接镇压。《自由亚洲电台》报导,警方已将天安门母亲亲属成员 — 1989年遇害人的亲属 — 置于更严格的技术和身体监视之下,主要是为了阻止她们与外国记者交谈。丁子霖,最敢言的母亲之一,和著名的维权活动家胡佳被带到北京以外的地方强制「度假」。非政府组织「中国人权捍卫者」(Chinese Human Rights Defenders)报导,至少有37名维权活动家和艺术家被关押、被迫旅行或被软禁,都与敏感的周年纪念日有关。其中包括四川的独立电影拍摄者邓传彬,他在推文发表了一张带有标记大屠杀的「铭记八酒六四」的酒瓶照片后,被警方拘留。现旅居国外的前学生领袖封从德于6月2日被拒绝入境香港

另外,1989年以后在中国长大的许多作者们都经由海外媒体来反思他们第一次了解一个已经从他们国家的历史书中消失的事件。在一份由网站「中参馆」(ChinaFile)出版的此类账户汇编中,作者们描述回家后看到家人秘密观看关于天安门大屠杀的被禁纪录片,在使用翻墙工具接触到未经审查的网络,偶然看到维基百科条目,得知一位喜欢的老师被拒晋升是由于过去参与了「天安门事件」,或者在5月下旬遭遇网络审查一个无意冒犯之词,并被告知这与即将到来的六四(6/4)周年纪念日有关。在大多数情况下,作者们随后找到机会了解更多发生的事情,比如在离开中国出国留学之后,透过询问他们的父母,或者经由网络持续探索被封禁的内容。

为了证明电影的力量,很多人都在重述这些经历,他们强调观看有关1989年事件的录像或纪录片,包括抗议和绝食抗议的学生的真人照片,随后是开往北京的坦克和血腥的平民。正如一位匿名撰稿人写的关于观看2006年电影《颐和园》的文章,「我出生于1990年。这是我第一次看到有中国面孔的抗议者。 这部电影让我无语。」


香港:伴随反送中抗议活动的袭击记者、网络攻击、监视恐吓

最近几周,由于数百万香港居民因香港政府提出的将犯罪嫌疑人引渡到中国大陆的法律修正案,因此出现了一系列与言论自由和隐私权有关的限制或担忧:

  • 警方袭击报导抗议活动的记者:香港记者协会(HKJA)抗议警方在6月10日及之后对报导示威活动的记者进行骚扰。据香港记者协会所说,警察侵犯记者们以语言暴力和对身体上的暴力,其中一些人受到胡椒喷雾的灼伤,甚至当他们出示记者证时仍阻止他们安全报导事件。据香港记者协会向警方提交的详细报告所述,6月份至少有27起案件报导抗议活动的媒体成员遭到警方暴力或骚扰。
  • 监视恐吓:据报导,香港抗议者正在使用加密的短信应用程式电报、关闭手机上的位置跟踪、删除聊天记录以避免潜在的政府监视和未来因参与抗议而遭受的惩罚。据网站《全球之声》(Global Voices)报导,尽管做出了这些努力,警方于6月11日逮捕了一名电报聊天小组的管理员,罪名是「阴谋妨害公众」。警察搜查了Ivan Ip的公寓,并从他的手机上下载了一组超过20,000名成员的聊天记录。据《纽约时报》报导,在Ip被捕后,许多抗议者开始使用现收现付的SIM卡或外国号码,以免被警方因他们的电话号码而发现。
  • 对电报中的网络攻击:中共政府涉嫌在最近的抗议活动高潮期间对电报发起大规模的分散式阻断服务攻击(DDoS)。据Engadget报导,6月12日,大量「垃圾申请」淹没了电报服务器并暂时关闭该应用程式。电报首席执行官帕维尔·杜罗夫(Pavel Durov)在其个人推特账户中证实,与此次袭击相关的大多数网络地址都在中国。这种策略并非新见。杜罗夫说,过去类似规模的网络攻击事件也都恰逢香港的抗议活动。

中國之外:支持香港、Twitter暂停、维吾尔族难民、华为在塞尔维亚从事间谍活动

  • 外国领导人就香港法案发表讲话抗议:世界各地民主政府的民选官员对香港的引渡法案表达深切关注,并支持抗议者。那些发言者包括来自美国、英国、加拿大、德国、台湾、日本和澳大利亚的内阁部长和立法议员们。如果该法案通过,香港居民以及外籍人士和旅客将可能会遭到拘捕,被带到中国接受声名狼藉的有缺陷的中共司法系统的审判。在迄今为止采取的最强有力的措施中,一个由两党组成的美国议员组织于6月13日重新提出了「香港人权与民主法案」(Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act)。该法律草案将要求美国政府每年从北京重新评估该领土的自治权, 及其相关的特殊贸易状况。该法律草案还将对被发现「同谋压制香港基本自由,包括......强迫谋害遵循国际公认权利的人,送去中国大陆被拘或受审......」的官员实施个人制裁。
  • 在中国的压力下,澳大利亚议员撤回纪念6月4日的议案:墨尔本市议员在最后一分钟撤回了纪念天安门广场大屠杀30周年的动议,显然是回应于中国领事馆的压力。市议员杰姬·沃茨(Jackie Watts)后来对她决定屈服于「政治影响」表示遗憾,并告诉媒体,对(六四)周年纪念日保持沉默是「与我们所珍视的非常民主相悖」。
  • Twitter在天安门周年纪念日之前暂停中国持不同政见者的账户:据估计在天安门广场大屠杀30周年前数千天,Twitter暂停了至少100名中国政治评论员的账户。中国的维权律师、人权活动家和大学生以及国外的知识分子都受到了影响。针对被称为#TwitterMassacre的内容,包括美国参议员马克·卢比奥(Marco Rubio)在内的许多观察人士指责该公司成为中共政府审查员或回应涉嫌虚假投诉的账户。 Twitter很快就道歉,声称暂停是定期「打击」垃圾邮件的「常规行动」的无意结果,而不是对中共政府要求的回应。许多帐户很快再次开通,但用户和维权活动家仍对Twitter的解释不满意,并敦促其提高透明度。Kalev Leetaru 在《福布斯》杂志上撰文指出,社交媒体公司不愿允许对其执法行动进行外部监控,这引发了「对Twitter关于对言论自由承诺的严重质疑」。
  • 外国帮助镇压维吾尔族人受批评:比利时政府因5月下旬发生的事件而受到抨击,该事件允许中国警方在该国驻北京大使馆拘留寻求帮助的维吾尔族家庭Wureyetiguli Abula为自己和她的四个5至17岁的孩子寻求签证,以便与她的丈夫一起在布鲁塞尔获得庇护。在否决了旅行证件后,领事允许中共警察进入大使馆,并带走曾在新疆遭软禁的这个家庭。在美国学术刊物《外交政策》报告中,这个家庭的熟人提到了德国2018年的一起案件,其中因一个官僚错误导致一名22岁的维吾尔族男子被驱逐出境,此后他杳无音讯,生死不明。在那次事件之后,德国和瑞典下令停止将维吾尔人驱逐到中国。另外,联合国反恐部长,俄罗斯外交官弗拉基米尔·沃罗恩科夫(Vladimir Voronkov)因六月中旬到新疆旅行,而没有提到在「再教育营」大规模拘留新疆维吾尔人而遭受批评。美国副国务卿约翰·沙利文(John Sullivan)谴责这次访问成为对中共政府的各种企图的认可,中共试图描绘「其对维吾尔族人和其他穆斯林人的镇压行动是合法的反恐努力,而事实并非如此」 。
  • 中国部署在塞尔维亚、塔吉克斯坦的面部识别技术:据《外交政策》报导,塞尔维亚政府已宣布将在首都贝尔格莱德(Belgrade)安装数百台华为制造的配备有面部识别技术的摄像机。这篇文章引用了一项现已被删除的华为研究报告,其中「该公司宣称它已经在全球230个城市部署了安全城市系统,为90多个国家或地区政府提供了支持。」事实上,据自由欧洲电台/自由电台(RFE/RL)6月17日的一份报告,塔吉克斯坦各城市正在安装类似技术,作为其安全城市计划的一部分,该计划部分资金来自中国贷款。此举引起了人权界的关注,回顾厄瓜多尔当局在该国不断扩大的国内监督系统中使用中国制造的技术。塞尔维亚被评为部分自由,塔吉克斯坦在自由之家的《2019年世界自由报告》中被评为不自由。这些华为技术的出口只是中共技术和媒体加强独裁者并挑战全球民主和新闻自由的一个例子 — 这一主题曾在6月初出版的自由之家 新报告《自由与媒体》中进行了探讨。

重点反制:歌曲、文字游戏帮助香港抗议者和中国网民

大规模爆发的歌曲和粤语文字游戏已成为反复回荡的特征,出现在抗议香港引渡法案运动中,引渡法案将使犯罪嫌疑人被送往中国大陆。或许最突出的例子是基督教赞美诗《唱哈利路亞歌赞美主》,成为运动的主题曲,即使大多数香港人不是基督徒。当一群基督徒学生唱响宗教歌曲为抗议活动提供合法掩护时,这首赞美诗歌最先获得瞩目,依据事实宗教聚会可以在无许可证的情况下在香港举行。这首歌流行起来,经常可以在抗议地点听到,一些参加者注意到这有助于减轻警察的紧张情绪,传达一种平静的气氛,并传递旨在和平抗议讯息。

各种类型的粤语讽刺文字游戏,大多数香港人所使用的汉语方言,作为一种显示区别于中国大陆身份的方式也已经出现。一些网红们播放所拍摄下来的警察向抗议者和记者投掷侮辱的视频在网络上走红。同样,看到抗议者携带神奇玩偶皮卡丘(Pikachu),讽刺香港保安局局长李家超(Lee Ka-chiu)的粤语名字,他是引渡法案中最凶悍的支持者之一,也是抗议者们的主要目标。

在中国大陆的边境地区,凶猛的审查制度使得香港抗议活动和相关警察暴力事件的照片和讨论无法广泛传播,尽管据报导搜索香港信息的用户数量激增。 (例如,6月12日腾讯微信对「香港」的搜索量达到3200万,而前一周则为1200万。)中国网民也转向歌曲和暗讽引用来表达他们的意见。尤其是,从20世纪80年代和90年代两首关于香港的歌曲 — 《东方之珠》和《皇后大道东》— 已被用作有关香港的暗讽 。用户们发表了歌曲中的歌词以及对抗议者的支持,例如「加油!」,常见的在抗议现场上已听到的中文鼓励专词。​


未來看点

7月增加的审查和监督:随着下一个月的敏感宗教和政治纪念日开始,请关注审查的新情况或加剧的限制,特别是针对那些重点人群,如维吾尔族人、西藏人和法轮功学员等,或知名的民主倡导者和刘晓波的朋友们。

香港抗议事件的余波:随着香港抗议活动的继续,以及在过去的抗议活动中证实警察暴行的新证据,请关注备受争议的引渡法案是否得到全部撤回,是否林郑月娥(Carrie Lam)辞去香港特首的职务,是否警方对袭击记者承担责任, 抗议发起人或参与者是否面临秋后算账,包括来自数字监控的迫害。

助钳制全球为虐的「平安城市」项目:随着中共面部识别技术和视频监控设备向全球数十个国家扩散,包括塔吉克斯坦等极端专制国家和塞尔维亚等民主倒退的国家,请关注新的关于这些安全设备的接受们是否以及如何使用新的政治压制工具,包括控制犯罪。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin: CCTV spreads disinformation, Hong Kong journalists attacked, activists die in custody (No. 138)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: China Central Television: A Long-standing Weapon in Beijing's Arsenal of Repression

Part of the station’s mission is to attack designated enemies of the Communist Party.

By Sarah Cook

Since antigovernment protests began three months ago in Hong Kong, Beijing’s state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), has gone to great lengths to demonize the protesters and mislead both Chinese and international audiences about the nature of the movement.

CCTV’s flagship news program ran a week’s worth of segments in July that denounced the protests and claimed that they were linked to “external forces.” A few weeks later, the broadcaster aired false reports that a protester had blinded a woman who was actually struck in the eye by a police bean-bag round. More recently, the station’s international arm released videos and graphics on YouTube and Facebook that likened protesters to Islamist militants and claimed that they are backed by US spy agencies. And on September 18, CCTV news posted a video on the Sina Weibo microblogging platform that urged its 89 million followers to identify, investigate, and publish online the personal information of Hong Kong protesters and journalists, exposing them to real-world harassment.

This latest use of CCTV to target the political enemies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is neither isolated nor new. As the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China approaches on October 1, it is worth reexamining CCTV’s role not only in helping to prop up party legitimacy and promote the reputation of its leaders, but also in doing the party’s “dirty work” by defaming and inciting hatred against perceived foes.

The broadcaster has achieved a truly global reach, meaning its content has the potential to shape the perceptions of hundreds of millions of people within and beyond China’s borders. The fact that this content is heavily distorted to suit the CCP’s political agenda poses a growing challenge for news consumers, regulators, journalists, advertisers, and others around the world.

A state broadcaster like no other

CCTV was founded 61 years ago, at a time when few Chinese citizens owned a television set. Today, it reaches nearly every household in China, runs over 40 channels, and produces more than 300,000 hours of programming a year. Alongside news, there are channels dedicated to sports, film, Chinese opera, and rural affairs. As the only authorized national broadcaster, the station retains a unique and privileged position in the domestic media market. Its flagship evening news program, Xinwen Lianbo, airs for 30 minutes at 7 p.m. Local and provincial stations are required to carry the program as well, ensuring a regular viewership in the hundreds of millions in addition to a large social media following.

Not surprisingly, CCTV maintains close ties to the party’s political and media-control hierarchy. The broadcaster’s current president, Shen Haixiong, is not only a CCP member but also an alternate member of the Central Committee. He had previously served as head of the propaganda department in Guangdong Province.

CCTV’s news program provides an authoritative expression of official viewpoints, but its repertoire also includes various “investigative” programs that seem to cater to the public interest, even carrying occasional exposés of official wrongdoing. Among the most notable of these shows is Jiaodian Fangtan (Focus Talk). Recent episodes have offered “feel good” stories on party cadres leading rural villages, the technological prowess of companies in different provinces, and the importance of a new land-management law.

Mobilizing against the party’s foes

While day-to-day coverage may be focused on promoting government policies, praising the party leadership, or demonstrating that corrupt officials are being brought to justice, the same programs have been activated time and again to serve as the party’s attack dogs when a particular political threat emerges, defaming the designated targets and whitewashing horrific human rights abuses against them.

One of the first and starkest examples of these televised campaigns coincided with the 1999 launch of the CCP’s violent crackdown on the Falun Gong meditation and spiritual practice. Other efforts have followed at regular intervals, including a 2009 documentary series about the Dalai Lama, the airing of forced confessions as part of a crackdown on human rights lawyers that began in 2015, attempts to justify the mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang since 2017, the disinformation about this summer’s antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and just this month, ominous warnings that Taiwanese spies are using academic exchanges to recruit Chinese students.

Focus Talk has also carried highly problematic reports at key moments in the CCP’s political crackdowns. The show aired 28 episodes defaming and inciting hatred against practitioners of Falun Gong within a 32 day period in 1999. This was followed by deceptive reporting claiming a group of people who self-immolated on Tiananmen Square in 2001 were adherents of the banned group. In 2006, a Canadian regulatory commission acknowledged that such coverage was “clearly abusive” and “could incite violence” against those who practice Falun Gong in China and abroad.

More recently, it was an October 2018 episode of the program that offered the first acknowledgment in Chinese state media of the existence of detention centers in Xinjiang, framing them as “vocational centers” that would boost employment and curb extremism rather than as heavily guarded facilities where ordinary Muslims are being confined en masse for political indoctrination and forced labor. Subsequent episodes have continued to parrot the official party line that the centers “saved people who hold terrorist and extremist intentions” in Xinjiang, despite credible reports of forced disappearances, torture, and deaths in custody affecting people with no connection to violence.

To produce such content, CCTV journalists are given exclusive access to relevant locations, interviewees, and officials. But they also apparently accept the government’s stage-management, fabrications, and distortions, without criticism or independent verification. In some cases, CCTV reporters have been complicit in deceiving interviewees or helping police to manipulate them.

This is especially clear with respect to televised confessions. An April 2018 investigation by Safeguard Defenders into 45 such confessions by detained journalists, bloggers, lawyers, activists, and others between 2013 and 2018 found that 90 percent had been aired on CCTV. In many instances, there was concrete evidence that the station’s staff played a knowingly collaborative role in producing and editing segments that had been filmed in coercive or deceptive circumstances.

Global resonance

This fraudulent and demonizing coverage has a real-world impact. It poisons the minds of Chinese viewers against innocent fellow citizens, and prepares the ground for further state abuses. Victims are deprived of potential support from both domestic—and in some cases international—audiences. One prominent Falun Gong torture survivor recalled in an interview how after the airing of the Focus Talk special about the supposed self-immolation in 2001, her own brother became afraid of her. Popular remarks on Chinese social media following the 2018 episode on Xinjiang included comments like “we have to help a large number of Muslims to quit their Islam addiction,” and that “it’s quite a frightening disease.” The propaganda blitzes are often followed by an escalation in police violence against the targeted group and their impact on public perceptions can last for years.

But the effects of CCTV’s programing and propaganda tactics also reach far beyond China’s borders. Among the Chinese diaspora, the state broadcaster is a dominant source of news and entertainment, and its content encourages discrimination and even assaults against CCP critics and persecuted minorities by fellow overseas Chinese. In recent weeks, for example, mainland students and others have attempted to silence and vandalize shows of support for Hong Kong protesters in places like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The broadcaster’s international arm, China Global Television Network (CGTN), has expanded its footprint and produced programming in multiple languages to reach non-Chinese viewers around the world. While it initially aims to build local audiences with attractive and innocuous content, it can be mobilized at key political moments to attack CCP opponents.

For instance, CGTN’s Facebook page now boasts over 85 million followers spread around the globe, and its ads and posts have tended to portray the Chinese government and leaders in a positive light and emphasize attractive national themes like pandas, Chinese cuisine, or tourism opportunities in particular provinces. But interspersed with the relatively benign content are a series of posts and ads that liken Hong Kong protesters to terrorists or repeat proven fabrications like a report claiming that protesters carrying toy weapons were armed with a US-made grenade launcher.

How to respond

Given CCTV’s close relationship with the Chinese state, its political campaigns, and its ongoing severe human rights violations, viewers in China and elsewhere would be wise to receive the broadcaster’s coverage—particularly of politically sensitive topics—with a healthy dose of skepticism, and to seek out more independent sources of information.

For their part, foreign news media should be wary of accepting CCTV coverage at face value and should conduct their own investigations into problematic content aired by the station, as some have done with regard to the recent reporting on Hong Kong. Journalists should carefully consider the ethical implications of working with or for the outlet, no matter what remuneration it might offer.

Although it is owned and subsidized by the Chinese state, CCTV also earns billions of dollars in private advertising revenue. Multinational corporations that currently pay for advertisements on CCTV—particularly its news programs—should reconsider this business decision and look to the many other avenues for reaching Chinese consumers.

Foreign governments and regulators should vigorously monitor the content being aired in their countries by CCTV in Chinese and CGTN in local languages. They should be ready to enforce any broadcasting regulations that might be violated, as British regulator Ofcom is now contemplating with regards to Hong Kong coverage and forced confessions. Foreign-agent registration requirements should be applied to CCTV in Chinese, as they already are to CGTN and other Chinese state media services in the United States, and consideration should be given to imposing sanctions on key executives responsible for televised confessions, as European officials have done in the case of Iran’s Press TV.

Despite the broad diversity of CCTV’s content and the arguably small percentage that rises to the level of abusive or demonizing propaganda, all audiences must remember that it is not a “normal” television station. It has a consistent record of blatantly and egregiously violating journalistic standards and encouraging or justifying hatred and violence against innocent people. CCTV is an essential component of the CCP’s brutal authoritarian regime and should be treated as such.

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. Aaron Cheng, a research intern studying at New York University, provided research assistance.

This article was also published by the Diplomat on September 25, 2019.


Harsh punishments meted out for speech-related offenses

While the Chinese government has developed one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated systems for information control, authorities continue to use low-tech tactics to punish and deter critical reporting and commentary. The following are a selection of such cases from the past few months:

  • Long prison sentences: Huang Qi, the founder of the human rights website 64 Tianwang, was sentenced to 12 years in prison on July 29 for “intentionally leaking state secrets.” In late June, authorities sentenced Liu Pengfei, the moderator of a popular WeChat account that provided Chinese readers with access to foreign news, to two years’ imprisonment. Liu's arrest came after warnings issued by state media in May that WeChat administrators could be held responsible for discussions in their groups. Mongolian historian Lhamjab A. Borjgin was sentenced on July 3 to one year in prison with a two-year reprieve for “national separatism” and “illegal business [activities]” related to dissemination of his book, China's Cultural Revolution.
  • Deaths in custody, and execution fears: Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported on September 23 that police had alerted relatives of activist Wang Meiyu that he had died in custody in Hunan. Wang was detained in July after holding a placard in public calling for Xi Jinping’s resignation and the conduct of national elections. In a separate case, Meng Hong, an elderly Falun Gong practitioner sentenced to prison in 2013 for handing out flyers, reportedly died on July 30 while in custody, according to her daughter living in the United States. In Xinjiang, scholar and former president of Xinjiang University Tashpolat Teyip may be “imminently” executed, according to Radio Free Asia. Teyip’s brother has not been able to contact him since his disappearance in 2017 en route to a conference in Germany.
  • Trumped-up espionage charges:Yang Hengjun, an Australian writer detained by Chinese authorities in January while visiting Guangzhou, was formally charged with espionage on August 23. Australian prime minister Scott Morrison has rejected the charges against Yang, who had been detained before in March 2011, but was released due to international pressure. Yang is not the only foreign national facing such charges: Canadians Michael Spavor, a businessman, and Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat who had worked for the International Crisis Group, have been detained since December 2018 in apparent reprisal for Canada’s arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. They were formally charged with national security crimes this May.
  • Long-term incommunicado detention: Uighurs continued to be held in long-term detention for comments made online, other forms of expression, or having outspoken relatives living abroad. Among those in custody are Buzainafu Abudourexiti, a student detained in 2017 after returning from studies in Egypt, and thirty relatives of prominent activist Rebiya Kadeers. Beyond Xinjiang, grassroots activist Chen Jiafeng has been detained since March due to an online article she wrote regarding the death of activist Cao Shunli. Labor activists Wei Zhili and Ke Chengbing have also been detained since March, while a third labor activist, Yang Zhengjun, has been detained since January. None of these individuals have been permitted to contact lawyers or their families.
  • Detentions in connection with Hong Kong prodemocracy protests: A 25-year-old Shenzhen resident who uses the pseudonym “Freedom Lu” was held by authorities for ten days in August on charges of “picking quarrels,” after he posted essays online urging mainlanders to rethink their attitudes about events in Hong Kong. In Chongqing, a local resident was placed under police surveillance in early August for expressing support online for the protests.
  • Other arrests linked to free-speech offenses: A Tibetan man in Sichuan was detained for 10 days in July for sharing a photograph of the Dalai Lama on WeChat. Two men were detained on June 13 for spreading rumors online concerning Chinese tech company Huawei. And Chinese artist Zhao Bang was arrested in August for designing an emoji-laden t-shirt that obliquely referenced the Tiananmen Square massacre. Zhang Jialong, a former journalist, was detained on August 13 for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” Zhang was known for his 2014 in-person appeal to US Secretary of State John Kerry for the US to pressure China over its internet censorship regime, but had been inactive since losing his job after the meeting.
  • Visa denied: The Wall Street Journal's Chun Han Wong was denied press credentials by the Chinese government in late August. The Singaporean journalist's expulsion from China is believed to come in retaliation for his July 30 report on President Xi Jinping's cousin Ming Chai, a naturalized Australian citizen suspected of money laundering.

Surveillance updates: Proliferating cameras, phone inspections at border, facial recognition in schools

  • Eight of the top ten most-surveilled cities in the world are in China: Researchers with the British proconsumer website Comparitech found that China has more surveillance cameras per capita than any other country. Chongqing was ranked as the world’s most-surveilled city, with 2.6 million cameras—or roughly 168.03 cameras per 1,000 people. There are believed to be more than 200 million surveillance cameras currently in use in China, with that number expected to rise to 626 million or higher by 2022.
  • New spyware and phone inspections at the border: Several reports emerged over the summer of visitors to China having their phones inspected at the border, apparently in connection with the unfolding crises in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. A joint investigation by the New York Times; Süddeutsche Zeitung and NDR, both of Germany; the Guardian; and the online magazine Motherboard published in July found that Chinese authorities have compelled people entering Xinjiang from Central Asia by land to install a surveillance app on their phone. Called Fengcai, the app can collect text messages and check the phone's files against a list of more than 73,000 sensitive items, which includes both books on Islamic terrorism and images of the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, Hong Kong residents crossing into mainland China have been compelled to unlock their phones and permit authorities to search for material related to the ongoing protests, according to the South China Morning Post. During these inspections, which occurred in July and August at the land crossing between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, some individuals were also asked whether or not they had participated in the protests.
  • Facial-recognition technology in schools prompts increasing concern: An August report on Sohu News detailed the use of facial recognition cameras at a primary school that are capable of assessing students’ posture and facial expressions, among other things. The expansion of facial-recognition in schools has prompted mounting domestic concern in recent months, and there are some signs of a government response. Officials at the China Pharmaceutical University in Nanjing recently announced they will curb the practice, while an official with the Ministry of Education conceded that officials must “be very careful when it comes to students' personal information,” adding that the government planned to regulate the use of facial recognition technology in classrooms.
  • Facial-recognition systems increasingly installed at public buildings: A report by Bitter Winter, an online magazine monitoring religious freedom in China, points to the increasing use of surveillance systems in public buildings. The magazine reported in September that facial recognition equipment had been installed by a local public security bureau at a residential compound in Jiangxi, as well as at 13 public housing complexes in Beijing. It is believed these systems could be used to surveil political dissidents and practitioners meeting at house churches.

Censorship updates: Hong Kong news manipulation, liberal think tank shuttered, filmmakers hampered

  • Censors delete, manipulate news on Hong Kong: Online content related to the Hong Kong protests that falls outside official government narratives continues to be significantly censored within China, while pro-regime propaganda is heavily promoted. Leaked instructions dated June 16 and published by China Digital Times order websites to “[f]ind and delete video content related to Hong Kong anti-extradition protests,” and to “delete any harmful comments” that reference several songs netizens have embraced as a way to discreetly express support for the protesters. A more recent set of instructions, dated September 5, highlights the dilemma facing Beijing’s content regulators following the official withdrawal of the extradition law amendments. The directives warn “all websites and new media” to “not re-publish, do not follow up, do not report, and strictly dispose of foreign information posted to social platforms” regarding the withdrawal. The instructions apparently came in response to online comments by Chinese netizens expressing confusion at the concession, which followed weeks of condemnation of the protests by state media. The leaked directive also ordered online media platforms to “[c]lose relevant comment sections, and strictly handle accounts who attack the government in the name of patriotism.”
  • Liberal Beijing-based institute announces closure: In late August, the Beijing-based Unirule Institute of Economics announced its closure after years of harassment by the authorities. The shuttering of Unirule, which over the last two years saw its social media accounts deleted and was evicted from its offices, is only the latest development reflecting authorities’ growing intolerance of free academic debate and critical discussion of economic policy.
  • Censors target war film, Taiwanese film festival: Chinese censors have continued to target mainland filmmakers. The release of the eagerly awaited war epic The Eight Hundredwas cancelled in late June, according to a brief statement on the producer's Sina Weibo account. The cancellation, announced just days before the film’s planned premiere, is thought to be related to its positive depiction of Nationalist soldiers who fought during the 1937 Battle of Shanghai prior to their defeat in 1949 to the Communists in China’s civil war. Separately, against a backdrop of rising tensions between China and Taiwan, the China Film Administration announced on August 6 that it would prevent mainland filmmakers from participating in Taiwan's prestigious Golden Horse Film Festival in November. Chinese documentary filmmaker Zhu Yu, who had previously expressed her intention to defy the ban, withdrew from the festival after she became the target of a cyberbullying campaign.
  • Content-recommendation algorithms face restrictive regulations: Draft regulations issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China on September 10 state that social media platforms, websites, and apps using algorithms to recommend content to users must ensure recommended material is in line with “mainstream values” and state ideology. The regulations come on the heels of the August 31 publication by the CCP Central Committee of “Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Work,” which stipulates the seven main responsibilities of Party committees regarding propaganda work, as well as sixteen discrete responsibilities for propaganda departments operating at all levels.

HONG KONG: Journalists face increased attacks amid protests, police clashes, mob violence

As prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong continue into the early fall, journalists and photographers in Hong Kong have increasingly become targets of violence by police officers, pro-Beijing mobs, and, on occasion, protesters themselves.

Since early July, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) has issued more than a dozen statements condemning attacks on media workers and urging all actors to allow journalists to work freely, and to take notice of PRESS helmets and vests. “Violent individuals and gangs are becoming more malicious in targeting and intimidating journalists,” the HKJA said in a September 16 statement, and repeated calls for police to acknowledge persistent abuses against journalists and “ensure fair law enforcement.”

Recent attacks on the media documented by HKJA include:

  • July 8: Police assaulted, and obstructed the work of journalists trying to covering police clearance operations on Nathan Road, in Mong Kok.
  • July 14: A reporter and a photographer from TVB News were assaulted by protesters during demonstrations in Shatin. The same day, a journalist from Commercial Hong Kong Radio was pepper sprayed by a police officer as he was covering a scuffle between police and protesters.
  • July 21: Two journalists were beaten with rods at the Yuen Long MTR station by a gang of pro-Beijing men wearing white t-shirts, who also destroyed their camera. One of the journalists was subsequently hospitalized for their injuries. The men had also attacked a number of protesters and bystanders at the station.
  • July 30: A number of attacks against journalists took place during protests at the Kwai Chung Police Station. Among them: police officers rushed at a photojournalist and deliberately struck him with a riot shield; a reporter was beaten by police while she was attempting to leave the scene of the demonstration; and a police officer pointed a shotgun at reporters covering the events.
  • August 5: A TVB News vehicle was destroyed by protesters during demonstrations near the Wong Tai Sin Centre.
  • August 11:Several journalists were assaulted amid an unruly gathering in North Point, including a Ming Pao journalist who was punched; a Stand News journalist who was threatened with a stick; and a journalist with the public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) who was assaulted by a crowd. Police made no arrests in any of these incidents.
  • August 14:During demonstrations at the Hong Kong International Airport, a reporter from the Hong Kong China News Agency was forced by protesters to delete pictures, while protesters tied up a reporter from the Global Times, a nationalist Chinese state-owned paper.
  • August 31: Police expelled reporters from the Prince Edward MTR station without explanation on the same evening they entered trained and assaulted commuters deemed linked to protests. That same evening, at Victoria Park, a group of ten reporters was encircled by police and temporarily prevented from leaving.
  • September 2: Police deployed tear gas and pepper spray against journalists at close range as they were covering demonstrations outside of the Mongkok Police station. A journalist from Now TV was pushed to the ground by police and was later treated for injuries to his hand at a local hospital.
  • September 15: Several apparently pro-Beijing men attacked journalists and damaged their cameras during a police clearance operations on Hong Kong Island, but police made no arrests.
  • September 17: A Hong Kong Baptist University journalism student and reporter for Broadcast News Network was arrested while reporting on protests on Hong Kong Island, and police blocked other reporters from filming the arrest.

BEYOND CHINA: Hong Kong counterprotests, surveillance exports, Confucius Institute closures

  • Hong Kong protests overseas met with counterprotests, stifling of speech: Clashes between supporters and opponents of the Hong Kong democracy movement at Australian and New Zealand university campuses have featured violent rhetoric by pro-Beijing students and an attack against at least one journalist. Well-organized groups of overseas Chinese students have responded to the establishment of so-called Lennon Walls covered in post-it notes calling for freedom by ripping down the expressions of support and bullying participating students. And while overseas rallies in support of the Hong Kong protests continue to elicit participation from both Hong Kongers and others, Chinese diplomats and consular officials have offered support for counterprotests—and, correspondingly, tacit approval of the violent behavior that has taken place at some of them.
  • New research details China's internet control, surveillance exports to over 100 countries: A September report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identified China as “a major driver of AI surveillance worldwide.” Chinese companies have sold AI technology to 63 countries, and are on the cutting edge of facial recognition technology, according to the study. Moreover, Chinese companies, along with their Russian counterparts, have provided internet control tools or training to over 100 countries, according to a separate report by the Open Technology Fund, also released in September.
  • Huawei helped African governments spy on opponents: The Wall Street Journal reported in August that employees of Chinese tech company Huawei had helped Ugandan and Zambian authorities intercept the encrypted communications of their political opponents, and had tracked the locations of some subjects using mobile phone data. Huawei, a primary supplier of internet network and surveillance equipment in sub-Saharan Africa, has also provided the Ugandan government with surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition software, raising fears of privacy campaigners.
  • Chinese police and proxies intimidate, threaten Uighur Americans: Uighurs living in the United States and Canada continue to face a campaign of intimidation by Chinese authorities, according to an August report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Individuals who have spoken out against the Chinese government reported receiving WeChat messages or phone calls in which individuals identifying as Chinese police officers threatened their family members in Xinjiang with imprisonment if they did not end their activism. Others have reported efforts to recruit them as informants for the Chinese government. In one case reported in May by Newsweek, Chinese authorities released a woman from a reeducation camp and compelled her to phone her son overseas to persuade him to refrain from criticizing the Chinese government; she was then returned to the camp days later.
  • Confucius Institutes close in the United States, face probe in Australia: Confucius Institutes are under renewed scrutiny in the US and Australia, amid growing concerns over Chinese government interference in Western academic institutions. Under a US military spending bill, US universities that host a Confucius Institute may not receive Defense Department funding for Chinese language training. More than a dozen US universities have now closed their Confucius Institutes in order to maintain Pentagon funding, the most recent being Miami Dade College on September 5. In Australia, the government of New South Wales announced in August that it had ended a partnership with Hanban, the Chinese government agency that oversees Confucius Institutes, to provide Chinese language programs in 13 public schools. That announcement came in the wake of a July 25 report by the Sydney Morning Herald that found that Confucius Institutes in Australian universities had signed agreements granting the Chinese government decision-making authority over teaching at the facilities. There are currently 548 Confucius Institutes and 1,193 primary and secondary school–based Confucius classrooms in operation worldwide.​

FEATURED PUSHBACK: Major social media firms take down anti-Hong Kong protest disinformation

Since mid-August, at least three major US-based social media platforms—Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—have publicly announced the discovery and removal of large networks of accounts that were actively spreading disinformation aimed at demonizing or otherwise undermining the reputation of prodemocracy protests that have taken place in Hong Kong since June. All three are blocked in mainland China.

Twitter was the first company to go public, announcing in an August 19 blog post that it had suspended 936 accounts from within China that were “deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong Kong, including undermining the legitimacy and political position of the protest movement on the ground.” It added that an additional 200,000 new accounts created after the initial closures were also shuttered. The same day, Facebook announced that after being tipped off by Twitter to the campaign, it too had removed seven Pages, three Groups, and five Facebook accounts involved in “coordinated inauthentic behavior…focused on Hong Kong.” Example posts Facebook shared after the removals compared Hong Kong protesters to cockroaches and Islamic State militants. Then, on August 23, Google revealed that its video-sharing platform YouTube had closed a network of 210 channels that had “behaved in a coordinated manner while uploading videos related to the ongoing protests in Hong Kong”.

Both Twitter and Facebook explicitly said they had found evidence of this being a coordinated Chinese state-backed operation, while Google refrained from placing the blame at the feet of the Chinese government. Twitter also made public all of the account names and tweets shared from the initially suspended accounts in an effort to assist researchers studying Chinese and other political manipulation activities on the platform. On September 20, Twitter published datasets from an additional 4,301 accounts most active in the August operation. It separately announced that all state-owned news outlets globally would henceforth be barred from using its advertising services.

The companies’ moves to expose these covert disinformation campaigns were welcomed by free expression advocates. Whether they will dampen Chinese state and other actors’ efforts to spread disinformation remains to be seen.

Photo caption: Facebook post comparing Hong Kong protesters to Islamic State militants from a Page the company removed for spreading disinformation. Credit: Facebook


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

  • PRC anniversary tightening: As with other politically sensitive anniversaries this year, watch for increased information controls and pro-Beijing propaganda surrounding October 1—the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China—including tightened internet controls, heightened real-world surveillance in Beijing, and “forced vacations” for dissidents and activists to remote parts of China.
  • Hong Kong escalation: As prodemocracy protests and clashes with police continue, watch for further arrests, media obstructions, and police violence surrounding the October 1 anniversary and beyond, as the authorities seek to end the movement and avoid accountability for police brutality. Also watch for reprisals for joining protests or expressing support for the movement among Hong Kong businesses and their employees, as has occurred in recent weeks at airline Cathay Pacific.
  • Impact of US bans on Chinese tech: As bans on the use of products by Chinese companies like surveillance supplier Hikvision and on partnerships with tech giant Huawei take effect, watch for the impact of their implementation on the companies’ operations in China and elsewhere, and whether other Chinese firms change their business plans to avoid similar sanctions.

TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中國媒體快報:央視傳播不實信息,香港記者遭受攻擊,維權人士死於監禁 (Issue 138, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:中共央視:北京壓制民意的軍火庫中的長期武器

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制:主要社交媒體公司刪除反香港抗議之假資訊

未來看點

起來


本期分析:中共央視:北京壓制民意的軍火庫中的長期武器

該電視台的部分任務是攻擊中共指定的敵人

/ 薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook) 

自香港的反送中抗議於三個月前開始後,北京的官方電視 ,中共央視(CCTV) ,就竭盡全力妖魔化抗議者,並就該運動的性質誤導中國和國際觀眾。

央視的主推新聞節目在7月做了相當於一週的專題節目指責抗議者,並指稱他們與「海外勢力」勾結。數週後,央視播出不實報導,說一位抗議者將一名女士的眼睛打瞎,而事實上該女士的眼睛是被警察的布袋槍所擊中。最近,該台的國際頻道在YouTube和臉書上播出視頻和圖片,將抗議者描述成伊斯蘭激進份子,並聲稱他們有美國間諜機構的支持。9月18日,央視新聞在新浪微博發布一則視頻,催促其八千九百萬跟隨者辨認、調查並在網上公佈香港抗議者和記者的個人信息,將他們暴露於現實世界的騷擾之中。

最近,這種利用央視來針對中共政治敵人的手法既非單一事件,也已不是什麼新鮮事。隨著10月1日中共統治70週年的紀念日臨近,我們有必要從新審視央視所扮演的角色;不僅是其協力粉飾中共的合法性和宣傳中共領導者名聲,也包含其為黨所做的「髒活」–對黨所認為的敵手進行抹黑誹謗和煽動仇恨。

央視的影響力已經真正遍布全球,這也意味者其內容有形塑中國國內外數億人觀點的潛力。其內容嚴重扭曲以迎合中共的政治主張,對全世界的新聞消費者、監管者、新聞記者、廣告商和其他人構成了不斷增加的挑戰

一個獨一無二的國家電視台 

中共央視始創於61年前,在當時中國公民還沒有幾家人有電視。今日,央視的影響力幾乎進入了中國的每一個家庭,經營40個頻道,每年製作超過30萬小時的節目。在新聞節目之外,還有體育、電影、京劇和農鄉事務方面的專門頻道。作為唯一中共授權的國家電視台,央視在中國國內媒體市場中保有獨特且優越的地位。央視主推的晚間新聞節目 –「新聞聯播」 – 是每晚7點播出的30分鐘節目。 各地區和省級的電視台被要求播出該節目,鞏固了其數億的固定觀眾群,外加其跟貼在社交媒體上的觀眾。

不意外地, 中共央視與中共的政治和媒體控制集團有緊密的關係。央視的現任台長慎海雄(Shen Haixiong不僅是中共黨員,也是中共中央委員;在此之前,他曾任廣東省的宣傳部部長。

央視的新聞節目對中共的官方觀點提供了權威性詮釋,但其節目單上也有各種各樣的「調查」節目。這些調查節目主導了公眾關注的焦點,偶爾也有揭露官員惡行的節目播出。這類節目中,最值得關注的莫過於「焦點訪談」。「焦點訪談」最近的節目中播出了許多讓中國人「感覺良好」的故事,例如關於黨的幹部如何領導偏遠的鄉村,或各省科技公司的先進技術,以及宣傳新土地管理法規的重要性。

動員群眾反對黨的敵人

央視的每日報導或許著重於政府政策的宣傳、歌頌黨的領導、或展示腐敗官員被繩之以法,但當特定的政治威脅出現時,同樣的節目就會不時被用來作為黨的咬人狗,尤其誹謗被鎖定的攻擊對象,並洗白對該黨異見者可怖的人權侵犯。

這種運用電視來進行宣傳攻擊最早、也最明顯的範例,便是中共自1999年啟動的,針對法輪功冥想和精神修行的的野蠻鎮壓。其它攻擊也以規律的頻率不斷出台,包括其2009年製作的針對達賴喇嘛的系列節目;播出自2015年起被打壓的人權律師的「被認錯」畫面;試圖合理化自2017年起在新疆對維吾爾人的大規模羈押;針對今年夏季香港抗爭播送假消息;就在本月,央視更發佈晦暗的警告,說台灣特務在利用學術交流來吸收中國學生。

「焦點訪談」更常在中共祭出政治迫害的關鍵時刻特意播出問題百出的報導。1999年,在32天內,「焦點訪談」播出了28個誹謗和煽動仇恨法輪功的節目。隨後,該節目又播出了欺騙性的報導,聲稱一群於2001年在天安門廣場自焚的人是被禁止的團體的擁護者。2006年,加拿大廣播電視及通訊委員會指出,這樣的報導不但是明顯地濫用,更可能煽動針對中國境內和全世界法輪功學員的暴力。

近期,在央視2018年的一期節目中,中國官方媒體首次承認新疆集中營的存在,但將其包裝成「渡假中心」。他們聲稱此「渡假中心」可以刺激當地就業機會並遏止極端份子,並不是一個大規模關押維吾爾人、派駐守衛森嚴看守、以來對維吾爾人進行政治教化和強迫勞動的地方。隨後的節目也對黨的官方說法的鸚鵡學舌,說這些中心在新疆「拯救了那些懷有恐怖主義和極端思想的人們」,雖然其他可信的報導揭露被羈押的人多為與暴力行為無干的普通人,並正在被強制失蹤、遭受酷刑,以及被死亡。

為製作這些內容,中共央視的記者通常被給予特權,擁有進入特定相關場所、接觸受訪者和官員的機會。但是他們也顯然接受了政府的政權管理、造謠和扭曲,報導中缺乏針貶和獨立地核實程序。在一些案例中,央視記者還曾串通欺騙受訪者,或協助警察來操控受訪者。

在電視播出的招供中,上述的情形特別明顯。2018年4月「保護衛士(Safeguard Defenders)」調查了2013年至2018年的45例的「招供」,這些招供來自被關押的媒體人、部落格博主、律師、維權行動者和其他人士。保護衛士發現發現這些招供約有九成在中共央視播出。在許多情形下,有確鑿的證據表明,電視台工作人員在製作和編輯這樣的節目時,明知是這些招供是在被強制或欺騙的狀況中被導演的,依然扮演著會意合作的角色,繼續編輯並製作節目。

全球影響

這種詐欺性的和妖魔化的報導,在現實世界造成廣大的影響。它毒化了中國觀眾對其無辜同胞的觀感,為政權的進一步壓迫埋下了基礎。它們剝奪了國內、甚至國際觀眾對於受害者的支持。一位在酷刑折磨下倖存的知名法輪功學員在一次採訪中回憶,在「焦點訪談」2001年自焚特別節目播出後,她自己的親生兄弟是如何開始對她產生恐懼。2018年關於新疆的特別節目播出後,在中國社交媒體平台上廣傳的評論如:「我們必須幫助大量的維吾爾人戒除他們的伊斯蘭成癮」、「那是相當可怕的疾病」。大量的政府宣傳

風暴過後,伴隨的往往是警方升級對特定群體的暴力行為,政府宣傳在公眾印象中所造成的污名烙印更可能會延續多年。

然而,中共央視的節目和宣傳策略的影響已遠超中國國界。在海外中國人社群中,中共央視是他們收看新聞和娛樂節目的主要來源,其節目內容甚至鼓勵海外中國人歧視、乃至攻擊中共的批評者和被迫害的少數群體。例如,最近幾周,在加拿大、澳大利亞和紐西蘭的中國學生和其他人正試圖噤聲與毀壞對於香港抗爭的支持。

作為中共央視的國際頻道,中國環球電視網(CGTN)更擴大了它的版圖,並製作多語種節目,以接觸全球的非華語觀眾。儘管它初始目標是以無害且吸引人的節目建立當地觀眾群,但在關鍵的政治時刻,它仍可以被調動來攻擊中共的敵人。

例如,在全球有8千5百萬粉絲的中國環球電視網的臉書頁,其頁面上的廣告和貼文傾向於美化中國政府和領導人,並特別強調吸引人的中國國家象徵,如大熊貓、中國美食佳餚、或某些特別省份的旅遊觀光機會。但是,穿插在這些相對良性內容之間的是一系列的貼文和廣告,意圖創造將香港抗議者與恐怖份子之間的連結,或不斷重複已被證實是假造的消息,譬如一則稱抗議者手持的玩具武器是美國製造的手榴彈發射器的報導。

如何應對

考慮到中共央視與中共政權、中共政治宣傳活動、以及持續發生的嚴重人權侵害事件的密切關係,中國和海外的觀眾應有智慧的吸收央視的報導—特別是針對那些政治敏感的話題—懷著有益健康的質疑收看,並同時尋找更多獨立的資訊來源。

外國新聞媒體也應對片面地接受央視報導有所警覺,並應對該台有問題的內容做獨立調查,就像部份外國媒體對最近香港的報導所採取的行動。記者們應審慎地考量與央視合作或為其工作的對道德倫理的影響,不管央視開出了怎樣的好處。

儘管中共官方持有並補貼央視的運作,它也從私營廣告中獲利了數十億美元。在央視購買廣告的跨國公司—特別是在其新聞節目中插播廣告者—應該重新考慮他們的商業決定,尋求其他接觸中國消費者的管道。

外國政府和制定規範者應該密切觀察中共央視和中國環球電視網在該國家用當地語言播出的節目內容。他們應該隨時準備好落實有可能被違反的規範,如英國通訊傳播管理局(Ofcom)現在正在仔細考慮關於香港的報導和強制招供的節目內容。外國代理人登記法規應該將中共央視中文節目納入監管範圍,就像在美國已將中共環球電視網和其它中共官方媒體機構納入管理範疇,並應考慮對負責央視認錯節目的主要執行者實施制裁,如同歐洲官員們對伊朗新聞電視台所做的(撤銷其倫敦分台播出執照)那樣。

儘管央視內容多元,其侵害性或妖魔化政治宣傳的節目只佔部分比例,但所有觀眾應該記住,中共央視不是一個「正常的」電視台。它有著明目張膽、令人震驚地違背新聞倫理,或鼓動、合法化針對無辜人們的煽動仇恨和暴力的紀錄。中共央視是中共殘暴威權政權的一個重要組成,也應該被這樣看待。

薩拉庫克(Sarah Cook)是自由之家中国、香港和台灣的資深研究分析員,《中國媒體快報》負責人。紐約大學研究實習生程艾倫(Aaron Cheng) 提供研究協助。


針對「出格言論」更嚴苛懲罰措施出台

儘管中國政府已開發了世界上技術最精密的信息控制系統之一,當局還是繼續採用低技術的手法來懲罰、恐嚇批評性的報導和評論。以下節選過去數月發生的一些案例:

  • 長期監獄判刑:黃琦,人權網站「六四天網」的創辦人,7月29日被以「故意洩露國家機密」罪名判處12年監禁。六月底,當局判處劉鵬飛2年監禁,劉一個微信帳號管理员,該帳號因為提供中國網民境外新聞而十分受歡迎;五月,官方媒體向微信群管理員發佈相警告,稱微信管理員可能為其管理群組內的討論內容負責,劉在警報發佈後不久即被捕。蒙古歷史學家Lhamjab A. Borjgin,於7月3日被判處一年監禁,緩刑兩年,被控以「 分裂國家」和「非法商業(活動)」罪名,因他散播自己的著作《中國的文革》。
  • 監禁中「被死亡和死刑恐嚇:9月23日,據「中國人權捍衛者(Chinese Human Rights Defenders)」報導,警察通知維權人士王美余的家屬,他在湖南被監禁期間死亡。7月,王美余於因其在公眾場合手持要求習近平下台、並呼籲舉行全國選舉的公告牌而被捕。在另一案例中,法輪功學員孟紅2013年因散發傳單被判刑入獄。據她現居美國的女兒指稱,孟紅已於7月30日死於監禁之中。據自由亞洲電台報導,在新疆,學者和前新疆大學校長塔西甫拉提·特依拜(Tashpolat Teyip) 可能被「隨時」處決。自特依拜2017年在前往德國參加一次會議途中失蹤後,他的兄弟就和他失去了聯繫。
  • 捏造間諜指控:楊恆均(Yang Hengjun),一位澳洲作家,一月份在廣州旅行期間被中國當局拘留,並於8月23日正式被指控犯了間諜罪。澳洲總理斯科特·莫里森(Scott Morrison)否認當局對楊的指控,楊在2011年3月前就曾被拘留過,但是當局迫於國際壓力而釋放了他。楊恆均並非遭受此類指控的唯一外國人:加拿大商人麥克·斯帕弗(Michael Spavor),以及曾經工作於國際危機組織(International Crisis Group)的加拿大前外交官康明凱(Michael Kovrig),自2018年12月被拘留,這顯然是中國對加拿大逮捕華為高幹孟晚舟的報復行為。五月,二人被正式指控危害國家安全罪
  • 與外界隔絕的長期拘留:維吾爾人持續地因其網絡評論、其它形式的言論表達、或有對政府提出批評的海外親戚,而繼續被長期拘留,完全無法與外界聯繫。被拘留者包括:學生Buzainafu Abudourexiti,其於2017年從埃及留學回來後被拘留;知名行動者熱妣亞(Rebiya Kadeers)的30名親屬。新疆之外,草根維權人士陳建芳(Chen Jianfang)自3月被拘留,因其餘網路發文悼念維權人士曹順利之死;勞工維權人士危志立和柯成冰也自3月起被拘留;另一位勞工維權人士楊鄭君自一月起被拘留。這些被拘者,都被禁止聯繫律師或他們的家屬。
  • 拘留支持香港民主抗議人士:化名「自由小陸」的一名25歲的深圳居民,8月份被當局拘留10天,因他在網上「尋釁滋事」,發佈貼文呼籲中國人重新思考他們對香港事件的態度。一位重慶居民在8月初被警察監視,只因在網上表達對抗議的支持。
  • 其他因言論自由被拘留者一名西藏人7月份在四川被拘留10天,因其在微信分享一張達賴喇嘛的照片。兩位男士於6月13日被拘留,因在網上散播關於中國技術公司華為的傳言。8月份,中國藝術家趙邦(Zhao Bang)因設計一款印有表情符號的T恤衫而被捕,被指控為影射天安門廣場大屠殺。前記者張賈龍(Zhang Jialong)因「尋釁滋事」於8月13日被拘留,張曾在2014年美國國務卿約翰·克里訪中期間親自向他請願,敦促美國對中國的網絡審查施壓。張因此成名,但那次會見後他立即遭到騰訊公司解聘。
  • 拒發簽證:《華爾街日報》的王春翰(Chun Han Wong)8月末被中國政府拒發記者證。這位新加坡籍記者被中國驅逐,據信是對他的7月3日報導習近平表弟齊明(Ming Chai)的報復。齊明是澳洲公民,據報有洗錢之嫌。

監控近況:攝像頭氾濫,邊境電話檢查,學校內面部識別

  • 世界排名前八名嚴厲監控的城市位於中國:英國維護消費者權益網站Comparitech的研究人員最近發現中國居人均攝像機數之最。重慶為世界上排名第一的最嚴厲監控城市,共有260萬個攝像頭—或大約說是每1000個人就有168.03個攝像頭進行監控。據信目前在中國使用2億多個監控攝像頭,預期到2022年,該數量會上升至6.26億個或更多。  
  • 在邊境處的新間諜軟件和手機檢查:有幾家報導指出,今年夏天,去中國的遊客在出入境處手機遭受檢查,這顯然與在新疆和香港發生的危機有關聯。一份由《紐約時報》(the New York Times、德國的《南德意志報》(Süddeutsche Zeitung與《北德廣播公司》(NDR)、英國《衛報》(the Guardian、以及網絡雜誌《母板》(Motherboard)聯合做出的調查在7月刊登,該調查發現中國當局強迫從中亞陸地口岸進入新疆者在手機上安裝一監控應用程式app。该app名為「蜂采」(Fengcai),它能收集短信並檢測手機內圖片文件,將手機內容和包含7萬3000敏感詞的清單進行比對,這些敏感字和圖片包括關於伊斯蘭恐怖主義的書籍和達賴喇嘛的照片。同時,據《南華早報》(South China Morning Post)報導,大陸的香港居民被強迫解鎖他們的手機,以便當局來搜索與正在進行的抗議相關的材料。在這些七、八月期間針對從大陸往來香港和深圳的遊客的檢查,有些人還被詢問是否曾參加過抗議活動。
  • 校園內的面部識別技術引發日益增加的擔憂:在搜狐新聞8月份刊載的一則報導中,其分析一所小學使用面部識別攝像機的情形,發現該系統可以評估學生的姿態和面部表情以及其它信息。最近幾月,面部識別系統在校園內的推廣引發了國內的擔憂,有些跡象表明政府有所回應。位於南京的中國藥科大學最近宣佈,他們將限制此類措施,而教育部的一位官員也有所讓步,稱「包含學生的個人信息都要非常謹慎」,還說政府要加以限制和管理對在教室內使用人臉識別技術應用。
  • 在公共建築內,面部識別系統越裝越多:據一觀察中國宗教自由的網絡雜誌《寒冬》的一篇報導指出,在公共建築內安裝的監控系統越來越多。該雜誌9月份報導,當地公安局已在江西的一家居民小區安裝了面部識別系統設備,北京的13個公共住房小區內也安裝了此類設備。據信這些系統能被用來監控政治異議人士和宗教教友們在家庭禮拜堂會面。

審查近況:香港新聞操控,自由智庫被關閉, 電影製作人受阻

  • 審查人員刪除、操控香港消息:在中國,和政府官方口徑不一致的關於香港人抗議的網絡內容繼續被嚴格審查,同時親政府的宣傳被大量散播。一份標註日期為6月16日的指示洩漏並被《中國數字時代》(China Digital Times發表,該指示命令各網站「發現並刪除與香港反送中抗議有關的視頻內容」,並「刪除任何有害評論」,指的是網民們用來謹慎地表達對香港抗議者支持的幾首歌曲。9月5日發出的更新的指令,表明了在官方撤回《引渡條例》修訂後,北京的內容監管者所面臨的兩難局面。這些指令警告「所有的網站和新聞媒體,不得轉載、跟進、報導並嚴格處理在社交平台上發佈的國外信息」,尤其是與反送中條例撤銷有關的信息。這顯然是為了處理此次讓步後中國網民在網上表達困惑的相關評論。該指令還命令網絡媒體平台「關閉相關評論區,並嚴厲解決那些以愛國名義而攻擊政府的帳戶」。
  • 位於北京的自由派機構宣佈關閉:8月底,位於北京的「天則經濟研究所」在歷經當局長年施壓之後宣佈關閉。過去兩年,該研究所社交媒體帳號被封,人員被逐出辦公室。天則研究所的關閉,不過是最新的進展,反映出當局對自由學術討論和經濟政策批評性討論日益無法容忍。
  • 審查者戰爭電影台灣電影節開刀:中國審查者們繼續向中國電影界開刀。根據製片人在其新浪微博上的一則簡短的聲明,觀眾翹盼已久的史詩電影《八佰》六月底被取消播放。人們認為就在該電影計劃首映前幾天被取消放映的理由源自於該電影對國民黨在1937年上海戰役中的正面描述,此後國民黨於1949年在中國內戰中戰敗於中共。另外,在中國和台灣緊張局勢不斷升高的態勢之下, 中國電影管理局於8月6日宣佈禁止中國電影人參加於11月在台灣舉行的台北金馬電影展。中國紀錄片導演朱昱(Zhu Yu)先前曾表達過她對抗該禁令的意願,但在她成為網絡霸凌的對象後正式退出金馬電影展
  • 推薦內容的演算法面臨嚴格管制:中共中央網絡安全和信息化委員辦公室(CAC)9月10日頒布的《網絡生態治理規定》草案中聲明,社交媒體平台、網站和應用程式軟體向用戶推薦內容的演算法必須確保推薦內容與「主流價值觀」和政府理念一致。該法規在8月31號中共中央委員會印發《中共宣傳工作條例》後隨後推出,它列出了中共委員會針對政治宣傳工作的七項職責,以及各級中共宣傳部門的16項工作職責。

香港:記者在抗議活動中面臨升級的攻擊  警察衝突 暴徒施暴

支持民主的香港抗議延續至初秋,香港的記者和攝影師日漸成為為警察、親北京暴徒,乃至有時是抗議者們本身的施暴目標。

自7月初開始,香港記者協會就已發佈了十數則聲明,譴責對媒體人員的攻擊,並敦促所有各方允許記者自由工作,並留意穿戴媒體頭盔和黃色背心的工作人員。在香港記者協會在9月16日發表的一則聲明中指出:「暴力份子及個別幫派更惡意針對及恐嚇新聞工作者」,香港記協不斷呼籲警察必須正視持續的濫權行為,「確保公平執法」。

最近被香港記者協會記錄在案的對媒體攻擊的事件包括:

  • 7月8日:針對試圖報導旺角彌敦道清場行動的記者,警察襲擊和阻礙記者們的工作
  • 7月14日:在沙田示威活動中,無綫電視(TVB)的一位記者和一名攝影師被抗議人群攻擊。同日,一名《香港商業電台》記者在其報導警察和抗議者的衝突之時,被警察以胡椒噴霧攻擊
  • 7月21日:兩名記者在元朗地鐵站,被一夥身著白T恤衫的親北京暴徒持棍毆打,暴徒們還毀壞了記者的相機。其中一名記者隨後被送往醫院療傷。這群暴徒還襲擊了許多在地鐵站的抗議者和圍觀群眾。
  • 7月30日:在葵湧警署的抗議活動中,發生多起攻擊記者們的事件。其中包含:警察衝向一名攝影記者並故意用防暴盾牌打擊該記者;一名記者在她試圖離開抗議現場時被警察毆打;一名警察將霰彈槍指向一名正在進行現場報導的記者。
  • 8月5日:在黃大仙中心的一場抗議中,無綫電視新聞部一輛採訪車被抗議者損毀
  • 8月11日:在北角的一場無序集會中,幾名記者被襲擊,其中包括一位《明報》(Ming Pao)記者被一拳打中,一名《立場新聞》(Stand News)記者被一位持棍者威脅;《香港電台》(RTHK)的一名記者被人群攻擊。在這些事件中,警察沒有採取任何逮捕行動。
  • 8月14日:在香港國際機場的抗議活動中,一名《香港中國通訊社》(Hong Kong China News Agency)的記者被抗議者強迫刪除照片。抗議者將一名《環球時報》的記者綁起來,《環球時報》(the Global Times是由中共機關報社《人民日報社》主辦與出版的新聞報刊。
  • 8月31日:警察未作解釋便將記者從太子地鐵站驅逐,當晚又攻擊了他們認為與抗議有關聯的地鐵通勤者。同一日晚上,在維多利亞公園,十名記者被警察包圍並暫時被禁止離開
  • 9月2日:在記者報導旺角警署外的抗議活動時,警察近距離對他們施放催淚瓦斯和胡椒噴霧。一名NOW TV的記者被警察推倒在地,後來在當地醫院治療手部傷勢。
  • 9月15日:在香港島的警察清場行動中,幾名顯然是親北京的男子攻擊了記者並毀壞了他們的相機
  • 9月17日:一名香港浸會大學的記者學生和《廣播新聞網》(Broadcast News Network)的記者在報導香港島的抗議時被捕,警察更阻擋其他記者拍攝搜捕現場。

中國之外:香港反抗議活動監控系統的輸出,孔子學院被關閉

  • 香港抗議在海外遭遇反抗議,扼殺言論:在澳洲和紐西蘭的大學校園,香港民主運動的支持者和反對者們發生衝突。其中最顯著的事件包含親北京學生的暴力言論和對至少一名記者的攻擊。組織有素的海外中國學生團體對貼有呼籲自由便條紙的「連儂牆」強烈反應,撕毀表達支持的言論並霸凌參與活動的學生。當海外支持香港抗議的集會中持續有香港人和其他人加入時,中共外交官和領事館官員便會對反抗議者提供支持給反抗議者,並相應地默許其祭出的暴力行為。
  • 研究報告詳述中國網絡控制,與輸出監控系統到100多個國家:卡內基國際和平基金會(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)一份九月份的研究報告中,將中國認定為「全球人工智能的主要推手」。該研究報告指出,中國公司已經向63個國家出售人工智能技術,並在人面部識別技術方面走在技術尖端。此外,根據9月份開放科技基金會(Open Technology Fund,OTF)提供的另一份報告,中國公司和與俄國的同行公司已經向100多個國家提供了網絡控制的工具或培訓。
  • 華為幫助非洲政府監視反對派:8月份的《華爾街日報》報導指出,中國技術公司華為的員工幫助烏干達和贊比亞當局截獲他們政治對手的加密通信,並利用手機數據對特定人士的具體位置進行跟蹤。華為是為撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲國家提供網絡和監控設備的主要供應商,它還給烏干達政府提供了裝有人臉部識別軟件的監控攝像機,增加了政治倡議人士對其自身隱私被洩漏的恐懼。
  • 中國警察及其代理人恐嚇、威脅美裔維吾爾人:根據8月份維吾爾人權計畫(Uyghur Human Rights Project)的報告,居住在美國和加拿大的維吾爾人持續面臨中共當局的威嚇。據報導,發聲反對中共政府言論的維族人收到中共警察微信短信或電話,威脅說如果他們不停止倡議行動,他們在新疆的家人將會面臨監禁,其他人還報導了中共政府正試圖招募他們作線人。在五月《新聞週刊》(Newsweek)的一則報導中,揭露了中共當局從集中營釋放了一位女士,並強迫她給她在海外的兒子打電話,勸說他節制對中國政府的批評。在幾天後,她又被重新關回了集中營。
  • 孔子學院在美國被關閉,在澳面臨調查:在世界對中共政府干涉西方學術機構的擔憂日益增加之時,孔子學院在美國和澳洲更新合約時面臨更嚴格的審查。在美國的軍費開支中,設有孔子學院的美國大學可能會得不到國防部的對其中文能力培訓的資金資助。為了繼續得到五角大樓的資金,迄今已有十多所美國大學關閉了孔子學院,最近的例子是9月5日邁阿密達德學院(Miami Dade College-FL)關閉了其校園的孔子學院。在澳洲,新南威爾士政府8月份宣佈,他們已經中止了與漢辦的合夥關係,並終止了漢辦–中國政府監管海外孔子學院的機構–於當地13所學校開設的中文語言項目。這項決定在7月25日悉尼晨鋒報(Sydney Morning Herald)一則報導之後宣布下達,該報導發現在澳洲大學的孔子學院簽署了合約,給予中國政府決定在該學院教課內容的權力。全球目前共有548所孔子學院,還有設在1193個小學、中學的孔子課堂。

成功的反制:主要社交媒體公司刪除反香港抗議之不實信息

自八月中旬以來,至少有三家美國的社交媒體平台 – 推特,臉書和YouTube –已公開宣佈發現並刪除了大量的活躍傳播不實信息賬戶,這些賬戶一直活躍妖魔化或詆毀六月以來在香港發生的親民主抗議者名譽。這三大社交媒體在中國都是被封的。

推特是第一個公開聲明的公司,在8月19日的博客中,它聲稱已經封掉了936個來自中國的帳號。這些帳號「蓄意並特別散佈在香港的政治衝突,包括破壞抗議活動的合法性和政治立場」。該聲明還說,自首批帳號被關閉後,其後建立的2萬個新帳號也被關閉。同一天,臉書宣佈在推特採取行動後,臉書也刪除了七個頁面,三個群組和5個臉書帳號,因其「針對香港的….有組織性的失真行為」。臉書作此刪除後公布了幾個帳號的貼文作為範例,其中包含將香港抗議者們比作蟑螂和伊斯蘭激進份子的貼文。其後,8月23日,谷歌聲明,其視頻分享平台(YouTube已關閉了210個頻道,因這些頻道涉及「 有系統地上傳與正在進行中的香港抗議活動相關視頻 」 。

儘管谷歌沒有指責中國政府,推特和臉書都明確表示,他們已發現證據,表明這些是中國政府支持的有組織的行為。為了協助在這個平台上中共和其它政治操控活動的研究,推特還公開了所有吊銷的帳號名稱和推文。9月20日,推特更公布了八月份最活躍的另外4301個帳號的相關數據。推特另行聲明,全球所有國家持有的新聞機構今後都將被禁止使用其廣告服務。

這些公司揭露這些隱蔽不實信息的舉動得到了言論自由倡議者們的認可。但它們是否能抑制中共政府及其他人散播不實信息,還有待觀察。

圖:臉書刪除散播不實信息的頁面中的貼文,該貼中將香港抗議者比作伊斯蘭激進份子(圖片來源:臉書


未來關注

  • 中共周年紀念日期間控制手段隨著今年多個政治敏感紀念日的到來,值得關注的是在中共統治中國70週年紀念日10月1日前後會加強的信息控制和親北京政治宣傳,包含可能加緊的網絡控制,增強在北京現實世界的監控,以及遣送異議人士和維權人士到中國偏遠地區「強制度假」。
  • 香港事態升級:隨著民主抗議者和警察的衝突延續,在當局設法終止抗議並避免警察暴力被問責之際,關注圍繞10月1日及往後進一步的逮捕、對媒體報導的阻礙和警察暴力。更應關注香港公司和其員工因參與抗議或表達支持而面臨的秋後算賬,最近幾週這樣的情形已經在國泰航空(Cathay Pacific)發生。
  • 美國頒布對中國技術公司實施禁令的影響:隨著美國禁用中國如海康威視(Hikvision提供監控設備的公司產品,以及與技術大公司華為(Huawei合作的禁令生效之後,關注禁令實施後這些公司在中國和世界其它地方的運營是如何受到影響,以及其它中國公司是否因此而改變商業計劃以避免類似制裁。

行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

 


中国媒体快报:央视传播不实信息,香港记者遭受攻击,维权人士死于监禁 (Issue 138, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题


本期分析: 中共央视:北京压制民意的军火库中的长期武器

该电视台的部分任务是攻击中共指定的敌人

文 / 萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook) 

自香港的反送中抗议于三个月前开始后,北京的官方电视 ,中共央视(CCTV) ,就竭尽全力妖魔化抗议者,并就该运动的性质误导中国和国际观众。

央视的主推新闻节目在7月做了相当于一周的专题节目指责抗议者,并指称他们与「海外势力」勾结。数周后,央视播出不实报导,说一位抗议者将一名女士的眼睛打瞎,而事实上该女士的眼睛是被警察的布袋枪所击中。最近,该台的国际频道在YouTube和脸书上播出视频和图片,将抗议者描述成伊斯兰激进份子(Islamist militants,并声称他们有美国间谍机构的支持。 9月18日,央视新闻在新浪微博发布一则视频,催促其八千九百万跟随者辨认、调查并在网上公布香港抗议者和记者的个人信息,将他们暴露于现实世界的骚扰之中。

最近,这种利用央视来针对中共政治敌人的手法既非单一事件,也已不是什么新鲜事。随着10月1日中共统治70周年的纪念日临近,我们有必要从新审视央视所扮演的角色;不仅是其协力粉饰中共的合法性和宣传中共领导者名声,也包含其为党所做的「脏活」–对党所认为的敌手进行抹黑诽谤和煽动仇恨。

央视的影响力已经真正遍布全球,这也意味者其内容有形塑中国国内外数亿人观点的潜力。其内容严重扭曲以迎合中共的政治主张,对全世界的新闻消费者、监管者、新闻记者、广告商和其他人构成了不断增加的挑战。

一个独一无二的国家电视台

中共央视始创于61年前,在当时中国公民还没有几家人有电视。今日,央视的影响力几乎进入了中国的每一个家庭,经营40个频道,每年制作超过30万小时的节目。在新闻节目之外,还有体育、电影、京剧和农乡事务方面的专门频道。作为唯一中共授权的国家电视台,央视在中国国内媒体市场中保有独特且优越的地位。央视主推的晚间新闻节目 –「新闻联播」 – 是每晚7点播出的30分钟节目。各地区和省级的电视台被要求播出该节目,巩固了其数亿的固定观众群,外加其跟贴在社交媒体上的观众。

不意外地, 中共央视与中共的政治和媒体控制集团有紧密的关系。央视的现任台长慎海雄(Shen Haixiong不仅是中共党员,也是中共中央委员;在此之前,他曾任广东省的宣传部部长。

央视的新闻节目对中共的官方观点提供了权威性诠释,但其节目单上也有各种各样的「调查」节目。这些调查节目主导了公众关注的焦点,偶尔也有揭露官员恶行的节目播出。这类节目中,最值得关注的莫过于「焦点访谈」。 「焦点访谈」最近的节目中播出了许多让中国人「感觉良好」的故事,例如关于党的干部如何领导偏远的乡村,或各省科技公司的先进技术,以及宣传新土地管理法规的重要性。

动员群众反对党的敌人

央视的每日报导或许着重于政府政策的宣传、歌颂党的领导、或展示腐败官员被绳之以法,但当特定的政治威胁出现时,同样的节目就会不时被用来作为党的咬人狗,尤其诽谤被锁定的攻击对象,并洗白对该党异见者可怖的人权侵犯。

这种运用电视来进行宣传攻击最早、也最明显的范例,便是中共自1999年启动的,针对法轮功冥想和精神修行的的野蛮镇压。其它攻击也以规律的频率不断出台,包括其2009年制作的针对达赖喇嘛的系列节目;播出自2015年起被打压的人权律师的被认错画面;试图合理化自2017年起在新疆对维吾尔人的大规模羁押;针对今年夏季香港抗争播送假消息;就在本月,央视更发布晦暗的警告,说台湾特务在利用学术交流来吸收中国学生。

「焦点访谈」更常在中共祭出政治迫害的关键时刻特意播出问题百出的报导。 1999年,在32天内,「焦点访谈」播出了28个诽谤和煽动仇恨法轮功的节目。随后,该节目又播出了欺骗性报导,声称一群于2001年在天安门广场自焚的人是被禁止的团体的拥护者。 2006年,加拿大广播电视及通讯委员会指出,这样的报导不但是明显地滥用,更可能煽动针对中国境内和全世界法轮功学员的暴力。

最近,在央视2018年的一期节目中,中国官方媒体首次承认新疆集中营的存在,但将其包装成「渡假中心」。他们声称此「渡假中心」可以刺激当地就业机会并遏止极端份子,并不是一个大规模关押维吾尔人、派驻守卫森严看守、以来对维吾尔人进行政治教化和强迫劳动的地方。随后的节目也对党的官方说法的鹦鹉学舌,说这些中心在新疆「拯救了那些怀有恐怖主义和极端思想的人们」,虽然其他可信的报导揭露被羁押的人多为与暴力行为无干的普通人,并正在被强制失踪、遭受酷刑,以及被死亡。

为制作这些内容,中共央视的记者通常被给予特权,拥有进入特定相关场所、接触受访者和官员的机会。但是他们也显然接受了政府的政权管理、造谣和扭曲,报导中缺乏针贬和独立地核实程序。在一些案例中,央视记者还曾串通欺骗受访者,或协助警察来操控受访者。

在电视播出的招供中,上述的情形特别明显。 2018年4月「保护卫士(Safeguard Defenders)」调查了2013年至2018年的45例的「招供」,这些招供来自被关押的媒体人、部落格博主、律师、维权行动者和其他人士。保护卫士发现发现这些招供约有九成在中共央视播出。在许多情形下,有确凿的证据表明,电视台工作人员在制作和编辑这样的节目时,明知是这些招供是在被强制或欺骗的状况中被导演的,依然扮演着会意合作的角色,继续编辑并制作节目。

全球影响

这种诈欺性的和妖魔化的报导,在现实世界造成广大的影响。它毒化了中国观众对其无辜同胞的观感,为政权进一步压迫埋下了基础。它们剥夺了国内、甚至国际观众对于受害者的支持。一位在酷刑折磨下幸存的知名法轮功学员在一次采访中回忆,在「焦点访谈」2001年自焚特别节目播出后,她自己的亲生兄弟是如何开始对她产生恐惧。 2018年关于新疆的特别节目播出后,在中国社交媒体平台上广传的评论如:「我们必须帮助大量的维吾尔人戒除他们的伊斯兰成瘾」、「那是相当可怕的疾病」。大量的政府宣传

风暴过后,伴随的往往是警方升级对特定群体的暴力行为,政府宣传在公众印象中所造成的污名烙印更可能会延续多年。

然而,中共央视的节目和宣传策略的影响已远超中国国界。在海外中国人社群中,中共央视是他们收看新闻和娱乐节目的主要来源,其节目内容甚至鼓励海外中国人歧视、乃至攻击中共的批评者和被迫害的少数群体。例如,最近几周,在加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰的中国学生和其他人正试图噤声与毁坏对于香港抗争的支持。

作为中共央视的国际频道,中国环球电视网(CGTN)更扩大了它的版图,并制作多语种节目,以接触全球的非华语观众。尽管它初始目标是以无害且吸引人的节目建立当地观众群,但在关键的政治时刻,它仍可以被调动来攻击中共的敌人。

例如,在全球有8千5百万粉丝的中国环球电视网的脸书页,其页面上的广告和贴文倾向于美化中国政府和领导人,并特别强调吸引人的中国国家象征,如大熊猫、中国美食佳肴、或某些特别省份的旅游观光机会。但是,穿插在这些相对良性内容之间的是一系列的贴文和广告,意图创造将香港抗议者与恐怖份子之间的连结,或不断重复已被证实是假造的消息,譬如一则称抗议者手持的玩具武器是美国制造的手榴弹发射器的报导

如何应对

考虑到中共央视与中共政权、中共政治宣传活动、以及持续发生的严重人权侵害事件的密切关系,中国和海外的观众应有智慧的吸收央视的报导—特别是针对那些政治敏感的话题—怀着有益健康的质疑收看,并同时寻找更多独立的资讯来源。

外国新闻媒体也应对片面地接受央视报导有所警觉,并应对该台有问题的内容做独立调查,就像部份外国媒体对最近香港的报导所采取的行动。记者们应审慎地考量与央视合作或为其工作的对道德伦理的影响,不管央视开出了怎样的好处。

尽管中共官方持有并补贴央视的运作,它也从私营广告中获利了数十亿美元。在央视购买广告的跨国公司—特别是在其新闻节目中插播广告者—应该重新考虑他们的商业决定,寻求其他接触中国消费者的管道。

外国政府和制定规范者应该密切观察中共央视和中国环球电视网在该国家用当地语言播出的节目内容。他们应该随时准备好落实有可能被违反的规范,如英国通讯传播管理局(Ofcom)现在正在仔细考虑关于香港的报导和强制招供的节目内容。外国代理人登记法规应该将中共央视中文节目纳入监管范围,就像在美国已将中共环球电视网和其它中共官方媒体机构纳入管理范畴,并应考虑对负责央视认错节目的主要执行者实施制裁,如同欧洲官员们对伊朗新闻电视台所做的(撤销其伦敦分台播出执照)那样。

尽管央视内容多元,其侵害性或妖魔化政治宣传的节目只占部分比例,但所有观众应该记住,中共央视不是一个「正常的」电视台。它有着明目张胆、令人震惊地违背新闻伦理,或鼓动、合法化针对无辜人们的煽动仇恨和暴力的纪录。中共央视是中共残暴威权政权的一个重要组成,也应该被这样看待。

萨拉∙库克(Sarah Cook)是自由之家关于中国、香港和台湾资深研究分析员,《中国媒体快报》负责人。纽约大学研究实习生程艾伦(Aaron Cheng) 协助研究。


针对「出格言论」更严苛惩罚措施出台

尽管中国政府已开发了世界上技术最精密的信息控制系统之一,当局还是继续采用低技术的手法来惩罚、恐吓批评性的报导和评论。以下节选过去数月发生的一些案例:

  • 长期监狱判刑:黄琦,人权网站「六四天网」的创办人,7月29日被以「故意泄露国家机密」罪名判处12年监禁。六月底,当局判处刘鹏飞2年监禁,刘是刘一个微信帐号管理员,该帐号因为提供中国网民境外新闻而十分受欢迎。5月,官方媒体向微信群管理员发布相关警告,称微信管理员可能为其管理群组内的讨论内容负责,刘在警报发布后不久即被捕。蒙古历史学家Lhamjab A. Borjgin,于7月3日被判处一年监禁,缓刑两年,被控以「 分裂国家」和「非法商业(活动)」罪名,只因他传播自己的书《中国的文革》。
  • 在监禁中「被死亡」和死刑的恐吓9月23日,据「中国人权卫士(Chinese Human Rights Defenders)」报导,,據「中國人權捍衛者(Chinese Human Rights Defenders)」報導,警察通知維權人士王美余的家屬,他在湖南被監禁期間死亡。7月,王美余於因其在公眾場合手持要求習近平下台、並呼籲舉行全國選舉的公告牌被捕。在另一案例中,法轮功学员孟红2013年因散发传单被判刑入狱。据她现居美国的女儿指称,孟红已于7月30日死于监禁之中。据自由亚洲电台报导,在新疆,学者和前新疆大学校长塔西甫拉提·特依拜(Tashpolat Teyip) 可能被「随时」处决。自特依拜2017年在前往德国参加一次会议途中失踪后,他的兄弟就和他失去了联系。
  • 捏造间谍指控:杨恒均(Yang Hengjun),澳大利亚作家,一月份在广州旅行期间被中国当局拘留,并于8月23日正式被指控犯了间谍罪。澳大利亚总理斯科特·莫里森( Scott Morrison)否认当局对杨的指控,杨在2011年3月前就被拘留过,但是当局迫于国际压力而释放了他。杨恒均并非遭受此类指控的唯一外国人:加拿大商人麦克·斯帕弗(Michael Spavor),以及曾经工作于国际危机组织(International Crisis Group)的加拿大前外交官康明凯(Michael Kovrig),自2018年12月被拘留,这显然是中国对加拿大逮捕华为高干孟晚舟的报复行为。五月,二人被正式指控危害国家安全罪
  • 与外界隔绝的长期拘留:维吾尔人持续地因其网络评论、其它形式的言论表达、或有对政府提出批评的海外亲戚,而继续被长期拘留,完全无法与外界联系。被拘留者包括:学生Buzainafu Abudourexiti,其于2017年从埃及留学回来后被拘留;知名行动者热妣亚(Rebiya Kadeers)的30名亲属。新疆之外,草根维权人士陈建芳(Chen Jianfang)自3月被拘留,因其网路发文悼念维权人士曹顺利之死;劳工维权人士危志立和柯成冰也自3月起被拘留;另一位劳工维权人士杨郑君自一月起被拘留(detained since January)。这些被拘者,都被禁止联系律师或他们的家属。
  • 拘留支持香港民主抗议人士:化名「自由小陆」的一名25岁的深圳居民,8月份被当局拘留10天,因他在网上「寻衅滋事」,发布贴文呼吁中国人重新思考他们对香港事件的态度。一位重庆居民在8月初被警察监视,因在网上表达对抗议的支持。
  • 抓捕绑架相关的自由言论者:一名西藏人7月份在四川被拘留10天,因其在微信分享一张达赖喇嘛的照片。两位男士于6月13日被拘留,因在网上传播散播关于中国技术公司华为的传言。 8月份,中国艺术家赵邦(Zhao Bang)因设计一款印有表情符号的T恤衫而被捕,被指控为影射天安门广场大屠杀。前记者张贾龙(Zhang Jialong)因「寻衅滋事」于8月13日被拘留,张曾在2014年美国国务卿约翰·克里访中期间亲自向他个人请愿,敦请促美国对中国的网络审查施压。张因此成名,但那次会见后他立即遭到腾讯公司解聘。。
  • 拒发签证:《华尔街日报》的王春翰(Chun Han Wong)8月末被中国政府拒发记者证。这位新加坡籍记者被中国驱逐,据信是对他的7月3日报导习近平表弟齐明(Ming Chai)的报复。齐明是澳洲公民,据报有洗钱之嫌。

监控近况:摄像头泛滥,边境电话检查,学校内面部识别

  • 世界排名前八名严厉监控的城市位于中国:英国维护消费者权益网站Comparitech的研究人员最近发现中国居人均摄像机数多之最。重庆为世界上排名第一的最严厉监控城市,共有260万个摄像头—或大约说是每1000个人就有168.03个摄像头进行监控。据信目前在中国使用2亿多个监控摄像头,预期到2022年,该数量会上升至6.26亿个或更多。
  • 在边境处的新间谍软件和手机检查:有几家报导指出,今年夏天,在边境处的新防间谍软件和手机检查:有几家报导指出,今年夏天,去中国的游客在出入境处手机遭受检查,这显然与在新疆和香港发生的危机有关联。一份由《纽约时报》(the New York Times)、德国的《南德意志报》(Süddeutsche Zeitung)与《北德广播公司》(NDR)、英国《卫报》(the Guardian)、以及网络杂志《母板》(Motherboard)联合做出的调查在7月刊登,该调查发现中国当局强迫从中亚陆地边境口岸进入新疆者该调查发现中国当局强迫从中亚陆地口岸进入新疆者在手机上安装一监控应用程式app。该app名为「蜂采」(Fengcai),它能收集短信并检测手机内图片文件,将手机内容和包含7万3000敏感词的清单进行比对,这些敏感字和图片包括关于伊斯兰恐怖主义的书籍和达赖喇嘛的照片。据《南华早报》 报导,同时,大陆的香港居民被强迫解锁他们的手机,以便当局来搜索与正在进行的抗议相关的材料。在这些七、八月期间针对从大陆往来香港和深圳的游客的检查,有些人还被询问是否曾参加过抗议活动。
  • 校园内的面部识别技术引发日益增加的担忧:在搜狐新闻8月份刊载的一则报导中,其分析一所小学使用面部识别摄像机的情形,发现该系统可以评估学生的姿态和面部表情以及其它信息。最近几月,面部识别系统在校园内的推广引发了国内的担忧,有些迹象表明政府有所回应。位于南京的中国药科大学最近宣布,他们将限制此类措施,而教育部的一位官员也有让步,称「包含学生的个人信息都要非常谨慎」,还说政府要加以限制和管理对在教室内使用人脸识别技术应用。
  • 在公共建筑内,面部识别系统越装越多:据一观察中国宗教自由的网络杂志《寒冬》的一篇报导指出,在公共建筑内安装的监控系统越来越多。该杂志9月份报导,当地公安局已在江西的一家居民小区安装了面部识别系统设备,北京的13个公共住房小区内也安装了此类设备。据信这些系统能被用来监控政治异议人士和宗教教友们在家庭礼拜堂会面。

审查近况:香港新闻操控,自由智库被关闭, 电影制作人受阻

  • 审查人员删除、操控香港消息:在中国,和政府官方口径不一致的关于香港人抗议的网络内容继续被严格审查,同时亲政府的宣传被大量散播。一份标注日期为6月16日的指示泄漏并被《中国数字时代》(China Digital Times)发表,该指示命令各网站「发现并删除与香港反送中抗议有关的视频内容」,并「删除任何有害评论」,指的是网民们用来谨慎地表达对香港抗议者支持的几首歌曲。 9月5日发出的更新的指令,表明了在官方撤回《引渡条例》修订后,北京的内容监管者所面临的两难局面。这些指令警告「所有的网站和新闻媒体,不得转载、跟进、报导并严格处理在社交平台上发布的国外信息」,尤其是与反送中条例撤销有关的信息。这显然是为了处理此次让步后中国网民在网上表达困惑的相关评论。该指令还命令网络媒体平台「关闭相关评论区,并严厉解决那些以爱国名义而攻击政府的帐户」。
  • 位于北京的自由派机构宣布关闭:8月底,位于北京的「天则经济研究所」在历经当局长年施压之后宣布关闭。过去两年,该研究所社交媒体帐号被封,人员被逐出办公室。天则研究所的关闭,不过是最新的进展,反映出当局对自由学术讨论和经济政策批评性讨论日益无法容忍
  • 审查者对战争电影和台湾电影节开刀:中国审查者们继续向中国电影界开刀。根据制片人在其新浪微博上的一则简短的声明,观众翘盼已久的史诗电影《八佰》六月底被取消播放。。人们认为就在该电影计划首映前几天被取消放映的理由源自于该电影对国民党在1937年上海战役中的正面描述,此后国民党于1949年在中国内战中战败于中共。另外,在中国和台湾紧张局势不断升高的态势之下, 中国电影管理局于8月6日宣布禁止中国电影人参加于11月在台湾举行的台北金马电影展。中国纪录片导演朱昱(Zhu Yu)先前曾表达过她对抗该禁令的意愿,但在她成为网络霸凌的对象后正式退出金马电影展
  • 推荐内容的演算法面临严格管制:中共中央网络安全和信息化委员办公室(CAC)9月10日颁布的《网络生态治理规定》草案中声明,社交媒体平台、网站和应用程式软体向用户推荐内容的演算法必须确保推荐内容与「主流价值观」和政府理念一致。该法规在8月31号中共中央委员会印发《中共宣传工作条例》后随后推出,它列出了中共委员会针对政治宣传工作的七项职责,以及各级中共宣传部门的16项工作职责。

香港:记者在抗议活动中面临升级的攻击 警察冲突 暴徒施暴

支持民主的香港抗议延续至初秋,香港的记者和摄影师日渐成为为警察、亲北京暴徒,乃至有时是抗议者们本身的施暴目标。

自7月初开始,香港记者协会就已发布了十数则声明,谴责对媒体人员的攻击,并敦促所有各方允许记者自由工作,并留意穿戴媒体头盔和黄色背心的工作人员。在香港记者协会在9月16日发表的一则声明中指出:「暴力份子及个别帮派更恶意针对及恐吓新闻工作者」,香港记协不断呼吁警察必须正视持续的滥权行为,「确保公平执法」。

最近被香港记者协会记录在案的对媒体攻击的事件包括:

  • 7月8日: 针对试图报导旺角弥敦道清场行动的记者,警察袭击和阻碍记者们的工作
  • 7月14日:在沙田示威活动中,无线电视(TVB)的一位记者和一名摄影师被抗议人群攻击。同日,一名《香港商业电台》记者在其报导警察和抗议者的冲突之时,被警察以胡椒喷雾攻击。
  • 7月21日:两名记者在元朗地铁站,被一伙身着白T恤衫的亲北京暴徒持棍殴打,暴徒们还毁坏了记者的相机。其中一名记者随后被送往医院疗伤。这群暴徒还袭击了许多在地铁站的抗议者和围观群众。
  • 7月30日:在葵涌警署的抗议活动中,发生多起攻击记者们的事件。其中包含:警察冲向一名摄影记者并故意用防暴盾牌打击该记者;一名记者在她试图离开抗议现场时被警察殴打;一名警察将霰弹枪指向一名正在进行现场报导的记者。
  • 8月5日:在黄大仙中心的一场抗议中,无线电视新闻部一辆采访车被抗议者损毁
  • 8月11日:在北角的一场无序集会中,几名记者被袭击,其中包括一位《明报》(Ming Pao)记者被一拳打中,一名《立场新闻》(Stand News)记者被一位持棍者威胁;《香港电台》(RTHK)的一名记者被人群攻击。在这些事件中,警察没有采取任何逮捕行动。
  • 8月14日:在香港国际机场的抗议活动中,一名《香港中国通讯社》(Hong Kong China News Agency)的记者被抗议者强迫删除照片。抗议者将一名《环球时报》的记者绑起来,《环球时报》(the Global Times)是由中共机关报社《人民日报社》主办与出版的新闻报刊。
  • 8月31日:警察未作解释便将记者从太子地铁站驱逐,当晚又攻击了他们认为与抗议有关联的地铁通勤者。同一日晚上,在维多利亚公园,十名记者被警察包围并暂时被禁止离开
  • 9月2日:在记者报导旺角警署外的抗议活动时,警察近距离对他们施放催泪瓦斯和胡椒喷雾。一名NOW TV的记者被警察推倒在地,后来在当地医院治疗手部伤势。
  • 9月15日:在香港岛的警察清场行动中,几名显然是亲北京男子攻击了记者并毁坏了他们的相机
  • 9月17日:一名香港浸会大学的记者学生和《广播新闻网》(Broadcast News Network)的记者在报导香港岛的抗议时被捕,警察更阻挡其他记者拍摄搜捕现场。

中国之外:香港的反抗议活动,监控系统的输出, 孔子学院被关闭

  • 香港抗议在海外遭遇反抗议,压制言论:在澳大利亚和新西兰的大学校园,香港民主运动的支持者和反对者们发生冲突,其中显著的是亲北京学生的暴力言论和对至少一名记者的攻击。组织有素的海外中国学生团体对被称为连侬墙上的呼吁自由的贴便条,撕毁那些表达支持的言论并霸凌参与的学生。在海外支持香港抗议者的集会中持续有香港人和其他人加入时,中共外交官和领事馆官员提供支持给反抗议者,并相应地默许在过程中发生的暴力行为。
  • 新的研究报告详述中国的网络控制,与输出监控系统到100多个国家: 卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)一份九月份的研究报告中,将中国认定为「全球人工智能的主要推手」。该研究报告指出,中国公司已经向63个国家出售人工智能技术,在人面部识别技术方面走在前沿。此外,根据9月份开放科技基金会(by the Open Technology Fund,OTF)提供的另一份报告,中国公司和俄国的同行公司一道,已经向100多个国家提供了网络控制的工具或培训。
  • 华为帮助非洲政府监视反对派:8月份的《华尔街日报》报导指出,中国技术公司华为的员工帮助乌干达和赞比亚当局截获他们政治对手的加密通信,并利用手机数据对特定人士的具体位置进行跟踪。华为是为撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲国家提供网络和监控设备的主要供应商,它还给乌干达政府提供了装有人脸部识别软件的监控摄像机,增加了政治倡议人士对其自身隐私被泄漏的恐惧
  • 中国警察及其代理人恐吓、威胁美裔维吾尔人:根据8月份维吾尔人权项目(Uyghur Human Rights Project)的报告,居住在美国和加拿大的维吾尔人持续面临中共当局的威吓。那些发声反对中共政府言论的维族人,据报导收到中共警察微信短信或电话,威胁说如果他们不停止活动,他们在新疆的家人会面临监禁。其他人还报导了中共政府正试图招募他们作线人。在5月《新闻周刊》(Newsweek)的一则报导中,揭露了中共当局从集中营释放了一位女士,并强迫她给她在海外的儿子打电话,劝说他节制对中国政府的批评。在几天后,她又被重新关回了集中营。
  • 孔子学院在美国被关闭,在澳大利亚面临调查:在对中共政府干涉西方学术机构之担忧日益增加之时,孔子学院在美国和澳洲面临新一轮的审查。在美国的军费开支中,设有孔子学院的美国大学可能会得不到国防部的对其中文培训的基金资助。为了继续得到五角大楼的基金,迄今已有十多所美国大学关闭了孔子学院,最近的一例是9月5日迈阿密达德学院 (Miami Dade College -FL)关闭其孔子学院。在澳大利亚,新南威尔士政府8月份宣布,他们已经中止了与汉办的合伙关系,并终止了汉办–中国政府监管海外孔子学院的机构–于当地13所学校开设的中文语言项目。这项决定在7月25日悉尼晨鋒報(Sydney Morning Herald)一则报导之后,一则报导之后宣布下达,该报导发现在澳洲大学的孔子学院签署了合约,给予中国政府决定在该学院教课内容的权力。全球目前共有548所孔子学院,还有设在1193个小学、中学的孔子课堂。

重点反制:主要社交媒体公司删除反香港抗议之不实信息

自八月中旬以来,至少有三家美国的社交媒体平台– 推特,脸书和YouTube –已公开宣布发现并删除了大量的活跃传播不实信息账户,这些账户一直活跃妖魔化或诋毁六月以来在香港发生的亲民主抗议者名誉。这三大社交媒体在中国都是被封的。

推特是第一个公开声明的公司,在8月19日的博客中,它声称已经封掉了936个来自中国的帐号。这些帐号「蓄意并特别散布在香港的政治冲突,包括破坏抗议活动的合法性和政治立场」。该声明还说,自首批帐号被关闭后,其后建立的2万个新帐号也被关闭。同一天,脸书宣布在推特采取行动后,脸书也删除了七个页面,三个群组和5个脸书帐号,因其「针对香港的….有组织性的失真行为」。脸书作此删除后公布了几个帐号的贴文作为范例,其中包含将香港抗议者们比作蟑螂和伊斯兰激进份子的贴文。其后,8月23日,谷歌声明,其视频分享平台(YouTube)已关闭了210个频道,因这些频道涉及「 有系统地上传与正在进行中的香港抗议活动相关视频 」 。

尽管谷歌没有指责中国政府,推特和脸书都明确表示,他们已发现证据,表明这些是中国政府支持的有组织的行为。为了协助在这个平台上中共和其它政治操控活动的研究,推特还公开了所有吊销的帐号名称和推文。 9月20日,推特更公布了八月份最活跃的另外4301个帐号的相关数据。推特另行声明,全球所有国家持有的新闻机构今后都将被禁止使用其广告服务

这些公司揭露这些隐蔽不实信息的举动得到了言论自由倡议者们的认可。但它们是否能抑制中共政府及其他人散播不实信息,还有待观察。

图:脸书删除散播不实信息的一个页面中的帖子,该贴中将香港抗议者比作伊斯兰激进份子(图片来源:脸书


未来关注

  • 中共周年纪念日期间加剧控制手段:随着今年多个政治敏感纪念日的到来,值得关注的是在中共统治中国70周年纪念日10月1日前后会加强的信息控制和亲北京政治宣传,包含可能加紧的网络控制,增强在北京现实世界的监控,以及遣送异议人士和维权人士到中国偏远地区「强制度假」。
  • 香港事态升级:随着民主抗议者和警察的冲突延续,在当局设法终止抗议并避免警察暴力被问责之际,关注围绕10月1日及往后进一步的逮捕、对媒体报导的阻碍和警察暴力。更应关注香港公司和其员工因参与抗议或表达支持而面临的秋后算账,最近几周这样的情形已经在国泰航空(Cathay Pacific)发生。
  • 美国颁布对中国技术公司实施禁令的影响:随着美国禁用中国如海康威视(Hikvision这样提供监控设备的公司产品,以及禁止与技术大公司华为(Huawei)的合作生效,关注禁令实施后这些公司在中国和世界其它地方的运营是如何受到影响,以及其它中国公司是否因此而改变商业计划以避免类似制裁。

行动起来!

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新资讯,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好的理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin:“Key individual” police databases, Tiktok censorship, NBA backlash (No. 139)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: China’s Surveillance State has Tens of Millions of New Targets 

So-called key individuals, from users of drugs to religious believers, are singled out in police databases.

By Emile Dirks and Sarah Cook

One evening in the summer of 2017, local police in China made a surprise inspection of a small private language school, checking the visas of all non-Chinese attendees.  Among those present was a foreign doctoral student, who had left his passport at his hotel. “Not to worry,” said the officer. “What’s your name?” The officer took out a handheld device and entered the student’s name. “Is this you?” Displayed on the screen was the researcher’s name, his passport number, and the address of his hotel.

These kind of incidents are common in Xinjiang, where China has extensively deployed technology against Muslim minorities. But this episode took place in Yunnan Province, near China’s southern border with Myanmar. In fact, Public Security Bureaus – one of the main agencies in China for domestic security and intelligence - across the country are using electronic databases coupled with handheld tools to keep track of certain categories of people. These “key individuals,” as they are officially known, range from paroled criminals and users of drugs to foreigners, petitioners, and religious believers. 

A review of dozens of local government notices, procurement tenders, and promotional material from Chinese companies indicates that the use of such technologies both predates and extends beyond the current crackdown in Xinjiang, affecting tens of millions of people all over China. 

As the Chinese Communist Party identifies new targets for repression under the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Xi Jinping, and Chinese companies expand their sales of surveillance equipment abroad, the scale and impact of these databases are likely to increase in the coming years.

Monitoring “key individuals” nationwide

The Ministry of Public Security’s 2007 Key Population Management Guidelines define key individuals broadly as those “suspected of threatening national security or public order.” Some specific groups are listed, including serious criminal offenders, people released from prisons or labor camps, and users of illegal drugs.

In practice, a far wider range of people are treated as key individuals by China’s security apparatus, according to an examination of more than 70 local government notices issued in 26 of China’s 34 provinces and administrative regions between 2011 and 2019. Frequently mentioned categories of key individuals include petitioners, members of banned religious groups like Falun Gong, people with mental illnesses, and those involved in “stability maintenance” or “terrorist” activities—two terms that are often applied to rights activists, protesters, and members of ethnic minority groups like Xinjiang’s Uighurs.

As the number of populations under surveillance has grown, so too has the collection of their personal data. The origins of today’s massive police databases extend back to the introduction of machine-readable “second generation” national ID cards in the mid-2000s. The cards allowed personal data to be stored electronically and shared easily among branches of the Ministry of Public Security. 

In 2006, one of the first nationwide databases of key individuals was launched: the Dynamic Control System. With records on more than two million registered users of drugs, the Dynamic Control System was an early example of ID-based location tracking and biometric data collection. It alerts public security offices whenever registered individuals use their national ID numbers to conduct computer-based transactions, such as buying a train ticket. Police can then determine the individuals’ location, intercept them, and conduct a drug test on their urine, the results of which are added to their electronic file. Fingerprints and DNA data are also collected. It was reported in November 2017 that police in Hainan were going door to door collecting DNA samples from registered users of drugs.

The Dynamic Control System soon became a template for other police databases, which Chinese technology firms were contracted to build. By 2008, Hongda Software’s Public Security Personnel Information Management Work System was being used to collect information on practitioners of the Falun Gong meditation and spiritual group, whose adherents have been subjected to a large-scale campaign of intimidation, imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial killing since 1999. Police were able to record who introduced practitioners to the movement, where and with whom they practiced, and their level of spiritual dedication—criteria that resemble precursors to more recent police assessments of Uighurs as “safe,” “average,” and “unsafe.”

 Mapping function for police database software developed by Yidiantong that shows the user where different
kinds of registered "key individuals" are located within a geographic area. Credit: Emile Dirks

A booming surveillance industry

Since the release of Hongda’s system, databases on key individuals have become a lucrative part of the country’s surveillance technology sector. At least 13 tenders for such projects were issued by Public Security Bureaus in seven provinces or centrally administered cities between October 2015 and May 2019, according to information available online.

The companies in question hail from across China, including Shenzhen Yuanzhongrui Technology from Guangdong Province, Beijing’s Sensingtech LLC, and Zhejiang Province’s Yidiantong Information Technology. Of 40 companies building surveillance database systems, at least 10 provide accompanying handheld devices, like Sensingtech, while 13 mention mapping or geolocation features, like Netposa.

The products themselves are not available for direct examination, but help manuals and screenshots of system interfaces are accessible online. Yidiantong’s Key Person Control system allows operators to collect basic identifying information on key individuals (name, date of birth, sex, address) as well as bank account and social media information. Additional categories of data are tailored for particular groups: the results of psychological evaluations for people with mental illnesses; the content of complaints by petitioners; the results of urine tests for users of drugs; or the reason for a foreigner’s visit to China and which Chinese counterpart is responsible for the traveler. Some products, like those offered by Hongda Software and Yidiantong, cover populations that are less typical targets of mass monitoring, including internal migrants and clergy from state-approved religious groups.

The diversity of the products—and of the target populations—reflect the decentralized aspects of Chinese policing. There is a nationwide focus on certain groups and a general desire to enforce “social stability” through high-tech surveillance tools. But which populations are prioritized varies across location and time.  Local government notices indicate that military veterans petitioning for improved treatment were a concern across China beginning in 2017, while people in community corrections, the mentally ill and petitioners were targeted in the leadup to the 19th Party Congress in 2018. Targets may also vary based on the size of local religious populations: Christians are a greater focus for security services in Zhejiang, Muslims in Xinjiang, Falun Gong practitioners in far northeastern provinces, and Tibetan Buddhists in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Sichuan, and Qinghai. Adding to the diversity of implementation is the fact that there does not appear to be a single designated supplier for these technologies, leading to a relatively competitive market.


Data entry interface for police database of "key individuals" developed by 
Yidiantong Information Technology in Zhejiang province. Credit: Emile Dirks

Future uses and implications

There are already signs that disparate databases are being combined with broader state surveillance projects. Yidiantong claims that its Key Person Control database is integrated with the information systems of hotels, internet cafés, airports, and railway stations, enabling real-time data sharing with the police. Several companies even boast that their databases are integrated with facial-recognition cameras capable of identifying key individuals in public places.

The regime’s ability to convert data integration into more intensive forms of control and punishment for key individuals is liable to increase. A decade ago, a known dissident, underground Christian, or Falun Gong practitioner might have received a visit from police during politically sensitive periods, like a Communist Party Congress. Today these same people may be monitored continuously, with police receiving automatic alerts about their movements. As the definition of a key individual continues to expand, and new forms of data are added to the tracking systems, there is little to stop police from punishing even minor forms of political or religious dissent and affecting more aspects of a person’s life for longer periods of time. 

The hoarding of so much personal information in integrated databases with minimal oversight raises obvious concerns about data security. Other surveillance and data-collection systems in China have been found over the past year to have very poor data protection measures, exposing the personal details of millions of people to hackers. Recent official efforts to improve data security have applied almost entirely to how private companies, not the government, handles personal data.

Another concern arises from the potential export of key-individual surveillance technologies to other countries. A study published last month by the Open Technology Fund documents sales of various types of Chinese surveillance and internet censorship equipment to at least 73 countries across five continents. The recipient states are not just other full-fledged autocracies like Egypt or Azerbaijan, but also countries with semiauthoritarian or even democratic systems like Brazil, Malaysia, Tanzania, Poland, and South Korea. At least three technology companies that are listed in the report for providing facial-recognition-enabled cameras to other countries—Dahua, Sensetime, and Hikvision—also offer surveillance technologies aimed at tracking key individuals.

How to respond

Developing effective responses to these surveillance practices is extremely difficult. At a minimum, though, it is worth alerting both  Chinese citizens and foreigners traveling in China about the extent of data collection, allowing vulnerable people to take precautions to protect themselves and their acquaintances.

Rights-conscious investors, whether foreign or Chinese, should closely examine their portfolios and eliminate any direct or indirect support for companies that are complicit in mass surveillance and rights violations, including through international pension funds and venture-capital firms. A loss of capital could reduce the attraction of contracts from China’s security apparatus and dampen enthusiasm for technologies that are specifically designed to track peaceful activism or religious observance.

Finally, officials in democratic settings should be wary of transactions with any of these firms. Among the Chinese commercial entities added this month to a US government export blacklist for their involvement in facilitating repression in Xinjiang, several also sell technologies aimed a broader range of key-individual targets. The United States and democracies in general should apply Xinjiang-style sanctions to Chinese companies that contribute to surveillance-enabled rights violations across the country.

Given the pace at which such dystopian tools of mass repression have proliferated within China, democratic actors should waste no time in halting their spread before they become a fact of life around the world.

Emile Dirks is a PhD candidate and independent researcher based in Toronto, Canada whose work focuses on extrajudicial detention and government surveillance in the People’s Republic of China. Sarah Cook is a Senior Research Analyst at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin.

This article was also published by Foreign Policy on October 21, 2019.

 


Chinese state media, troll networks fuel backlash against NBA in China

On October 4, a simple tweet in support of the ongoing protests in Hong Kong by Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, elicited a fierce backlash from the Chinese government, state media, and Chinese fans of the NBA. The tweet, which contained an image bearing the words “fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,” was quickly deleted by Morey, who subsequently apologized, along with the Rockets’ owners, to Chinese audiences offended by the message. Despite these damage-control efforts, following an October 8 statement by NBA commissioner Adam Silver supporting free expression, numerous Chinese companies withdrew their sponsorship from the NBA, while banners advertising upcoming NBA exhibition games in China were taken down across the country, and official merchandise was removed from store shelves. Online, viral videos spread of Chinese basketball fans tearing up their tickets, as did messages condemning Morey and the NBA. Silver claimed that the Chinese government had even pressured him to fire Morey.

The controversy around Morey, the NBA, and the Hong Kong protests was not the result of spontaneous Chinese netizen outcries. Rather, it emerged at least in part due to government-led propaganda and content manipulation efforts, including the following:

  • A coordinated Twitter troll attack targeting Morey: In the hours and days following Morey’s initial tweet, tens of thousands of Twitter users apparently based in China were mobilized to respond in a coordinated pro-China intimidation campaign against him. A Wall Street Journal analysis of nearly 170,000 tweets directed at Morey concluded that he had been the target of a “troll attack” intended to “manipulate the conversation about the Hong Kong protests,” and noted that many of the tweets contained verbal abuse including, among other things, a Chinese acronym meaning “your mother is dead.” At the peak of the activity, Morey would have received notifications of such tweets at a rate of nearly two messages per second. Twitter is blocked in China but accessible with circumvention tools; according to experts who analyzed the data and messages, the tweets were likely sent by human users rather than a bot network.
  • Broadcast cancellations by Chinese state media and Tencent: Chinese state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) denounced Adam Silver for defending Morey on free- speech grounds, arguing instead that Morey’s tweet challenged “national sovereignty and social stability.” CCTV further announced that it would no longer broadcast NBA preseason games. In light of Morey’s tweet, the Chinese company Tencent—the NBA’s online broadcast partner in China, which also has close ties to the Chinese government—announced that it too would temporarily suspend broadcasts of preseason games.
  • Top-down censorship and manipulation of popular opinion: Chinese state media responded quickly to the unfolding controversy with both public and behind-the-scenes attempts to manipulate public opinion concerning Morey and the NBA. A Weibo survey released by the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, on October 8 asked respondents to pick one of four answers to the question of how they felt about Morey. However, the poll was derided by netizens for only allowing respondents to select from pro-China or anti-Morey answers. On October 10, government censors instructed Chinese websites to remove reports on the NBA from their homepages and to not “hype” topics related to the ongoing controversy.

Persistent public anger in China directed at Morey, Silver, and the NBA in response to Morey’s comments and the subsequent fallout, is due also in part to China’s notoriously closed media landscape, which has been awash with state disinformation about the Hong Kong protests. Among other smears, participants have been routinely derided as “terrorists” and “cockroaches,” as detailed in last month’s China Media Bulletin. Still, from netizen responses to the People’s Daily survey, it is also clear that at least some Chinese fans remain unconvinced by Chinese state propaganda. In one case, a Chinese Rockets fan posted an emotional video in support of his team in which he set fire to China’s national flag. However, despite the fan’s efforts to cover his face and hide his identity, police were able to track him down and arrest him, sending a chilling message to would-be outspoken fans.


Foreign and Chinese brands under increased pressure to aid government censorship

  • Online travel platforms covered by new censorship rules: New regulations drafted by China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism will increase censorship of content posted on the platforms of online travel providers. The 42 draft regulations, posted October 10, require the platforms to preemptively review content published in order to prevent information deemed problematic by the government from spreading. The applications will also be required to store information on people posting on their platforms, and to cooperate with authorities in any investigations related to these people. The rules come on the heels of several other sets of restrictions and content-monitoring efforts imposed over the past year on apolitical platforms like live-streaming, dating, and celebrity gossip applications.
  • South Park “Band in China” episode banned in China: Chinese government censors have ordered the popular US animated series South Park scrubbed from the internet after a recent episode of the show took satirical aim at the Chinese government. Officials ordered websites to add the show’s name to a banned keyword search list, according to a leaked directive published by China Digital Times. The episode mocked Chinese censorship and American companies that attempt to appease the Chinese government through self-censorship, while also including politically sensitive references like a scene of Winnie the Pooh being imprisoned in a labor camp because of his use as a meme for Chinese president Xi Jinping. Following the ban, creators Trey Parker and Matt Stone issued on Twitter a faux apology praising the Communist Party and welcoming “Chinese censors into our home and into our hearts.” Others have also felt the impact of Chinese government ire at South Park, with musician Zedd announcing on Twitter that he had been banned from performing in China after liking a Tweet from the show’s official Twitter account.
  • Apple takes new steps to aid Chinese government censorship: Numerous reports indicate that tech giant Apple continues to assist Chinese state authorities in censoring content within and outside China. In early October, Quartz’s mobile news app was removed from the Chinese version of the App Store due to its coverage of continuing protests in Hong Kong. An app that helps crowdsource data on the location of police in Hong Kong was also removed from the store in early October at the request of local authorities, a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times. Apple chief executive Tim Cook defended the move on that grounds that the app was being used to target police officers for violence, but subsequent statements from Hong Kong police indicate that despite official fears, the app had not yet been used in such a way. Buzzfeed has also reported that as early as 2018, Apple was warning show developers for Apple TV+ to avoid topics that might anger the Chinese government. Even emojis have not been spared, with recent updates to iPhone’s iOS 13.1 in Macau and Hong Kong removing the Taiwanese flag emoji. In other cases, while Apple itself has not been complicit in government repression, its minimal response has nonetheless concerned critics. According to security researchers at Google Project Zero, the Chinese government has reportedly launched malicious attacks on Uyghur Muslim iPhone users in Xinjiang and abroad in an effort to gain access to the users’ location and files. Apple reportedly closed the vulnerability, but declined to comment on the scope or target of the attacks.

Surveillance updates: Study app backdoor, facial scans for internet registration, “Super camera” unveiled, facial recognition on subways

  • Study reveals government-backed study app’s surveillance capabilities: A report by the Open Technology Fund released October 12 provides evidence that a Chinese government app, “Study the Great Nation,” can potentially be used for surveillance of users. The app, designed by Chinese tech giant Alibaba, is promoted as a resource through which users can study Communist Party ideology, follow the news, and learn about Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, through backdoors in the app, Chinese authorities can view a user’s internet history, text messages, and photos; review their contacts; and even turn on the phone’s audio recorder. The app has reportedly been downloaded over 100 million times, and many government employees are required to spend free time accruing points awarded on its programs. In September, regulators announced that journalists’ accreditation for 2019 would be based on reporters’ performance on an exam drawn in part on the app’s content.
  • Facial scans required for internet and phone registration starting in December: On September 27, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced that starting December 1, all telecommunications companies must obtain facial scans of all new internet or mobile phone users. Under this same regulation, Chinese citizens would also be prohibited from transferring cell phone numbers to other people. The move, which is being justified in the name of safeguarding the rights and interests of Chinese citizens, marks a further expansion of domestic surveillance and real-name registration requirements for telecommunications customers and netizens—developments that have already discouraged online discussion.
  • “Super camera” unveiled at industry fair: A team of Chinese scientists unveiled a camera with 500 megapixel resolution capable of capturing detailed still and moving images of faces within panoramic shots of thousands of people. Unveiled in late September at China’s International Industry Fair, images from the camera can be uploaded to cloud storage and analyzed in real time. Given the Chinese government’s embrace of domestic surveillance, voices in China and abroad have raised serious privacy concerns, asking how such technology could be used in coordination with facial recognition enabled cameras.
  • Free subway ride for facial recognition registration: In late September, it was reported that Shenzhen has become the latest Chinese city to roll out facial recognition systems for subway commuters. Using technology designed by Huawei, people over the age of 60 who register for the system will be able to gain access to stations for free by scanning their faces. Similar experimental systems have been tested out in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao, Nanjing, and Nanning. While facial recognition could facilitate the quick passage of people through station barriers, the program could easily give way to broader use by private companies and the government of the facial scans obtained, as surveillance systems in China become increasingly integrated.

Hong Kong: Face masks ban, more attacks on journalists signal declining press freedom

Police violence against journalists in Hong Kong has underscored the worsening climate for press freedom in the Special Administrative Region in recent months, as have scattered attacks on reporters by both protesters and pro-Beijing sympathizers. On October 3, the Hong Kong Journalists Association filed an application for a judicial review against the Commissioner of Police due to his failure to curb police violence, interference, and misconduct directed at journalists. The following are three key developments reflecting deteriorating press freedom in Hong Kong over the previous month:

  • Outlets recall reporters covering National Day protests: In the face of rising violence, RTHK, the South China Morning Post, and Baptist University’s student newspaper decided to recall journalists from the frontlines after several incurred injuries during police efforts to disperse protests held on National Day on October 1. Police had used water cannons, pepper spray, and tear gas against protesters, some of whom responded with Molotov cocktails and bricks, during the demonstrations that took place on the sensitive political anniversary. The Hong Kong Journalists Association reported that scores of journalists were injured by rubber bullets and sponge rounds fired by police, while others were treated for acid attacks, and called on all sides to refrain from interfering with the work of the city’s reporters.

Beyond China: Blizzard sanctions pro-Hong Kong gamers, TikTok censorship, US limits Chinese tech exports, academic freedom threats

  • Blizzard controversy, boycott: US gaming firm Blizzard has come under fire for sanctioning a player of the popular game Hearthstone who expressed support for the ongoing protests in Hong Kong. During a post-match press conference announcing a gaming victory on October 6, Hong Kong player Chung Ng Wai voiced the popular protest slogan, “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” In response, Blizzard stripped Chung of his prize money and banned him from competing for a year. After an outcry from other players, his winnings were later reinstated and his ban reduced to six months. Nevertheless, calls for a boycott of Blizzard arose, and intensified following the subsequent banning of three US-based Hearthstone players on October 16 for holding up a sign reading “free Hong Kong, boycott Blizz” during a live-streamed match. Seemingly in response to the growing controversy, Blizzard cancelled a product launch in New York City scheduled for October 16. While Blizzard’s user base in China is small, the company is seeking to expand in the lucrative software market to make up for lost revenues elsewhere.
  • TikTok censorship of Hong Kong protests and more: Evidence is growing that the popular social media network TikTok regularly censors material considered sensitive by the Chinese government. The video-sharing platform has emerged as one of the most downloaded and popular applications globally in 2019, especially among teenage users. According to internal documents obtained by the Guardian, employees of the company, which is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance, are required to remove content related to such topics as the Tiananmen Square massacre and the persecuted Falun Gong spiritual group. Searches for “Hong Kong” on the site also return surprisingly few results related to the ongoing protests in the city compared to other popular social media platforms. Amid these revelations, on October 9, Senator Marco Rubio requested that the Treasury Department look into the national security implications of the acquisition of the music-based social media service Musical.ly by TikTok, while on October 17 Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg criticized the Chinese company for censoring content. In response, TikTok has hired former US lawmakers now working at law firm K&L Gates to revise its company policies.
  • US places export restrictions on Chinese tech firms aiding repression in Xinjiang: On October 7, the US Commerce Department announced it would place 28 Chinese entities on a government export blacklist due to their complicity in the Chinese government’s ongoing campaign of repression in Xinjiang. Included in the so-called Entity List are eight Chinese tech companies: Dahua Technology; Hikvision; iFlytek; Megvii Technology; Sense Time; Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Company; Yitu Technologies; and Yixin Science and Technology. In light of the sanctions, two of the largest US public pension funds, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System and the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, are said to be reexamining their holdings in Hikvision. Other observers have questioned the impact of the sanctions, and called for stronger measures.
  • New research on Confucius Institutes, Chinese extraterritorial impact on academic freedom: The impact of Chinese government intimidation and influence on scholarly activity inside China and beyond continues to be a source of concern. On September 24, Scholars at Risk published Obstacles to Excellence, a detailed report on challenges to academic freedom linked to activities undertaken by the Chinese government. The report noted a worsening academic environment on both the Chinese mainland as well as in Hong Kong and Macau. The report also examined the extraterritorial reach of Chinese government influence, including via Confucius Institutes operating on campuses across the globe, as well as Chinese government-backed surveillance and intimidation efforts directed at Chinese students and scholars overseas. Separately, Freedom House researcher Sarah Cook and University of Washington student Flora Yan wrote in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief about the intersection between Confucius Institutes and the corporate sector, in particular the increasing efforts by Confucius Institutes to offer courses on Chinese language, politics, and economics to multinational corporations. Their piece also highlights a new partnership program between Hanban—the Confucius Institute Headquarters—and Chinese companies, including tech firms Tencent and iFlytek, both of which are already known for their high level of collaboration with the Chinese government in surveillance and censorship. These revelations raise new concerns about the impact of Confucius Institutes on free expression on campuses, and the potential for these establishments to act as intelligence-gathering organs for the Chinese state.

 


FEATURED PUSHBACK: Uighurs use video-sharing apps to break through information blockade

Amid a massive campaign of detention, reeducation, and forced labor, China’s northwest region of Xinjiang is arguably one of the most tightly controlled information environments in the world. Efforts by Uighur and other Muslim residents of the region to communicate their plight, even to family members overseas, can result in long-term extralegal detention.

It was all the more surprising then to observers of the crisis to see in late August the emergence of dozens of short videos by Uighurs on Douyin, a video-sharing application owned by Chinese firm ByteDance. The clips, often just a few seconds long, typically showed an ethnic Uighur with a photo of a loved one—who had presumably been taken away to a reeducation camp or state-run orphanage—crying or making other gestures of mourning. Experts who have viewed the videos say they appear to have been filmed and posted from within Xinjiang.

The videos’ ambiguity appears to have helped them slip past censors initially. It remains unclear how many views the clips received within China—or how long they survived before being deleted, as many were. But the images and videos have spread globally as overseas Uighur activists have reposted them on Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram (all of which are blocked in China). Meanwhile, dozens of international media outlets have published articles about the phenomenon, including the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, and publications in France and Australia.                                                                                                                                   Snapshot of an unnamed Uighur woman appearing to                                                                                                                                                         mourn missing family members from a video on Douyin.


Meanwhile, Douyin and its international counterpart Tiktok have emerged as an important, if unlikely, source of video evidence of the Xinjiang crackdown and of the whereabouts of the province’s missing children. Despite the difficulty of verifying their accuracy, clips posted by official government or state media accounts have enabled overseas observers and relatives to identify and preserve footage of orphanages for Uighur children whose parents are in detention, instances of mosques being demolished, and images of heavily armed police in training or pro-Communist Party loyalty-building sessions.

WHAT TO WATCH FOR

Trial and treatment of rights defender Chen Jianfang: Chen was detained in March 2019, apparently for publishing an online essay paying tribute to the United Nations–oriented activist Cao Shunli on the fifth anniversary of her death in custody. On August 30, Shanghai prosecutorsindicted Chen on charges of “subversion of state power,” a serious offense often used to impose long prison sentences on activists, but news of the charges only emerged this month. Chen is a long-time vocal human rights advocate, and UN human rights experts and international human rights groups have written to the Chinese government to express concern about her arrest and denial of due process. Watch for updates on her trial and possible sentencing, whether international pressure on her behalf impacts the outcome of her case, including whether she is granted the legal counsel of her choice, which to date she has been denied.
 

Impact of foreign tech firm attendance at Wuzhen “World Internet Conference”: From October 20 to 22, the Chinese government hosted its sixth annual internet conference in the town of Wuzhen, in Zhejiang. Chinese state mediareported that 1,500 people from 80 countries joined. As in past years, the Communist Party had a strong presence at the event, including a keynote speech by Huang Kunming, a member of the Politburo and head of the party’s powerful propaganda department, who also read a congratulatory message from Xi Jinping. Several major US tech firms, including Google and Facebook did not attend—possibly because they sought to avoid the blowback that Apple and Google faced in 2017 after sending top executives, and thereby conferring some legitimacy upon the Chinese Communist Party’s model of restrictive internet control. But a number of notable hardware, semiconductor, and cloud service companies sent representatives, including Qualcomm, Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco; they joined Chinese tech executives from Alibaba and Baidu. Amid heightened US-China trade tensions and renewed concerns over how Chinese economic ties affect free speech abroad, watch for any fallout for these companies as a result of their participation, or examples of how their attendance influences their business practices.
 

China-Russia treaty on combating “illegal” content online: On October 8, Reuters reported that China and Russia were planning to sign a treaty later in the month aimed at joining efforts to combat “illegal” content online, based on reports from a Russian state communications agency. Watch for confirmation that the treaty had been signed, any details on its provisions, and emerging evidence of its implementation, including increased Russian efforts to censor political and religious content within its borders on topics that might be deemed sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party. 


TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.

中國媒體快報:「重點人物」警務資料庫,抖音審查,NBA引發的強烈反彈(Issue 139, Traditional Chinese)

$
0
0

本期標題

本期分析:中國政府數千萬計的新監視目標

新聞報導:​​​

重點反制​維族人用各種視頻分享平台突破信息封鎖

未來關注

行動起來!


本期分析:中國的警務資料庫涵蓋範圍遠超過新疆

該整合系統被設計為追蹤特定人口,但其監視範圍正不斷擴大。

作者:薩拉·庫克 (Sarah Cook) 

2017年夏天的一天晚上,中國當地警察對一所小型私營語言學校進行了突擊檢查,檢視了所有非華裔參加者的簽證。 在場地一位外國博士生把他的護照留在了旅館。 「不用擔心」警察說。 「你叫什麼名字?」警察掏出了一個手持設備並輸入這位學生的姓名。 「這是你嗎?」屏幕上顯示了是這位研究人員的姓名,護照號碼和飯店地址。

這類事件在新疆很常見,畢竟中國在新疆廣泛部署了監控穆斯林少數民族的技術。 但是這個特定事件發生在雲南省,靠近中國與緬甸南部的邊界。 實際上,公安局–負責國內安全和情報的主要機構之一–在中國各地已在使用電子資料庫以及手持工具來追蹤特定類別的人員。眾所皆知地,這些「重點人物」涵蓋了被假釋的罪犯、吸毒者,到外國人,上訪者和宗教信眾。

在查閱了數十份地方政府通告、採購招標和中國公司的促銷資料後,這些文件顯示此類技術的應用既早於、也超越了目前新疆的鎮壓範圍,並實際上影響了中國各地的千萬人。

隨著中國共產黨在習近平日益增加的極權統治下鎖定新的壓迫目標,以及中國公司將監視設備的銷售擴大到國外的趨勢下,這些資料庫的規模和影響在未來幾年可能會增加。

全國範圍監控「重點人物」

2007年公安部發佈的《重點人口管理規定》對於「重點人口」的廣泛定義為「有危害國家安全或社會治安嫌疑」的人員。一些特定的群體被列出,包括重刑犯,從監獄或勞教所被釋放者,和吸食非法毒品者。

根據2001年至2009年間70份中國34個省和直轄市其中26個當地政府發佈的公告,在實際操作中,被公安機關和部門以「重點人口」處理的範圍更廣。這些文件中經常提到的重點人口類別包含請願者,被禁止的宗教團體信仰者如法輪功學員,精神疾病患者,以及參與「維穩」或「恐怖」活動的人— 這兩個術語通常適用於維權人士,抗議者和新疆維吾爾族等少數民族群體的成員。

隨著被監視人口的數量上升,對被監視者個人資訊的蒐集也隨之增加。現有警務資料庫的大量數據來自2000年中期的「第二代」機器可讀身分證系統。這種身份證允許電子存取個人信息,因而公安部下的各局處之間可以輕易分享這些數據。

2006年,首批全國規模的重點人物資料庫之一正式啟動–動態控制系統。存取了200多萬筆已登記的吸毒者紀錄, 動態控制系統是早期基於身份證定位和生物識別數據來收集資料的例子。每當被登記者使用他們的身份證進行電腦交易時(如購買火車票),公安機關就會收到警示。警察便可由此確定該個體的位置、攔截他們,並對他們的尿樣進行毒品檢測,檢測的結果會被加入他們的電子檔案。指紋和DNA數據也在該過程中被蒐集。據2017年11月的一份報告,海南的警察對登記的吸毒者挨家挨戶進行DNA取樣。

動態控制系統不久即成為其它警務數據庫的樣本,承包給中國的技術公司依樣建立此類系統。到2008年,「宏達管理軟件體驗中心」公司(Hongda Software)的「公安人員信息管理工作系統」被用來收集法輪功學員的信息。自1999年以來,法輪功學員被大規模地迫害,例如恐嚇、監禁、酷刑和非法殺戮。依據該系統,警察可以紀錄誰介紹他們接觸法輪功,他們在和誰、在哪裡煉功,以及他們對法輪功信奉的程度—判斷標準類似於警察最近對維吾爾人所評定的 「安全」、「一般」和「不安全」。

浙江省億點通信息技術有限公司開發的「重點人物」警察數據庫的數據輸入界面。 圖片來源:Emile Dirks

監視行業蓬勃發展

自宏達管理軟件體驗中心系統推出後,對重點人物監控的資料庫變成了中國監視技術行業的搖錢樹。根據網路上可得到的信息,2015年10月2019年5月間,中共公安局在中國七各省或直轄市至少簽發了13個類似的項目招標工程。

有問題的公司遍及整個中國,其中包括來自廣東的深圳源中瑞科技有限公司北京深醒科技有限公司Sensingtech LLC)和浙江億點通信息科技有限公司。在40家研發監視數據系統的公司中,至少10家提供隨附手持設備,譬如北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensingtech);有13家提到有地圖和定位功能(如東方網力智能安防社區系統Netposa)。

這些產品無法直接被取得並檢視,但是它們的說明書和系統介面的畫面截圖在網路上找得到。浙江億點通信息科技有限公司的重點人物控制系統允許操作者收集重點人物的基本識別信息(名字、生日、性別和地址),以及其銀行帳號和社交媒體信息。針對特定的群體還有量身訂做的相應數據種類:精神病患者的心理評估結果,上訪者的上訪內容,吸毒者的尿液檢測結果;或是外國遊客拜訪中國的原因,及其在中國國內相應的接待者。部分產品,如宏達管理軟件體驗中心Hongda Software)和浙江億點通信息科技有限公司(Yidiantong)提供的系統,甚至涵蓋了大規模監控非典型目標群眾,包括境內移民,和政府認可的宗教團體的工作人員。

這些產品的五花八門— 以及其針對的人群— 反映了中國警察去中心化的警務操作。普遍來說,執行警務包含對於特定的人群進行全國規模的監控,且冀求透過高科技監視手段來加強「社會穩定」。然而,該優先處置哪些人口,則因時間、地理位置而有所不同。當地政府的各式公告顯示,退伍軍人上訪並要求改善待遇,自2017年開始成為全國關注焦點;在2018年中共第十九屆全國代表大會前夕,在社區登記的重點人口、精神病患者和上訪者則成為前沿鎖定對象。根據當地宗教信眾人數的多寡,目標人群也會有所不同:在浙江,警衛對基督徒的監視較嚴密,在新疆則針對穆斯林,東北省份則多關注法輪功學員,在西藏、四川和青海則是更針對藏傳佛教徒。不僅系統有多種多樣的操作,更因為相關技術並沒有被特定公司壟斷,導致產品的市場的競爭也相對較強。

浙江億點通信息科技有限公司開發的警務資料庫軟件的製圖功能,
向用戶顯示地理區域內不同類型已註冊的「重點人物」身在何處。
圖片來源:Emile Dirks

 

未來的使用和影響

已有跡象表明,這些各類不同的資料庫正被與其他更廣的國家監控項目合併使用。浙江億點通信息科技有限公司聲稱其重點人物控制資料庫已與酒店、網吧、機場和火車站的信息系統整合,與警察進行即時數據共享成為可能。有幾家公司甚至誇口說,他們的數據庫已和面部辨識的攝像頭聯通,可以在公眾場合識別出重點人物。

當局將資料整合轉化為對重點人物更強勢的控制和懲罰的能力可能日益增強。十年前,知名的異議人士,地下基督徒,或是法輪功學員可能會在政治敏感時期–如中共黨代表大會期間–被警察扣門問話。但在今天,這些人極有可能被持續不斷的的監控,警察甚至可以收到關於其行蹤的自動警示。隨著對重點人物的定義不斷擴張、各種新的數據形式被加入追蹤系統,要遏止警察對於政治或宗教的微小異見的懲罰,或是終止警察影響人們的長期生活,幾乎是束手無策。

儲存如此多的個人信息在整合資料庫卻又缺乏監管,數據的安全性顯而易見地令人擔憂。在過去的一年發現,中國其它監視和數據蒐集系統的資料保護非常薄弱,導致數百萬人的個人信息被駭客取得。最近官方針對資訊安全,的努力都著重於規範私營企業如何處理個人數據,並沒有針對政府部門。

另一個隱憂,則是重點人物監控技術被輸出到其它國家。「開放技術基金(Open Technology Fund)」上月發佈的一項研究報告中,列出了各式被出售到五大洲、至少73個國家的中國監控和網路審查設備。輸出國家不只有其他成熟的專制國家,如埃及或亞塞拜然;更有半專制的、甚至民主國家,如巴西、坦桑尼亞、波蘭和南韓。報告指名的科技公司中至少有三家—浙江大華技術股份有限公司(簡稱大華Dahua)、北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensetime)和海康威視(Hikvision)— 這些公司除了提供面部識別攝像頭,更輸出追蹤特定重點人物的監控技術給其它國家。

如何應對

開發能有效回應此類監控技術的對策極為困難。但至少,應該讓中國網民和外國遊客對中國政府數據收集的廣泛程度有所,以保護脆弱族群和他們有交往的人。

關注人權的投資者,不管是中國人還是外國人,應該密切審視他們的產品或服務,並排除任何對參與大規模人群監控和人權侵害的公司直接或間接的支持,包括國際退休基金和風險投資基金的支持 。失去資金,中共安全監控器材合約的吸引力則會減少,降低人們對開發追蹤和平維權人士或宗教信仰者相關技術的興趣。

最後,民主體制下的官員們應該警惕與任何這類公司的交易。因涉及資助於新疆的迫害、而被美國政府列入本月出口限制名單的中國商業機構中,有數家公司也出售針對更大範圍重點人物的監控的科技。美國和所有民主國家,對那些導致監控而在中國人權侵害的中國公司,應該施行如對新疆的制裁。

考慮到這些打壓大眾的專制工具在中國擴展的速度,在其成為全球生活常態之前,民主國家應刻不容緩地 阻止這種行為的擴散。

本文也於2019年10月21日由《外交政策》刊登發表。

艾蜜莉·德克斯(Emile Dirks)是加拿大的一名博士候選人和獨立研究員,其工作主要關注中國的法外拘留和政府監控。薩拉·庫克(Sarah Cook)是《自由之家》的資深研究分析員,《中國媒體快報》主任,《中國精神之戰》報告的作者,該報告是關於在習近平治理下的宗教復興、壓制和抵抗。


中國官方媒體,網路酸民煽動中國的反NBA聲浪

10月4日,休士頓火箭隊總經理莫雷(Morey)支持香港抗議的一則簡單推文,在中國政府、官方媒體和中國的NBA粉絲中引發了巨大的反對聲浪。這則推文是一幅圖片搭配了以下文字:「捍衛自由,支持香港」。發佈後,很快就被莫雷本人刪除。他與火箭隊的老闆隨後發表聲明,向被此推文冒犯的中國觀眾道歉。儘管他們嘗試滅火,NBA總裁蕭華(Adam Silver)也隨後在10月8日發表聲明支持言論自由。許多中國公司撤銷了他們對NBA的贊助;在中國國內,NBA即將展開的巡迴比賽的廣告牌也被紛紛摘下,NBA的官方商品更被從商店下架。網路上,中國籃球迷撕毀門票的視頻,以及譴責莫雷和NBA的訊息被瘋傳。蕭華聲稱,中國政府甚至向施壓,要他解僱莫雷。

這場圍繞莫雷、NBA和香港抗議的紛爭,並不是來自於中國網民自發的隨機抗議的結果。事實上,至少在部分原因來自於中國政府引導的政治宣傳和內容操控,具體如下:

  • 有組織的推特酸民來攻擊莫雷:在莫雷最初推文發佈後的數小時及數日內,顯然位於中國的數萬推特主被動員,以一種有組織的方式呼應親中國者對莫雷的恐嚇,攻擊莫雷。《華爾街日報》對近17萬則針對莫雷的推文進行分析後得出結論:他是「酸民攻擊」的目標,這些攻擊意圖「操控關於香港抗議的對話」,並指出許多這類推文包含有暴力性語言包括諸如「你媽死了」這樣的中文首字縮寫。在此類行動的高峰時刻,莫雷每秒鐘幾乎就會收到兩則這樣的推文提示。推特在中國是被封鎖的,但通過翻牆軟件可以登入;根據分析數據和訊息的專家們所言,這些推文並非來自機器,是由真人用戶發出的推文。
  • 中國官方媒體和騰訊取消轉播:中國官方電視台央視譴責蕭華以言論自由為基點相挺莫雷,說莫雷的推文挑戰了中國的「國家主權和社會穩定」。央視還進一步宣佈,它將不再轉播NBA季前賽。根據莫雷的推文,中國公司騰訊—NBA網路轉播的中國合作對象,同時也與中國政府關係密切—發表聲明在中國它也會暫停網路轉播NBA 季前賽。
  • 由上而下對公眾輿論進行審查與操控:中國官方媒體對展現出來的爭議反應迅速,通過公開與幕後的操作手段,試圖操控有關莫雷和NBA的公眾輿論。為中共喉舌的《人民日報》發表了一份微博所做的調查,該調查於10月8日發佈,請人們從四個選項選一的問卷題選擇其對莫雷的看法。然而,該民調被網民大力吐槽,因為它只准許受訪者勾選親中或反莫雷的答案。10月10日,政府審查者命令中國網站從他們的首頁上刪除關於NBA的報導,並不要「炒作」與正在發生的事態相關的話題。

莫雷的推文及後續事件引發了中國公眾針對莫雷、蕭華和NBA持續的憤怒,部分也因中國惡名昭著的封閉媒體環境,正充斥著源自於官方針對香港抗爭的不實信息。在各種各樣的抹黑中,抗議者們一貫性的被嘲笑為「恐怖分子」和「蟑螂」,如上期《中國媒體快報》中所詳述。即便如此,從網民們對《人民日報》調查的反應來看,很顯然至少一些中國粉絲還是未被中國的官方宣傳所蒙蔽。其中有一位中國的火箭隊粉絲發了一則感性視頻,支持他的球隊,其中他手持打火機站在中國國旗旁邊。然而,儘管此球迷試圖遮擋臉部以隱藏身份,警察還是追蹤並逮捕了他,欲令那些還想發聲的球迷噤若寒蟬。


中國政府增加壓力,要求中國與境外品牌公司協助政府進行言論審查

  • 線上旅遊平台被新的審查條例所規範:中國文化和旅遊部起草新的法規,擬對網絡旅遊平台上發貼的內容加強審查。10月10日發佈的42條法規草案中,要求這些平台對所發佈的內容先行審核,防止當局認為有問題的信息進一步傳播。這些法規中還要求存取在這些平台上發帖人的資訊,並配合當局對這些人進行任何調查。去年,已針對非政治性內容的平台如流媒體、相親網站和名人八卦類網站進行內容管制,這些法規與去年的措施可謂一脈相承。
  • 南方公園「中國樂隊」節目在中國被禁:在廣受好評的美國動漫系列「南方公園」最近劇目中諷刺中國政府後,中國政府的審查者已命令將其節目從網上刪除。據《中國數字時代》洩漏的一則指令,官方命令網站將該節目的名稱加入被禁的關鍵詞搜尋名單。該其內容諷刺了中國的審查制度,以及和試圖通過自我審查來討好中國政府的美國公司,並包含了政治敏感性的隱喻,譬如其中一個場景展示小熊維尼(Winnie the Pooh),因模仿了中國主席習近平,而被關押在一個勞改營中。被禁之後,南方公園的創始人派克(Trey Parker)與史東(Matt Stone)發表推文反諷式「道歉」,稱讚中共,並歡迎「中國的審查人員到我們的家和心中」。其他人也感受到了中國政府對南方公園的怒火,音樂人泽德(Zedd)在推特上聲明, 他因對「南方公園」官方推特帳戶上的一則推文點讚,而被中國封殺。
  • 蘋果採取新措施協助中共政府進行審查:大量報導表明,科技巨頭蘋果公司繼續協助中共當局針對國內外進行內容審查。十月初,因報導在香港的持續抗議,Quartz手機新聞應用程式被蘋果從其中文應用程式app商店中移除。應當局要求,一個以群眾外包蒐集資料來定位香港警察的app也在10月除被蘋果移除,此決定受到了官方媒體《環球時報》的表揚(a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times)。蘋果總裁提姆•庫克(Tim Cook)為其舉措辯護,說該app被用來對警察施暴行,但隨後從香港警方發佈的聲明中顯示,儘管恐懼瀰漫,事實上該 app並未做此用。Buzzfeed 也早在2018年就有報導,說蘋果警告其在蘋果電視+平台上的節目開發者,避免開發可能惹怒中國政府的主題。連表情符號都沒被放過,iPhone最新升級的iOS 13.1系統,在香港和澳門地區的版本就刪除了台灣的國旗符號。在其它案例中,雖然蘋果還沒有參與中共政府打壓,但他們的低調反應仍飽受批評。根據谷歌Project Zero的安全研究人員發現,報導顯示中國政府已針對新疆和海外維吾爾族人 iPhone 使用者發動了惡意攻擊,以取得這些用戶的位置和文件信息。 據報導,蘋果已修正了漏洞,但卻不願對被攻擊的範圍和對象多作評論。​

監控更新:學習 app後門,網絡註冊需面部掃描,「超級攝像頭」亮相,地鐵上的面部識別

  • 研究揭示政府支持的學習應用程式兼具監控功能:10月12日,一份「開放技術基金」(the Open Technology Fund)發佈的報告提出證據,指中國政府「學習強國」應用程式app 可被用來監控用戶。該 app由中國科技公司阿里巴巴設計,被以讓用戶學習中共意識形態的用途作推廣,跟進新聞,和認識中國主席習近平。然而,通過該應用程式的後門,中國當局可以檢視用戶的上網紀錄、短信和圖片,查看他們的通訊錄,甚至開啟用戶手機的錄音功能。據報導該應用程式已被下載1億多次,許多政府工作人員被要求在業餘時間使用此軟件,累積分數。9月份,監管部門宣佈,2019年記者的證照將基於該記者的考試成績,而試卷中的題目部分來自該應用程式的內容。
  • 12月起網路和手機註冊要求面部掃描:9月27日,中國工業和信息化部(China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology)宣佈,從12月1日起,所有的電信公司必須對新的網絡和手機用戶,進行面部掃描。在此相同規定下中國公民將被禁止將手機號碼轉給他人。此舉名為保護中國公民的權益,實則是對電信用戶和網民們國內監控,以及進一步擴大實名制的要求—意圖遏止網絡討論的發展。
  • 行業博覽會中,「超級攝像頭」露臉:一中國科學家團隊展示了一款分辨率高達500萬畫素解析度的攝像頭,該攝像頭可以捕捉靜態和移動物體的細節,也可照取數千人場面的全景圖片。此攝像頭在9月末的一個中國國際行業博覽會上展出,攝取的圖像可上傳到雲端儲存,並可進行實時分析。考慮到中國政府採取的國內監控手段,海內外嚴正表示關注其對隱私的影響,並質問這樣的技術將會被應用在可進行面部識別的攝像頭上。
  • 註冊面部識別就可免費乘坐地鐵:9月末,據報道,深圳成為中國最新推出為地鐵通勤對乘客進行面部識別登記的中國城市。採用華為設計的技術,年齡超過60歲的地鐵乘客,若登記面部識別,可以免費乘坐地鐵。類似的實驗性系統已在廣州、上海、青島、南京和南寧試點推出。雖說面部識別可以幫助乘客快速通過進出站口,但在中國的監控系統日益集成一體的情形下,此項目很容易將私人公司和政府所得到的面部掃描數據擴展到更廣用途。

香港:禁戴面罩及對記者的更多攻擊顯示新聞自由的惡化

伴隨著零星的來自抗議人群和親北京人士對記者的攻擊,香港警察對記者施暴顯示了特別行政區最近數月新聞自由的惡化。10月3日,香港記者協會遞交了一項申請,要求對警察局長進行司法評議,因為他未能阻止警察施暴以及對記者的干擾和不良行為。以下是反映相比上月新聞自由由惡化趨勢的三個主要動態:

  • 禁蒙面法:10月4日,香港特首林鄭月娥啟動一項殖民時代的緊急條令,發佈禁令禁止蒙面,此舉遭到許多國際關注者的抨擊。10月8日,香港記者協會要求政府澄清此禁令將對記者對抗議活動進行報導的影響,以及記者們戴口罩是否違反禁令。無國界記者組織稱此禁令會使記者遭受危險,畢竟就近報導的記者需要護目鏡和防毒面具以免於警察催淚瓦斯和辣椒噴霧的傷害。警方回應說他們有權要求記者摘下面具,不從者會被捕。
  • 對本地和外國記者更多的肢體攻擊:9月30日,一個警察被拍到正在笑著用辣椒水噴射端傳媒(Initium Media記者林振東的鏡頭,儘管林振東身配記者證,頭盔上也有「媒體」字樣,還是被攻擊。10月3日,印尼記者維比 Veby Indah在被警察發射的橡膠子彈擊中左眼後失明,這是迄今為止在採訪抗議活動中媒體人所受最重的傷害。幾天後,10月6日, 美國記者蘇珊 • 薩拉丁(Suzanne Salatine)被拍攝到正被警察推倒到牆邊, 用防暴盾牌擊打。她隨後被拘留,爾後無罪釋放。同一天,一名公共電視台香港電台(RTHK)記者被抗議者扔出的燃燒彈(Molotov cocktail)擊中,造成面部灼傷。10月13日,在旺角警察局外,一名為 NowTV 工作的司機被警察扔出的布袋彈擊中,後被拘留兩個多小時,拘留期間被警察毆打。
  • 媒體召回報導國慶抗議的記者:隨著暴力日益升級,在10月1日國慶日警察在驅散抗議者造成了幾起受傷事件後,香港電台(RTHK),《南華早報》(South China Morning Post)和《香港浸會大學學生報》決定從前方召回他們的記者。值此政治敏感日,在抗議期間,警察對抗議者動用了水炮車、辣椒噴霧和催淚瓦斯,有些抗議者以燃燒彈和磚頭回應。香港記者協會報導,有數十名記者被警察連珠發射的橡膠子彈和海棉彈擊傷,還有其他人在受到酸液攻擊後正在治療,並呼籲各方不要干擾城市中記者的工作。

中國之外:暴雪制裁支持香港的遊戲玩家,抖音審查,美國限制中國的技術出口,學術自由遭受威脅

  • 暴雪爭議與抵制:一名熱門遊戲《爐石戰記(Hearthstone)》的玩家因表達對當下香港抗議的支持,而受到美國遊戲公司暴雪的制裁,暴雪因此受到各方批評。10月6日,在一場遊戲後宣佈勝利的新聞發佈會中,香港玩家職業選手吳偉聰( Chung Ng Wai) 說出了抗議中盛行的口號:「光復香港,時代革命」,隨後,暴雪收回了給吳偉聰的獎金,並懲罰禁賽一年。在此舉遭到其它玩家強烈抗議後,其贏家身份後來被恢復,禁賽期則減為6個月。即便如此,呼籲抵制暴雪的呼聲響起,並由於隨後在10月16日,在三個美國《爐石戰記》的玩家在網上進行的遊戲中舉起一個寫著「香港自由,抵制暴雪」的標語、暴雪進而對這三位玩家禁賽後,抵制暴雪的呼聲更強烈。似乎因爭議越來越多,暴雪取消了原定10月16日於紐約市舉行的一場產品發佈會。儘管暴雪在中國的用戶群還少,該公司正在尋求擴展這一有利可圖的中國市場,來彌補在其它地方的虧損。
  • 抖音對香港抗議與更多的審查:越來越多的證據表明,熱門社交媒體網絡抖音定期審查中國政府眼中的敏感內容。2019年,這一視頻分享平台已成為全球被下載得最多的應用程式之一,特別是青少年用戶之間。據《英國衛報》(The Guardian) 得到的一份抖音內部文件表明,抖音公司隸屬於在北京的一家名為ByteDance的公司,其員工被要求刪除與天安門屠殺和迫害法輪功相關的話題內容。在該網站上搜尋「香港」,得到的結果與目前的抗議相關的結果,和其它熱門媒體網站相比,少得驚人。鑑於此類發現,10月9日,美國聯邦參議員馬可•盧比奧(Marco Rubio)要求美國財務部對併購抖音旗下的音樂類社交媒體服務Musical.ly進行評估,查看是否有損害國家安全的隱患。10月17日,臉書總裁馬克•扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)對該中國公司的內容審查提出批評。以此回應,抖音聘請了現在法律事務所K&L Gates工作的前美國議員, 來修訂其公司政策。
  • 美國對協助打壓新疆的中國科技公司進行出口限制:10月7日,美國商務部宣佈,將28家中國公司列入政府出口黑名單上,這些公司同謀於中國政府在新疆打壓的行動。在這份所謂的限制公司名單中有8家中國科技公司:大華技術,海康威視,科大訊飛,曠世,商湯科技,廈門美亞柏科信息有限公司,依圖科技和頤信科技。鑒於這樣的制裁,美國兩家最大的公共養老金管理基金 - 加州教師退休金系統和紐約州教師退休金系統 – 據說在重新檢查他們在海康威視的持有股份。其他關注人士在質疑這些制裁的影響,呼籲採取更嚴厲措施。
  • 針對孔子學院的新研究,中國境外影響學術自由:中國政府對國內外學術活動的恐嚇與影響,一直引人擔憂。9月24日,《風險中的學者們》(Scholars at Risk)一份名為「卓越的障礙」(Obstacles to Excellence的報告,該報告詳細描述了中國政府針對學術自由所採取的行動。該報告指出無論在中國大陸,還是在香港、澳門,學術環境都在惡化。該報告還審視了中國政府向境外輸出其影響,其中包括在全球校園內開設孔子學院,以及中國政府對身在海外的中國學生學者們進行的恐嚇行為。自由之家研究員薩拉•庫克(Sarah Cook)和華盛頓大學學生(Flora Yan) 在Jamestown Foundation出版的《中國簡報》China Brief上發表文章,提到了在孔子學院和公司方面的互動 , 特別是孔子學院越來越多的給跨國大公司提供中文、中國政治和經濟方面的課程。這些文章中還強調了漢辦––孔子學院的總部 ––和中國公司之間的一個合夥項目,包括兩家公司科技公司騰訊和科大訊飛,人們都已知道這兩家公司在監控和審查方面和中國政府高層合作。這些發現引發新的擔憂關於孔子學院對校園言論自由的影響,以及這些機構是否會成為中國政府收集情報機構的可能性。

重點反制:維族人用視頻分享應用程式突破信息封鎖

在大規模的拘留、再教育和強制迫勞動運動下,中國西北的新疆已被認為是世界上信息環境被最嚴厲管控得最嚴厲的的地區。那裡的維吾爾人和其他穆斯林居民談到他們所遭受的困境苦難時,即便是對他們的海外的家人,也會導致長期的非法被拘留。

令關注這一類危難者驚喜的是更令對這一危機進行觀察的人士吃驚的是,八月份,在抖音上出現的維吾爾人送出的數十則短視頻(抖音是中國公司ByteDance旗下的一個視頻分享平台)。這些短視頻通常只有幾秒鐘的長度,通常是顯示有一名維吾爾人手持親人的照片—該親人想必或已被抓到再教育集中營,或政府孤兒院—持照人在哭泣或其它哀思的表情姿勢。看過這些視頻的專家分析說,這些視頻看似是在新疆被拍到並在當地上被傳出的。

這類視頻的模稜兩可似乎幫助它們躲過了過去最初的審查。但尚不清楚在中國這些視頻有多少瀏覽量—或在被刪除前(它們許多是被刪除了)能存留多久 。但是這些圖像和視頻已經在海外全球傳播,維族維權人士在推特(Twitter)、YouTube和 Instagram上轉貼,(這些平台在中國都是被封的)。同時,數十個國際媒體都發表刊登了這些現象的相關文章,包括《華爾街日報》(Wall Street Journal、《外交政策》(Foreign Policy和法國(France)以及澳大利亞(Australia)刊物。

同時,儘管看似不可能,抖音和其國際同類平台Tiktok (也譯作「抖音」)已出現成為重要的證據來源,如果不太可能,成為主要的新疆鎮壓和該地區失蹤孩子的重要的視頻證據源頭視頻證據。儘管證實這些視頻的準確正確信性很還有困難,在政府官方或官方媒體帳號上發佈的這些短視頻,已能使海外關注觀察人士和家屬們以此進行辨認和保留如因父母被拘留而成為孤兒的維吾爾人孤兒兒童的影像鏡頭,包括父母被拘留的維吾爾兒童,清真寺被拆毀的事件視頻,全副武裝的警察訓練的圖片,或為效忠中共的黨校幹部培訓班的片段。
 

在抖音上的視頻截圖,一位不知名的維吾爾女子,看似在悲痛思念家人


未來關注

對人權衛士陳建芳的審判和處理:陳建芳於2019年3月被拘留,原因顯然是因為她在網上發表文章,紀念聯合國相關的維權人士曹順利在被拘留期間去世五週年。8月30日,上海檢察院以「顛覆國家政權罪」為由起訴陳建芬,這一嚴重罪名經常被中共當局用來給維權人士判處長期監禁,但她被起訴的消息只有最近這月才傳出。陳建芳長期以來為人權而呼籲,聯合國人權專家國際人權團體已致信給中國政府,對其被捕和沒有通過正常司法程序表達關切。關注她的被審和被判刑的最新狀況,是否因為國際壓力能影響她的案件結果,包括她是否被允許自己聘請律師,迄今這權利仍被官方拒絕。

外國科技公司出席烏鎮「世界互聯網大會」的影響:10月20至22日,中國政府在浙江烏鎮舉辦了第六屆互聯網年會。中國官方媒體報導,有來自全球80個國家的1500人出席了該會。如同去年,中共在會上強勢亮相,包括中共政治局委員、中共宣傳部部長黃坤明在會上發表主題演講,他還宣讀了習近平發來的賀詞。幾家主要的美國公司包括谷歌和臉書都沒有出席—很可能他們是想避免產生要面對的後壓力。蘋果與谷歌在2017年派高管來參加該會,期間商談中共限制性網路管控的模型之合法性進行了討論。但一些知名的硬件和半導體與雲服務公司,包括高通、英特爾、微軟和Cisco都派代表參加。他們和中國技術公司阿里巴巴和百度的高管一道與會。在中美貿易關係日趨緊張,人們再次擔憂與中國的經濟關聯會在海外怎樣影響言論自由,關注因這些公司參加會帶來的任何後果,或他們的出席會怎樣影響他們的公司生意。

中俄簽訂打擊「非法」網路內容的條約:10月8日,《路透社》根據《俄國國家通訊社》的報導稱,說中國和俄國月末計劃簽署一項條約,以期聯合打擊「非法」網路內容。關注此條約簽署的確認,任何條約細節和實施中新出現的證據,包括俄國在境內對中共認定敏感的政治和宗教內容加強審查。


行動起來!

  • 訂閱《中國媒體快報》:每月直送電子郵箱,獲取《中國媒體快報》最新資訊,最深入分析。免費發送!點擊這裡或發送郵件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中國媒體快報》:幫助朋友和同事更好的理解中國不斷變化的媒體和言論審查狀況。
  • 獲取未經審查的消息內容:請點擊這裡這裡,找到比較流行翻牆工具的綜合測評以及如何通過GreatFire.org獲取翻牆工具。
  • 支持良心犯:瞭解如何採取行動幫助新聞記者和言論自由維權人士,包括在往期《中國媒體快報》中特別提到的良心犯。點擊這裡
  • 訪問《中國媒體快報》資源中心:透過自由之家網站的新資源中心,了解決策者、媒體、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何幫助推進中國和其他地方的言論自由。

中国媒体快报:「重点人物」警察数据库,抖音审查,NBA引发的强烈反弹(Issue 139, Simplified Chinese)

$
0
0

本期标题

本期分析​: 中国共产党的最新宣传目标:年轻人的思想

新闻报道​​​

重点反制:维族人用各种视频分享平台突破信息封锁

未來看点

行动起来!


本期分析:中国的警务数据库涵盖范围远超过新疆

该整合系统被设计为追踪特定人口,但其监视范围正不断扩大。

作者:萨拉·库克 (Sarah Cook)

2017年夏天的一天晚上,中国当地警察对一所小型私营语言学校进行了突击检查,检视了所有非华裔参加者的签证。在场地一位外国博士生把他的护照留在了旅馆。 「不用担心」警察说。 「你叫什么名字?」警察掏出了一个手持设备并输入这位学生的姓名。 「这是你吗?」屏幕上显示了是这位研究人员的姓名,护照号码和饭店地址。

这类事件在新疆很常见,毕竟中国在新疆广泛部署了监控穆斯林少数民族的技术。但是这个特定事件发生在云南省,靠近中国与缅甸南部的边界。实际上,公安局–负责国内安全和情报的主要机构之一–在中国各地已在使用电子资料库以及手持工具来追踪特定类别的人员。众所皆知地,这些「重点人物」涵盖了被假释的罪犯、吸毒者,到外国人,上访者和宗教信众。

在查阅了数十份地方政府通告、采购招标和中国公司的促销资料后,这些文件显示此类技术的应用既早于、也超越了目前新疆的镇压范围,并实际上影响了中国各地的千万人。

随着中国共产党在习近平日益增加的极权统治下锁定新的压迫目标,以及中国公司将监视设备的销售扩大到国外的趋势下,这些资料库的规模和影响在未来几年可能会增加。

全国范围监控「重点人物」

2007年公安部发布的《重点人口管理规定》对于「重点人口」的广泛定义为「有危害国家安全或社会治安嫌疑」的人员。一些特定的群体被列出,包括重刑犯,从监狱或劳教所被释放者,和吸食非法毒品者。

根据2001年至2009年间70份中国34个省和直辖市其中26个当地政府发布的公告,在实际操作中,被公安机关和部门以「重点人口」处理的范围更广。这些文件中经常提到的重点人口类别包含请愿者,被禁止的宗教团体信仰者如法轮功学员,精神疾病患者,以及参与「维稳」或「恐怖」活动的人— 这两个术语通常适用于维权人士,抗议者和新疆维吾尔族等少数民族群体的成员。

随着被监视人口的数量上升,对被监视者个人资讯的搜集也随之增加。现有警务资料库的大量数据来自2000年中期的「第二代」机器可读身分证系统。这种身份证允许电子存取个人信息,因而公安部下的各局处之间可以轻易分享这些数据。

2006年,首批全国规模的重点人物数据库之一正式启动–动态控制系统。存取了200多万笔已登记的吸毒者纪录, 动态控制系统是早期基于身份证定位和生物识别数据来收集数据的例子。每当被登记者使用他们的身份证进行电脑交易时(如购买火车票),公安机关就会收到警示。警察便可由此确定该个体的位置、拦截他们,并对他们的尿样进行毒品检测,检测的结果会被加入他们的电子档案。指纹和DNA数据也在该过程中被搜集。据2017年11月的一份报告,海南的警察对登记的吸毒者挨家挨户进行DNA取样。

动态控制系统不久即成为其它警务数据库的样本,承包给中国的技术公司依样建立此类系统。到2008年,「宏达管理软件体验中心」公司(Hongda Software)的「公安人员信息管理工作系统」被用来收集法轮功学员的信息。自1999年以来,法轮功学员被大规模地迫害,例如恐吓、监禁、酷刑和非法杀戮。依据该系统,警察可以纪录谁介绍他们接触法轮功,他们在和谁、在哪里炼功,以及他们对法轮功信奉的程度—判断标准类似于警察最近对维吾尔人所评定的「安全」、「一般」和「不安全」。

自宏达管理软件体验中心系统推出后,对重点人物监控的资料库变成了中国监视技术行业的摇钱树。根据网路上可得到的信息,2015年10月2019年5月间,中共公安局在中国七各省或直辖市至少签发了13个类似的项目招标工程。

有问题的公司遍及整个中国,其中包括来自广东的深圳源中瑞科技有限公司北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensingtech LLC)和浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司。在40家研发监视数据系统的公司中,至少10家提供随附手持设备,譬如北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensingtech);有13家提到有地图和定位功能(如东方网力智能安防社区系统(Netposa)。

这些产品无法直接被取得并检视,但是它们的说明书和系统介面的画面截图在网路上找得到。浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司的重点人物控制系统允许操作者收集重点人物的基本识别信息(名字、生日、性别和地址),以及其银行帐号和社交媒体信息。针对特定的群体还有量身订做的相应数据种类:精神病患者的心理评估结果,上访者的上访内容,吸毒者的尿液检测结果;或是外国游客拜访中国的原因,及其在中国国内相应的接待者。部分产品,如宏达管理软件体验中心(Hongda Software)和浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司(Yidiantong)提供的系统,甚至涵盖了大规模监控非典型目标群众,包括境内移民,和政府认可的宗教团体的工作人员。

这些产品的五花八门— 以及其针对的人群— 反映了中国警察去中心化的警务操作。普遍来说,执行警务包含对于特定的人群进行全国规模的监控,且冀求透过高科技监视手段来加强「社会稳定」。然而,该优先处置哪些人口,则因时间、地理位置而有所不同。当地政府的各式公告显示,退伍军人上访并要求改善待遇,自2017年开始成为全国关注焦点;在20​​18年中共第十九届全国代表大会前夕,在社区登记的重点人口、精神病患者和上访者则成为前沿锁定对象。根据当地宗教信众人数的多寡,目标人群也会有所不同:在浙江,警卫对基督徒的监视较严密,在新疆则针对穆斯林,东北省份则多关注法轮功学员,在西藏、四川和青海则是更针对藏传佛教徒。不仅系统有多种多样的操作,更因为相关技术并没有被特定公司垄断,导致产品的市场的竞争也相对较强。

浙江省亿点通信息技术有限公司(Yidiantong)开发的「重点人物」警察数据库的数据输入界面。 图片提供:埃米尔·德克斯(Emile Dirks)

监视行业蓬勃发展

自宏达管理软件体验中心系统推出后,对重点人物监控的资料库变成了中国监视技术行业的摇钱树。根据网路上可得到的信息,2015年10月2019年5月间,中共公安局在中国七各省或直辖市至少签发了13个类似的项目招标工程。

有问题的公司遍及整个中国,其中包括来自广东的深圳源中瑞科技有限公司北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensingtech LLC)和浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司。在40家研发监视数据系统的公司中,至少10家提供随附手持设备,譬如北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensingtech);有13家提到有地图和定位功能(如东方网力智能安防社区系统(Netposa)。

这些产品无法直接被取得并检视,但是它们的说明书和系统介面的画面截图在网路上找得到。浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司的重点人物控制系统允许操作者收集重点人物的基本识别信息(名字、生日、性别和地址),以及其银行帐号和社交媒体信息。针对特定的群体还有量身订做的相应数据种类:精神病患者的心理评估结果,上访者的上访内容,吸毒者的尿液检测结果;或是外国游客拜访中国的原因,及其在中国国内相应的接待者。部分产品,如宏达管理软件体验中心(Hongda Software)和浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司(Yidiantong)提供的系统,甚至涵盖了大规模监控非典型目标群众,包括境内移民,和政府认可的宗教团体的工作人员。

这些产品的五花八门— 以及其针对的人群— 反映了中国警察去中心化的警务操作。普遍来说,执行警务包含对于特定的人群进行全国规模的监控,且冀求透过高科技监视手段来加强「社会稳定」。然而,该优先处置哪些人口,则因时间、地理位置而有所不同。当地政府的各式公告显示,退伍军人上访并要求改善待遇,自2017年开始成为全国关注焦点;在20​​18年中共第十九届全国代表大会前夕,在社区登记的重点人口、精神病患者和上访者则成为前沿锁定对象。根据当地宗教信众人数的多寡,目标人群也会有所不同:在浙江,警卫对基督徒的监视较严密,在新疆则针对穆斯林,东北省份则多关注法轮功学员,在西藏、四川和青海则是更针对藏传佛教徒。不仅系统有多种多样的操作,更因为相关技术并没有被特定公司垄断,导致产品的市场的竞争也相对较强。

浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司开发的警察数据库软件的制图功能,
向用户显示地理区域内不同类型的已注册「重点人物」身在何处。
图片提供:Emile Dirks

 

未来的使用和影响

已有迹象表明,这些各类不同的资料库正被与其他更广的国家监控项目合并使用。浙江亿点通信息科技有限公司声称其重点人物控制资料库已与酒店、网吧、机场和火车站的信息系统整合,与警察进行即时数据共享成为可能。有几家公司甚至夸口说,他们的数据库已和面部辨识的摄像头联通,可以在公众场合识别出重点人物。

当局将资料整合转化为对重点人物更强势的控制和惩罚的能力可能日益增强。十年前,知名的异议人士,地下基督徒,或是法轮功学员可能会在政治敏感时期–如中共党代表大会期间–被警察扣门问话。但在今天,这些人极有可能被持续不断的的监控,警察甚至可以收到关于其行踪的自动警示。随着对重点人物的定义不断扩张、各种新的数据形式被加入追踪系统,要遏止警察对于政治或宗教的微小异见的惩罚,或是终止警察影响人们的长期生活,几乎是束手无策。

储存如此多的个人信息在整合资料库却又缺乏监管,数据的安全性显而易见地令人担忧。在过去的一年发现,中国其它监视和数据搜集系统的资料保护非常薄弱,导致数百万人的个人信息被骇客取得。最近官方针对资讯安全,的努力都着重于规范私营企业如何处理个人数据,并没有针对政府部门。

另一个隐忧,则是重点人物监控技术被输出到其它国家。 「开放技术基金(Open Technology Fund)」上月发布的一项研究报告中,列出了各式被出售到五大洲、至少73个国家的中国监控和网路审查设备。输出国家不只有其他成熟的专制国家,如埃及或亚塞拜然;更有半专制的、甚至民主国家,如巴西、坦桑尼亚、波兰和南韩。报告指名的科技公司中至少有三家—浙江大华技术股份有限公司(简称大华Dahua)、北京深醒科技有限公司(Sensetime)和海康威视(Hikvision)— 这些公司除了提供面部识别摄像头,更输出追踪特定重点人物的监控技术给其它国家。

如何应对

开发能有效回应此类监控技术的对策极为困难。但至少,应该让中国网民和外国游客对中国政府数据收集的广泛程度有所,以保护脆弱族群和他们熟悉的人。

关注人权的投资者,不管是中国人还是外国人,应该密切审视他们的产品或服务,并排除任何对参与大规模人群监控和人权侵害的公司直接或间接的支持,包括国际养老基金和风险投资基金的支持。失去资金,中共安全监控器材合约的吸引力则会减少,降低人们对开发追踪和平维权人士或宗教信仰者相关技术的兴趣。

最后,民主体制下的官员们应该警惕与任何这类公司的交易。因涉及资助于新疆的迫害、而被美国政府列入本月出口限制名单的中国商业机构中,有数家公司也出售针对更大范围重点人物的监控的科技。美国和所有民主国家,对那些导致监控而在中国人权侵害的中国公司,应该都施行对新疆式的制裁。

考虑到这些打压大众的专制工具在中国扩展的速度,在其成为全球生活常态之前,民主国家应刻不容缓地 阻止这种行为的扩散。

本文也于2019年10月21日由《外交政策》刊登发表。

意麦尔·德克斯(Emile Dirks)是加拿大的一名博士生和独立研究员,其工作主要在中国的法外拘留和政府监控方面。萨拉·库克(Sarah Cook)是《自由之家》的资深研究分析员,《中国媒体快报》主任,《中国精神之战》报告的作者,该报告是关于在习近平治理下的宗教复兴、被压制和抵抗。


中国官方媒体,网络挑唆煽动在中国反NBA声浪

10月4日,休士顿火箭队总经理莫雷(Morey)支持香港抗议的一则简单推文,在中国政府、官方媒体和中国的NBA粉丝中引发了巨大的反对声浪。这则推文是一幅配图的文字:「捍卫自由,支持香港」,发布后很快就被莫雷本人删除,他以及火箭队的老板随后发表声明,对为此推文冒犯的中国观众道歉。尽管他们做了这些灭火的努力,NBA总裁萧华(Adam Silver)也随后在10月8日发表声明支持言论自由,许多中国公司撤销了他们对NBA的赞助,在全国范围内,NBA即将在华巡回比赛的广告牌被纷纷摘下,NBA的官方商品也被从商店下架。在网络上,中国篮球迷撕毁他们门票的视频以及谴责莫雷和NBA的讯息被疯传。萧华声称,中国政府甚至给他施压要解雇莫雷。

这场围绕莫雷、NBA和香港抗议的纷争并非是中国网民自发的强烈抗议的结果。至少在部分程度上,它更是来自中国政府引导的宣传和内容操控的结果,具体如下:

  • 有组织的推特挑唆来攻击莫雷:在莫雷最初推文发布后的数小时及数日内,显然是基于中国的数万推特使用者集合起来,以一种有组织的方式,发布支持中国的恐吓式运动,攻击莫雷。 《华尔街日报》对近17万则针对莫雷的推文进行分析后得出结论:他是「挑唆性攻击」的目标,这些攻击用意于「操控关于香港抗议的对话」,并指出许多这类推文包含有暴力性语言包括诸如「你妈死了」这样的中文首字缩写。在此类反响的高峰时刻,莫雷每秒钟几乎就会收到两则这样的推文提示。推特在中国是被封的,但通过翻墙软件可以上。根据分析数据和讯息的专家们所言,这些推文看来是真人用户发出的,而非来自机器的自动发布。
  • 中国官方媒体和腾讯的转播取消:中国官方电视台央视就萧华以言论自由为基点挺莫雷进行谴责,说莫雷的推文挑战了中国的「国家主权和社会稳定」。央视还进一步宣布,它将不再转播NBA季赛前的比赛。根据莫雷的推文,中国公司腾讯—NBA在网络上转播的中国合作伙伴,同时也和中国政府关系密切—宣布在中国它也会暂停网络转播NBA 季前赛。
  • 对公众舆论的自上而下的审查与操控:中国官方媒体对展现出来的争议反应迅速,通过公开的和幕后的手段,试图操控有关莫雷和NBA的公众舆论。中共喉舌《人民日报》发表了一份微博所做的调查,该调查是于10月8日询问人们从四个选项选一的问卷题选择对莫雷的看法。然而,该民调遭到了网民的吐槽,因其它准许受访者只能勾选亲中或反莫雷的答案。 10月10日,政府审查指令中国网站从他们的首页上删除关于NBA的报导,并不要「炒作」与正在发生的事态相关的话题。

由莫雷的推文引发的在中国持续的针对莫雷、萧华和NBA的公众愤怒情绪,以及随之而来的余波,部分归咎于中国臭名昭著的封闭式的媒体大环境,其中充斥着官方关于香港抗议的不实信息。在各种各样的抹黑中,抗议者们一贯性的被嘲笑为「恐怖分子」和「蟑螂」,这在上月的《中国媒体快报》中有详述。即便如此,从网民们对《人民日报》发布的调查的反应来看,很显然至少一些中国球迷还是没有被中国的官方宣传所蒙蔽。其中有一位中国的火箭队球迷貼出了一则感性视频,支持他的球队,其中他手持打火机站在中国国旗旁边。然而,尽管此球迷试图遮挡脸部以隐藏身份,警察还是追踪到了他并将其逮捕,此举令那些还想发声的球迷不寒而栗。


中外品牌公司面临增加的压力去协助中共政府审查

  • 网絡旅行平台要求遵循新的审查条例:中国文化和旅游部起草新的法规,拟对网络旅游平台上发贴的内容加强审查。 10月10日发布的42条法规草案中,要求这些平台对所发布的内容先行审核,以防当局认为有问题的信息传播。这些法规中还要求存储在这些平台上发帖人的信息,并配合当局对这些人进行的任何调查。在去年,已针对非政治性内容的平台如流媒体、相亲网站和名人八卦类网站进行内容管制,这些法规与去年的措施可谓一脉相承。
  • 南方公园「中国乐队」节目在中国被禁:在广受好评的美国动漫系列「南方公园」最近剧目中讽刺中国政府后,中国政府的审查者已命令将其节目从网上删除。据《中国数字时代》透漏的一则指令,官方命令网站将该节目的名称加入被禁的关键词搜寻名单。该其内容讽刺了中国的审查制度和试图通过自我审查来讨好中国政府的美国公司,并包含了政治敏感性的所指,譬如其中有一个场景是温尼普尔(Winnie the Pooh)(注:节目中的角色)因模仿了中国主席习近平,而被关押在一个劳改营中。被禁之后,南方公园的创始人派克(Trey Parker)与史东(Matt Stone)发表推文反讽式「道歉」,称赞中共,并欢迎「中国的审查人员到我们的家和心中」。其他人也感受到了中国政府对南方公园的怒火,音乐人泽德(Zedd)在推特上声明, 他因对「南方公园」官方推特帐户上的一则推文点赞,而被禁在中国演出。
  • 苹果采取新举措,帮助中共政府进行审查:大量报导表明,科技巨头苹果公司继续协助中共当局在国内外进行内容审查。十月初,因报导在香港的持续抗议,Quartz手机新闻软件被苹果从其中文软件app商店中移除。应当局要求,一个帮助以群众外包形式来定位香港警察的app也在10月除被苹果移除,此决定受到了官方媒体《环球时报》的表扬(a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times) 。苹果总裁提姆•库克(Tim Cook)为其举措辩护,说该app是用来对准警察的暴行,但随后从香港警方发布的声明中显示,尽管警察害怕,事实上该app并未做此用。 Buzzfeed 也早在2018年就有报导,说苹果警告其在苹果电视+平台上的节目开发者,要避免开发可能惹怒中国政府的主题。甚至连表情符号都未能幸免,iPhone最新升级的曹族系统iOS 13.1 版,在香港和澳门地区就删除了台湾国旗符号。在其它案例中,虽然苹果还没有同谋中共政府打压,但其最小的反应仍得到关注的批评。根据谷歌「零工程」的安全研究人员发现,中国政府已被报道发动了对在新疆和海外维吾尔族人 iPhone 使用者的恶意攻击,意在得到这些用户的位置和文件信息。据报道苹果已关闭了此漏洞,但是没有对被攻击的范围和对象评论。

监控更新:学习 app后门,网络注册面部扫描,「超级摄像头」揭幕,地铁上的面部识别

  • 研究揭示政府支持的学习软件兼具监控功能:10月12日,一份「开放技术基金」(report by the Open Technology Fund)发布的报告提出证据,指中国政府「学习强国」软件app 可被用来监控用户。该 app是由中国科技公司阿里巴巴设计的,被推广让用户学习中共意识形态,跟进新闻和学习中国主席习近平。然而,通过该软件的后门,中国当局可以看到用户的上网纪录、短信和图片,看他们的通讯录,甚至开启用户手机的录音功能。据报导该软件已被下载1亿多次,许多政府工作人员被要求在业余时间使用此软件,累积分数。 9月份,监管部门宣布,2019年记者的证照将基于该记者的考试成绩,而试卷中的题目部分来自该软件的内容。
  • 12月起网络和手机注册要求面部扫描:9月27日,中国工业和信息化部(China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology)宣布,从12月1日起,所有的电信公司必须对新的网络和手机用户,进行面部扫描。在此相同规定下(Under this same regulation) (Note: 该英文部分找不到链结网址,只能全部copy此链接),中国公民将不许将手机号码转给他人。此举名为保护中国公民的权益,实则是对电信用户和网民们国内监控和实名制要求的进一步扩大—此措施已经不鼓励在网络上讨论。
  • 行业博览会中「超级摄像头」露脸:一团队中国科学家展示了一款分辨率高达500万画素解析度的摄像头,该摄像头可以捕捉静态和移动物体的细节,也可照取数千人场面的全景图片。此摄像头在9月末的一个中国国际行业博览会上展出,摄取的图像可上传到云储存,并可进行实时分析。考虑到中国政府采取的国内监控手段,海内外关注声严肃关注隐私,询问这样的技术会被怎样用在可进行面部识别的摄像头上。
  • 免费乘坐地铁为面部识别注册:9月末,据报道,深圳成为中国最新推出为地铁通勤对乘客进行面部识别登记的中国城市。采用华为设计的技术,年龄超过60岁的地铁乘客,若登记面部识别,可以免费乘坐地铁。类似的实验性系统已在广州、上海、青岛、南京和南宁试点推出。虽说面部识别可以帮助乘客快速通过进出站口,但在中国的监控系统日益集成一体的情形下,此项目很容易将私人公司和政府所得到的面部扫描数据扩展到更广用途。

香港:禁蒙面法及对记者的更多攻击显示新闻自由的下降

伴随着零星的来自抗议人群和亲北京人士对记者的攻击,香港警察对记者施暴标志着特别行政区最近数月新闻自由的气候恶化。 10月3日,香港记者协会递交了一项申请,要求对警察局长进行司法评议,因为他未能阻止警察施暴以及对记者的干扰和不良行为。以下是反映相比上月新闻自由由恶化趋势的三个主要动态:

  • 禁蒙面法:10月4日,香港特首林郑月娥启动一项殖民时代的紧急条令,发布禁令禁止蒙面,此举遭到许多国际观察员的抨击。 10月8日,香港记者协会尋求政府澄清,此禁令将对记者们报导抗议活动造成怎样的影响,以及记者们戴口罩是否违反禁令。记者无疆界组织称此禁令会使记者遭受危险,因为他们很多人要戴护目镜和防毒面具以免遭警察催泪瓦斯和辣椒喷雾的伤害。警方回应说他们有权要求记者摘下面具,不从者会被捕。
  • 对本地和外国记者更多的身体攻击:9月30日,一个警察被拍攝到正在笑着用辣椒水喷射端传媒(Initium Media)记者林振东的镜头,尽管林振东身配记者证,头盔上也有「媒体」字样,他还是被攻击。 10月3日,印尼记者维比Veby Indah在被警察发射的橡胶子弹击中左眼后失明,这是迄今为止在采访抗议活动中媒体人所受最重的伤害。几天后,10月6日,拍摄到美国记者苏珊 • 萨拉丁(Suzanne Salatine)被警察推倒墙边, 用防暴盾牌击打。她随后被拘留,后无罪释放。同一天,一名公共电视台香港电台(RTHK)记者被抗议者扔出的燃烧弹(Molotov cocktail)击中,造成面部灼伤。 10月13日,在旺角警察局外,一名为 NowTV 工作的司机被警察扔出的布袋弹击中,后被拘留两个多小时,拘留期间被警察殴打。
  • 媒体召回报导国庆抗议的记者:随着暴力日益升级,在10月1日国庆日警察在驱散抗议者造成了几起受伤事件后,香港电台(RTHK),《南华早报》(South China Morning Post)和《香港浸会大学学生报》决定从前方召回他们的记者。值此政治敏感日,在抗议期间,警察对抗议者动用了水炮车、辣椒喷雾和催泪瓦斯,有些抗议者以燃烧弹和砖头回应。 「香港记者协会」报导说,有数十名记者被警察连珠发射的橡胶子弹和海棉弹击伤,还有其他人在受到酸性物攻击后得到治疗,并呼吁各方不要干扰城市记者的工作。

中国之外:暴雪制裁支持香港的游戏者,抖音审查,美国限制中国的技术出口,对学术自由的威胁

  • 暴雪争议,抵制:一名热门游戏《炉石战记(Hearthstone)》的选手因表达对当下香港抗议的支持,而受到美国游戏公司暴雪的制裁,因此暴雪受到各方批评。 10月6日,在一场游戏后宣布胜利的新闻发布会中,香港玩家职业选手吴伟聪( Chung Ng Wai) 说出了抗议中盛行的口号:「光复香港,时代革命」,随后,暴雪收回了对Chung的奖金,并罚其禁赛一年。在此举遭到其它玩家强烈抗议后,其赢家身份后来被恢复,禁赛期减为6个月。即便如此,呼吁抵制暴雪的呼声响起,并由于随后在10月16日,因三个美国《炉石战记》的选手在网上进行的游戏中举起一个写着「香港自由,抵制暴雪」的标语,暴雪对这三位选手禁赛后,抵制暴雪的呼声更强。看似是因对越来越多的争议,暴雪取消了原定10月16日于纽约市举行的一场产品发布会。尽管暴雪在中国的用户群还少,该公司正在寻求扩展这一有利可图的中国市场,来弥补在其它地方的亏损。
  • 抖音对香港抗议及其它的审查:越来越多的证据表明,热门社交媒体网络抖音定期审查被中国政府视为是敏感的内容。 2019年,这一视频分享平台已成为全球被下载最多的应用软件之一,特别是在青少年用户中。据《英国卫报》(The Guardian) 得到的一份抖音内部文件表明,抖音公司隶属于在北京的一家名为ByteDance的公司,其员工被要求删除与天安门屠杀和迫害法轮功相关的话题内容。在该网站上搜寻「香港」,得到的结果与目前的抗议相关的结果,和其它热门媒体网站相比,少的惊人。鉴于此类发现,10月9日,美国联邦参议员麦可•卢比奥(Marco Rubio)要求美国财务部对并购抖音旗下的音乐类社交媒体服务Musical.ly进行评估,查看是否有损害国家安全的隐患。 10月17日,脸书总裁马克•扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)对该中国公司的内容审查提出批评。以此回应,抖音聘请了现在法律事务所K&L Gates工作的前美国议员, 来修订其公司政策。
  • 美国对协助新疆打压的中国科技公司进行出口限制:10月7日,美国商务部宣布,将28家中国公司列入政府出口黑名单上,这些公司同谋于中国政府在新疆打压行动。在这份所谓的限制公司名单中有8家中国科技公司:大华技术,海康威视,科大讯飞,旷世,商汤科技,厦门美亚柏科信息有限公司,依图科技和颐信科技。鉴于这样的制裁,美国两家最大的公共养老金管理基金,加州教师退休金系统和纽约州教师退休金系统,据说在重新检查他们在海康威视的持有股份其他观察人士在质疑这些制裁的影响,呼吁采取更严厉措施。
  • 对孔子学院的新研究,中国对外输出影响学术自由:中国政府对国内外学术活动的恐吓与影响程度如何,一直引人担忧。 9月24日,《风险中的学者们》(Scholars at Risk)一份名为「卓越的障碍」(Obstacles to Excellence)的报告,该报告详细描述了中国政府针对学术自由所采取的行动。该报告指出无论在中国大陆,还是在香港、澳门,学术环境都在恶化。该报告还审视了中国政府向境外输出其影响,其中包括在全球校园内开设孔子学院,以及中国政府对身在海外的中国学生学者们进行的恐吓行为。自由之家研究员萨拉•库克(Sarah Cook)和华盛顿大学学生(Flora Yan) 在詹姆斯镇基金会( Jamestown Foundation)出版的《中国简报》China Brief上发表文章,提到了在孔子学院和公司方面的互动, 特别是孔子学院越来越多的给跨国大公司提供中文、中国政治和经济方面的课程。这些文章中还强调了汉办––孔子学院的总部––和中国公司之间的一个合伙项目,包括两家公司科技公司腾讯和科大讯飞,人们都已知道这两家公司在监控和审查方面和中国政府高层合作。这些发现引发新的担忧关于孔子学院对校园言论自由的影响,以及这些机构是否会成为中国政府收集情报机构的可能性。

重点反制:维吾尔人用视频分享软件突破信息封锁

在大规模的拘留、再教育和强制劳动运动下,中国西北的新疆已被认为是世界上信息环境被最严厉管控的地区。那里的维吾尔人和其他穆斯林居民谈到他们所遭受的苦难时,即便是对他们的海外家人,也会导致长期的非法被拘留。

更令对这一危机进行观察的人士吃惊的是,八月份,在抖音上出现的维吾尔人送出的数十则短视频(抖音是中国公司ByteDance旗下的一个视频分享平台)。这些短视频通常只有几秒钟的长度,通常是显示有一名维吾尔人手持亲人的照片—该亲人想必或已被抓到再教育集中营,或政府孤儿院—持照人在哭泣或其它哀思的表情姿势。看过这些视频的专家分析说,这些视频看似是在新疆被拍到并在当地上被传出的。

这类视频的模棱两可似乎帮助它们躲过了过去最初的审查。但尚不清楚在中国这些视频有多少浏览量—或在被删除前(它们许多是被删除了)能存留多久​​ 。但是这些图像和视频已经在海外全球传播,维族维权人士在推特(Twitter)、YouTube和 Instagram上转贴,(这些平台在中国都是被封的)。同时,数十个国际媒体都发表刊登了这些现象的相关文章,包括《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)、《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)和法国(France)以及澳大利亚(Australia)刊物。

同时,抖音和其国际同类平台Tiktok (也译作「抖音」)已出现成为重要的证据来源,如果这种看似不可能的成为可能,已成为主要的新疆镇压和该地区失踪孩子的视频证据。尽管证实这些视频的准确性很还有困难,在政府官方或官方媒体帐号上发布的这些短视频,已能使海外观察人士和家属们以此进行辨认和保留维吾尔人孤儿的镜头,包括父母被拘留的维吾尔儿童,清真寺被拆毁的事件视频,全副武装的警察训练的图片,或为中共党校干部培训班的片段。

图片说明:在抖音上的视频截图,一位不知名的维吾尔女子,看似在悲痛思念家人


未來看点

对人权卫士陈建芳的审判和处理:陈建芳于2019年3月被拘留,原因显然是因为她在网上发表文章,纪念联合国相关的维权人士曹顺利在被拘留期间去世五周年。 8月30日,上海检察院以「颠覆国家政权罪」为由起诉陈建芬,这一严重罪名经常被中共当局用来给维权人士判处长期监禁,但她被起诉的消息只有最近这月才传出。陈建芳长期以来为人权而呼吁,联合国人权专家国际人权团体已致信给中国政府,对其被捕和没有通过正常司法程序表达关切。关注她的被审和被判刑的最新状况,是否因为国际压力能影响她的案件结果,包括她是否被允许自己聘请律师,迄今由她自己选律师已被官方拒绝。

外国科技公司出席乌镇「世界互联网大会」的影响:10月20至22日,中国政府在浙江乌镇举办了第六届互联网年会。中国官方媒体报导,有来自全球80个国家的1500人出席了该会。如同去年,中共在会上强势亮相,包括中共政治局委员、中共宣传部部长黄坤明在会上发表主题演讲,他还宣读了习近平发来的贺词。几家主要的美国公司包括谷歌和脸书都没有出席—很可能他们是想避免产生要面对的后压力。苹果与谷歌在2017年派高管来参加该会,期间商谈中共限制性网络管控的模型之合法性进行了讨论。但一些知名的硬件和半导体与云服务公司,包括高通、英特尔、微软和Cisco都派代表参加。他们和中国技术公司阿里巴巴和百度的高管一道与会。在中美贸易关系日趋紧张,人们再次担忧与中国的经济关联会在海外怎样影响言论自由,关注因这些公司参加会带来的任何后果,或他们的出席会怎样影响他们的公司生意。

中俄签订打击「非法」网络内容的条约:10月8日,《路透社》根据《俄国国家通讯社》的报导称,说中国和俄国月末计划签署一项条约,以期联合打击「非法」网络内容。关注此条约签署的确认,任何条约细节和实施中新出现的证据,包括俄国在其境内对中共认为敏感的政治和宗教内容的加强审查。


行动起来

  • 订阅《中国媒体快报》:每月直送电子邮箱,获取《中国媒体快报》最新信息,最深入分析。免费发送!点击这里或发送邮件至cmb@freedomhouse.org
  • 分享《中国媒体快报》:帮助朋友和同事更好地理解中国不断变化的媒体和言论审查状况。
  • 获取未经审查的消息内容:请点击这里这里,找到比较流行翻墙工具的综合测评以及如何通过GreatFire.org获取翻墙工具。
  • 支持良心犯:了解如何采取行动帮助新闻记者和言论自由维权人士,包括在往期《中国媒体快报》中特别提到的良心犯。点击这里
  • 访问《中国媒体快报》资源中心:透过自由之家网站的新资源中心,了解了解更多决策者、媒体、教育界人士和捐助人可以如何帮助推进中国和其他地方的言论自由。

China Media Bulletin: 2019 internet freedom trends, Shutterstock censorship, Huawei “safe cities” (No. 140)

$
0
0

HEADLINES


ANALYSIS: China’s Internet Freedom Hit a New Low in 2019, and the World Could Follow

No user or platform is safe from the leadership’s insatiable appetite for ideological conformity.

By Sarah Cook and Mai Truong

Late last month, public security agencies and a school in Hebei Province“seriously criticized” a 15-year-old student for accessing blocked websites and browsing information that was deemed “antagonistic toward China.” A few days earlier, another Chinese netizen had reported that his account on Tencent’s social media platform WeChat had been suspended for “spreading malicious rumors” after he posted a comment about Winnie the Pooh, whose likeness is often used to mock President Xi Jinping. It will soon be even easier for authorities to track down such individuals: as of December 1, all telecommunications companies will be required to obtain facial scans of new internet or mobile phone users as part of the real-name registration process.

These are just a few recent examples of the daunting growth in restrictions on expression, privacy, and access to information in China. Indeed, the newly released edition of Freedom House’s annual global assessment of internet freedom, Freedom on the Net, identified the Chinese government as the world’s worst abuser of internet freedom for the fourth consecutive year. But even by China’s own poor track record, the past year stood out, as the country’s score reached its lowest point since the inception of the report a decade ago.

China is rated Not Free with an internet freedom score of 10 in Freedom on the Net 2019.

Extreme censorship and penalties for once-tolerated activities

Driven by official paranoia surrounding the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, persistent antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and an ongoing trade war with the United States, information controls in China reached exceptional levels over the past year. The scale of content removals, website closures, and social media account deletions expanded, affecting tens of thousands of individual users and institutional content providers. Platforms focused on apolitical topics, including entertainment, dating, and celebrity gossip applications, faced new restrictions, particularly on their real-time communication features. Information on subjects like economic news that have traditionally been given freer rein became more systematically and permanently censored.

Chinese citizens’ risk of being detained or imprisoned for accessing or sharing information online has increased considerably in recent years. During the past year alone, several new categories of individuals were targeted with legal and extralegal reprisals for their online activity. These included users of Twitter, which is blocked in China but still accessible via circumvention tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs). Numerous Twitter users were harassed, detained, interrogated by police, and forced to delete their past posts. Some users and sellers of VPNs faced similar reprisals, although on a smaller scale.

Ordinary users of WeChat increasingly faced detention and prosecution. Among others who were jailed during 2019, the moderator of a popular WeChat account that shared news from outside China was sentenced in July to two years in prison, a professor from Guangdong Province was jailed for three and a half years after posting images related to the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, and a 22-year-old Tibetan monk from Sichuan Province was arrested for expressing concern over Beijing’s policies that are reducing use of the Tibetan language. Several activists who operated websites about civil society and human rights issues also faced pretrial detention and long prison sentences. The most prominent was Huang Qi, founder of the human rights website 64 Tianwang, who was sentenced in July to 12 years in prison for “intentionally leaking state secrets.”

Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region increasingly faced severe penalties and long-term detention for mundane online activities like communicating with relatives who live abroad. Erpat Ablekrem, a 24-year-old aspiring professional soccer player, was sent to a reeducation camp in January 2019 for using WeChat to contact family members who had fled the country. Rapid advances in surveillance technology and greater police access to user data have helped facilitate this rise in arrests and prosecutions. In some instances, tools that were first deployed by police in Xinjiang have now spread to other parts of China, such as hand-held devices used for extracting data from mobile phones.

Impact on user communication

In response to the escalation of real-world reprisals and legal penalties for online commentary, self-censorship has become more pervasive. The risk of losing one’s personal WeChat account is a particularly strong deterrent, since the multifaceted application—used for everything from banking to ordering food—is now regarded as essential to everyday life in China.

The space for online mobilization has also narrowed. The effects of the Chinese government’s multiyear crackdown on civil society and nongovernmental organizations are visible in the online sphere, as previously outspoken activists have gone silent following arrests or the closure of their social media accounts.

Several platforms that still provided alternative means of communication on routinely censored topics—such as video-sharing, live-streaming, and blockchain applications—faced new restrictions during the year, indicating that the authorities were determined to plug gaps in the system. For example, blockchain platforms were required to enforce real-name registration and censor their content, and artificial intelligence was deployed to screen images for banned material.

Global implications

Foreigners visiting China should not expect to be exempt from the government’s ever-expanding web of surveillance and censorship. Recent Freedom House research on police use of advanced databases to track “key individuals” throughout China found that foreigners are one of the targeted populations. At least one foreign journalist reporting from China said he was barred from his WeChat account for “spreading rumors” about the Tiananmen Square massacre. He had to admit to the offense and provide a face scan before access could be restored. Ongoing restrictions on VPNs and implementation of the facial-scan requirement for SIM card registration may also disproportionately affect foreign visitors to the country.

Meanwhile, international companies and investors must grapple with the increasing censorship of economic news, US government sanctions on Chinese technology firms linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and the prominent role of social media giants like Tencent in helping to detect and penalize users for engaging in legitimate political, religious, or simply humorous speech. Foreign firms like Apple, Microsoft, and LinkedIn have already complied with government censorship in China, and they could be forced to play a part in user arrests as well.

Even as it increases internet controls at home, the Chinese government and affiliated private companies are affecting internet freedom in other countries around the world. In the 2018 edition of Freedom on the Net, Freedom House found that 36 out of 65 countries under study had sent personnel to China for training on new media or information management, while 18 had purchased artificial intelligence–enabled surveillance systems. New research published in 2019 by the Open Technology Fund shows that both fields of activity have continued to expand, with Chinese-made internet control equipment and official training reaching more than 70 countries.

The 2019 edition of Freedom on the Net noted that China has emerged as a leader in developing, employing, and exporting automated tools for mass surveillance of social media. The Chinese firm Knowlesys, for example, is planning to provide live demonstrations at an upcoming trade show in Dubai on how to “monitor your targets’ messages, profiles, locations, behaviors, relationships, and more,” and how to “monitor public opinion” for elections. Mass surveillance of social media was identified in 40 of the 65 countries assessed in 2019, though not all employed Chinese technology.

This year featured a series of especially sensitive anniversaries that motivated the escalation in censorship and surveillance in China, but there is no reason to believe that the new restrictions will be rolled back. On the contrary, the leadership appears determined to ratchet up its repression indefinitely as it pursues the impossible goal of ideological conformity and social control in a globally engaged nation of 1.4 billion people. In fact, it is increasingly obvious that Beijing’s efforts are, by necessity, global in scope, and that the rest of the world will have to choose between resistance and complicity.

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. Mai Truong is Freedom House’s research director for strategy and management.

This article was also published in the Diplomat on November 18, 2019.


Communist Party Fourth Plenum: Xi Jinping governance model affirmed, tech innovation emphasized, Hong Kong warning issued

Last month, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee completed its fourth plenum. The meeting of top leaders, held in the military-run Jingxi Hotel in Beijing from October 28 to 31, was long delayed; the previous plenum had taken place in February 2018. The final bulletin and resolution called on the party to increase its role in society, but advocated few major changes. The outcome was considered by many to be anticlimactic when compared with the last plenum’s announcement of a constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits. Perhaps for this reason, there was neither a public outcry nor increase in state censorship following the close of the plenum as had happened in 2018.

With regard to media, internet, and academic freedom, there are three main takeaways from the plenum:

  • Continuing support for Xi and his policies of increasing political and ideological control: This year’s plenum reaffirmed President Xi Jinping’s particular brand of authoritarianism. Xi’s 65-page-long speech was replete with references to the tenets of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—the full name of the ideology commonly known as “Xi Jinping Thought,” which undergirds party policies and is increasingly incorporated into schools, workplaces, media, public spaces, and other components of everyday life. The plenum’s bulletin stressed the need to reconsolidate the power of the Communist Party, extend party control over all levels of Chinese society, and strengthen people’s faith in China’s socialist system, while managing domestic risks and improving ideological purity. The strong show of support for Xi deflated some earlier speculation that the plenum’s delay had been due to party infighting and challenges to Xi’s leadership.
  • Tech investment and innovation: This year, tech innovation was emphasized, with the plenum calling for a national system to master new “core technologies.”According to the Elsa Kania, a research fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, the bulletin used the word “innovation” 31 times. This comes after calls made by President Xi prior to the plenum for China to invest in further development of blockchain technologies, the technology behind Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. However, after the price of bitcoins and blockchain shares began to rise in the plenum’s wake, state media like the People’s Daily tried to rein in investor enthusiasm, urging them to “remain rational.
  • Hard-line stance on Hong Kong, Taiwan: Although no specific mention was made of the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, the plenum’s bulletin included calls to uphold the “one country, two systems” arrangement governing Hong Kong, and to promote Taiwan’s unification with China. It urged creation of an improved mechanism for “safeguarding national security” in Hong Kong, where prodemocracy protests have now entered their sixth month, as well as the deepening of cross-strait integration. It further called for new policies aimed at fostering sentiments favorable to reunification among the Taiwanese public. Statements to the media by officials after the end of the meeting further signaled Beijing’s intention to take a more active role in Hong Kong’s affairs, including by more frequently exercising its power to interpret the territory’s Basic Law, increasing patriotic education, and exercising greater scrutiny over the selection of future chief executives.

Censorship Updates: Shutterstock, YouTube celebrity, iPhone browsers use Tencent blacklist

  • Shutterstock censoring search results in China: Last month, stock image supplier Shutterstock began censoring search results in mainland China, according to a November 6 report by the Intercept, after engineers received instructions in September to implement the changes. Banned keywords reportedly include “President Xi,” “dictator,” and “yellow umbrella,” a symbol of 2014 prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong. A petition signed by 180 Shutterstock employees called on the company to reject Chinese government demands that search results be censored, referencing in part the many company employees from around the world who have “experienced government oppression firsthand.” Employees further expressed concern about the slippery slope the change entails, be it in terms of future demands from China, or similar requests from other restrictive governments. Shutterstock chief executive Jon Oringer admitted that the company would filter search results in China, but defended the decision as being in line with the company’s “brand promise” by enabling Chinese storytellers to still access a wide range of creative content. Shutterstock has been distributing its images in China since 2014, but its involvement grew last year with a $15 million investment in the tech platform ZCool—a partnership that grants Shutterstock greater access to widely used platforms like Tencent Social Ads.
  • PewDiePie censored in China after discussion of Hong Kong protests: Popular YouTube personality Felix Kjellberg—known as PewDiePie—has claimed that the Chinese government censored online references to him after he recorded a video commenting on the Hong Kong protest movement. With more than 100 million subscribers to his video-sharing channel, PewDiePie is the world's second-most popular YouTube personality. In an October 16 video, PewDiePie referred to the Chinese government’s response to overseas media personalities’ expressions of support for Hong Kong protesters and shared memes about the protests, as well as memes mocking Xi Jinping. Shortly after, media outlets and Chinese internet users reported that references to him had been scrubbed from Baidu’s Tieba, an online forum similar to Reddit. According to one Twitter user, PewDiePie has 600,000 fans in China, who know him mostly through reposts of his content on domestic video-sharing and social media platforms.
  • Apple using Tencent blacklist for iPhone web-browsing filter:An October 31 report by Quartz revealed that Apple is working with Chinese tech giant Tencent to identify websites for blocking by the Safari web browser in China. Outside of China, Apple cooperates with Google’s “safe browsing service” to provide Safari with a blacklist of sites with malware or phishing content. Inside China, where Google is blocked, Apple is partnering with Tencent for the same functionality. However, along with malicious malware sites, Tencent’s blacklist includes websites containing political material the Chinese government considers harmful. Apple has repeatedly complied with Chinese government censorship demands in an effort to retain market access, although some of its most revenue-rich services like Apple TV+, Apple Books, and iTunes movie rentals remain unavilable in China.

Facial recognition upgrades and US sanctions fuel citizen complaints, lawsuit, and scrutiny of international collaboration

  • Facial recognition systems continue to expand in use and location: Authorities have continued to expand use of facial recognition technologies, with some cases triggering public concerns over privacy. At the Urban Rail Transit Operation and Development Forum held in Beijing on October 29, it was announced that the city’s metro would implement facial recognition technology to classify passengers, as part of a security screening system. In Xiangyang, Hubei Province, local authorities have used facial recognition cameras at a downtown crosswalk to identify jaywalkers and broadcast their images, names, and national ID numbers on a large electronic screen, according to recent footage uploaded to video sharing platform Douyin. Over the past two months, similar initiatives have reportedly been introduced in Zhenjiang (Jiangsu Province), Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), and Xining (Qinghai Province). In Shanghai, facial recognition equipment has been installed in a third of the city’s apartment complexes as of this May, in some instances drawing complaints from residents who had not been alerted. Emotion-recognition camera systems were advertised widely at China’s Public Security Expo held in Shenzhen in late October. These systems are reportedly being tested in Xinjiang, though experts suggest the technology is still in its infancy. Other technology displayed at the expo included prison surveillance systems, eyeglasses with hidden cameras, and devices which could read all Chinese- and foreign-language material on a user’s personal computer or phone.
  • Chinese professor files lawsuit against the use of facial recognition at wildlife park: A professor from Zhejiang University of Science and Technology has taken legal action against a Hangzhou safari park which requires visitors to scan their faces in order to gain entrance. In a complaint accepted by a Hangzhou court on November 1, Professor Guo Bing accused the park of infringing on customer privacy and questioned how visitor information was being stored after members with annual passes like himself were told that they would not be allowed to enter if they refused to provide a facial scan. He is seeking modest financial compensation, but reportedly hopes the case will encourage increased regulation of biometric data collection. According to the Guardian, the case has the potential to “open wider debate in China over the use of such technology by businesses and the government.”
  • Increased scrutiny of international collaboration with banned Chinese firms: Companies and institutions outside China have come under greater scrutiny for their ties with Chinese firms that have been blacklisted by the US government for their involvement in human rights abuses and surveillance in Xinjiang. An October 14 report by Australia’s national broadcaster ABC found that leading Australian universities have potentially assisted the Chinese government in the development of surveillance and military technologies, including through partnerships with two entities on the US government’s entities list. Buzzfeed reports that as of early November, tech firms Google, Apple, and Amazon continue to distribute physical products and apps produced by three companies—Hikvision, Dahua Technology, and iFlytek—that have been placed on the entities list. On November 8, Pittsburgh’s local Action News 4 reported that dozens of the city’s surveillance cameras purchased by the local district attorney are manufactured by Dahua, a Chinese firm banned by the US government from selling to federal agencies, and whose equipment is reportedly vulnerable to hacking.

Hong Kong: Government, airport, “testing waters” of internet censorship

Censorship of the sort seen within China has long been absent in Hong Kong, even as local authorities have adopted increasingly repressive measures to deter prodemocracy protests. But 24 weeks into the current protest movement, signs have emerged that this may be changing.

On November 1, Hong Kong’s High Court granted a temporary injunction to block incitement to violence or property damage on “any internet-based platform or medium.” These included but were not limited to messaging app Telegram and online forum LIHKG—platforms popular among protesters, which the Hong Kong government has accused of facilitating “unlawful activities.” The move apparently came in response to, among other things, activity on the Telegram channels “dadfindboy” and “tanakayotsuba.” Each with large followings, the channels have been used to collect and share personal information about police officers. As of November 7, “dadfindboy” had reportedly been shuttered because it violated Telegram’s terms of service. Police are now reportedly also seeking to break the app’s encryption protocol in order to reveal the identity of the channels’ administrators, as well as those of other protesters using the app.

Responses from legislators and international rights groups to the injunction was swift. Legislative Council Chairman of Information Technology Charles Mok expressed concern that the injunction is “just testing the waters,” and may presage further government censorship. In an open letter to Chief Executive Carrie Lam, digital rights organization Access Now and other international groups including Freedom House said the injunction “enables overly broad restrictions on the freedom of expression of Hong Kong residents and interferes with access to popular forums…in violation of fundamental rights,” and asked the government to withdraw it.

The international and local pressure may have had some impact. While the injunction was extended on November 15—the day it was to expire—the renewed version reportedly had a narrowed scope, relaying that online platforms themselves would not be liable for violence-inciting content on their services. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Internet Society expressed disappointment with the extension, and Mok voiced concern over the chilling effect it creates for internet users.

Online censorship has also extended to the government-operated Hong Kong International Airport. In late October, a Reddit user reported that the Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP) website had been blocked on the airport's public ASUS internet terminals, though it remained accessible at non-ASUS terminals and through the airport's Wi-Fi. HKFP is an independent, English-language digital news outlet that has reported extensively on the protests and police violence against them.

As protests show no sign of abating, comments from Chinese Vice Premier Han Zheng on November 6 calling for the imposition of national security laws in the city suggest that government censorship may increase in the future.


Beyond China: Huawei “safe cities,” Chinese cameras at US military facilities, university influence, Taiwan elections

  • New report finds Huawei “safe cities” have spread to 52 countries: A November report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that more than 73 cities in 52 countries around the world have entered into “safe city” agreements with Huawei. Through these agreements, the Chinese tech firm provides local authorities with surveillance technology, including facial and license plate recognition cameras and social media monitoring tools. Of these agreements, 71 percent were concluded with administrations in countries rated Not Free or Partly Free by Freedom House; 59 percent are with governments in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa; and 71 percent with those in middle-income countries. The CSIS analysis also questions the supposed benefits of the technology in reducing crime, saying that Huawei’s “solutions are difficult to verify and appear grossly exaggerated in some cases.” By contrast, reports have already emerged of the systems being used to suppress political opponents in recipient countries. In a recent example, the Associated Press (AP) reported on October 16 that police in Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, leaked footage of antigovernment protesters taken from Huawei cameras to progovernment media, which then published the images alongside the names of the participants.
  • New York firm sold Chinese cameras to military facilities, claiming they were US-made: In early November, federal prosecutors filed fraud charges against seven current and former employers of the New York-based Aventura Technologies. They accused the company of selling tens of millions of dollars of Chinese security equipment—goods Aventura falsely claimed were US-made—to American government facilities. The firm reportedly relabeled the items to hide their Chinese origin. Federal prosecutors claim that purchasers included military bases, US Department of Energy facilities, and even a Navy aircraft carrier, and that individuals in China were reportedly aware of the deception.
  • Canadian Chinese student association decertified: Universities continue to struggle with how to respond to growing Chinese presence on their campuses, and the impact on academic freedom, but one potentially fruitful approach is fair enforcement of school regulations when violations by Chinese students or officials occur. On November 3, the student union of McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada, upheld its September 22 decision to decertify the Chinese Student and Scholars Association (CSSA) for having violating school guidelines. The initial decision was made after members of the CSSA disrupted a February talk by a Uighur activist, and after the revelation of messages in the CSSA’s WeChat group that indicated that photographs of the event had been supplied to the Chinese consulate in Toronto. Similar worries have been raised in the United Kingdom, where a November 5 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report cited several scholars who expressed concern about the negative impact of Chinese government influence on academic freedom across British universities.
  • Governments, civil society, social media firms on high alert for Chinese disinformation ahead of Taiwan elections: As Taiwan’s January 2020 elections approach, some observers are concerned that China will step up disinformation aimed at the country’s voters. According to  researchers from V-Dem, a program at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that assesses democracies, Taiwan is subjected to the dissemination of more false information from Beijing than any other country in the world, with misleading content being spread by hackers and bots on social media platforms like Facebook, Sina Weibo, and the Japanese instant messaging app Line. China’s efforts are believed to have favored Kuomintang presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu in November 2018, when he successfully ran for the mayorship of Kaohsiung; Han has called for closer ties with China. In response to ongoing concerns, Facebook pledged to strengthen measures to combat disinformation on the platform in the lead-up to the polls. Meanwhile, several civil society groups—including Taiwan Fact-check Center, Cofacts, MyGoPen, and Rumor and Truth—are running various initiatives to combat online disinformation related to the elections and other topics, at times in collaboration with social media platforms like Line.

FEATURED PUSHBACK: European rights prizes awarded to political prisoners in China

Over the past two months, European organizations have awarded three prestigious human rights and free speech prizes to political prisoners in China. These came despite threats and Chinese government reprisals for similar actions in the past, such as a series of retaliatory steps taken against Norway in 2010 after prodemocracy advocate Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 

In late October, the European Parliament announced that the 2019 Sakharov Prize, the European Union’s prestigious human rights prize, was being awarded to Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti. Earlier in the month, Tohti was the recipient of the Council of Europe’s Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize. Tohti, an academic, is serving a life sentence for “separatism” due to his efforts to foster dialogue between Han and Uighur citizens, and to speak out against violations of Uighur rights. Activists have been touting Tohti as a deserving recipient of such prizes since his initial arrest in 2014. The current timing of the awards speaks to both his own plight and his symbolism as a voice silenced for speaking up on behalf of an ethnic minority; an estimated one million Uighurs are in detention in China due to their religious beliefs and ethnic identity.

Additionally, on November 15, Sweden’s branch of PEN International awarded its Tucholsky Prize for a persecuted writer or publisher to Swedish citizen and bookseller Gui Minhai, who has been held in Chinese police custody since his 2015 abduction from Thailand. In advance of the ceremony, Chinese diplomats reportedly threatened consequences for Swedish-Chinese relations, and implied that any government representatives attending the event would be barred from entering China in the future. Despite the threats, Swedish culture and democracy minister Amanda Lind attended the ceremony to present the award. Earlier in the day, Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven told local television, “We are not going to give in to this type of threat. Never. We have freedom of expression in Sweden, and that’s how it is, period.” 

 Photo caption: Swedish culture and democracy minister Amanda Lind announces the Tucholsky prize to Gui Minhai in Stockholm. Credit: IBL/Rex/Shutterstock


WHAT TO WATCH FOR

  • Political prosecutions relying on facial recognition tools: As facial recognition technologies spread throughout China—including on public transportation and in private residential units—and are also integrated with other police surveillance databases of “key individuals,” watch for emerging examples of the technology being used as a trigger for arrests, or as evidence in the prosecution of political activists, ethnic minorities, and religious dissidents.
  • Escalating Hong Kong crackdown amid winter holidays: The Chinese Communist Party has a long track record of timing politicized arrests and prosecutions of prominent activists within China to occur around Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s Eve—a holiday period when many Americans and other international observers take time off to spend with family, and may be slower to respond to heightened repression. As tensions and unrest escalate in Hong Kong after six months of protests, watch for whether the CCP will apply this playbook in the territory to deploy paramilitary forces to violently suppress the demonstrations.
  • Outcome and impact of US national security review of Tiktok acquisition: On November 1, Reuters and other news outlets reported that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) had initiated a national security review of the 2017, $1 billion acquisition of Musical.ly by Tiktok, which is owned by the Chinese company Bytedance. The review was triggered in part by bipartisan congressional calls for greater scrutiny of the app after recent reports of Tiktok’s popularity among American teenagers, evidence of the app censoring content that would be deemed undesirable by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and concerns about the status of Americans’ online data accessed by the Chinese tech firm. As the review proceeds, watch for how the committee addresses these concerns, the impact of its final decision on Tiktok’s operations in the United States and globally (about 60 percent of the app’s monthly active users reportedly are US residents), and whether the process sets a precedent for future reviews of other Chinese tech acquisitions—including Tencent, which has stakes in online forum Reddit and the gaming company Blizzard.

TAKE ACTION

  • Subscribe to the China Media BulletinHave the bulletin’s updates and insights delivered directly to your inbox each month, free of charge. Visit here or e-mail cmb@freedomhouse.org.
  • Share the bulletin: Help friends and colleagues better understand China’s changing media and censorship landscape.
  • Access uncensored content: Find an overview comparing popular circumvention tools and information on how to access them via GreatFire.org, here or here. Learn more about how to reach uncensored content and enhance digital security here
  • Support a prisoner: Learn how to take action to help journalists and free expression activists, including those featured in past issues of the China Media Bulletin here.
  • Visit the China Media Bulletin Resources section: Learn more about how policymakers, media outlets, educators and donors can help advance free expression in China and beyond via a new resource section on the Freedom House website.
Viewing all 165 articles
Browse latest View live