与发展全国性的社会信用机制相关的各种试行方案和各式各样的系统包括有效鼓励镇压迫害宗教和少数民族的成分。比方说，Nectar Gan 2月19日在《南华早报》发布的一份调查，详细描述了在山东省荣城市，信息是如何被收集的以及点数是如何分配的。其中一例，一对夫妇因「他们的儿子在驻藏部队服役」而获得了10分，在西藏，中国维稳部队对藏人的基本权利强迫实施繁重限制。
2018年腾讯审查：2月11日，香港大学WeChatscope项目研究人员对2018年腾讯微信平台做了公众帐号的审查制度分析报告。报告发现，相比微信管理员的删文（2950篇），更多的内容删除（8092篇）是来自用户的自我审查。这表明在越来越严苛的互联网环境下，虽着「红线」不断移位和帐户被关闭的风险日益增高，自我审查加强了。报告指出，许多审查最严的话题包括在加拿大抓捕华为首席财务官孟晚舟、进行中的中美贸易纷争、受争议的中国科学的人类基因改造，这些都是官方对媒体发出的要审查的内容，这是《中国数字时代（China Digital Times）》翻译的，彰显了微信审查员们是在执行当局的指令。 自由之家及其合作伙伴在发布这份媒体快报之中所做的努力，也表明腾讯在去年加强了对其电子邮件服务器QQ的控制，因为在2018年年底数月中，媒体快报发至QQ电子邮件信箱变得越来越靠不住了。
2018年12月，由国际人权组织「保护人权捍卫者」公布更新之前关于强迫电视认罪现象的報告，建议更多国家应审查「中国环球电视网」和中央电视台在他们的空中频道播放的节目。研究者发现涉及的106人的其中48个电视认罪者在中国电视播放，「其中至少29个电视认罪在世界其他国家播放，经常明显违反和明确违反播放规定国家电视法规」。在至少27个案例中，外国人被强迫认罪播放到了认罪本人所在的国家，包括加拿大、英国、瑞典和美国。在很多案例中，有问题的节目以中文播放，通过中国中央电视台中文国际频道（CCTV-4）播放给其他华裔侨民，中国中央电视台中文国际频道（CCTV-4）是一个独立经营并拥有自己的许可证的子公司。从这个观点看，去检查中央电视四台以及其他中国国有中文媒体的运作，如中国国际广播电台（China Radio International，CRI）和他们的外国分台，将使想寻求完全强制相关外国法律影响和电视播放职业道德的立法者得到很好的建议。
It has long been understood that Tencent—the Chinese company that owns WeChat and QQ, two of the world’s most widely used social media applications—facilitates Chinese government censorship and surveillance. But over the past year, the scale and significance of this activity have increased and become more visible, both inside and outside China.
During the last month alone, several events have illustrated the trend and Tencent’s close relationship with the Chinese authorities.
On March 2, Dutch hacker Victor Gevers revealed that the content of millions of conversations on Tencent applications among users at internet cafés are being relayed, along with the users’ identities, to police stations across China. Just three days later, the company’s founder and chief executive, Pony Ma, took his seat among 3,000 delegates to the National People’s Congress, the country’s rubber-stamp parliament. Ma reportedly raised the issue of data privacy even as security agencies were using data from his company’s applications to root out unauthorized religious activity.
On March 16, China watcher Chenchen Zhang shared an anecdote on Twitter about a member of the Uighur Muslim minority who was stopped at mainland China’s border with Hong Kong and interrogated for three days simply because someone on his WeChat contact list had recently “checked in” with a location setting of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The authorities apparently feared that the Uighur man had traveled on pilgrimage to Mecca without permission, warning that such a move could yield 15 years in prison.
As Tencent’s pattern of censorship and data sharing with China’s repressive government continues and intensifies, now is the time to consider actions that might help protect the basic rights of all users, regardless of their location and nationality.
Tencent’s role in China
Founded in 1998, Tencent and its popular applications have quickly emerged as ubiquitous elements of China’s communications, financial, and social fabric. In January, the company declared that WeChat alone had a billion active daily users.
While the company has been forced since its inception to comply with strict Chinese Communist Party information controls, the combination of growing government demands and WeChat’s near market saturation in China has increased the scope and impact of its complicity.
In the realm of censorship, media reports and expert research indicate that WeChat has been refining the use of artificial intelligence to identify and delete images, which netizens commonly employ to evade censorship and surveillance of text-based communications. The platform has also shuttered thousands of independently operated social media accounts that produced unauthorized news and analysis. These and other forms of censorship significantly distort the information received by Chinese users on vital topics. Analysis by researchers at Hong Kong University’s WeChatscope project, which tracks deletions from some 4,000 public accounts on the platform, found that among the most censored topics in 2018 were major news stories like the US-China trade dispute, the arrest in Canada of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, the #MeToo movement, and public health scandals.
Monitoring of user activity on the platform has been made simpler by enhanced enforcement of real-name registration requirements for mobile phones, the electronic payment features of WeChat, large-scale police purchases of smartphone scanners, and new rules facilitating public security agencies’ access to data centers. As indicated above, content from Tencent applications is being directly “spoon-fed” to police in some cases.
This surveillance is increasingly leading to legal repercussions for ordinary users. A sample of cases tracked in Freedom House’s China Media Bulletin over the past year feature penalties against numerous WeChat users for mocking President Xi Jinping, criticizing judicial officials, commenting on massive floods, sharing information about human rights abuses, or expressing views related to their persecuted religion or ethnicity, be they Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, or Falun Gong practitioners. The punishments have ranged from several days of administrative detention to many years in prison, in some cases for comments that were ostensibly shared privately with friends. These dynamics have inevitably encouraged self-censorship on the platform.
Global expansion
Although WeChat’s primary user base is in China, an estimated 100 to 200 million people outside the country use the messaging service. Among them are millions of members of the Chinese diaspora in countries like Canada, Australia, and the United States, but there is also broader expansion in much of Asia. Malaysia is reportedly home to 20 million users, out of a population of 31 million. In Thailand, an estimated 17 percent of the population has a WeChat account. In Mongolia, WeChat was the second most downloaded application in 2017. Merchants in Myanmar’s Shan State along the border with China have taken up the app, and the number of retailers in Japan that accept WePay (mostly when serving Chinese tourists) increased 35-fold last year.
Tencent recently purchased a $150 million stake in the popular news aggregator Reddit and is eyeing an entrance into the online video market in Taiwan, according to Taiwanese officials.
Evidence that politicized censorship and surveillance may affect Tencent users outside China has begun to emerge. A 2016 study by Citizen Lab found that conversations between an overseas user and a contact inside China were subject to certain forms of keyword censorship, and that once an account is registered with a Chinese phone number, it remains subject to mainland controls even outside the country.
In Australia, a more recent study of news sources available to the Chinese diaspora found negligible political coverage of China on the WeChat channels of Chinese-language news providers. Incredibly, between March and August 2017, none of the WeChat channels published a single article on Chinese politics, despite the run-up to the important 19th Party Congress that fall. In Canada, WeChat censors have deleted a member of Parliament’s message to constituents praising Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement protesters, manipulated dissemination of news reports related to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest, and blocked broader media coverage of Chinese government corruption and leading officials.
Amid a massive crackdown in Xinjiang, Chinese police have also harnessed WeChat to connect with overseas Uighurs, demand personal information or details about activists, and insert state monitors into private groups.
How to respond
Regardless of whether Tencent is a reluctant or an eager accomplice to the Chinese government’s repressive policies, the reality is that Tencent employees can be expected to censor, monitor, and report private communications and personal data, in many cases leading to innocent people’s arrest and torture.
This should be the starting point for anyone considering using, regulating, or investing in the company’s services.
For those inside China, it is nearly impossible today to function without using WeChat to some extent. But they would be well advised to exercise caution, restricting the application to its most practical functions and consulting available guides on enhancing digital security and accessing information on current affairs more safely. (Freedom House published a set of such resources last year.)
Users outside China, particularly those without family or friends on the mainland, should rethink whether WeChat is really essential to their daily lives. Individuals who do communicate with personal contacts in China can help protect them by directing them to more secure applications if a sensitive topic comes up, or using homonyms to replace potentially problematic terms, as some journalists have reported doing. Users in the Chinese diaspora should explore ways of expanding their sources of news and information beyond what is available on WeChat.
As governments around the world try to tackle problems related to “fake news,” political manipulation, and weak data protections on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, Chinese counterparts like WeChat should be subject to at least as much scrutiny and regulation—and be held accountable for any violations. Governments and corporations should also restrict usage of WeChat among their employees, particularly those who work with sensitive information, as the governments of Australia and India have recently done. Politicians communicating with their Chinese-speaking constituents should make sure to do so across a diversity of platforms, not just those that are subject to Chinese government control.
International civil society groups can assist both users and democratic governments by maintaining up-to-date digital security guides available in Chinese, documenting the extent to which content outside China is censored or monitored on WeChat, and exploring legal recourse for those whose rights may have been violated by Tencent’s practices.
Lastly, investors in Tencent should seriously consider the moral and political implications of their support for the firm. Anyone concerned about human rights, electoral interference by foreign powers, or privacy violations by tech giants should divest from the company, including retirement funds. Socially responsible investment plans should exclude Tencent from their portfolios if they have not already. Even from a purely financial perspective, Tencent shares may not be a wise purchase. The stock’s price has dropped 19 percent over the past year, at least in part because of tighter government controls on user communications. Given that Chinese regulators are now turning their attention to the gaming industry, the company’s most profitable area of activity, its value is likely to dip further. As stock analyst Leo Sun has warned, “investors in Chinese tech companies should never underestimate the government’s ability to throttle their growth.”
No amount of pushback from users, democratic governments, civil society groups, or investors is likely to change Tencent’s complicity with the Chinese government’s repressive activities. Its very survival depends on dutiful adherence to Communist Party directives. But the steps suggested above would do a great deal to limit the current and potential future damage caused by the company’s practices—for individual users, for the world’s open societies, and for the very concept of free expression in the digital age.
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin.This article was also published in the Diplomat on March 26, 2019.
Tighter information controls and flailing foreign propaganda greet congress, advisory sessions
This year’s “two sessions” of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), held March 5–15, arrived as President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were under unusual pressure due to a slowing economy, a continuing trade war with Washington, and mounting international criticism of the human rights crisis in Xinjiang. Beijing responded by tightening controls on speech and information and kicking its external propaganda machine into overdrive.
Tightened information controls: As is often the case preceding high-profile political meetings, authorities sought to preempt any independent commentary or protests by compelling Beijing-based human rights activists to travel outside the capital. Activist Hu Jia was among those escorted out of town for a forced holiday, as he has been in years past. Poet Hua Yong, who had previously been detained after criticizing the party online, shared a poem on Twitter on February 27, bidding his friends and home city goodbye as “they hold their meeting.” Beijing residents reported increased security measures throughout the city, including additional bag checks at transit hubs. Internet restrictions also tightened in early March, an apparent attempt to further control the news narrative surrounding the meetings. Companies running virtual private network (VPN) services noticed an increase in blocking efforts beginning on March 2, and one VPN staffer noted that the authorities appeared “to be using a combination of automation, likely artificial intelligence, and focused human monitoring” to block the tools that enable users to bypass website filtering. Meanwhile, a Twitter account that used artificial intelligence to analyze public information about Chinese officials deleted all of its content on March 6, apparently under police pressure, in keeping with a recent crackdown on critical Twitter users based in China, where Twitter is blocked. The account in question, @AirMovingDevice, focused in part on top officials’ plagiarism in their graduate degree theses, and it had more recently used facial recognition technology on NPC delegates ahead of this year’s two sessions. Some of the account’s previous tweets are archived at China Digital Times.
Foreign propaganda: Beijing’s English-language propaganda apparatus generated some laughable content in preparation for the two sessions, summed up by the China Media Project’s David Bandurski as “the inevitable outcome of a propaganda system that is cash-rich and culturally and intellectually bankrupt.” The official news agency Xinhua on March 3 posted a nationalistic English-language rap video celebrating China’s recent achievements. The video’s sometimes nonsensical lyrics, and the fact that it came amid official restrictions on hip-hop culture, earned the video an overwhelminglynegativereview from the international English-language press. Xinhua offered two other videos that were likely just as ineffective: One attempted Web 2.0–style news coverage, with two foreign “Xinhua correspondents” answering questions about the two sessions; the other had an American presenter extol the virtues of “Chinese democracy,” which “results in political stability and vitality” and is, supposedly, on full display at the two sessions. Other examples of state propaganda about the meetings may have been more successful. China Global Television Network (CGTN), the English-language channel of state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV), featured a “Who Runs China” interactive webpage that attempted to portray the legislative assembly as highly diverse and representative. The Global Times newspaper ran an article on March 15, the closing day of the sessions, that highlighted a large assembly of journalists from partner countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China’s controversial program of infrastructural investment—who contributed to positive coverage of the sessions and the BRI in their home publications.
Tech policy at the two sessions
Foreign investment law: On March 15, the National People’s Congress (NPC) voted almost unanimously (2,929 to 8) to approve a law on foreign investment that will go into effect on January 1, 2020. The law was rushed through the rubber-stamp legislature on the last day of its annual plenary session—held in parallel with that of the advisory Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC)—in what was read by analysts as an attempt to address concerns from foreign investors and governments about unfair market access, forced technology transfers, and the theft of commercial secrets from foreign businesses operating in China. Ahead of the law’s adoption, a March 7 post at Lawfare noted that the vague provisions in the draft fell far short of meeting the demands of the United States regarding technology transfers and investment restrictions, characterizing it as a “modest step in the direction of making China’s investment climate more appealing to and equitable for foreign investors.” The post noted that even with the law in place, the Chinese Communist Party’s unchecked power could still put foreign firms at a huge disadvantage and leave them exposed to security risks. While the new law does state that the government is not allowed to force foreign investors to transfer their technology, the imprecise language and lack of details in the adopted legislation is unlikely to satisfy foreign companies and US trade negotiators.
Artificial intelligence priority highlighted: For the thirdyear in a row, Premier Li Keqiang mentioned the development of the artificial intelligence (AI) industry in his work report at the opening of the two sessions on March 5. Li urged China to hasten the development of big data and AI technology in its efforts to build “smart cities.” One thing that Li conspicuously did not mention in his report was the government’s “Made in China 2025” industrial plan, which has been a key focus of concerns in Washington and the European Union. Throughout the annual meetings, it was made clear that AI development was high on the government agenda. The March 5 unveiling of the state budget showed that, despite slow economic growth, funds for science and technology would expand 13.4 percent compared with 2018. On the sidelines of the meetings, the official news agency Xinhua debuted its AI “anchorwoman,” which helped to cover the NPC session. The new artificial presenter, dubbed “Xin Xiaomeng,” is an upgraded version of “Xin Xiaohao,” a virtual male anchor that made its debut at the World Internet Conference in November.
Tech entrepreneur participation: Technology entrepreneurs have played an increasingly prominent role in the two sessions from year to year, suggesting a closer relationship between their companies and the authorities. Several founders and chief executives of Chinese tech firms are NPC delegates, including Tencent’s Pony Ma, Xiaomi’s Lei Jun, and Gree’s Dong Mingzhu. Others, like Baidu’s Robin Li and Sogou’s Wang Xiaochun, are members of the CPPCC. These businesspeople added their voices to the discussion about AI, calling for further research, collaboration, and the industrialization of AI technology. As noted by TechNode and SupChina, the “internet of things,” 5G mobile technology, cybersecurity, and data protection were among the other topics mentioned by the participating tech executives.
Surveillance updates: Data leaks, gait recognition, expansion in Tibet
Data leaks show extent of surveillance, vulnerability of stockpiled information: Recent data leaks uncovered by a Dutch researcher shed light on the extent of Chinese surveillance programs, as well as the lack of data protection measures at some leading Chinese technology firms. On February 13, ethical hacker and security researcher Victor Gevers (@0xDUDE) found an exposed database belonging to Shenzhen-based SenseNets, a company specializing in artificial intelligence (AI) crowd analysis and facial recognition technology. The database, which Gevers claimed was “fully accessible to anyone,” contained information on 2.6 million people in Xinjiang—including their official identification numbers, birthdays, addresses, ethnicities, employers, and perhaps most chillingly, a list of their GPS locations over the past 24 hours. The database had been open since July, but it was locked by the company after Gevers reported the leak. A long-running crackdown in Xinjiang has led to the detention of an estimated one million or more ethnic Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in a network of internment camps. As a result of the campaign, Xinjiang has become a “laboratory” for testing cutting-edge surveillance technology that in some cases has spread to other parts of China or been exported abroad. On March 6, Gevers revealed on Twitter that the Microsoft platforms Github and Azure were being used in the SenseNets program. That, along with a SenseNets website that listed Microsoft as a partner, sparked speculation on whether Microsoft was knowingly or unknowingly allowing its services to be used for Xinjiang surveillance. Microsoft has since denied having a partnership with the Chinese firm. Separately, Gevers on March 2 reported that he had uncovered a similarly unprotected Chinese collection of over 300 million private social media messages that contained highly personal metadata. Later, on March 9, Gevers revealed a different cache of detailed personal information on over 1.8 million women in China, including a “BreedReady” column detailing their childbearing status.
Real-time gait recognition: Last month, news outlets began covering recent software advances made by Chinese AI start-up Watrix, including a program that is able to identify a person by analyzing physical movement from real-time video images. The company claims that its accuracy rate is above 96 percent, and that the software can identify a person from as far as 50 meters away. Unlike facial recognition software, which an individual can thwart by simply covering or altering his or her face, Watrix claims that its system can distinguish a fake limp from a real one. Police are piloting the software in large cities including Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, and the start-up is reportedly in contract talks with security companies from Singapore, India, Russia, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic.
US DNA tech firm halts sales in Xinjiang: As the human rights crisis in Xinjiang continues to garner international criticism, the US-based firm Thermo Fisher said on February 20 that it would stop selling DNA biodata collection equipment in Xinjiang. Meanwhile, Kenneth Kidd, a prominent Yale University geneticist who had been providing Chinese officials with genetic material that was used to compare Uighur and Han Chinese DNA, told the New York Times that he had been unaware of how the Chinese side had been using his material, and had been led to believe that he was simply collaborating on research in keeping with ethical norms.
Chinese tech firms racing to Tibet: As Beijing attempts to further tighten its grip on Tibet in order to “maintain stability,” Chinese tech firms that specialize in AI and big data analysis are elbowing their way into the highly sensitive region. AI start-ups and tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent, and iFlyTek are establishing research and venture-capital units in Lhasa, taking advantage of government subsidies meant to promote economic growth in the region and increase the sector’s proximity to a population that Beijing seeks to control. News about the Tibetan tech rush came at an especially sensitive time in the region: March 10 marked the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan unrest and crackdown that led to the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, and March 14 was the anniversary of 2008 protests that sparked the largest crackdown in the Tibetan areas of China in decades.
HONG KONG: Pro-Beijing media outlets harass activists
In recent months, Beijing-controlled media outlets in Hong Kong have been “weaponized” to surveil and smear local activists in the semiautonomous region, once a haven for press freedom in East Asia. Staffers from outlets such as Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po have begun to follow democracy and independence advocates, then run feature stories about the targeted individuals’ supposed secret relationships or shady meetings. A February 26 report from the Globe and Mail describes the “paparazzi-style coverage” of activist Wayne Chan by the two Beijing-linked papers, which ran headlines presenting his lifestyle as indulgent and lacking in morals.
The two papers are also believed to be pursuing Hong Kong activists to Taiwan, as evidenced by detailed reports on several activists’ movements on the island during a January trip. A Reuters examination published on March 15 found that at least 25 people linked to causes disliked by Beijing had been the subject of such harassment when visiting Taiwan over the past three years. Rights activists have argued that the newspapers’ coverage should not be regarded as legitimate journalism, since it regularly involves intrusive surveillance and the publication of personal information about the targets and their families. Some Taiwanese officials concur, stating that the papers had committed “unlawful” acts, and that their journalists would be banned from traveling to Taiwan for several years if they do not provide “a reasonable explanation” for their activities. Similar tactics have been used on foreign critics of Beijing who visited Hong Kong, such as Australia-based American academic Kevin Caricco, as noted in the January 2019 issue of the China Media Bulletin.
BEYOND CHINA: Aggressive diplomats, Chinese printers, Reddit downvoting, propaganda in Taiwan
While Chinese Communist Party authorities keep a tight grip on the domestic media narrative through regular directives to editors and a sophisticated censorship apparatus that limits access to foreign news, Beijing also consistently seeks to influence external public opinion regarding China. This month, examples of its efforts included bullying by Chinese diplomats, domestic printers’ censorship of foreign clients’ orders, and an apparent trolling campaign on Reddit.
Chinese diplomats get aggressive in Sweden, Russia: On March 18, Reporters Without Borders condemned the Chinese embassy in Stockholm for its repeated harassment of Swedish journalists regarding their coverage of China. Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou and his staff had denounced several Swedish news outlets, most recently for publishing an op-ed by a Taiwanese representative advocating support for Taiwan’s democracy in the face of Beijing’s increasing aggression. Relations between Stockholm and Beijing have been strained since the extralegal 2015 cross-border abduction of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, who was again detained in January 2018 while traveling with Swedish diplomats in China. Sweden recalled its former ambassador to China and launched an inquiry into her conduct after she reportedly arranged meetings between two mysterious businessmen and Gui’s daughter on January 24–25. The men pressed Gui’s daughter to remain silent about her father’s case. Meanwhile, on March 5, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an editorial criticizing the Chinese embassy for threatening to blacklist a reporter over a February 28 article on China’s economy.
Chinese printers’ censorship affects foreign publishing: Chinese printers have been turning down books that contain certain words or may be deemed sensitive in China, even when the books are intended for foreign sales and audiences. Australian and New Zealand–based publishers are being denied services by Chinese printers or having timeline delays if their works include mentions of particular Chinese political figures, maps, political movements, religious or geographic keywords, or Chinese dissidents. The printing companies’ actions effectively make the production of such books more expensive by forcing publishers to print them elsewhere, influencing the global marketplace of ideas in Beijing’s favor.
Critical news on China is “downvoted” on Reddit: Users of the link-sharing website Reddit are reporting that the service has become inundated with pro-China accounts that collectively “downvote” critical links about China, or that troll streams with comments matching Beijing’s propaganda. The trend is evident throughout the service on news, geopolitics, and area-focus subreddits. In a March 14 BuzzFeed report, Sinocism publisher Bill Bishop said the phenomenon was part of an “upsurge” in Chinese government accounts “taking the battle overseas to the global internet” over the past 18 months. While many on Reddit have suggested that this is an outgrowth of the long-standing government strategy of deploying paid internet commentators known as the “50 cent party,” Bishop noted that it is impossible to know which comments represent government coordination and which are simply the product of Chinese nationalism.
New Chinese social media apps face foreign scrutiny: As Chinese social media firms innovate and their applications gain worldwide popularity, the services’ controversial activity and users’ fears about data privacy have foreign regulators sounding the alarm. The short-video-sharing app TikTok (the distinct international counterpart of Douyin in China, also owned by ByteDance) agreed on February 28 to pay the US Federal Trade Commission $5.7 million for illegally collecting personal information from children. In India, where Chinese apps now make up 44 of the 100 most downloaded apps in Google’s Playstore, TikTok is in the crosshairs of the state government of Tamil Nadu. Officials there have called for an all-out ban on the grounds that the app allowed users to share sexual material and advertise prostitution. Within India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, there have also been calls for a blanket ban of Chinese apps due to national security and data access concerns.
Taiwan regulator mulls action on Chinese propaganda sites, streaming platforms: As Chinese lawmakers reinforced official rhetoric on reunification with Taiwan, Taiwanese authorities voiced stark concerns about plans by Chinese tech giant Tencent to bring its video platform to the island. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stepped in on March 15 after the government learned that Beijing was encouraging new media services to expand overseas, with Taiwan as a primary target. The MAC said it was concerned that Beijing would attempt to use the Tencent Video platform as an avenue to disseminate political propaganda. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC) said on the same day that permission for mainland-based streaming media would depend on national security considerations, and it called an interministerial meeting to discuss the fate of Tencent and Youku Tudou streaming services in Taiwan. Earlier, on March 13, the NCC had announced that it would also decide whether to restrict www.31t.tw, a Taiwan-registered website that has been promoting content strikingly similar to Chinese government propaganda.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Assertive journalists at the two sessions
Restrictions on the media at the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) this month were tight as usual, intended to preserve a carefully choreographed image of China’s leaders and political system. Nevertheless, Chinese and foreign journalists took advantage of the rare opportunity to get close to the country’s political and economic elite and ask provocative questions—also known as “doorstepping”—even when no answer was forthcoming. Videos and accounts of such efforts circulated on Twitter. Bill Birtles of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation shared a clip of a reporter asking Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “How many Taiwanese diplomatic allies will you take this year?” The Financial Times’ Yang Yuanfen shared a video of a Chinese reporter chasing down Tencent chief executive Pony Ma to ask, “Mr. Ma, at the Congress can you ask them not to block our account?”—presumably referring to censorship of his publication’s public WeChat account.
Although substantive replies to such questions are rare, other forms of official reaction can be equally telling. Xinjiang’s delegation to Beijing apparently arrived for their meeting an hour early in order to avoid 150 journalists who had gathered to report on it. As the delegates left, security officers cleared away reporters to prevent them from calling out questions, with one trying to seize the press pass of Agence France-Presse photographer Pak Yiu. After Cissy Wei Zhou from Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post pressed a CPPCC member on his view of the new foreign investment law, he reportedly covered his mouth and said, “My tongue is sick, cannot talk.”
In past years, subtle and not-so-subtle critiques of China’s media and propaganda system have emerged at the two sessions. In 2016, CPPCC delegate Zhu Zhengfu raised a proposal urging the party-state to be more prudent with the use of forced televised confessions, a trend that has accelerated under Xi Jinping’s leadership. And last year, an expressive eye-roll by one journalist in response to a colleague’s fawning question for a Chinese official went viral and provoked a whole new genre of internet memes.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Implementation of Xi Jinping’s “media convergence” vision: On March 15, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), China’s top Communist Party policy journal, published the full text of a January speech that Xi made at a study session for members of the Politburo. Xi called for acceleration of media integration, a vision of propaganda tactics, regulation, and technology policy that goes far beyond the news sector to include “social, ideological, and cultural resources” and “social management big data,” as a means of achieving greater political control and influence over public opinion. Watch for specific policy measures adopted to implement Xi’s vision, including new efforts to incorporate artificial intelligence into news production and dissemination and initiatives to more effectively deliver party propaganda and narratives to mobile phone users inside and outside China.
Changes to proposed amendments of Hong Kong extradition rules: After the Hong Kong government introduced draft amendments that would ease criminal extraditions last month, local democrats and human rights groups criticized the changes, citing the risk of exposure to the mainland’s flawed justice system. Surprisingly, however, the normally proestablishment local and foreign business community, including the American Chamber of Commerce, have also voiced concerns. Watch for whether the amendments are passed in their current form; partially revised, for instance to exclude economic crimes; or dropped entirely.
Democracies’ responses to Chinese tech expansion: Regulators and internet users in the United States, Taiwan, India, Canada, and elsewhere are increasingly coming to terms with the fact that freedom of expression, electoral integrity, and user privacy may be threatened by the global expansion of applications like Tencent's WeChat and ByteDance's TikTok. Watch for any restrictions or penalties imposed in response, and for the ways in which government agencies in democratic settings try to strike a balance between open commerce on the one hand and national security and human rights on the other.
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人大和政协两会期间，对媒体的限制依然是和往年一样严，这都是意在维护中国领导人们和政治体系经过精心排演的形象。即使如此，中外记者们还是会抓住这难得的机会，接近这个国家的政商界名流，问一些挑战性的问题，所谓「堵问」，甚至明知没有答案也要问。这类努力的视频和记录在推特上流传。澳大利亚广播公司Bill Birtles分享了记者发问外交部长王毅的一则视频片段：「你要拿掉几个台湾邦交国啊？」英国《金融时报》的 Yang Yuan @YuanfenYang分享了一则视频，是一位中国记者追着腾讯总裁马化腾问：「马总，你能不能在会上提议一下，让他们不要封我们的号啊？」这帐号应是指对其旗下的微信公众号的审查。
尽管对类似问题的实质性回答很少见，但其它形式的官方回应也同样说明问题。新疆进京代表团早到一小时，以避开聚在一起的150名记者的发问。代表团离开时，保安人员将记者清场，以防止他们喊问，一名保安人员试图抓住法新社摄影师Pak Yiu的记者证。当香港南华早报的记者Cissy Wei Zhou追问一政协代表，问他怎么看新的外国投资法案时，该代表捂住了嘴说：「我舌头生病，不能说话。(my tongue is sick, cannot talk)」
Chinese president Xi Jinping wants children and students not just to obey, but to love the Communist Party. At an April 19 conference organized by the Politburo to mark the 100th anniversary of the student-led anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement, he said, “We need to … strengthen political guidance for young people, guide them to voluntarily insist on the party’s leadership, to listen to the party and follow the party.”
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.
Political indoctrination has long been a required component of the curriculum at all levels of education in China. Under Xi, however, new steps are being taken to tighten the Communist Party’s ideological control over universities, schools, teachers, and students.
Disciplining teachers
The party’s system for influencing students depends in large part on their teachers and professors. In a speech at a Beijing seminar attended by teachers from across the country in March, Xi called on educators to instill patriotism in the country’s youth and reject “wrong ideas and ideology.” He also emphasized that teachers themselves “should have strict self-discipline, be consistent in class and out of class, online and offline, should consciously carry forward the main melody and actively convey positive energy.”
In recent months, a number of teachers have faced dismissal, detention, and other penalties after falling short of these expectations. On March 25, the Financial Times reported that prominent constitutional law professor Xu Zhangrun had been barred from teaching at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. He had written numerous essays that sharply and eloquently criticized the top leadership’s decisions, often drawing on ancient Chinese philosophy, literature, and political theory to make his arguments. Xu was subsequently stripped of his other positions and teaching responsibilities. On April 8, scholar Yu Jianrong, known for his research on China’s peasants, had his Sina Weibo microblogging account, which had 7.2 million followers, silenced such that he could no longer post comments, only read others’ messages.
In two other cases, educators have faced jail time for sharing information about the persecuted Falun Gong spiritual group in their private capacities. In January, Zeng Hao, a business professor at Tianhe College in Guangdong Province, was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison after posting images related to Falun Gong on Tencent’s QQ messaging platform. On April 15, Amnesty International issued an urgent action for high school chemistry teacher Chen Yan, who is expected to face trial for handing out a calendar with information about Falun Gong to someone on a Beijing street.
In early March, the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report outlining the details of 386 Uighur scholars, students, and other intellectuals who have been swept into detention amid a massive reeducation effort targeting Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.
Surveillance inside and outside the classroom
In an April 8 article, Radio Free Asia noted increased efforts to monitor Chinese university students. Reporters found online documents showing how institutions like Wuhan University of Science and Technology are continually recruiting students to act as informants on their classmates and teachers, typically submitting reports to authorities every two weeks. One former professor said the recruitment began in earnest in 2014, shortly after surveillance cameras began being widely installed on campuses in 2013.
More recently, surveillance cameras linked to facial recognition software and brainwave-detecting headbands have appeared in elementary and secondary schools, provoking nervousness and anger among some pupils. Although the monitoring is ostensibly for the purpose of tracking students’ focus and study habits, it could also be used to detect ideological transgressions by teachers or students.
Universities, government agencies, and private companies are increasingly trying to gain access to students’ social media accounts and other online information. Officials at universities in Beijing and Anhui Province have reportedly asked students to register the details of their private and public accounts on Tencent’s WeChat and QQ platforms. In February the company China Youth Credit Management (CY Credit), working with the Communist Youth League, launched an application called “Unictown,” which aims to serve as the foundation for a specialized social credit system for China’s youth. The app is meant to track young adults’ behavior and incentivize activities that are considered positive or socially beneficial. The South China Morning Post reports that the firm has already collected data from 70 million people, is building a database of 90 million youth league volunteers, and aspires within a few years to cover all 460 million Chinese aged 18 to 45.
Curriculum controls and direct indoctrination
The Unictown app is not the only new party-linked mobile application targeting China’s youth. When the “Study Xi, Strengthen China” app was launched in January by the party’s propaganda department, a corresponding version for young people also sprung up on the website, mobile app, and social media accounts of the party’s media mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. According to the South China Morning Post, the app requires “schoolchildren to study texts related to Xi’s political ideology.”
In Xinjiang, young Muslim minority children are more directly exposed to indoctrination. Those whose parents have been detained for “reeducation” are themselves placed in state-run orphanages, where they are reportedly required to speak Chinese, eat pork, and read slogans like “I’m Chinese; I love my country.” In some instances children are being used to inform on their parents. An April 4 multimedia report by the New York Times on conditions in the ancient city of Kashgar included a chilling account of kindergarteners being interrogated. As one interviewee described it, “My daughter had a classmate who said, ‘My mom teaches me Quran.’ The next day, they are gone.”
In addition to indoctrinating students on Communist Party ideology, the authorities are clamping down on access to alternative ideas, including those associated with democratic governance. Over the past year, China’s Education Ministry has conducted countrywide audits of constitutional law textbooks, and books by reform-minded professors have reportedly been removed from online booksellers. A series of foreign academic publishers have come under pressure to remove certain articles from collections available in China, and at least some have complied.
Global reach
The Communist Party’s watchful gaze also follows Chinese students who study abroad, whether through student informants, consulate-linked Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, or monitoring of WeChat accounts. One 2018 survey by Cheryl Yu, then a graduate student at the University of Washington, found that among 72 Chinese respondents from at least 31 American universities, 58 percent were aware of potential Chinese government surveillance in the United States. Yu also found that 80 percent of the students reported self-censoring (whether or not they demonstrated awareness of official surveillance) by choosing not to attend university events on politically sensitive topics, discuss such topics with large groups of fellow Chinese, or even admit to a willingness to learn about the issues.
Students who overstep the party’s redlines while abroad risk serious reprisals. On April 10, Mirror Media published an emotional account by Li Jiabao from Shandong Province, who had criticized China’s authoritarian system in a live-stream broadcast while studying in Taiwan. Soon afterward, he found that his QQ, WeChat, Taobao, and Alipay accounts were all deleted. As he counted down the days before he had to return to China, he reported having nightmares.
Impact and ramifications
Recent activism by Marxist students from elite universities on behalf of exploited Chinese workers hints at the ways in which ideological indoctrination could backfire for the party, whose actual governance is often in conflict with its loftier principles. Many other young people may reject or disregard the stilted propaganda entirely, and even high school students have balked at the onerous surveillance being imposed on them, in at least one case dismantling their classroom cameras.
Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities’ efforts to shape students’ minds have clearly had some success. Young Chinese studying abroad are often unwilling to explore forbidden topics, and domestic graduates who are employed as censors require crash courses on events like the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, suggesting that they have large blind spots in their knowledge of the world and their country.
China’s youth, in other words, are growing up in a more manipulated information environment than their parents’ generation or their foreign counterparts. There is a very real danger that this generation will be less open-minded, more nationalistic, more supportive of authoritarian rule, and more isolated from a common set of facts and norms that previously facilitated peaceful international exchanges.
To mitigate such an outcome, foreign educational institutions should reexamine the terms of their partnerships with Chinese universities, safeguard the academic freedom and security of their Chinese students, and find alternative channels for engaging students in China with the full spectrum of ideas necessary for a 21st-century education.
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin.This article was also published in the Diplomat on April 25, 2019.
Photo caption: Children in an elementary school in Zhejiang wear brainwave-reading headbands that reportedly monitor their attention levels in class. Credit:SupChina
Authorities escalate crackdown on Twitter and virtual private networks
A police crackdown on users of Twitter and virtual private networks (VPNs) that was first reported in late 2018 appears to be expanding and escalating, with relatively low-profile individuals facing reprisals for previously tolerated activities like opening an account, following overseas news, “liking” posts, or using VPN software on mobile phones. It remains unclear what has triggered the crackdown or how Chinese authorities have been able to trace accounts to individual users, but the shift suggests tighter enforcement of a 2017 ban on unauthorized VPN services and an effort to silence and isolate independent Chinese voices on a global social media platform. Specifically, the Financial Times, Radio Free Asia, and other outlets have reported the following cases from at least five different provinces, most within the past two months:
Zhu Xiuyuan, a lawyer from Haining in Zhejiang Province, was warned by police in March that he had “liked many harmful posts that insulted the party.”
An anonymous lawyer who had registered but never used “anti-China software” was cautioned for violating regulations governing the professional conduct of attorneys.
An editor at a provincial state broadcaster in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, was demoted and docked pay for registering a Twitter account and following “harmful information from illegal overseas websites.”
Sun Yuanping of Hebei Province was detained by police on March 22 for “disorderly behavior” after he forwarded content that was critical of the Chinese government via his personal Twitter account; he was then sentenced to seven days’ administrative detention.
On March 25, police warned a man in Pengxi, Sichuan Province, “not to use illegal channels to access the international internet,” having found VPN software on his mobile phone.
A man in Guangdong Province was fined 1,000 yuan ($148) in December 2018 for using the circumvention app Lantern Pro.
Meanwhile, in late March, Google confirmed that it had long had a policy of banning VPN providers from purchasing banner ads in China and other “countries where such servers are illegal.” Users wishing to continue using Twitter may consider ensuring that no personally identifying information is publicly available on their profiles or removing their phone number from the account and using the application only on a computer.
Surveillance updates: Uighur faces, prisoners, street cleaners, rental homes
As artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced surveillance technologies spread across China and are used in ever more intrusive ways, new questions are being raised—internationally and by Chinese citizens themselves—about the systems’ ethical implications, and investors are under pressure to disassociate themselves from surveillance companies as a result.
AI and racial profiling: An April 14 article by the New York Timesrevealed that Chinese authorities have been using facial recognition technology since 2018 to surveil the minority Uighur population, not only in Xinjiang but throughout China. The AI software that powers the system has been trained to recognize the facial features of Uighurs and distinguish them from those of China’s ethnic Han majority. According to the website of CloudWalk, one of the Chinese AI companies that developed the product, the system is able to alert police if there is an unexpected increase in the number of Uighurs living in a neighborhood. Police departments in 16 provinces have expressed interest in acquiring the technology to monitor their local Uighur populations. In the city of Sanmenxia in Henan Province, local law enforcement officials conducted half a million face scans over the course of a single month to test the capacity of the system to register Uighur faces.
AI and a ‘smart prison’: A high-security prison in Yanjiao, Hebei Province, has installed a security camera system and hidden sensors powered by artificial intelligence. A joint product of surveillance technology company Tiandy and domestic public research institutes, the system is purportedly able to monitor each of the prison’s 1,600 detainees simultaneously and register any abnormal activity, all without the assistance of a human operator. Facial recognition and movement analysis capacities allow the system to track individuals throughout Yancheng prison—home to numerous high-profile detainees, including former Chongqing mayor Bo Xilai’s wife, Gu Kailai—and produce comprehensive daily reports. While project representatives have claimed that the system will make prison breaks a thing of the past, critics have noted that it could violate the dignity and impact the mental health of prisoners subjected to round-the-clock surveillance. A 2017 Freedom House study and accounts by human rights lawyers indicate that in some cases, local police have been more lenient with religious and political prisoners who gain their sympathy than their supervisors would likely approve; widespread use of this type of surveillance could undermine the limited protection that such prisoners occasionally receive.
Street-cleaner monitoring: Chinese netizens have responded with anger to reports that street cleaners in the city of Jiangsu have been required since March to wear wristbands that monitor their location and warn them against “slacking off.” The wristbands are part of a local government effort aimed at promoting “intelligent cleaning” through real-time tracking of the city’s public cleaners and the issuing of warnings to any wearer who remains in one place for more than 20 minutes. China’s urban street cleaners are widely considered to be underpaid and overworked, and Chinese internet users ridiculed the plan as a waste of public resources, with some recommending that the program instead be applied to lazy government officials.
Surveillance of rental properties: The online magazine Bitter Winterreports that since November a number of landlords in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, have been ordered by local authorities to install security cameras in the living rooms of rental units. Police are said to be conducting inspections of local units to ensure that security cameras have been installed, and have been issuing fines of 500 yuan ($75) to landlords who fail to comply. Gated communities have also been ordered to install surveillance cameras in elevators, and cameras equipped with facial recognition software at entrances to the community. The moves have been justified on the grounds of “maintaining public security”, though residents have already complained about violations of their privacy.
Pressure grows on surveillance company investors: The Financial Times reported on March 29 that two of the largest US pension funds—the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—have stakes in Hikvision, a partly state-owned Chinese surveillance company linked to the network of detention camps for Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. In another form of apparent complicity, research collaborations on AI projects between the People’s Liberation Army’s University of Defense Technology and the US companies Google and Microsoft were reported in recentweeks. Writing in a March 19 piece in Foreign Policy, Lindsay Gorman and Matt Schrader of the Alliance for Securing Democracy warned that foreign investors may “end up owning some of the responsibility for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere” if they fail to fully understand the plans of their Chinese partners. While Chinese companies often seem immune to foreign criticism, on April 15 the Financial Times reported that Chinese AI company SenseTime had sold its 51 percent stake in the joint venture Tangli Technologies, which is building surveillance systems targeting Uighurs, out of concern that its association with the controversial program would alienate potential foreign investors in the run-up to its initial public offering.
Censorship updates: ‘People’s Daily’ innovations, streamer purges, music and drama culls
‘People’s Daily’ aids other media with censorship: On March 28, Reuters reported that the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily is increasing the number of AI-assisted internet censors working for its website, People.cn. The Shanghai-listed People.cn is also earning income and attracting investors as other websites and mobile applications turn to its staff for guidance amid stricter censorship rules, taking advantage of its special relationship with the party and presumed grasp of top leaders’ redlines. News aggregator Jinri Toutiao and tech company Liangziyun are among those that have signed lucrative deals with People.cn to help delete content that violates state and party guidelines. This news comes on the heels of a March 26 report from Supchina that People.cn had partnered with the municipal government of Jinan, Shandong Province, to turn the city into a hub for a new unit dedicated to enhancing the website’s censorship capabilities.
Influential bloggers, live-streamers banned: An April 15 report on Technode highlights the disappearance of thousands of Chinese live-streaming accounts in the latest example of tightening government controls on such media. In 2018, government censors deleted roughly 5,000 channels for allegedly promoting “vulgar” content, while platforms were told to engage in greater self-censorship. The deleted channels included some of China’s most popular live-streamers, like Li Tianyou, Lu Benwei, Chen Yifa, and Yang Kaili, each of whose followers numbered in the tens of millions. Some were banned for using profane language, while others mocked the national anthem or relayed an unofficial narrative on the 1937–38 Nanjing Massacre. According to a March 16 report in the New York Times, recent targets have also included influential bloggers like Ma Ling, whose lifestyle blog was shuttered on February 21 for spreading “false news.” Commentator Wang Yongzhi told the Times that “the party simply can’t tolerate anyone who has a big influence on society.”
Hong Kong singers and dramas censored: A Jacky Cheung song released 30 years ago to comment on the Tiananmen massacre of June 4, 1989, has been removed from Apple Music’s mainland Chinese platform. According to a Standnews report from April 7, the removal of the 1990 song “The Path of Man” seems to have occurred after March 28. Two Hong Kong singers and prodemocracy activists, Denise Ho and Anthony Wong, have also had their music removed from Apple Music’s mainland China services. The two celebrities have been persona non grata in mainland China since 2014, after they publicly offered support to the Occupy Central protests in Hong Kong. Separately, one of China’s most popular television shows, Yanxi Palace, has been pulled from the airwaves after it and other period dramas were criticized in state media for “propagating a luxurious and hedonistic lifestyle, encouraging admiration for imperial life and a glorification of emperors overshadowing the heroes of today,” according to a February 8 report by the BBC. Other costume dramas have also fallen afoul of China’s media controls. An episode of Qin Empire 3, aired on China Central Television on February 29, was partially censored after netizens circulated screenshots showing a two-second clip in which a character reads a list of “traitors” that includes the names of Xi Jinping and other top party leaders.
HONG KONG: Amid Umbrella Movement convictions, new threats to free speech emerge
On April 8, a Hong Kong judge convicted nine democracy activists—including Pastor Chu Yiu-ming and Professors Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man—for their role in the 2014 Occupy Central or Umbrella Movement protests. The group was sentenced on April 24, with four heading to jail for between eight and 16 months (including Tai and Chan), while others received suspended sentences, community service, or sentencing postponement The judge rejected the defendants’ free speech claims, finding that the occupation of some of the city’s busiest intersections “impinge[d] unreasonably upon the rights of others.”
A series of other recent developments also suggest that freedom of speech is in serious danger in Hong Kong:
Museum commemorating 1989 Tiananmen Massacre vandalized: A museum in Hong Kong commemorating the June 1989 massacre of prodemocracy protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and other locations was vandalized earlier this month. Staff at the museum, which was set to open on April 26, alerted the police after discovering on April 7 that the lock on the front door had been removed, electrical outlets and a fuse box had been splashed with salt water, and holes had been punched in a chair. Speaking to reporters, Albert Ho, chair of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democracy Movements in China, which established the museum, said “those who did this must be wanting to please those in power.” Security cameras have since been installed at the museum.
‘Apple Daily’ advertisers intimidated: Reporters Without Borders has called on Hong Kong’s former chief executive, C.Y. Leung, to cease his attacks on the prodemocracy newspaper Apple Daily and its advertisers. Since February, Leung—in his current capacity as vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a mainland government advisory body—has been using his Facebook page to denounce companies by name for taking out advertisements in Apple Daily. Leung has a history of press intimidation. In 2018, he brought a defamation suit against a journalist who had written about his possible links with organized crime. In August of that year, Leung denounced the Foreign Correspondents Club of Hong Kong for hosting a talk by a proponent of Hong Kong independence. Apple Daily has also faced interference with its advertising in the past. The paper has long been the subject of an ad boycott by the powerful and pro-Beijing real-estate industry, and in 2014, Apple Daily reported that the London-based banks HSBC and Standard Chartered had pulled their ads under pressure from the Chinese government.
Electronic ID contract given to mainland tech firm: It was announced on April 2 that mainland Chinese firm Ping An Technology had been awarded a contract to build an electronic identification (eID) system for the Hong Kong government. As part of the territory’s “Smart City Blueprint,” the eID system will allow residents to access a hundred online services, like registering for public housing or a vehicle license plate. The Hong Kong government claims that the system will not store personal data and that measures have been taken to ensure the privacy of the city’s residents. Yet Human Rights Watch’s Hong Kong office has noted the possibility that eID may become a tool of government surveillance.
BEYOND CHINA: Australia and Taiwan meddling, 1989 ad, Uighurs trolled, Zambia broadcasting
WeChat use by Australian politicians, media outlets: Concerns have been raised that politicians in Australia may be forced to self-censor when communicating on Tencent’s WeChat messaging service. Many Australian politicians—including the prime minister and the head of the opposition—use the Chinese application to reach out to Chinese-speaking Australian voters. Yet critics allege that use of WeChat may lead Australian politicians to avoid discussing subjects that are considered politically sensitive by the Chinese government, in order to avoid losing access to their accounts. Several of the accounts are registered with Chinese phone numbers, increasing the risk that WeChat itself or the Chinese person or company that was used to create the account could alter content under Chinese government pressure. Professor John Fitzgerald of Swinburne University said, “We are entering uncharted territory. WeChat was not designed to work in a democracy, and a democracy can’t work with WeChat.”
Local Australian council ends partnership with independent Chinese media: China’s consulate in Sydney stands accused of bullying a local council into banning an Australian Chinese-language newspaper from sponsoring a Chinese New Year event. Over a 14-month period ending in January 2018, Georges Rivers Council received eight warnings from the Chinese consulate about Vision China Times, a newspaper that regularly publishes critical news about China’s government. The consulate claimed that ties between the council and the paper, if allowed to continue, would damage Sino-Australian relations. The council subsequently restricted the paper’s sponsorship.
China attempts to influence Taiwan elections through social media: Suspected Chinese government agents have made quiet offers to buy popular pro-Taiwan Facebook pages in the run-up to next year’s general elections in Taiwan. Recruitment advertisements for live-streamers with pro-unification views have also emerged online. The efforts seem to be part of a coordinated attempt by the Chinese government to influence Taiwan’s elections. The Taiwan government has responded by placing greater restrictions on video streaming services from the Chinese companies Baidu and Tencent.
Leica backs away from Tiananmen ad: German camera company Leica has backed away from a promotional video that depicts the iconic “Tank Man” who attempted to block a Chinese military crackdown on prodemocracy protesters in 1989. A report by the South China Moring Post on April 19 notes that discussion of Leica was banned on Chinese social media following the release of the video. The company soon issued a public disavowal of the short film, which was produced by the public relations firm F/Nazca Saatchi Saatchi. The video arrived just weeks before the 30th anniversary of the 1989 massacre.
Coordinated troll attack on Uighur activists’ Facebook pages: On April 10, pro-Beijing trolls launched a coordinated attack against Uighur rights groups on Facebook, bombarding their pages with hostile comments. In a tweet on April 10, the World Uyghur Congress noted that many of the comments simply pasted text from a Communist Party white paper on Xinjiang. That same day, the campaign received enthusiastic coverage from state-run tabloid Global Times, which praised the attackers as “patriotic Chinese netizens” fighting against “terrorists” and “separatists.”
Digital migration in Zambia: Chinese investment in the Zambian state broadcaster’s move from analog to digital transmission has raised concerns about the impact of growing Chinese influence in the country. The partnership between Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and Chinese service provider StarTimes to create a joint venture—TopStar—reportedly violates domestic laws against any single media entity having licenses for both content transmission and content creation. The deal was also made without approval from either ZNBC’s board or Zambia’s parliament, leading to suspicions of corruption. Zambia is not the only regional market StarTimes has entered. It has actively partnered with state broadcasters across Africa as part of a soft-power drive by the Chinese government.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Chinese engineers mobilize on GitHub
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.The widely used code-sharing site GitHub has become a platform for Chinese tech employees to expose and protest exploitative working conditions. The site, used by 31 million software developers worldwide, is accessible in China. The movement began in late March, when a user posted a repository complaining about the 996 work schedule—9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week—and naming two e-commerce firms that required it. The post used the term 996.ICU (based on a joke that the harsh schedule will land workers in a hospital’s intensive care unit), which has since become the movement’s moniker. Within two days, the post had garnered over 30,000 stars, a function that allows GitHub users to bookmark a project they like, pushing it to the top-ranked spot on the site’s trending page.
By mid-April, the number of stars had reached 230,000, and the activism had evolved in a more sophisticated and international direction. Developers began posting firsthand accounts about particular companies that employed the 996 schedule. They argued that such practices violate China’s labor laws, which limit work weeks to 44 hours or require overtime payments. Meanwhile, Shanghai-based programmer Suji Yan and his wife, Katt Gu, designed a free software license for the 996.ICU GitHub campaign. It allows companies to signal that they follow labor laws. Yan told National Public Radio that within 48 hours “a lot of small and medium companies started to put all their work in the anti-996 license to show that they are a good company.”
The campaign has also encountered some backlash. The web browsers of several big Chinese tech firms like Tencent and Xiaomi have reportedly blocked the page. This may be because they are among the companies that employ the harsh 996 schedule. Chinese government censors so far have not taken action to block the site, however, because doing so would cut off a wide array of content and collaboration that is critical to innovation in the country.
But fears remain that the government will instead put pressure on Microsoft, which owns GitHub and has extensive business interests in China, to remove the page. In an effort to preempt such a move, employees from Microsoft and other international tech firms like Google and TripAdvisor posted an open letter on GitHub on April 22 expressing solidarity with the campaign and encouraging “Microsoft and GitHub to keep the 996.ICU GitHub repository uncensored and available to everyone.” By April 24, the letter had garnered 250 signatures from software engineers and other tech workers around the world.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Run-up to Tiananmen anniversary: Watch for increased censorship, surveillance, and harassment or “forced vacations” for activists, particularly in Beijing, in advance of the 30th anniversary of the army’s suppression of prodemocracy protests on June 4, 1989. Outside China, watch for various events and public statements by foreign governments and civil society groups to commemorate those killed in the crackdown.
GitHub censorship: Watch for any steps by the Chinese government to limit access to GitHub or compel Microsoft to remove the 996.ICU page.
More pressure on teachers, students: As more educational institutions, tech companies, and local party cadres seek to implement Xi Jinping’s orders to raise a generation of young people who are fiercely loyal to the Communist Party, watch for new examples of reprisals, surveillance, and indoctrination aimed at instructors, college students, and children.
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澳洲當地議會終止與中國獨立媒體的合作：中共駐悉尼領事館被控施壓地方議會禁止澳洲中文報紙贊助中國新年活動。截止2018年1月的14個月期間，喬治河市政廳（Georges River Council）收到中共領事館關於《看中國》（Vision China Times）的八次警告，該報定期發表有關中共政府的評論性新聞。該領事館聲稱市政廳和媒體合作關係，如果得到允許繼續合作，將損害中澳兩國關係。喬治河市政廳隨後限制了該報刊（對中國新年活動）的贊助。
澳洲当地议会终止与中国独立媒体的合作：中共驻悉尼领事馆被控施压地方议会禁止澳洲中文报纸赞助中国新年活动。截止2018年1月的14个月期间，乔治河市政厅（Georges River Council）收到中共领事馆关于《看中国》（Vision China Times）的八次警告，该报定期发表有关中共政府的评论性新闻。该领事馆声称市政厅和媒体合作关系，如果得到允许继续合作，将损害中澳两国关系。乔治河市政厅随后限制了该报刊（对中国新年活动）的赞助。
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.Thirty years ago this week, thousands of students occupied Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, engaging in a hunger strike to call for political and economic reform. Other citizens across the country—professors, workers, even party cadres—were slowly joining in their demands for democracy and transparency. The movement was violently crushed on the night of June 4, 1989, but over the decades that followed, a budding civil society sector began to develop and professionalize, investigative journalism and legal advocacy provoked policy changes, and the country experienced a religious revival.
Political repression, surveillance, and censorship have all intensified since 2012 under the leadership of Communist Party head Xi Jinping. Even so, various forms of protest and activism have survived and continue to emerge.
The following trends point to an environment that is highly restrictive but also more complex, and potentially less stable, than it first appears.
The chilling effect is real
Running a nonprofit advocacy organization, working as an investigative journalist, practicing one’s faith, or simply sharing a political joke with friends on social media is more difficult and risky in today’s China than it was even three years ago. Some long-standing civil society groups are closing their doors, prominent journalists are changing careers, and ordinary Chinese are more careful about their online communications.
Numerous factors have contributed to this change, but tightening controls on Tencent’s ubiquitous WeChat messaging application—including several rounds of large-scale account deletions over the past 18 months, often for relatively minor political infractions—have played a unique role in encouraging users to self-censor. Unlike with the Sina Weibo microblogging platform, which was the focus of a fierce crackdown in 2013–14, a shuttered WeChat account does not just silence the user’s public commentary. It also cuts the individual off from an entire network of contacts as well as from options for electronic payment, seriously affecting his or her ability to function normally in modern Chinese society. This powerful deterrent is far more common than other penalties like imprisonment, though jail sentences have also increased in recent years.
Self-censorship in the online world is slowly spilling over into face-to-face conversations. “It’s a dead end with friends. Nobody wants to talk about anything even remotely political,” according to one expatriate who has lived in China for over 20 years. “Today most families are careful about what they say, even to loved ones.” Foreign scholars who have attended conferences in China in recent years have similarly remarked on the narrowed space for academic discussion and the increased reticence of Chinese counterparts to frankly relay their views.
‘Dissent is not dead’
Despite this chill, scholar Elizabeth Economy wrote in an article published last month that “in critical respects, the political values and spirit of collective action embodied in the 1989 democracy movement have endured and even thrived.” She notes that despite the narrowing room for dissent under Xi, scholars continue to pen widely circulated articles calling for a political opening, and broad social movements have emerged around issues like women’s rights, labor rights, and the environment. Thousands of public protests take place across China each year, including some 1,700 documented workers’ strikes in 2018.
Another China specialist, Teresa Wright, pointed out in her 2018 book on popular protest in China that “the Chinese public is far from passive, obedient, or complacent. To the contrary, Chinese citizens often boldly, defiantly, and doggedly confront authority when they feel that their rights have been violated or that they have been treated unjustly.”
Dissent in China takes many forms and reflects a range of views. The more intellectual commentators tend to critique Xi’s policy choices and call for a return to the more open economy and society associated with some of his predecessors. Bolder activists seek to challenge the legitimacy of Communist Party rule or directly explore political alternatives. The latter have typically garnered the harshest penalties, but as repression expands to individuals who seek to improve party-state governance without challenging the system itself—including public interest lawyers and liberal economists—the prospects for such modest reform are dimming.
Meanwhile, as the screws have tightened on formal civil society organizations, the latest activist campaigns have featured loose networks of individuals joining together to call for change, often from populations that have traditionally remained silent. In fact, every time there appears to be a lull in dissent, a new source of criticism or mobilization makes itself known. Recent examples include efforts by Marxist students at top universities to assist striking workers, engineers at tech companies organizing to push back against a grinding 996 schedule (9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week), and the #MeToo movement, which at one point drew 30 million Chinese in a single month to discuss sexual harassment online.
Religious resistance on the rise
The relative potency of decentralized networks of dissent and the way in which expanding repression can generate pushback from new sources come together in another underappreciated trend: Resistance among religious believers is growing even as religious persecution increases. A key finding from a 2017 Freedom House report on religion in China was that “members of all faith communities have responded to official controls with creativity and with courage, at times scoring significant victories.”
Millions of believers defy official restrictions in their daily lives, some openly and others with great secrecy. Chinese Buddhists have resisted efforts to exploit holy sites for economic purposes. Christians and Falun Gong adherents advocate for the release of detained coreligionists. Tibetan Buddhists have marched through marketplaces calling for the return of the Dalai Lama. Uighur Muslims have used various means to document and expose harsh conditions in Xinjiang.
Some efforts extend beyond an individual religious community in an attempt to influence the beliefs and behaviors of the broader Chinese public, including party and state officials. Registered and underground church leaders have worked with rights lawyers to challenge arrests and property disputes in court. Activists have conducted trainings to increase legal awareness among congregants and made phone calls to police in an effort to discourage them from violating believers’ rights under Chinese law.
Since 2004, Falun Gong practitioners and supporters have, as a 2015 scholarly study noted, encouraged “citizens to issue ‘tuidang’ (‘withdraw from the party’) statements, symbolically severing their affiliations with the party, youth league, or young pioneers as a form of catharsis and a way to clear the conscience.” Focused as it is on the realms of spirit and culture, the “tuidang movement” does not necessarily aim to overthrow the Communist Party, but rather encourages Chinese to imagine a future without it and to renounce support for its violent tendencies. The campaign has spread by word of mouth, messages written on paper currency, and via social media and overseas websites accessible through virtual private networks (VPNs).
Resilience through technology
Both religious and secular dissidents in China confront the world’s most sophisticated system of information control. They have responded by developing complex workarounds to achieve the basic level of free communication that people in many countries take for granted.
Simply accessing uncensored news has become more difficult thanks to tightening restrictions on VPN use. Nevertheless, partial data from several developers indicate that at least 20 to 30 million people in China jumped the so-called Great Firewall in 2018. The technologists who develop and maintain the necessary circumvention tools are continually innovating to serve their users as efficiently, consistently, and securely as possible. Meanwhile, some Chinese citizens have risked prison to help install satellite dishes capable of receiving overseas content for their neighbors or to secure unregistered SIM cards.
As censorship, surveillance, and legal liabilities have increased on popular social media platforms like Sina Weibo and WeChat, netizens have turned to other spaces to mobilize and communicate with the outside world. In two examples from the past year, users posted open letters in metadata accompanying blockchain transactions, and tech workers used GitHub—an unblocked global code-sharing site—to protest harsh working conditions, garnering notable support from their international colleagues. Online crowdfunding has also helped support specific initiatives, like subway ads denouncing sexual harassment, or the broader operations of Chinese civil society organizations.
An uncertain future
People in China may be increasingly reluctant to voice public criticism of the Communist Party or Xi Jinping, or even to share politically sensitive information, but no one should underestimate the actual level of dissatisfaction with Xi’s heavy-handed rule. The sheer scale of censorship and spikes in netizen efforts to jump the Great Firewall at politically significant moments—such as the period surrounding the removal of presidential term limits in 2018—hint at a notable degree of latent dissent. Indeed, Xi’s obsession with tightening control and his tendency to abandon the party’s own past strategies for political survival belie deep insecurities within the regime.
Thirty years ago, over a million Chinese people from every walk of life took to the streets to call for greater freedom and better governance. Although it is hard to imagine a repeat of those events today, the desire for a freer, more just China lives on in the hearts and daily actions of many.
Nationalist rhetoric, strict censorship shape coverage of US-China trade war
Over the past month, Chinese government censors remained busy stifling open discussion of the escalating trade war with the United States. In a leaked censorship directive published by China Digital Times and dated May 6, the Ministry of Public Security and the Cyberspace Administration of China ordered local public security and internet management departments to “organize personnel to control and delete rumors related to increased American tariffs on China.” Another directive from the same day prohibited all websites from “publishing news and commentary on the China-US trade war.” Such moves are not new. As tensions between the two countries rose last year, the trade war became the most heavily censored topic in a large sample of public WeChat accounts, according to researchers at the University of Hong Kong. Censorship has only increased as ongoing bilateral talks fail to bear fruit.
In addition to the impact on ordinary news consumers, state censorship has harmed China’s retail investors, according to a May 8 article from Reuters. When US president Donald Trump threatened on May 5 to raise tariffs on Chinese goods from 10 percent to 25 percent, his comments went unreported in Chinese state media despite the ensuing 5 percent plunge in Chinese stock benchmarks, leaving many individual investors in the dark about the catalyst for the drop. More sophisticated investors have also felt the effects of state censorship. A May 15 report in MarketWatch cited quantitative investors who said that media controls undermined the accuracy of algorithms they used to sift through Chinese social media posts for signals of retail investor sentiment.
As the Chinese government threatened on May 13 to respond to higher US tariffs with $60 billion in new tariffs of their own, Chinese media suddenly became increasingly vocal, nationalistic, and defensive, performing an about-face after days of conciliatory rhetoric from official sources. In a segment on the flagship evening news program of state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) that subsequently went viral, a news anchor declared, “If the US wants to fight, we’ll be with them until the end.” A May 13 editorial prominently featured by Xinhua News Agency was similarly direct: “The American side fights because of greed and arrogance.... China is fighting back to protect its legitimate rights and interests.”
State propaganda “appears to be preparing the public for a protracted and costly trade war,” wrote professor Jessica Chen Weiss in the Washington Post on May 15. Part of this preparation has involved drawing on nationalist historical narratives. For example, CCTV’s movie channel replaced regular programming with films on fighting the United States during the Korean War. According to a May 14 piece in the New York Times, “commentators have drawn comparisons between the current trade dispute and China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign powers during the colonial era.” Some netizen content has echoed the nationalistic tone, with many users sharing a privately produced militant song about the trade war.
Despite these bold words, China may be in a weaker position than the Communist Party would like to admit. Writing in the New York Times on May 7, Hong Kong commentator and professor Yi-Zheng Lian speculated that in the first great test of Sino-US ties, President Xi Jinping may have mismanaged the situation by overreaching in his attempt to challenge the United States, which could undermine his legitimacy.
Surveillance updates: Xinjiang police app, new data leaks, WeChat keyword monitoring
Reverse-engineered policing app from Xinjiang: On May 2, Human Rights Watch released a reverse-engineered version of an application that Chinese police use to categorize and surveil the population in Xinjiang. The app, which is connected to the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, allows police to collect the personal data of ethnic minority Muslims in the region, including blood type, political affiliation, and whether a person’s phone includes secure communications applications like WhatsApp or Telegram, or tools used to jump China’s so-called Great Firewall and reach the uncensored internet. People are classified according to 36 suspicious personality types, which include those who have stopped using smartphones, people who enthusiastically collect donations for mosques, and even those believed to be “using an abnormal amount of electricity.” According to Human Rights Watch, “based on these broad and dubious criteria, the system generates lists of people to be evaluated by officials for detention.” It adds that although the Xinjiang-based tracking and database system is particularly intrusive, its basic design matches others that police are planning to implement throughout China.
Beijing smart-city data leak: In the latest example of a public surveillance system with shoddy data security, researcher John Wethington discovered an unsecured Chinese smart-city database hosted by Alibaba, as Tech Crunch reported on May 3. The database contains the personal information of hundreds of people in two housing districts in eastern Beijing, including facial recognition files that collate individuals based on approximate age and even ethnicity. The system also reportedly pulls in data from police to alert managers about people of interest or criminal suspects, with labels such as “drug addict.” In a May 3 tweet, Beijing correspondent Emily Feng of US National Public Radio noted that the database is also linked to sensors that scan mobile devices and computers in the neighborhood.
Keywords trigger WeChat monitoring inside, outside China:On April 22, researcher Victor Gevers of GDI Foundation revealed that WeChat is filtering billions of messages for “review” based on keyword triggers. He noted that “not all the dialogues were in Chinese or only had GPS coordinates in China.” For example, on March 18 alone, 3.6 billion messages in Chinese, 59 million in English, and 26 million in other languages were captured and routed to operators. Keywords triggering capture of the entire conversation included “Xi Jinping,” “CCP,” “1989,” and “Tibet.” While the majority of the messages were sent in China, some 19 million English-language messages were captured from users around the globe, including people in North America, Europe, South America, Taiwan, and Australia.
Internet censorship and “rectification” on rise ahead of June 4 anniversary: Chinese authorities are expanding supervision of online and social media platforms as they attempt to crack down on illicit and politically sensitive content in the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, in which the military opened fire on peaceful Beijing protesters on June 4, 1989. The website of the photo and media agency Visual China Group was relaunched on May 12 after undergoing “rectification” and establishing a content review agreement with the Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily. As part of the agreement, users will be able to report “harmful” material, including political content, to the agency. This follows reports that on May 11, mobile dating applications Momo and Tantan suspended their social newsfeed functions for a month on orders from the government. Access to uncensored material beyond China’s so-called Great Firewall has also been curtailed. The Chinese government has shut down hundreds of virtual private network (VPN) servers over the last month, according to a May 6 report on Blokt, although many free circumvention tools continue to function. The BBC reported on May 14 that versions of Wikipedia in all languages have been blocked in China since late April. Previously, only the Chinese-language version and non-Chinese articles related to sensitive topics like the Dalai Lama were inaccessible in the country.
Censors, police target online labor-rights activism: The censorship and repression of labor activists has intensified under President Xi Jinping. Wei Zhili, editor of the labor rights website ilabour.net, was arrested on March 19 in Guangzhou for “disturbing public order.” His colleague Ke Chengbing has disappeared and is believed to be held by police, while Yang Zhengjun, editor in chief of the workers’ rights website New Generation, has been detained since January 8. Other activists have also disappeared. Wuqiong Wenqing, the former editor of a left-wing feminist website whose work focused heavily on workers’ rights, has been missing since May 8 after being detained by police in Beijing. On May 12, the South China Morning Post reported that police in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen raided the offices of civil society organizations focused on worker and migrant rights, with members of each organization arrested. Government authorities instructed media outlets on April 21 not to report or comment on the case of Marxist student activists detained by police for their support of Jasic Technology workers in Shenzhen. Censors have even blocked material satirizing Alibaba founder and Communist Party member Jack Ma’s support for the “996” work pattern; a broader movement has lobbied against the schedule, which entails working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. each day and six days a week. Alongside students, workers notably played an important role in the 1989 prodemocracy protests, whose anniversary may be contributing to this new wave of official wariness about labor activism.
Sichuan earthquake still sensitive 11 years later: Official media have played down the 11th anniversary of the deadly 2008 Sichuan earthquake. On May 11 parents of students killed in the earthquake attempted to publicly commemorate the tragedy in Dujiangyan, a county-level city within Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, but they were surrounded and beaten by local authorities, with many subsequently hospitalized. Parents who agreed to media interviews in the past have been placed under round-the-clock surveillance by the police in the lead-up to the anniversary. Despite government efforts to present the quake in a positive light as the beginning of a new era of “volunteerism” in China, censorship of online discussion about the disaster remains pervasive.
HONG KONG: Tensions rise over extradition law amendments
Proposed revisions to Hong Kong ordinances that would facilitate extradition to mainland China have elicited fierce resistance from Hong Kong civil society. As many as 130,000 protesters took to the streets on April 28 to protest the amendments, which, if passed, would permit Hong Kongers and foreigners working or living in the territory to be sent to face trial in China's notoriously flawed judicial system. Members of the local artistic community have also expressed fear that the agreement could undermine creative freedom in the territory. Scuffles between opponents and supporters of the bill broke out in the Hong Kong legislature on May 11, with one member of the prodemocracy camp falling and being taken away on a stretcher. Despite the opposition, the South China Morning Post reported on May 14 that Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam is “doubling down” on her support for the bill, believing that failure to pass it would undermine her authority. For its part, the Chinese government has defended the bill, with the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Zhang Xiaoming, describing it as “necessary, appropriate, lawful, and reasonable” during a meeting with a Hong Kong think tank on May 15.
Concerns about the bill have also been raised by the US government. On May 7, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a brief criticizing the proposed amendments, noting that they may negatively affect US interests in Hong Kong. Local opponents of the bill have also brought their message to Washington. Testifying before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Hong Kong Democratic Party founder and former lawmaker Martin Lee warned that the bill could permit the kidnapping and extradition to China of American citizens living in Hong Kong. In a May 15 op-ed for the Washington Post, Lee called on “the world to act to protect Hong Kong’s free society and legal system.”
Against this backdrop, members of Hong Kong's 2014 Umbrella Movement continue to be jailed, reinforcing fears that politically motivated charges may increase should the extradition bill come into force. An estimated 100 such activists have been convicted by Hong Kong courts, and one of them, former protest leader Joshua Wong, is scheduled to return to prison for two months following the recent rejection of his appeal. In a sign of the deteriorating international reputation of Hong Kong’s judicial system, news emerged on May 21 that Germany had granted asylum to two political activists wanted by Hong Kong police.
BEYOND CHINA: US TV drama, NGO landlord, Taiwan and Dutch media, Ecuador cameras, Nepal journalists
CBS censors The Good Fight segment: The US television network CBS decided to censor an episode of the legal drama The Good Fight out of concern that it would offend Chinese authorities, the New York Times reported on May 8. An animated segment in the program—which discussed Chinese government censorship of sensitive topics like the Tiananmen Square massacre and deceased Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo—was removed and replaced with a black screen and text reading “CBS has censored this content.” Despite the network’s self-censorship, the episode (and in some cases, the whole season) has reportedly been removed from streaming websites in China, such as Douban and American Drama Everyday, because of its depiction of mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang. The Good Wife, another CBS program of which The Good Fight is a spinoff, was banned from online streaming platforms in China in 2014.
Chinese firm vetoes Amnesty International office lease in New York: According to a May 13 report in the New York Times, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, has refused to rent office space in a building they own in New York City to the US branch of Amnesty International. The organization regularly publishes research on human rights abuses in China. A representative of a Cosco subsidiary reportedly informed Amnesty that it was “not the best tenant for a building owned by a Chinese SOE.”
Taiwan media execs attend China gathering:Dozens of representatives from Taiwanese media organizations attended the Chinese government’s Fourth Cross-Strait Media People Summit in Beijing on May 10. The summit aimed to discuss how media in China and Taiwan could promote “peaceful reunification” and the “1992 Consensus.” Participants came from a range of television, radio, print, and online media outlets, including major pro-China entities like United Daily News, China Times, TVBS, and CTiTV, as well as members of local and national press and broadcast associations. In response, the deputy director of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, Ko Cheng-heng, stated that the Chinese government did not have the right to direct the activities of Taiwanese media.
Dutch publisher censors Xinjiang book review: Timothy Grose, a professor of Chinese studies, claimed in a May 13 article in the Los Angeles Review of Books’ China Channel that his review of a book about Xinjiang was censored by the editors of an academic journal at the respected Dutch publishing house Brill. While the review of Tom Cliff's Oil and Water was originally commissioned by the journal, China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies, in early 2018, it was ultimately rejected for publication due to Grose’s explicit discussion of the reeducation camps in Xinjiang. The editor of the journal, Han Xiaorong, is a professor at Hong Kong Polytechnic University with a history of defending Communist Party policies in Xinjiang.
Ecuador using Chinese surveillance tech: China has supplied Ecuador with an extensive system of 4 200 security cameras that can be used to surveil the country’s population, the New York Times reported on April 24. The system, built by Chinese state-backed companies CEIEC and Huawei, is similar to those already deployed in China. Activists have expressed fears that such surveillance networks would allow authoritarian-leaning governments to engage in greater acts of domestic repression. The cameras in Ecuador have reportedly been ineffective at reducing crime, their stated purpose, partly because that would require far more police manpower to monitor video feeds. However, evidence indicates that under former president Rafael Correa, national intelligence agencies known for persecuting government opponents had access to the Chinese-built system. Similar networks have reportedly been sold to governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Angola.
Nepal state media investigating journalists over Dalai Lama reference: According to a May 14 report by the Hong Kong Free Press, Nepal’s national news agency RSS is investigating three journalists for circulating a news item about the Dalai Lama’s discharge from a hospital in April. The investigation comes as diplomatic and economic ties are growing between Nepal and China. The chairman of RSS, Hari Adhikari, was quoted by Hong Kong Free Press as saying, “We don’t carry news that is against the foreign policy of our country and affects the relationship with our neighbors.” RSS has long had a content-exchange agreement with China’s official Xinhua News Agency.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Smuggled video footage
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.
On May 20, Fox News aired a television segment about a Chinese family trying to retrieve the body of a relative who had been killed in police custody in China after being detained for practicing Falun Gong, the banned spiritual movement. The segment included secretly recorded video of the deceased woman’s brother-in-law confronting officials and being told that the body would be released if the family admitted that she died “naturally.” The report also covered a more recent episode from November 2018, showing video of a wife crying over the frail body of her husband, also a Falun Gong adherent, in a hospital where he had died after abuse in custody. Yu Ming, an entrepreneur who recently fled China for the United States, recorded these clips as well as others from inside organ transplant hospitals and the notorious Masanjia labor camp. He displayed for reporters a watch and car keys that held hidden cameras.
Yu’s videos are part of a larger effort by Chinese activists and foreign journalists to obtain sensitive footage from within China, particularly of detention facilities and prisoners of conscience, and circulate it abroad. On May 7, CNN posted a segment by China correspondent Matt Rivers showing the high walls and barbed wire of various camps in Xinjiang where an estimated one million members of Muslim minorities are being held for “reeducation.” The piece also depicts police efforts to obstruct the journalists, including a forced dinner with officials replete with folk music. It is clear that some of the video was filmed secretly with a device other than a visible professional television camera. Other recent examples can be found on the YouTube channel of Bitter Winter, a religious freedom website with a network of contacts in China. They include a series of videos of church demolitions in Henan Province earlier this month that show believers crying, praying, and confronting authorities; images of Buddhist statues that have been plastered over to prevent believers from worshipping; and a mosque demolition in Gansu Province.
Foreign journalists who record secretly risk being briefly detained, having their work destroyed, and being denied future visas to cover the world’s second-largest economy. Chinese citizens engaging in this activity face far greater repercussions, including potential imprisonment and torture. Despite the risks, however, Chinese activists continue to smuggle out first-hand video footage of abuse, in part because of its potential utility for raising international awareness and even ending repression if used to pressure the Chinese government.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Censorship related to Wang Quanzhang’s condition in prison: On May 20, the wife of jailed Chinese human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang met with authorities at Linyi Prison in an effort to see her husband. Wang was detained in July 2015 and held incommunicado for over three years before being sentenced in January to 4.5 years in prison for his work defending dissidents. Li was denied access to Wang but told reporters that officials showed her a disturbing three-minute video in which he appeared thinner, with greying hair, nervous gestures, and a stammer. Watch for increased international pressure on Chinese authorities to permit Li to see Wang and any censorship related to new information on his condition.
Huawei access to US technology: In the latest blow to Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s reputation and operations, on May 16 the Trump administration added the company to a blacklist of firms with restricted access to American technology. Within days, Google announced that it would be suspending any business with Huawei that requires the transfer of hardware, software, and technical services other than those involving open-source licensing, a move that could hobble Huawei’s global smartphone business. On May 21, the US Department of Commerce issued a notice that Huawei would be allowed to support existing products for 90 days. Watch for the company’s final status on the blacklist and the practical ramifications should its US business dealings be restricted.
CGTN investigations in Britain: On May 8, British regulators launched an investigation into whether the confession of a British man on Chinese national television, aired in China and abroad, violated the British Broadcasting Code. The following day, a second investigation was launched based on a complaint filed by Angela Gui, daughter of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, who made several confessions on Chinese state television after being abducted from Thailand amid a larger crackdown on Hong Kong booksellers in 2015; he remains in Chinese custody. Such televised confessions by journalists, lawyers, businesspeople, and others have emerged as a common phenomenon under Xi Jinping’s rule. The British investigations center on China Global Television Network (CGTN), the international arm of state broadcaster China Central Television. Watch for the outcome of the probes and potential penalties for CGTN, which may include revocation of its broadcast license and large fines.
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Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.三十年前的這一週，數千名學生佔領了北京市中心的天安門廣場，參加了絕食抗議，要求中國政治和經濟改革。全國各地的其他公民 — 教授、工人，甚至是中共黨內幹部 — 慢慢加入到他們對民主和透明度的訴求中。1989年6月4日晚，該運動遭到暴力鎮壓，但在接下來的幾十年裡，一個正在萌芽的民間社會團體開始發展和專業化，調查性新聞工作和法律倡議引發政策改變，並經歷了一個宗教信仰的復甦。
網路審查和「糾正」在6月4日週年前增加：中共當局正在擴大對網路和社交媒體平台的監管，因為他們試圖封殺被禁的和政治上敏感的內容，在即將到來的天安門廣場大屠殺事件30週年，也就是1989年6月4日中共軍隊向和平的北京請願者們開槍。圖片和媒體機構「視覺中國」（Visual China Group）於 5月12日結束整改，重新啟動網站運營，並與中共報紙《人民日報》簽署一內容審查協議。作為協議的一部分，用戶將能夠向該機構報告「有害的」資料，包括含政治內容的材料。這是繼5月11日的報導，在中國的約會應用程式陌陌和探探，根據政府的命令暫停了用戶在其平台上發送社交新聞的功能一個月。在審查嚴密的中國「長城防火牆」之外訪問不受審查的資料也受到了限制。據5月6日 Blokt上的報導，中共政府已經在上個月關閉了數百個虛擬私人網絡（VPN）服務器，儘管許多免費翻牆工具仍在繼續開通。英國廣播公司（BBC）於5月14日報導，自4月下旬以來，維基百科所有語言的版本在中國都被封鎖。此前，只有中文版和像達賴喇嘛等敏感話題有關的非中文文章在中國無法訪問。
美國政府也對該法案表示擔憂。5月7日，美中經濟與安全審查委員會（US-China Economic and Security Review Commission，USCC）發表了一份批評《逃犯條例》修正案的簡報，指出這些修正案可能對美國構成極大風險。該法案的當地反對者也向華盛頓傳達了他們的信息。在美國國會及行政當局中國委員會（Congressional-Executive Commission on China，CECC）作證時，香港民主黨創黨成員兼前香港立法會議員李柱銘（Martin Lee）警告說，該法案可能允許將居住在香港的美國公民綁架和引渡到中國。在5月15日的《華盛頓郵報》專欄文章中，李柱銘呼籲「世界採取行動保護香港的自由社會和法律體系」。
CBS審查《傲骨之戰The Good Fight》片段：據《紐約時報》5月8日報導，美國電視公司哥倫比亞廣播公司（CBS）決定審查一律政題材的電視劇《傲骨之戰(The Good Fight)》中的一集，原因是擔心冒犯中共當權者。在電視中有一段動漫— 其中談到了中共政府對敏感話題如天安門大屠殺和已故諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波 — 該動漫被刪除，用黑屏來取代，屏幕上打出字幕：「CBS已審查了這段內容」。儘管CBS做了自我審查，據報導該劇目（有些時候甚至是整個季的系列）依然從中國的流媒體網站被刪除，如「豆瓣」和「天天美劇」，因為該劇還談到了在新疆的維吾爾族人被大範圍關押。《傲骨賢妻（The Good Wife）》是 CBS 從《傲骨之戰》中分離出去的另一部電視劇，2014年也在中國的網路流媒體平台被禁止播出。
荷蘭出版商審查有關新疆的評論：研究中國的教授提姆·葛羅斯（Timothy Grose）聲稱，在5月13日《洛杉磯書評》（Los Angeles Review of Books’）中國頻道的一篇文章中，他的一本關於新疆的評論，在荷蘭一家受人尊敬的出版社（Brill）旗下的一學術期刊被編輯們審查了。儘管這篇關於湯姆·克利夫（Tom Cliff）所著的《油與水》 （Oil and Water）的書評最初得到該期刊早在2018年初的邀約，最終還是因葛羅斯在其中明顯討論在新疆的再教育營而被拒絕。該期刊的名字是《中國和亞洲：在歷史研究方面之學刊》（China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies）。該期刊的編輯韓孝榮（Han Xiaorong）是香港理工大學的一名教授，他多年來維護中共在新疆的政策。
尼泊爾國家媒體調查參與達賴喇嘛報導的記者們：據5月14日《香港自由新聞》（ Hong Kong Free Press）的報告，尼泊爾國家新聞機構RSS正在調查三位記者，原因是他們傳播了一則關於達賴喇嘛4月出院的消息。該調查是在尼泊爾與中國的外交與經濟關係增強的背景下出現的。《香港自由新聞》援引RSS主席哈里·阿迪卡裡（Hari Adhikari）的話說：「我們不報導違反我們國家外交政策和影響我們與鄰國關係的新聞。」尼泊爾國家新聞機構長期以來一直和中共官方媒體新華社有內容交換協約。
英國調查中國環球電視網CGTN：5月8日，英國廣播監管機構開始調查英國男子在中國和海外播出的中國國家電視台上的被迫認罪是否違反英國廣播法。接著，根據瑞典公民桂民海的女兒Angela Gui提交的訴訟啟動了第二次調查，桂民海在2015年香港書商遭到大規模打擊而在被泰國綁架後，出現在中國國家電視台做了幾次被認罪；他仍在中國被拘留。在習近平的治理下，記者、律師、商人和其他人的這種電視被迫認罪已成為一種普遍現象。英國調查中心注意力集中在中國環球電視網（China Global Television Network，CGTN），即中共國營電視台中央電視台的國際部門。關注英國對中國環球電視網CGTN的調查結果和其可能得到的處罰，可能包括撤銷其廣播執照和巨額罰款。
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.三十年前的这一周，数千名学生占领了北京市中心的天安门广场，参加了绝食抗议，要求中国政治和经济改革。全国各地的其他公民 — 教授，工人，甚至是中共党内干部 — 慢慢加入到他们对民主和透明度的诉求中。1989年6月4日晚，该运动遭到暴力镇压，但在接下来的几十年里，一个正在萌芽的民间社会团体开始发展和专业化，调查性新闻工作和法律倡议引发政策改变，并经历了一个宗教信仰的复苏。
网絡审查和「纠正」在6月4日周年前增加：中共当局正在扩大对网络和社交媒体平台的监管，因为他们试图封杀被禁的和政治上敏感的内容，在即将到来的天安门广场大屠杀事件30周年，也就是1989年6月4日中共军队向和平的北京请愿者们开枪。图片和媒体机构「视觉中国」（Visual China Group）于5月12日结束整改，重新启动网站运营，并与中共报纸《人民日报》签署一内容审查协议。作为协议的一部分，用户将能够向该机构报告「有害的」资料，包括含政治内容的材料。这是继5月11日的报导，在中国的约会应用程序陌陌和探探，根据政府的命令暂停了用户在其平台上发送社交新闻的功能一个月。在审查严密的中国「防火长城」之外获得不受审查的资料也受到了限制。据5月6日Blokt上的报导，中共政府已经在上个月关闭了数百个虚拟私人网络（VPN）服务器，尽管许多免费翻墙工具仍在继续开通。英国广播公司（BBC）于5月14日报导，自4月下旬以来，维基百科所有语言的版本在中国都被封锁。此前，只有中文版和像达赖喇嘛等敏感话题有关的非中文文章在中国无法访问。
CBS审查《傲骨之战The Good Fight》片段：据《纽约时报》5月8日报导，美国电视公司哥伦比亚广播公司（CBS）决定审查一律政题材的电视剧《傲骨之战(The Good Fight)》中的一集，原因是担心冒犯中共当权者。在电视中有一段动漫— 其中谈到了中共政府对敏感话题如天安门大屠杀和已故诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波— 该动漫被删除，用黑屏来取代，屏幕上打出字幕：「CBS已审查了这段内容」。尽管CBS做了自我审查，据报导该剧目（有些时候甚至是整个季的系列）依然从中国的流媒体网站被删除，如「豆瓣」和「天天美剧」，因为该剧还谈到了在新疆的维吾尔族人被大范围关押。 《傲骨贤妻（The Good Wife）》是 CBS 从《傲骨之战》中分离出去的另一部电视剧，2014年也在中国的网路流媒体平台被禁。
荷兰出版商审查有关新疆的评论：研究中国的教授提姆·葛罗斯（Timothy Grose）声称，在5月13日《洛杉矶书评》（Los Angeles Review of Books'）中国频道的一篇文章中，他的一本关于新疆的评论，在荷兰一家受人尊敬的出版社（Brill）旗下的一学术期刊被编辑们审查了。尽管这篇关于汤姆·克利夫（Tom Cliff）所著的《油与水》 （Oil and Water）的书评最初得到该期刊早在2018年初的邀约，最终还是因葛罗斯在其中明显讨论在新疆的再教育营而被拒绝。该期刊的名字是《中国和亚洲：在历史研究方面之学刊》（China & Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies）。该期刊的编辑韩孝荣（Han Xiaorong）是香港理工大学的一名教授，他多年来维护中共在新疆的政策。
尼泊尔国家媒体调查参与达赖喇嘛报导的记者们：据5月14日《香港自由新闻》（ Hong Kong Free Press）的报告，尼泊尔国家新闻机构RSS正在调查三位记者，原因是他们传播了一则关于达赖喇嘛4月出院的消息。该调查是在尼泊尔与中国的外交与经济关系增强的背景下出现的。 《香港自由新闻》援引RSS主席哈里·阿迪卡里（Hari Adhikari）的话说：「我们不报导违反我们国家外交政策和影响我们与邻国关系的新闻。」尼泊尔国家新闻机构长期以来一直和中共官方媒体新华社有内容交换协约。
英国调查中国环球电视网CGTN：5月8日，英国广播监管机构开始调查英国男子在中国和海外播出的中国国家电视台上的被迫认罪是否违反英国广播法。接着，根据瑞典公民桂民海的女儿Angela Gui提交的诉讼启动了第二次调查，桂民海在2015年香港书商遭到大规模打击而在被泰国绑架后，出现在中国国家电视台做了几次被认罪；他仍在中国被拘留。在习近平的治理下，记者、律师、商人和其他人的这种电视被迫认罪已成为一种普遍现象。英国调查中心注意力集中在中国环球电视网（China Global Television Network，CGTN），即中共国营电视台中央电视台的国际部门。关注英国对中国环球电视网CGTN的调查结果和其可能得到的处罚，可能包括撤销其广播执照和巨额罚款。
Every year in June, China’s censors go into overdrive to prevent citizens from discussing, commemorating, or learning about the prodemocracy protests that took place across the country in 1989 and the brutal military action that brought them to an end.
But this year, the combination of the 30th anniversary of those events, an escalating trade war with the United States, massive antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and the availability of a more technologically advanced information-control system has driven the Chinese Communist Party’s censorship efforts to unprecedented extremes. With even more sensitive anniversaries approaching in July, the escalation is likely to continue.
New upgrades to existing censorship
Not surprisingly, the national internet filtering system known as the Great Firewall expanded its reach this month. Within the first week of June, the websites of 12 major international news outlets from five different countries were blocked, including CNN, the Washington Post, the Guardian, the Intercept, the Toronto Star, The Age in Australia, and New Zealand’s Newsroom. These joined others like the New York Times, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal, which have long been inaccessible within China.
Meanwhile, the country’s most popular social media applications—Sina Weibo and Tencent’s WeChat—deployed novel technologies and penalties to prevent information about the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre from circulating. Censors at top Chinese tech companies told Reuters that the artificial intelligence used to detect and delete banned content had reached “unprecedented levels of accuracy.” Those caught communicating about the events of 1989 risked being shut out of their WeChat accounts; to log back in, they would have to acknowledge that they had “spread malicious rumors” and provide a face print, as BBC journalist Stephen McDonell experienced first-hand. Manya Koetse notes that on Weibo there was more airtight censorship this year surrounding the word “Tiananmen” itself, and not only in combination with dates or terms that would link it to 1989. In another first, Apple reportedly removed several Chinese-language podcasts from its online store in China, affecting one of the few Apple services in the country that had until then avoided censorship.
Expansion to apolitical spaces
Even somewhat dated entertainment content has not escaped the censors’ attention. In the most prominent example, major Chinese streaming platforms have removed music by rock star Li Zhi since April, and the musician’s Weibo account, WeChat public account, and Douban musician page have been deleted. Although Li’s recent music has been apolitical or even progovernment, a few older pieces alluded to the 1989 protests. In the run-up to the June anniversary, regulators ordered the deletion of any audio or video content related to these songs.
A more unexpected move has been the full or partial suspension of live-streaming, dating, and celebrity gossip services due to “system upgrades” or “maintenance,” all commencing in May and scheduled to end in June. At least nine such cases were documented, including Momo (a hook-up and live streaming app with 113 million users), video-sharing site Bilibili (100 million users), China’s largest dating app Tantan (90 million users), LGBT social media app Blued (27 million users), and Dingtalk, a business communication app. In most instances the service was not entirely shuttered, with suspensions focusing instead on features that enable real-time communication and might be difficult for censors to keep up with—such as “bullet chat” commentary that runs along a video. YY, a popular live-streaming platform, announced this type of restriction in late May, shortly after adding over 300 new keywords related to June 4 and Hong Kong to its blacklist.
The companies’ statements explained that their efforts were initiated at the behest of “the relevant government authority,” an apparent reference to the powerful Cyber Administration of China (CAC). They had little choice but to comply with the agency’s demands. The financial news service Refinitiv, which distributes Reuters content via Eikon terminals, was reportedly warned by CAC officials that it could lose its news dissemination license if it refused to omit articles related to the Tiananmen anniversary. In a sign of the regime’s broader anxiety about the economy and associated topics, on June 10 the CAC reportedly ordered the suspension of the website and mobile app of Wallstreet.cn, a financial news aggregator that had garnered an estimated 180 million global users.
In fact, the jump in censorship over the past month is perhaps most remarkable for the sheer scale of the media types and user bases affected. Hundreds of millions of people have experienced a sudden decline in their ability to access or share information, even if in some cases they remain unaware of the reasons behind the restriction.
Temporary or permanent?
Given that the upgraded censorship seems to have been triggered largely by the Tiananmen anniversary, one might assume that most of the new measures are temporary. But the evidence suggests that such an assumption would be a mistake.
Freedom House’s tests of the 12 foreign news sites that were blocked in early June—conducted on GreatFire.org’s URL analyzer—show that apart from CNN, all remained blocked as of June 18. Other innovations deployed over the past month, such as social media filtering aided by artificial intelligence, can be expected to expand rather than contract in the coming years. Any information about problematic WeChat users that was collected during this sensitive period will be retained for future reference.
And if China’s censors were busy in June, the month of July will be no picnic either. July 1 marks the anniversary of Hong Kong’s transfer from British to Chinese rule, which could easily prompt another round of mass protests. Then there is July 5, the 10th anniversary of ethnic violence in the Xinjiang region that led to a harsh and ongoing crackdown on its large Muslim population. The very next day, July 6, is the Dalai Lama’s birthday, and July 13 is the second anniversary of the death of democracy advocate and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. Finally there is July 20, the 20th anniversary of the Communist Party’s ban on the Falun Gong spiritual practice and the beginning of a massive and often violent campaign to eradicate it.
Unlike the more historically focused June 4 anniversary, some of July’s sensitive dates are closely tied to current events, including the most egregious human rights abuses and most important examples of dissent taking place in China today. Over the last week alone, news emerged that a prominent Uighur writer had died due to detention in a Xinjiang “reeducation” camp, an independent inquiry in London concluded that prisoners of conscience in China—including Falun Gong and potentially Uighur detainees—have been killed so that their organs can be used in transplant operations, and the Hong Kong government suspended its controversial extradition bill after mass protests.
Most people in China may be completely unaware of these developments, even though they are making international headlines and could have real repercussions for the country. Despite this information isolation, however, hope is not lost. Numerous accounts published this month by young Chinese explain how they learned the truth about the events of 1989 and highlight some of the cracks in the regime’s censorship system. Data from at least two circumvention tools show an increase in users from China in June compared with the previous month, around both the June 4 anniversary and the large protests in Hong Kong.
People in China clearly want to know what the government is not telling them. As the coming month propels Beijing’s information control efforts to even greater extremes, international actors should be prepared to support ordinary individuals’ quest for access to uncensored news.
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House, director of its China Media Bulletin. This article was also published in the Diplomat on June 24, 2019.
US and Chinese companies feel the chill of a ‘Tech Cold War’
The US administration’s proposed ban on the sale of American hardware and software to the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei due to national security concerns, announced on May 16, is already taking a toll on the company. Overseas sales of Huawei smartphones have dropped by 40 percent since the US Department of Commerce said last month that it intended to place the firm on a list of companies considered a threat to US national interests. Huawei has warned that the ban may cost it $30 billion in revenue, despite the potential that it could in some cases receive special permission from the US government to buy American components and technology. US suppliers are also facing massive financial losses. US chipmaker Broadcom, which made $900 million in direct sales to Huawei in 2018, has reportedly already felt the impact of the ban.
Compounding these losses are US tech companies’ decisions to sever ties with Huawei out of fear of violating the proposed restrictions. On June 7, Reuters reported that Facebook will no longer allow its mobile application to be preinstalled on Huawei phones, while Google will stop providing Huawei with Android operating software in August.
China, however, looks set to respond in kind. The Ministry of Commerce announced in late May that it was compiling its own “Unreliable Entities List.” It is not yet clear which companies will be designated, but a ministry spokesperson's reference to companies that “block or cut supplies to Chinese firms for noncommercial reasons” suggested that US tech companies would be among the first targets. On June 8, the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had already summoned representatives from Microsoft, Dell, and South Korea’s Samsung to warn them against cooperating with the US ban.
Not all countries have been convinced by US assertions that Huawei poses a national security threat, for example by using its role in building fifth-generation (5G) mobile infrastructure to facilitate espionage on behalf of the Chinese state. Chile and Brazil have indicated that they would not exclude Huawei from plans to introduce 5G technology in their respective territories, and Russia’s largest telecom provider signed a deal with Huawei on June 5 to build that country’s 5G network.
Chinese state media, censors respond to protests in Hong Kong
Over the past month, Hong Kong has been gripped by mass protests in opposition to draft legal amendments that would enable the extradition of accused criminals to mainland China. The assemblies have featured episodes of violence, including police assaults against protesters on June 12, but also massive and peaceful marches, such as a demonstration on June 16 that brought an estimated two million of Hong Kong’s seven million people into the streets. Mainland Chinese media have avoided extensive coverage of the protests, with the flagship evening news program of China Central Television (CCTV) on June 17 making no mention of the historic turnout for the previous day’s demonstration.
But Chinese state media and Hong Kong government supporters have not been entirely silent about the public dissent. Disinformation regarding the protests has spread online, much of it promoted by Chinese state media. Among the false reports were a June 10 China Daily article claiming that 800,000 people had taken part in an online signature campaign to voice their support for the extradition bill and a June 17 assertion that parents in Hong Kong had marched against “US meddling.” Some of this content has spread outside China via Chinese-language media. In one example that emerged in New Zealand, the Chinese New Zealand Herald came under criticism for reprinting distorted information from the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, leading it to retract the article.
Chinese state media also attempted to dismiss opposition to the bill as the result of “some Hong Kong residents being hoodwinked by the opposition camp and its foreign allies,” as a June 9 editorial in the China Daily put it. The same editorial warned that the protests could undermine the “credibility and reputation” of the city. A June 13 Global Times commentary struck an even more belligerent note, denouncing expression of support for the protesters from US lawmakers like Nancy Pelosi as “a stark provocation.” A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman tried to justify police brutality against protesters by claiming on June 13 that the demonstration in question was “not a peaceful rally, but a blatant, organized riot.”
Meanwhile, Chinese censors have been busy trying to stop mainland news consumers and netizens from learning about the political crisis and demonstrations in Hong Kong. China Digital Times published a leaked June 16 government directive instructing websites to “find and delete video content related to Hong Kong antiextradition protests.” Censors at Tencent and other Chinese social media companies have worked to comply with such orders, for example by removing a song from the musical Les Misérables from a popular Chinese music-streaming platform. The Economist reported that the song “Do You Hear the People Sing?”—adopted as one of the anthems of the protest movement—was no longer available on QQ Music. However, the Christian pop song “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord,” another unofficial anthem, was still available. Censors for Sina’s Weibo microblogging platform have also worked to remove discussion of the Hong Kong protests. Posts or comments voicing support for the movement have been deleted from Weibo.
Tiananmen anniversary: Surveillance, harassment, and recollections of learning the truth
In addition to censorship of the news media and other communication tools, the Chinese government intensified its direct repression of key critics ahead of the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Radio Free Asia reported that police had placed members of the Tiananmen Mothers—relatives of people killed in 1989—under greater technical and physical surveillance, primarily to prevent them from speaking to foreign journalists. Ding Zilin, one of the more outspoken mothers, and prominent activist Hu Jia were taken on an enforced “vacation” outside Beijing. Chinese Human Rights Defenders reports that at least 37 activists and artists were taken into custody, forced to travel, or placed under house arrest in connection with the sensitive anniversary. Among them was Sichuan-based independent filmmaker Deng Chuanbin, who was detained by police after tweeting a photograph of a bottle of liquor with a label that commemorated the massacre. Former student leader Feng Congde, who now lives abroad, was denied entry to Hong Kong on June 2.
Separately, many writers who grew up in China after 1989 used overseas media to reflect on the moment they first learned about an event that has been wiped from their country’s history books. In one compilation of such accounts published by ChinaFile, writers described coming home to see family members secretly watching a banned documentary about the massacre, stumbling upon a Wikipedia entry after using circumvention tools to reach the uncensored internet, learning that a favorite teacher was denied promotion because of some past involvement in the “Tiananmen disturbance,” or encountering online censorship of an innocuous word in late May and being told it was related to the upcoming anniversary of liusi (6/4). In most cases, the writers subsequently found opportunities to learn more about what had happened, for example after leaving China to study abroad, by asking their parents, or through persistent digging for banned content online.
In a testimony to the power of film, many of those recounting these experiences emphasized watching video footage or documentaries about the 1989 events, including real-life images of students protesting and going on hunger strike, followed by tanks driving into Beijing and bloodied civilians. As one anonymous contributor wrote about watching the 2006 film Summer Palace, “I was born in 1990. This was the first time I had seen protesters with Chinese faces. The movie left me speechless.”
HONG KONG: Journalist assaults, cyberattacks, surveillance fears accompany protests
As millions of Hong Kong residents faced off with their government in recent weeks over proposed legal amendments that would enable the extradition of criminal suspects to mainland China, a number of restrictions or fears related to free speech and privacy rights emerged:
Police attack journalists covering protests: The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) protested police harassment of journalists covering demonstrations on June 10 and subsequent dates. According to the HKJA, police officers verbally and physically assaulted reporters, with some suffering burns from pepper spray, and prevented them from safely covering the events even when they presented their press cards. There were at least 27 cases of reported violence or harassment against members of the media covering protests during June, as outlined in a detailed HKJA complaint to police.
Surveillance fears: Protesters in Hong Kong are reportedly using the encrypted messaging application Telegram, disabling the location tracking on their phones, and deleting chat records to avoid potential government surveillance and future punishment for participating in protests. Despite these efforts, on June 11 police arrested the administrator of a Telegram chat group on charges of “conspiring to commit a public nuisance,” according to Global Voices. Police searched Ivan Ip's apartment and downloaded chat records from his phone pertaining to a group of over 20,000 members. According to the New York Times, in the wake of Ip’s arrest, many protesters began using pay-as-you-go SIM cards or foreign numbers to avoid being found by police on the basis of their phone numbers.
Cyberattack on Telegram: The Chinese government is suspected of launching a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Telegram during the height of the recent protests. On June 12, a large number of “garbage requests” overwhelmed Telegram’s servers and temporarily disabled the app, reports Engadget. Telegram chief executive Pavel Durov confirmed on his personal Twitter account that most of the internet protocol addresses linked to the attack were in China. Such tactics are not new. Durov said that past attacks of similar sizes had coincided with protests in Hong Kong.
BEYOND CHINA: Support for Hong Kong, Twitter suspensions, Uighur refugees, Huawei spying in Serbia
Foreign leaders speak out on Hong Kong bill, protests: Officials from democratic governments around the world have expressed deep concern about Hong Kong’s extradition bill and support for the protesters opposing it. Those speaking out include cabinet ministers and lawmakers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia. If passed, the bill would expose Hong Kong residents as well as expatriates and visitors to detention and trial in China's notoriously flawed judicial system. In one of the strongest steps taken thus far, a bipartisan group of US lawmakers reintroduced the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act on June 13. The draft law would, among other actions, require the US government to annually reassess the territory’s autonomy from Beijing and its related special trading status. It would also enable personal sanctions against officials who are found to be “complicit in suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong, including … rendition of individuals … to mainland China.”
Under Chinese pressure, Australian councilor withdraws motion commemorating June 4: A city councilor for Melbourne withdrew at the last minute a motion to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, apparently in response to pressure from the Chinese consulate. Councilor Jackie Watts later expressed regret for her decision to bow to “political influence” and told the media that remaining silent about the anniversary “was contrary to the very democracy that we hold dear.”
Twitter suspends Chinese dissidents’ accounts ahead of Tiananmen anniversary: Twitter suspended the accounts of at least 100 Chinese political commentators, and by some estimates thousands, days before the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Rights lawyers, activists, and college students in China as well as intellectuals based abroad were affected. Responding to what has been dubbed the #TwitterMassacre, many observers, including US senator Marco Rubio, accused the company of acting as a censor for the Chinese government or responding to suspected fake complaints about the accounts. Twitter soon apologized and claimed that the suspensions were the unintentional result of a periodic “routine action” to crack down on spam, not a reaction to Chinese government requests. Many of the accounts were soon functioning again, but users and activists remain unsatisfied with Twitter’s explanation and are urging more transparency. Writing in Forbes, Kalev Leetaru argued that the social media company’s reluctance to allow external monitoring of its enforcement actions raised “grave questions about Twitter’s commitment to freedom of speech.”
Foreign help in Uighur crackdown criticized: The Belgian government has come under fire for an incident in late May in which it allowed Chinese police to detain a Uighur family seeking assistance at the country’s Beijing embassy. Wureyetiguli Abula was seeking visas for herself and her four children, aged 5 to 17, in order to join her husband in Brussels, where he had been granted asylum. After a disagreement over the travel documents, consular officials permitted police to enter the embassy and remove the family, who have since been placed under house arrest in Xinjiang. Writing in Foreign Policy, acquaintances of the family referred to a 2018 case in Germany in which a bureaucratic error led to the deportation of a 22-year-old Uighur man, who has not been heard from since. After that incident, Germany and Sweden ordered a halt to any deportations of Uighurs to China. Separately, the United Nations counterterrorism chief, Russian diplomat Vladimir Voronkov, has been criticized for making a trip to Xinjiang in mid-June and failing to mention the mass detention of Uighurs in “reeducation” camps. US deputy secretary of state John Sullivan condemned the visit as an endorsement of the Chinese government's efforts to depict “its repressive campaign against Uighurs and other Muslims as legitimate counterterrorism efforts when it is not.”
Chinese facial-recognition technology deployed in Serbia, Tajikistan: The Serbian government has announced that it will be installing hundreds of Huawei-made cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology across the capital, Belgrade, reports Foreign Policy. The article cites a now-deleted Huawei study in which “the company boasted that it had already deployed its Safe City system in 230 cities around the world, for more than 90 national or regional governments.” Indeed, according to a June 17 report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), similar technology is being installed in cities across Tajikistan as part of a Safe City program funded in large part by a loan from China. The move, which has raised concerns within the human rights community, recalls the use by Ecuadorean authorities of Chinese-made technology in that country’s expanding system of domestic surveillance. Serbia is rated Partly Free and Tajikistan is rated Not Free in Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World report. The export of such technologies is just one example of the way China’s technological and media reach could strengthen autocrats and challenge democratic governance and press freedom worldwide—a theme explored in a new report, Freedom and the Media, published by Freedom House in early June.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Songs, wordplay aid Hong Kong protesters and Chinese netizens
Mass outbreaks of song and Cantonese wordplay have been a recurring feature of the protest movement against Hong Kong’s extradition bill, which would enable criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China. Perhaps the most prominent example has been the Christian hymn “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord,” which became an anthem for the movement even though most Hong Kongers are not Christians. The hymn first gained prominence when a group of Christian students sang religious songs to provide legal cover for the protests, relying on the fact that religious gatherings can be held in Hong Kong without a permit. The song caught on and can often be heard at protest sites, with some participants noting that it helps reduce tensions with the police, conveying an air of calm and sending the message that the protest is intended to be peaceful.
Various types of satirical wordplay in Cantonese, the dialect of Chinese spoken by most Hong Kongers, have also appeared, serving as a way to assert a sense of identity distinct from that of mainland China. Several internet memes have played off of insults hurled by police at protesters and journalists that were caught on camera and went viral. Similarly, protesters have been seen carrying dolls of the Pokémon character Pikachu, a mocking reference to the Cantonese name of Hong Kong’s secretary of security (Lee Ka-chiu), one of the fiercest proponents of the extradition bill and a key target of protester ire.
Across the border in mainland China, aggressive censorship has prevented photos and discussion of the Hong Kong protests and related police violence from circulating widely, although there has reportedly been a spike in the number of users searching for information about Hong Kong. (Searches on Tencent’s WeChat for “Hong Kong” reportedly reached 32 million on June 12, up from 12 million the week before, for example.) Chinese netizens have also turned to songs and coded references to express their opinions. Specifically, two songs about Hong Kong from the 1980s and 1990s—“Pearl of the Orient” and “Queen’s Road East”—have been used as code to refer to the city. Users posted lyrics from the songs alongside expressions of support for protesters, like “Jiayou!” ("Add oil!"), a common Chinese term of encouragement that has also been heard at the protest sites.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Increased censorship and surveillance in July: As another month of sensitive religious and political anniversaries begins, watch for new instances of censorship innovation or intensified restrictions, especially those targeting key populations like Uighurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, or known democracy advocates and friends of Liu Xiaobo.
Hong Kong protest fallout: With demonstrations continuing in Hong Kong, and new evidence confirming police brutality during past protests, watch for whether the controversial extradition bill is fully withdrawn, Carrie Lam resigns as chief executive, police are held accountable for assaults on journalists, and protest leaders or participants face repercussions, including prosecutions based on digital surveillance.
‘Safe City’ projects aiding repression globally: With Chinese facial-recognition technology and video surveillance equipment spreading to dozens of countries around the world, including deeply autocratic states like Tajikistan and backsliding democracies like Serbia, watch for new information on whether and how the recipient security forces may be using the new tools for political repression in addition to crime control.
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外國領導人就香港法案發表講話抗議：世界各地民主政府的民選官員對香港的引渡法案表達深切關注，並支持抗議者。那些發言者包括來自美國、英國、加拿大、德國、台灣、日本和澳大利亞的內閣部長和立法議員們。如果該法案通過，香港居民以及外籍人士和旅客將可能會遭到拘捕，被帶到中國接受聲名狼藉的有缺陷的中共司法系統的審判。在迄今為止採取的最強有力的措施中，一個由兩黨組成的美國議員組織於6月13日重新提出了「香港人權與民主法案」（Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act）。該法律草案將要求美國政府每年從北京重新評估該領土的自治權，及其相關的特殊貿易狀況。 該法律草案還將對被發現「同謀壓制香港基本自由，包括......強迫謀害遵循國際公認權利的人，送去中國大陸被拘或受審......」的官員實施個人制裁。
与此同时，中国审查机构一直在努力阻止大陆新闻消费者和网民了解香港的政治危机和请愿游行。《中国数字时代》（China Digital Times）发布了6月16日泄露的政府指令，指示「各网站：查删香港反送中相关游行视频，查删《海阔天空》《真的爱你》《皇后大道东》等香港歌曲下面的不良评论。」腾讯和其他中国社交媒体公司的审查机构已经努力遵守这些命令，例如从流行的中国音乐流媒体平台中删除音乐剧《悲惨世界》中的一首歌。 《经济学人》（Economist ）报导称，雨果《悲惨世界》歌曲《你听到人民在唱歌吗？ 》— 改编成香港抗议活动主题歌之一 — 在QQ音乐上已经不再出现了。然而，基督教流行歌曲《唱哈利路亚赞美主》，另一首非正式的圣歌，仍然在传唱。新浪微博平台的审查机构也努力删除对香港抗议活动的讨论。微博已经删除了对该运动表示支持的帖子或评论。
天安门事件纪念日：监视、骚扰和了解真相的追忆
除了审查新闻媒体和其他通讯工具外， 在天安门大屠杀30周年纪念日之前，中共政府加强了对主要批评者的直接镇压。《自由亚洲电台》报导，警方已将天安门母亲亲属成员 — 1989年遇害人的亲属 — 置于更严格的技术和身体监视之下，主要是为了阻止她们与外国记者交谈。丁子霖，最敢言的母亲之一，和著名的维权活动家胡佳被带到北京以外的地方强制「度假」。非政府组织「中国人权捍卫者」（Chinese Human Rights Defenders）报导，至少有37名维权活动家和艺术家被关押、被迫旅行或被软禁，都与敏感的周年纪念日有关。其中包括四川的独立电影拍摄者邓传彬，他在推文发表了一张带有标记大屠杀的「铭记八酒六四」的酒瓶照片后，被警方拘留。现旅居国外的前学生领袖封从德于6月2日被拒绝入境香港。
外国领导人就香港法案发表讲话抗议：世界各地民主政府的民选官员对香港的引渡法案表达深切关注，并支持抗议者。那些发言者包括来自美国、英国、加拿大、德国、台湾、日本和澳大利亚的内阁部长和立法议员们。如果该法案通过，香港居民以及外籍人士和旅客将可能会遭到拘捕，被带到中国接受声名狼藉的有缺陷的中共司法系统的审判。在迄今为止采取的最强有力的措施中，一个由两党组成的美国议员组织于6月13日重新提出了「香港人权与民主法案」（Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act）。该法律草案将要求美国政府每年从北京重新评估该领土的自治权， 及其相关的特殊贸易状况。该法律草案还将对被发现「同谋压制香港基本自由，包括......强迫谋害遵循国际公认权利的人，送去中国大陆被拘或受审......」的官员实施个人制裁。
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.大规模爆发的歌曲和粤语文字游戏已成为反复回荡的特征，出现在抗议香港引渡法案运动中，引渡法案将使犯罪嫌疑人被送往中国大陆。或许最突出的例子是基督教赞美诗《唱哈利路亞歌赞美主》，成为运动的主题曲，即使大多数香港人不是基督徒。当一群基督徒学生唱响宗教歌曲为抗议活动提供合法掩护时，这首赞美诗歌最先获得瞩目，依据事实宗教聚会可以在无许可证的情况下在香港举行。这首歌流行起来，经常可以在抗议地点听到，一些参加者注意到这有助于减轻警察的紧张情绪，传达一种平静的气氛，并传递旨在和平抗议讯息。
Since antigovernment protests began three months ago in Hong Kong, Beijing’s state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), has gone to great lengths to demonize the protesters and mislead both Chinese and international audiences about the nature of the movement.
CCTV’s flagship news program ran a week’s worth of segments in July that denounced the protests and claimed that they were linked to “external forces.” A few weeks later, the broadcaster aired false reports that a protester had blinded a woman who was actually struck in the eye by a police bean-bag round. More recently, the station’s international arm released videos and graphics on YouTube and Facebook that likened protesters to Islamist militants and claimed that they are backed by US spy agencies. And on September 18, CCTV news posted a video on the Sina Weibo microblogging platform that urged its 89 million followers to identify, investigate, and publish online the personal information of Hong Kong protesters and journalists, exposing them to real-world harassment.
This latest use of CCTV to target the political enemies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is neither isolated nor new. As the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China approaches on October 1, it is worth reexamining CCTV’s role not only in helping to prop up party legitimacy and promote the reputation of its leaders, but also in doing the party’s “dirty work” by defaming and inciting hatred against perceived foes.
The broadcaster has achieved a truly global reach, meaning its content has the potential to shape the perceptions of hundreds of millions of people within and beyond China’s borders. The fact that this content is heavily distorted to suit the CCP’s political agenda poses a growing challenge for news consumers, regulators, journalists, advertisers, and others around the world.
A state broadcaster like no other
CCTV was founded 61 years ago, at a time when few Chinese citizens owned a television set. Today, it reaches nearly every household in China, runs over 40 channels, and produces more than 300,000 hours of programming a year. Alongside news, there are channels dedicated to sports, film, Chinese opera, and rural affairs. As the only authorized national broadcaster, the station retains a unique and privileged position in the domestic media market. Its flagship evening news program, Xinwen Lianbo, airs for 30 minutes at 7 p.m. Local and provincial stations are required to carry the program as well, ensuring a regular viewership in the hundreds of millions in addition to a large social media following.
Not surprisingly, CCTV maintains close ties to the party’s political and media-control hierarchy. The broadcaster’s current president, Shen Haixiong, is not only a CCP member but also an alternate member of the Central Committee. He had previously served as head of the propaganda department in Guangdong Province.
CCTV’s news program provides an authoritative expression of official viewpoints, but its repertoire also includes various “investigative” programs that seem to cater to the public interest, even carrying occasional exposés of official wrongdoing. Among the most notable of these shows is Jiaodian Fangtan (Focus Talk). Recent episodes have offered “feel good” stories on party cadres leading rural villages, the technological prowess of companies in different provinces, and the importance of a new land-management law.
Mobilizing against the party’s foes
While day-to-day coverage may be focused on promoting government policies, praising the party leadership, or demonstrating that corrupt officials are being brought to justice, the same programs have been activated time and again to serve as the party’s attack dogs when a particular political threat emerges, defaming the designated targets and whitewashing horrific human rights abuses against them.
One of the first and starkest examples of these televised campaigns coincided with the 1999 launch of the CCP’s violent crackdown on the Falun Gong meditation and spiritual practice. Other efforts have followed at regular intervals, including a 2009 documentary series about the Dalai Lama, the airing of forced confessions as part of a crackdown on human rights lawyers that began in 2015, attempts to justify the mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang since 2017, the disinformation about this summer’s antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and just this month, ominous warnings that Taiwanese spies are using academic exchanges to recruit Chinese students.
Focus Talk has also carried highly problematic reports at key moments in the CCP’s political crackdowns. The show aired 28 episodes defaming and inciting hatred against practitioners of Falun Gong within a 32 day period in 1999. This was followed by deceptive reporting claiming a group of people who self-immolated on Tiananmen Square in 2001 were adherents of the banned group. In 2006, a Canadian regulatory commission acknowledged that such coverage was “clearly abusive” and “could incite violence” against those who practice Falun Gong in China and abroad.
More recently, it was an October 2018 episode of the program that offered the first acknowledgment in Chinese state media of the existence of detention centers in Xinjiang, framing them as “vocational centers” that would boost employment and curb extremism rather than as heavily guarded facilities where ordinary Muslims are being confined en masse for political indoctrination and forced labor. Subsequent episodes have continued to parrot the official party line that the centers “saved people who hold terrorist and extremist intentions” in Xinjiang, despite credible reports of forced disappearances, torture, and deaths in custody affecting people with no connection to violence.
To produce such content, CCTV journalists are given exclusive access to relevant locations, interviewees, and officials. But they also apparently accept the government’s stage-management, fabrications, and distortions, without criticism or independent verification. In some cases, CCTV reporters have been complicit in deceiving interviewees or helping police to manipulate them.
This is especially clear with respect to televised confessions. An April 2018 investigation by Safeguard Defenders into 45 such confessions by detained journalists, bloggers, lawyers, activists, and others between 2013 and 2018 found that 90 percent had been aired on CCTV. In many instances, there was concrete evidence that the station’s staff played a knowingly collaborative role in producing and editing segments that had been filmed in coercive or deceptive circumstances.
Global resonance
This fraudulent and demonizing coverage has a real-world impact. It poisons the minds of Chinese viewers against innocent fellow citizens, and prepares the ground for further state abuses. Victims are deprived of potential support from both domestic—and in some cases international—audiences. One prominent Falun Gong torture survivor recalled in an interview how after the airing of the Focus Talk special about the supposed self-immolation in 2001, her own brother became afraid of her. Popular remarks on Chinese social media following the 2018 episode on Xinjiang included comments like “we have to help a large number of Muslims to quit their Islam addiction,” and that “it’s quite a frightening disease.” The propaganda blitzes are often followed by an escalation in police violence against the targeted group and their impact on public perceptions can last for years.
But the effects of CCTV’s programing and propaganda tactics also reach far beyond China’s borders. Among the Chinese diaspora, the state broadcaster is a dominant source of news and entertainment, and its content encourages discrimination and even assaults against CCP critics and persecuted minorities by fellow overseas Chinese. In recent weeks, for example, mainland students and others have attempted to silence and vandalize shows of support for Hong Kong protesters in places like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
The broadcaster’s international arm, China Global Television Network (CGTN), has expanded its footprint and produced programming in multiple languages to reach non-Chinese viewers around the world. While it initially aims to build local audiences with attractive and innocuous content, it can be mobilized at key political moments to attack CCP opponents.
For instance, CGTN’s Facebook page now boasts over 85 million followers spread around the globe, and its ads and posts have tended to portray the Chinese government and leaders in a positive light and emphasize attractive national themes like pandas, Chinese cuisine, or tourism opportunities in particular provinces. But interspersed with the relatively benign content are a series of posts and ads that liken Hong Kong protesters to terrorists or repeat proven fabrications like a report claiming that protesters carrying toy weapons were armed with a US-made grenade launcher.
How to respond
Given CCTV’s close relationship with the Chinese state, its political campaigns, and its ongoing severe human rights violations, viewers in China and elsewhere would be wise to receive the broadcaster’s coverage—particularly of politically sensitive topics—with a healthy dose of skepticism, and to seek out more independent sources of information.
For their part, foreign news media should be wary of accepting CCTV coverage at face value and should conduct their own investigations into problematic content aired by the station, as some have done with regard to the recent reporting on Hong Kong. Journalists should carefully consider the ethical implications of working with or for the outlet, no matter what remuneration it might offer.
Although it is owned and subsidized by the Chinese state, CCTV also earns billions of dollars in private advertising revenue. Multinational corporations that currently pay for advertisements on CCTV—particularly its news programs—should reconsider this business decision and look to the many other avenues for reaching Chinese consumers.
Foreign governments and regulators should vigorously monitor the content being aired in their countries by CCTV in Chinese and CGTN in local languages. They should be ready to enforce any broadcasting regulations that might be violated, as British regulator Ofcom is now contemplating with regards to Hong Kong coverage and forced confessions. Foreign-agent registration requirements should be applied to CCTV in Chinese, as they already are to CGTN and other Chinese state media services in the United States, and consideration should be given to imposing sanctions on key executives responsible for televised confessions, as European officials have done in the case of Iran’s Press TV.
Despite the broad diversity of CCTV’s content and the arguably small percentage that rises to the level of abusive or demonizing propaganda, all audiences must remember that it is not a “normal” television station. It has a consistent record of blatantly and egregiously violating journalistic standards and encouraging or justifying hatred and violence against innocent people. CCTV is an essential component of the CCP’s brutal authoritarian regime and should be treated as such.
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. Aaron Cheng, a research intern studying at New York University, provided research assistance.
This article was also published by the Diplomat on September 25, 2019.
Harsh punishments meted out for speech-related offenses
While the Chinese government has developed one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated systems for information control, authorities continue to use low-tech tactics to punish and deter critical reporting and commentary. The following are a selection of such cases from the past few months:
Long prison sentences: Huang Qi, the founder of the human rights website 64 Tianwang, was sentenced to 12 years in prison on July 29 for “intentionally leaking state secrets.” In late June, authorities sentenced Liu Pengfei, the moderator of a popular WeChat account that provided Chinese readers with access to foreign news, to two years’ imprisonment. Liu's arrest came after warnings issued by state media in May that WeChat administrators could be held responsible for discussions in their groups. Mongolian historian Lhamjab A. Borjgin was sentenced on July 3 to one year in prison with a two-year reprieve for “national separatism” and “illegal business [activities]” related to dissemination of his book, China's Cultural Revolution.
Deaths in custody, and execution fears: Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported on September 23 that police had alerted relatives of activist Wang Meiyu that he had died in custody in Hunan. Wang was detained in July after holding a placard in public calling for Xi Jinping’s resignation and the conduct of national elections. In a separate case, Meng Hong, an elderly Falun Gong practitioner sentenced to prison in 2013 for handing out flyers, reportedly died on July 30 while in custody, according to her daughter living in the United States. In Xinjiang, scholar and former president of Xinjiang University Tashpolat Teyip may be “imminently” executed, according to Radio Free Asia. Teyip’s brother has not been able to contact him since his disappearance in 2017 en route to a conference in Germany.
Trumped-up espionage charges:Yang Hengjun, an Australian writer detained by Chinese authorities in January while visiting Guangzhou, was formally charged with espionage on August 23. Australian prime minister Scott Morrison has rejected the charges against Yang, who had been detained before in March 2011, but was released due to international pressure. Yang is not the only foreign national facing such charges: Canadians Michael Spavor, a businessman, and Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat who had worked for the International Crisis Group, have been detained since December 2018 in apparent reprisal for Canada’s arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. They were formally charged with national security crimes this May.
Long-term incommunicado detention: Uighurs continued to be held in long-term detention for comments made online, other forms of expression, or having outspoken relatives living abroad. Among those in custody are Buzainafu Abudourexiti, a student detained in 2017 after returning from studies in Egypt, and thirty relatives of prominent activist Rebiya Kadeers. Beyond Xinjiang, grassroots activist Chen Jiafeng has been detained since March due to an online article she wrote regarding the death of activist Cao Shunli. Labor activists Wei Zhili and Ke Chengbing have also been detained since March, while a third labor activist, Yang Zhengjun, has been detained since January. None of these individuals have been permitted to contact lawyers or their families.
Detentions in connection with Hong Kong prodemocracy protests: A 25-year-old Shenzhen resident who uses the pseudonym “Freedom Lu” was held by authorities for ten days in August on charges of “picking quarrels,” after he posted essays online urging mainlanders to rethink their attitudes about events in Hong Kong. In Chongqing, a local resident was placed under police surveillance in early August for expressing support online for the protests.
Other arrests linked to free-speech offenses: A Tibetan man in Sichuan was detained for 10 days in July for sharing a photograph of the Dalai Lama on WeChat. Two men were detained on June 13 for spreading rumors online concerning Chinese tech company Huawei. And Chinese artist Zhao Bang was arrested in August for designing an emoji-laden t-shirt that obliquely referenced the Tiananmen Square massacre. Zhang Jialong, a former journalist, was detained on August 13 for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” Zhang was known for his 2014 in-person appeal to US Secretary of State John Kerry for the US to pressure China over its internet censorship regime, but had been inactive since losing his job after the meeting.
Visa denied: The Wall Street Journal's Chun Han Wong was denied press credentials by the Chinese government in late August. The Singaporean journalist's expulsion from China is believed to come in retaliation for his July 30 report on President Xi Jinping's cousin Ming Chai, a naturalized Australian citizen suspected of money laundering.
Surveillance updates: Proliferating cameras, phone inspections at border, facial recognition in schools
Eight of the top ten most-surveilled cities in the world are in China: Researchers with the British proconsumer website Comparitech found that China has more surveillance cameras per capita than any other country. Chongqing was ranked as the world’s most-surveilled city, with 2.6 million cameras—or roughly 168.03 cameras per 1,000 people. There are believed to be more than 200 million surveillance cameras currently in use in China, with that number expected to rise to 626 million or higher by 2022.
New spyware and phone inspections at the border: Several reports emerged over the summer of visitors to China having their phones inspected at the border, apparently in connection with the unfolding crises in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. A joint investigation by the New York Times; Süddeutsche Zeitung and NDR, both of Germany; the Guardian; and the online magazine Motherboard published in July found that Chinese authorities have compelled people entering Xinjiang from Central Asia by land to install a surveillance app on their phone. Called Fengcai, the app can collect text messages and check the phone's files against a list of more than 73,000 sensitive items, which includes both books on Islamic terrorism and images of the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, Hong Kong residents crossing into mainland China have been compelled to unlock their phones and permit authorities to search for material related to the ongoing protests, according to the South China Morning Post. During these inspections, which occurred in July and August at the land crossing between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, some individuals were also asked whether or not they had participated in the protests.
Facial-recognition technology in schools prompts increasing concern: An August report on Sohu News detailed the use of facial recognition cameras at a primary school that are capable of assessing students’ posture and facial expressions, among other things. The expansion of facial-recognition in schools has prompted mounting domestic concern in recent months, and there are some signs of a government response. Officials at the China Pharmaceutical University in Nanjing recently announced they will curb the practice, while an official with the Ministry of Education conceded that officials must “be very careful when it comes to students' personal information,” adding that the government planned to regulate the use of facial recognition technology in classrooms.
Facial-recognition systems increasingly installed at public buildings: A report by Bitter Winter, an online magazine monitoring religious freedom in China, points to the increasing use of surveillance systems in public buildings. The magazine reported in September that facial recognition equipment had been installed by a local public security bureau at a residential compound in Jiangxi, as well as at 13 public housing complexes in Beijing. It is believed these systems could be used to surveil political dissidents and practitioners meeting at house churches.
Censorship updates: Hong Kong news manipulation, liberal think tank shuttered, filmmakers hampered
Censors delete, manipulate news on Hong Kong: Online content related to the Hong Kong protests that falls outside official government narratives continues to be significantly censored within China, while pro-regime propaganda is heavily promoted. Leaked instructions dated June 16 and published by China Digital Times order websites to “[f]ind and delete video content related to Hong Kong anti-extradition protests,” and to “delete any harmful comments” that reference several songs netizens have embraced as a way to discreetly express support for the protesters. A more recent set of instructions, dated September 5, highlights the dilemma facing Beijing’s content regulators following the official withdrawal of the extradition law amendments. The directives warn “all websites and new media” to “not re-publish, do not follow up, do not report, and strictly dispose of foreign information posted to social platforms” regarding the withdrawal. The instructions apparently came in response to online comments by Chinese netizens expressing confusion at the concession, which followed weeks of condemnation of the protests by state media. The leaked directive also ordered online media platforms to “[c]lose relevant comment sections, and strictly handle accounts who attack the government in the name of patriotism.”
Liberal Beijing-based institute announces closure: In late August, the Beijing-based Unirule Institute of Economics announced its closure after years of harassment by the authorities. The shuttering of Unirule, which over the last two years saw its social media accounts deleted and was evicted from its offices, is only the latest development reflecting authorities’ growing intolerance of free academic debate and critical discussion of economic policy.
Censors target war film, Taiwanese film festival: Chinese censors have continued to target mainland filmmakers. The release of the eagerly awaited war epic The Eight Hundredwas cancelled in late June, according to a brief statement on the producer's Sina Weibo account. The cancellation, announced just days before the film’s planned premiere, is thought to be related to its positive depiction of Nationalist soldiers who fought during the 1937 Battle of Shanghai prior to their defeat in 1949 to the Communists in China’s civil war. Separately, against a backdrop of rising tensions between China and Taiwan, the China Film Administration announced on August 6 that it would prevent mainland filmmakers from participating in Taiwan's prestigious Golden Horse Film Festival in November. Chinese documentary filmmaker Zhu Yu, who had previously expressed her intention to defy the ban, withdrew from the festival after she became the target of a cyberbullying campaign.
Content-recommendation algorithms face restrictive regulations: Draft regulations issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China on September 10 state that social media platforms, websites, and apps using algorithms to recommend content to users must ensure recommended material is in line with “mainstream values” and state ideology. The regulations come on the heels of the August 31 publication by the CCP Central Committee of “Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Work,” which stipulates the seven main responsibilities of Party committees regarding propaganda work, as well as sixteen discrete responsibilities for propaganda departments operating at all levels.
HONG KONG: Journalists face increased attacks amid protests, police clashes, mob violence
As prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong continue into the early fall, journalists and photographers in Hong Kong have increasingly become targets of violence by police officers, pro-Beijing mobs, and, on occasion, protesters themselves.
Since early July, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) has issued more than a dozen statements condemning attacks on media workers and urging all actors to allow journalists to work freely, and to take notice of PRESS helmets and vests. “Violent individuals and gangs are becoming more malicious in targeting and intimidating journalists,” the HKJA said in a September 16 statement, and repeated calls for police to acknowledge persistent abuses against journalists and “ensure fair law enforcement.”
Recent attacks on the media documented by HKJA include:
July 14: A reporter and a photographer from TVB News were assaulted by protesters during demonstrations in Shatin. The same day, a journalist from Commercial Hong Kong Radio was pepper sprayed by a police officer as he was covering a scuffle between police and protesters.
July 21: Two journalists were beaten with rods at the Yuen Long MTR station by a gang of pro-Beijing men wearing white t-shirts, who also destroyed their camera. One of the journalists was subsequently hospitalized for their injuries. The men had also attacked a number of protesters and bystanders at the station.
July 30: A number of attacks against journalists took place during protests at the Kwai Chung Police Station. Among them: police officers rushed at a photojournalist and deliberately struck him with a riot shield; a reporter was beaten by police while she was attempting to leave the scene of the demonstration; and a police officer pointed a shotgun at reporters covering the events.
August 5: A TVB News vehicle was destroyed by protesters during demonstrations near the Wong Tai Sin Centre.
August 11:Several journalists were assaulted amid an unruly gathering in North Point, including a Ming Pao journalist who was punched; a Stand News journalist who was threatened with a stick; and a journalist with the public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) who was assaulted by a crowd. Police made no arrests in any of these incidents.
August 14:During demonstrations at the Hong Kong International Airport, a reporter from the Hong Kong China News Agency was forced by protesters to delete pictures, while protesters tied up a reporter from the Global Times, a nationalist Chinese state-owned paper.
August 31: Police expelled reporters from the Prince Edward MTR station without explanation on the same evening they entered trained and assaulted commuters deemed linked to protests. That same evening, at Victoria Park, a group of ten reporters was encircled by police and temporarily prevented from leaving.
September 2: Police deployed tear gas and pepper spray against journalists at close range as they were covering demonstrations outside of the Mongkok Police station. A journalist from Now TV was pushed to the ground by police and was later treated for injuries to his hand at a local hospital.
September 17: A Hong Kong Baptist University journalism student and reporter for Broadcast News Network was arrested while reporting on protests on Hong Kong Island, and police blocked other reporters from filming the arrest.
BEYOND CHINA: Hong Kong counterprotests, surveillance exports, Confucius Institute closures
Hong Kong protests overseas met with counterprotests, stifling of speech:Clashes between supporters and opponents of the Hong Kong democracy movement at Australian and New Zealand university campuses have featured violent rhetoric by pro-Beijing students and an attack against at least one journalist. Well-organized groups of overseas Chinese students have responded to the establishment of so-called Lennon Walls covered in post-it notes calling for freedom by ripping down the expressions of support and bullying participating students. And while overseas rallies in support of the Hong Kong protests continue to elicit participation from both Hong Kongers and others, Chinese diplomats and consular officials have offered supportfor counterprotests—and, correspondingly, tacit approval of the violent behavior that has taken place at some of them.
New research details China's internet control, surveillance exports to over 100 countries: A September report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identified China as “a major driver of AI surveillance worldwide.” Chinese companies have sold AI technology to 63 countries, and are on the cutting edge of facial recognition technology, according to the study. Moreover, Chinese companies, along with their Russian counterparts, have provided internet control tools or training to over 100 countries, according to a separate report by the Open Technology Fund, also released in September.
Huawei helped African governments spy on opponents: The Wall Street Journal reported in August that employees of Chinese tech company Huawei had helped Ugandan and Zambian authorities intercept the encrypted communications of their political opponents, and had tracked the locations of some subjects using mobile phone data. Huawei, a primary supplier of internet network and surveillance equipment in sub-Saharan Africa, has also provided the Ugandan government with surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition software, raising fears of privacy campaigners.
Chinese police and proxies intimidate, threaten Uighur Americans: Uighurs living in the United States and Canada continue to face a campaign of intimidation by Chinese authorities, according to an August report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Individuals who have spoken out against the Chinese government reported receiving WeChat messages or phone calls in which individuals identifying as Chinese police officers threatened their family members in Xinjiang with imprisonment if they did not end their activism. Others have reported efforts to recruit them as informants for the Chinese government. In one case reported in May by Newsweek, Chinese authorities released a woman from a reeducation camp and compelled her to phone her son overseas to persuade him to refrain from criticizing the Chinese government; she was then returned to the camp days later.
Confucius Institutes close in the United States, face probe in Australia: Confucius Institutes are under renewed scrutiny in the US and Australia, amid growing concerns over Chinese government interference in Western academic institutions. Under a US military spending bill, US universities that host a Confucius Institute may not receive Defense Department funding for Chinese language training. More than a dozen US universities have now closed their Confucius Institutes in order to maintain Pentagon funding, the most recent being Miami Dade College on September 5. In Australia, the government of New South Wales announced in August that it had ended a partnership with Hanban, the Chinese government agency that oversees Confucius Institutes, to provide Chinese language programs in 13 public schools. That announcement came in the wake of a July 25 report by the Sydney Morning Herald that found that Confucius Institutes in Australian universities had signed agreements granting the Chinese government decision-making authority over teaching at the facilities. There are currently 548 Confucius Institutes and 1,193 primary and secondary school–based Confucius classrooms in operation worldwide.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Major social media firms take down anti-Hong Kong protest disinformation
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Since mid-August, at least three major US-based social media platforms—Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—have publicly announced the discovery and removal of large networks of accounts that were actively spreading disinformation aimed at demonizing or otherwise undermining the reputation of prodemocracy protests that have taken place in Hong Kong since June. All three are blocked in mainland China.
Twitter was the first company to go public, announcing in an August 19 blog post that it had suspended 936 accounts from within China that were “deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong Kong, including undermining the legitimacy and political position of the protest movement on the ground.” It added that an additional 200,000 new accounts created after the initial closures were also shuttered. The same day, Facebook announced that after being tipped off by Twitter to the campaign, it too had removed seven Pages, three Groups, and five Facebook accounts involved in “coordinated inauthentic behavior…focused on Hong Kong.” Example posts Facebook shared after the removals compared Hong Kong protesters to cockroaches and Islamic State militants. Then, on August 23, Google revealed that its video-sharing platform YouTube had closed a network of 210 channels that had “behaved in a coordinated manner while uploading videos related to the ongoing protests in Hong Kong”.
Both Twitter and Facebook explicitly said they had found evidence of this being a coordinated Chinese state-backed operation, while Google refrained from placing the blame at the feet of the Chinese government. Twitter also made public all of the account names and tweets shared from the initially suspended accounts in an effort to assist researchers studying Chinese and other political manipulation activities on the platform. On September 20, Twitter published datasets from an additional 4,301 accounts most active in the August operation. It separately announced that all state-owned news outlets globally would henceforth be barred from using its advertising services.
The companies’ moves to expose these covert disinformation campaigns were welcomed by free expression advocates. Whether they will dampen Chinese state and other actors’ efforts to spread disinformation remains to be seen.
Photo caption:Facebook post comparing Hong Kong protesters to Islamic State militants from a Page the company removed for spreading disinformation. Credit: Facebook
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
PRC anniversary tightening: As with other politically sensitive anniversaries this year, watch for increased information controls and pro-Beijing propaganda surrounding October 1—the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China—including tightened internet controls, heightened real-world surveillance in Beijing, and “forced vacations” for dissidents and activists to remote parts of China.
Hong Kong escalation: As prodemocracy protests and clashes with police continue, watch for further arrests, media obstructions, and police violence surrounding the October 1 anniversary and beyond, as the authorities seek to end the movement and avoid accountability for police brutality. Also watch for reprisals for joining protests or expressing support for the movement among Hong Kong businesses and their employees, as has occurred in recent weeks at airline Cathay Pacific.
Impact of US bans on Chinese tech: As bans on the use of products by Chinese companies like surveillance supplier Hikvision and on partnerships with tech giant Huawei take effect, watch for the impact of their implementation on the companies’ operations in China and elsewhere, and whether other Chinese firms change their business plans to avoid similar sanctions.
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長期監獄判刑：黃琦，人權網站「六四天網」的創辦人，7月29日被以「故意洩露國家機密」罪名判處12年監禁。六月底，當局判處劉鵬飛2年監禁，劉一個微信帳號管理员，該帳號因為提供中國網民境外新聞而十分受歡迎；五月，官方媒體向微信群管理員發佈相警告，稱微信管理員可能為其管理群組內的討論內容負責，劉在警報發佈後不久即被捕。蒙古歷史學家Lhamjab A. Borjgin，於7月3日被判處一年監禁，緩刑兩年，被控以「 分裂國家」和「非法商業（活動）」罪名，因他散播自己的著作《中國的文革》。
在監禁中「被死亡」和死刑的恐嚇：9月23日，據「中國人權捍衛者（Chinese Human Rights Defenders）」報導，警察通知維權人士王美余的家屬，他在湖南被監禁期間死亡。7月，王美余於因其在公眾場合手持要求習近平下台、並呼籲舉行全國選舉的公告牌而被捕。在另一案例中，法輪功學員孟紅2013年因散發傳單被判刑入獄。據她現居美國的女兒指稱，孟紅已於7月30日死於監禁之中。據自由亞洲電台報導，在新疆，學者和前新疆大學校長塔西甫拉提·特依拜（Tashpolat Teyip） 可能被「隨時」處決。自特依拜2017年在前往德國參加一次會議途中失蹤後，他的兄弟就和他失去了聯繫。
在邊境處的新防間諜軟件和手機檢查：有幾家報導指出，今年夏天，去中國的遊客在出入境處手機遭受檢查，這顯然與在新疆和香港發生的危機有關聯。一份由《紐約時報》（the New York Times）、德國的《南德意志報》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）與《北德廣播公司》（NDR）、英國《衛報》（the Guardian）、以及網絡雜誌《母板》（Motherboard）聯合做出的調查在7月刊登，該調查發現中國當局強迫從中亞陸地口岸進入新疆者在手機上安裝一監控應用程式app。该app名為「蜂采」（Fengcai)，它能收集短信並檢測手機內圖片文件，將手機內容和包含7萬3000敏感詞的清單進行比對，這些敏感字和圖片包括關於伊斯蘭恐怖主義的書籍和達賴喇嘛的照片。同時，據《南華早報》（South China Morning Post）報導，大陸的香港居民被強迫解鎖他們的手機，以便當局來搜索與正在進行的抗議相關的材料。在這些七、八月期間針對從大陸往來香港和深圳的遊客的檢查，有些人還被詢問是否曾參加過抗議活動。
審查人員刪除、操控香港消息：在中國，和政府官方口徑不一致的關於香港人抗議的網絡內容繼續被嚴格審查，同時親政府的宣傳被大量散播。一份標註日期為6月16日的指示洩漏並被《中國數字時代》（China Digital Times）發表，該指示命令各網站「發現並刪除與香港反送中抗議有關的視頻內容」，並「刪除任何有害評論」，指的是網民們用來謹慎地表達對香港抗議者支持的幾首歌曲。9月5日發出的更新的指令，表明了在官方撤回《引渡條例》修訂後，北京的內容監管者所面臨的兩難局面。這些指令警告「所有的網站和新聞媒體，不得轉載、跟進、報導並嚴格處理在社交平台上發佈的國外信息」，尤其是與反送中條例撤銷有關的信息。這顯然是為了處理此次讓步後中國網民在網上表達困惑的相關評論。該指令還命令網絡媒體平台「關閉相關評論區，並嚴厲解決那些以愛國名義而攻擊政府的帳戶」。
新的研究報告詳述中國的網絡控制，與輸出監控系統到100多個國家：卡內基國際和平基金會（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）一份九月份的研究報告中，將中國認定為「全球人工智能的主要推手」。該研究報告指出，中國公司已經向63個國家出售人工智能技術，並在人面部識別技術方面走在技術尖端。此外，根據9月份開放科技基金會（Open Technology Fund,OTF）提供的另一份報告，中國公司和與俄國的同行公司已經向100多個國家提供了網絡控制的工具或培訓。
中國警察及其代理人恐嚇、威脅美裔維吾爾人：根據8月份維吾爾人權計畫（Uyghur Human Rights Project）的報告，居住在美國和加拿大的維吾爾人持續面臨中共當局的威嚇。據報導，發聲反對中共政府言論的維族人收到中共警察微信短信或電話，威脅說如果他們不停止倡議行動，他們在新疆的家人將會面臨監禁，其他人還報導了中共政府正試圖招募他們作線人。在五月《新聞週刊》（Newsweek）的一則報導中，揭露了中共當局從集中營釋放了一位女士，並強迫她給她在海外的兒子打電話，勸說他節制對中國政府的批評。在幾天後，她又被重新關回了集中營。
长期监狱判刑：黄琦，人权网站「六四天网」的创办人，7月29日被以「故意泄露国家机密」罪名判处12年监禁。六月底，当局判处刘鹏飞2年监禁，刘是刘一个微信帐号管理员，该帐号因为提供中国网民境外新闻而十分受欢迎。5月，官方媒体向微信群管理员发布相关警告，称微信管理员可能为其管理群组内的讨论内容负责，刘在警报发布后不久即被捕。蒙古历史学家Lhamjab A. Borjgin，于7月3日被判处一年监禁，缓刑两年，被控以「 分裂国家」和「非法商业（活动）」罪名，只因他传播自己的书《中国的文革》。
在监禁中「被死亡」和死刑的恐吓：9月23日，据「中国人权卫士（Chinese Human Rights Defenders）」报导，，據「中國人權捍衛者（Chinese Human Rights Defenders）」報導，警察通知維權人士王美余的家屬，他在湖南被監禁期間死亡。7月，王美余於因其在公眾場合手持要求習近平下台、並呼籲舉行全國選舉的公告牌被捕。在另一案例中，法轮功学员孟红2013年因散发传单被判刑入狱。据她现居美国的女儿指称，孟红已于7月30日死于监禁之中。据自由亚洲电台报导，在新疆，学者和前新疆大学校长塔西甫拉提·特依拜（Tashpolat Teyip） 可能被「随时」处决。自特依拜2017年在前往德国参加一次会议途中失踪后，他的兄弟就和他失去了联系。
捏造间谍指控：杨恒均（Yang Hengjun），澳大利亚作家，一月份在广州旅行期间被中国当局拘留，并于8月23日正式被指控犯了间谍罪。澳大利亚总理斯科特·莫里森（ Scott Morrison）否认当局对杨的指控，杨在2011年3月前就被拘留过，但是当局迫于国际压力而释放了他。杨恒均并非遭受此类指控的唯一外国人：加拿大商人麦克·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor），以及曾经工作于国际危机组织(International Crisis Group)的加拿大前外交官康明凯（Michael Kovrig），自2018年12月被拘留，这显然是中国对加拿大逮捕华为高干孟晚舟的报复行为。五月，二人被正式指控危害国家安全罪。
与外界隔绝的长期拘留：维吾尔人持续地因其网络评论、其它形式的言论表达、或有对政府提出批评的海外亲戚，而继续被长期拘留，完全无法与外界联系。被拘留者包括：学生Buzainafu Abudourexiti，其于2017年从埃及留学回来后被拘留；知名行动者热妣亚（Rebiya Kadeers）的30名亲属。新疆之外，草根维权人士陈建芳（Chen Jianfang）自3月被拘留，因其网路发文悼念维权人士曹顺利之死；劳工维权人士危志立和柯成冰也自3月起被拘留；另一位劳工维权人士杨郑君自一月起被拘留(detained since January)。这些被拘者，都被禁止联系律师或他们的家属。
在边境处的新间谍软件和手机检查：有几家报导指出，今年夏天，在边境处的新防间谍软件和手机检查：有几家报导指出，今年夏天，去中国的游客在出入境处手机遭受检查，这显然与在新疆和香港发生的危机有关联。一份由《纽约时报》（the New York Times）、德国的《南德意志报》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）与《北德广播公司》（NDR）、英国《卫报》（the Guardian）、以及网络杂志《母板》（Motherboard）联合做出的调查在7月刊登，该调查发现中国当局强迫从中亚陆地边境口岸进入新疆者该调查发现中国当局强迫从中亚陆地口岸进入新疆者在手机上安装一监控应用程式app。该app名为「蜂采」（Fengcai)，它能收集短信并检测手机内图片文件，将手机内容和包含7万3000敏感词的清单进行比对，这些敏感字和图片包括关于伊斯兰恐怖主义的书籍和达赖喇嘛的照片。据《南华早报》 报导，同时，大陆的香港居民被强迫解锁他们的手机，以便当局来搜索与正在进行的抗议相关的材料。在这些七、八月期间针对从大陆往来香港和深圳的游客的检查，有些人还被询问是否曾参加过抗议活动。
审查人员删除、操控香港消息：在中国，和政府官方口径不一致的关于香港人抗议的网络内容继续被严格审查，同时亲政府的宣传被大量散播。一份标注日期为6月16日的指示泄漏并被《中国数字时代》（China Digital Times））发表，该指示命令各网站「发现并删除与香港反送中抗议有关的视频内容」，并「删除任何有害评论」，指的是网民们用来谨慎地表达对香港抗议者支持的几首歌曲。 9月5日发出的更新的指令，表明了在官方撤回《引渡条例》修订后，北京的内容监管者所面临的两难局面。这些指令警告「所有的网站和新闻媒体，不得转载、跟进、报导并严格处理在社交平台上发布的国外信息」，尤其是与反送中条例撤销有关的信息。这显然是为了处理此次让步后中国网民在网上表达困惑的相关评论。该指令还命令网络媒体平台「关闭相关评论区，并严厉解决那些以爱国名义而攻击政府的帐户」。
新的研究报告详述中国的网络控制，与输出监控系统到100多个国家： 卡内基国际和平基金会（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）一份九月份的研究报告中，将中国认定为「全球人工智能的主要推手」。该研究报告指出，中国公司已经向63个国家出售人工智能技术，在人面部识别技术方面走在前沿。此外，根据9月份开放科技基金会（by the Open Technology Fund,OTF）提供的另一份报告，中国公司和俄国的同行公司一道，已经向100多个国家提供了网络控制的工具或培训。
中国警察及其代理人恐吓、威胁美裔维吾尔人：根据8月份维吾尔人权项目（Uyghur Human Rights Project）的报告，居住在美国和加拿大的维吾尔人持续面临中共当局的威吓。那些发声反对中共政府言论的维族人，据报导收到中共警察微信短信或电话，威胁说如果他们不停止活动，他们在新疆的家人会面临监禁。其他人还报导了中共政府正试图招募他们作线人。在5月《新闻周刊》（Newsweek）的一则报导中，揭露了中共当局从集中营释放了一位女士，并强迫她给她在海外的儿子打电话，劝说他节制对中国政府的批评。在几天后，她又被重新关回了集中营。
孔子学院在美国被关闭，在澳大利亚面临调查：在对中共政府干涉西方学术机构之担忧日益增加之时，孔子学院在美国和澳洲面临新一轮的审查。在美国的军费开支中，设有孔子学院的美国大学可能会得不到国防部的对其中文培训的基金资助。为了继续得到五角大楼的基金，迄今已有十多所美国大学关闭了孔子学院，最近的一例是9月5日迈阿密达德学院 (Miami Dade College -FL)关闭其孔子学院。在澳大利亚，新南威尔士政府8月份宣布，他们已经中止了与汉办的合伙关系，并终止了汉办–中国政府监管海外孔子学院的机构–于当地13所学校开设的中文语言项目。这项决定在7月25日悉尼晨鋒報（Sydney Morning Herald）一则报导之后，一则报导之后宣布下达，该报导发现在澳洲大学的孔子学院签署了合约，给予中国政府决定在该学院教课内容的权力。全球目前共有548所孔子学院，还有设在1193个小学、中学的孔子课堂。
One evening in the summer of 2017, local police in China made a surprise inspection of a small private language school, checking the visas of all non-Chinese attendees. Among those present was a foreign doctoral student, who had left his passport at his hotel. “Not to worry,” said the officer. “What’s your name?” The officer took out a handheld device and entered the student’s name. “Is this you?” Displayed on the screen was the researcher’s name, his passport number, and the address of his hotel.
These kind of incidents are common in Xinjiang, where China has extensively deployed technology against Muslim minorities. But this episode took place in Yunnan Province, near China’s southern border with Myanmar. In fact, Public Security Bureaus – one of the main agencies in China for domestic security and intelligence - across the country are using electronic databases coupled with handheld tools to keep track of certain categories of people. These “key individuals,” as they are officially known, range from paroled criminals and users of drugs to foreigners, petitioners, and religious believers.
A review of dozens of local government notices, procurement tenders, and promotional material from Chinese companies indicates that the use of such technologies both predates and extends beyond the current crackdown in Xinjiang, affecting tens of millions of people all over China.
As the Chinese Communist Party identifies new targets for repression under the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Xi Jinping, and Chinese companies expand their sales of surveillance equipment abroad, the scale and impact of these databases are likely to increase in the coming years.
Monitoring “key individuals” nationwide
The Ministry of Public Security’s 2007 Key Population Management Guidelines define key individuals broadly as those “suspected of threatening national security or public order.” Some specific groups are listed, including serious criminal offenders, people released from prisons or labor camps, and users of illegal drugs.
In practice, a far wider range of people are treated as key individuals by China’s security apparatus, according to an examination of more than 70 local government notices issued in 26 of China’s 34 provinces and administrative regions between 2011 and 2019. Frequently mentioned categories of key individuals include petitioners, members of banned religious groups like Falun Gong, people with mental illnesses, and those involved in “stability maintenance” or “terrorist” activities—two terms that are often applied to rights activists, protesters, and members of ethnic minority groups like Xinjiang’s Uighurs.
As the number of populations under surveillance has grown, so too has the collection of their personal data. The origins of today’s massive police databases extend back to the introduction of machine-readable “second generation” national ID cards in the mid-2000s. The cards allowed personal data to be stored electronically and shared easily among branches of the Ministry of Public Security.
In 2006, one of the first nationwide databases of key individuals was launched: the Dynamic Control System. With records on more than two million registered users of drugs, the Dynamic Control System was an early example of ID-based location tracking and biometric data collection. It alerts public security offices whenever registered individuals use their national ID numbers to conduct computer-based transactions, such as buying a train ticket. Police can then determine the individuals’ location, intercept them, and conduct a drug test on their urine, the results of which are added to their electronic file. Fingerprints and DNA data are also collected. It was reported in November 2017 that police in Hainan were going door to door collecting DNA samples from registered users of drugs.
The Dynamic Control System soon became a template for other police databases, which Chinese technology firms were contracted to build. By 2008, Hongda Software’s Public Security Personnel Information Management Work System was being used to collect information on practitioners of the Falun Gong meditation and spiritual group, whose adherents have been subjected to a large-scale campaign of intimidation, imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial killing since 1999. Police were able to record who introduced practitioners to the movement, where and with whom they practiced, and their level of spiritual dedication—criteria that resemble precursors to more recent police assessments of Uighurs as “safe,” “average,” and “unsafe.”
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.
Mapping function for police database software developed by Yidiantong that shows the user where different kinds of registered "key individuals" are located within a geographic area. Credit: Emile Dirks
A booming surveillance industry
Since the release of Hongda’s system, databases on key individuals have become a lucrative part of the country’s surveillance technology sector. At least 13 tenders for such projects were issued by Public Security Bureaus in seven provinces or centrally administered cities between October 2015 and May 2019, according to information available online.
The companies in question hail from across China, including Shenzhen Yuanzhongrui Technology from Guangdong Province, Beijing’s Sensingtech LLC, and Zhejiang Province’s Yidiantong Information Technology. Of 40 companies building surveillance database systems, at least 10 provide accompanying handheld devices, like Sensingtech, while 13 mention mapping or geolocation features, like Netposa.
The products themselves are not available for direct examination, but help manuals and screenshots of system interfaces are accessible online. Yidiantong’s Key Person Control system allows operators to collect basic identifying information on key individuals (name, date of birth, sex, address) as well as bank account and social media information. Additional categories of data are tailored for particular groups: the results of psychological evaluations for people with mental illnesses; the content of complaints by petitioners; the results of urine tests for users of drugs; or the reason for a foreigner’s visit to China and which Chinese counterpart is responsible for the traveler. Some products, like those offered by Hongda Software and Yidiantong, cover populations that are less typical targets of mass monitoring, including internal migrants and clergy from state-approved religious groups.
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.The diversity of the products—and of the target populations—reflect the decentralized aspects of Chinese policing. There is a nationwide focus on certain groups and a general desire to enforce “social stability” through high-tech surveillance tools. But which populations are prioritized varies across location and time. Local government notices indicate that military veterans petitioning for improved treatment were a concern across China beginning in 2017, while people in community corrections, the mentally ill and petitioners were targeted in the leadup to the 19th Party Congress in 2018. Targets may also vary based on the size of local religious populations: Christians are a greater focus for security services in Zhejiang, Muslims in Xinjiang, Falun Gong practitioners in far northeastern provinces, and Tibetan Buddhists in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Sichuan, and Qinghai. Adding to the diversity of implementation is the fact that there does not appear to be a single designated supplier for these technologies, leading to a relatively competitive market.
Data entry interface for police database of "key individuals" developed by Yidiantong Information Technology in Zhejiang province. Credit: Emile Dirks
Future uses and implications
There are already signs that disparate databases are being combined with broader state surveillance projects. Yidiantong claims that its Key Person Control database is integrated with the information systems of hotels, internet cafés, airports, and railway stations, enabling real-time data sharing with the police. Several companies even boast that their databases are integrated with facial-recognition cameras capable of identifying key individuals in public places.
The regime’s ability to convert data integration into more intensive forms of control and punishment for key individuals is liable to increase. A decade ago, a known dissident, underground Christian, or Falun Gong practitioner might have received a visit from police during politically sensitive periods, like a Communist Party Congress. Today these same people may be monitored continuously, with police receiving automatic alerts about their movements. As the definition of a key individual continues to expand, and new forms of data are added to the tracking systems, there is little to stop police from punishing even minor forms of political or religious dissent and affecting more aspects of a person’s life for longer periods of time.
The hoarding of so much personal information in integrated databases with minimal oversight raises obvious concerns about data security. Other surveillance and data-collection systems in China have been found over the past year to have very poor data protection measures, exposing the personal details of millions of people to hackers. Recent official efforts to improve data security have applied almost entirely to how private companies, not the government, handles personal data.
Another concern arises from the potential export of key-individual surveillance technologies to other countries. A study published last month by the Open Technology Fund documents sales of various types of Chinese surveillance and internet censorship equipment to at least 73 countries across five continents. The recipient states are not just other full-fledged autocracies like Egypt or Azerbaijan, but also countries with semiauthoritarian or even democratic systems like Brazil, Malaysia, Tanzania, Poland, and South Korea. At least three technology companies that are listed in the report for providing facial-recognition-enabled cameras to other countries—Dahua, Sensetime, and Hikvision—also offer surveillance technologies aimed at tracking key individuals.
How to respond
Developing effective responses to these surveillance practices is extremely difficult. At a minimum, though, it is worth alerting both Chinese citizens and foreigners traveling in China about the extent of data collection, allowing vulnerable people to take precautions to protect themselves and their acquaintances.
Rights-conscious investors, whether foreign or Chinese, should closely examine their portfolios and eliminate any direct or indirect support for companies that are complicit in mass surveillance and rights violations, including through international pension funds and venture-capital firms. A loss of capital could reduce the attraction of contracts from China’s security apparatus and dampen enthusiasm for technologies that are specifically designed to track peaceful activism or religious observance.
Finally, officials in democratic settings should be wary of transactions with any of these firms. Among the Chinese commercial entities added this month to a US government export blacklist for their involvement in facilitating repression in Xinjiang, several also sell technologies aimed a broader range of key-individual targets. The United States and democracies in general should apply Xinjiang-style sanctions to Chinese companies that contribute to surveillance-enabled rights violations across the country.
Given the pace at which such dystopian tools of mass repression have proliferated within China, democratic actors should waste no time in halting their spread before they become a fact of life around the world.
Emile Dirks is a PhD candidate and independent researcher based in Toronto, Canada whose work focuses on extrajudicial detention and government surveillance in the People’s Republic of China. Sarah Cook is a Senior Research Analyst at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin.
This article was also published by Foreign Policy on October 21, 2019.
Chinese state media, troll networks fuel backlash against NBA in China
On October 4, a simple tweet in support of the ongoing protests in Hong Kong by Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, elicited a fierce backlash from the Chinese government, state media, and Chinese fans of the NBA. The tweet, which contained an image bearing the words “fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,” was quickly deleted by Morey, who subsequently apologized, along with the Rockets’ owners, to Chinese audiences offended by the message. Despite these damage-control efforts, following an October 8 statement by NBA commissioner Adam Silver supporting free expression, numerous Chinese companies withdrew their sponsorship from the NBA, while banners advertising upcoming NBA exhibition games in China were taken down across the country, and official merchandise was removed from store shelves. Online, viral videos spread of Chinese basketball fans tearing up their tickets, as did messages condemning Morey and the NBA. Silver claimed that the Chinese government had even pressured him to fire Morey.
The controversy around Morey, the NBA, and the Hong Kong protests was not the result of spontaneous Chinese netizen outcries. Rather, it emerged at least in part due to government-led propaganda and content manipulation efforts, including the following:
A coordinated Twitter troll attack targeting Morey: In the hours and days following Morey’s initial tweet, tens of thousands of Twitter users apparently based in China were mobilized to respond in a coordinated pro-China intimidation campaign against him. A Wall Street Journal analysis of nearly 170,000 tweets directed at Morey concluded that he had been the target of a “troll attack” intended to “manipulate the conversation about the Hong Kong protests,” and noted that many of the tweets contained verbal abuse including, among other things, a Chinese acronym meaning “your mother is dead.” At the peak of the activity, Morey would have received notifications of such tweets at a rate of nearly two messages per second. Twitter is blocked in China but accessible with circumvention tools; according to experts who analyzed the data and messages, the tweets were likely sent by human users rather than a bot network.
Broadcast cancellations by Chinese state media and Tencent: Chinese state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) denounced Adam Silver for defending Morey on free- speech grounds, arguing instead that Morey’s tweet challenged “national sovereignty and social stability.” CCTV further announced that it would no longer broadcast NBA preseason games. In light of Morey’s tweet, the Chinese company Tencent—the NBA’s online broadcast partner in China, which also has close ties to the Chinese government—announced that it too would temporarily suspend broadcasts of preseason games.
Top-down censorship and manipulation of popular opinion: Chinese state media responded quickly to the unfolding controversy with both public and behind-the-scenes attempts to manipulate public opinion concerning Morey and the NBA. A Weibo survey released by the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, on October 8 asked respondents to pick one of four answers to the question of how they felt about Morey. However, the poll was derided by netizens for only allowing respondents to select from pro-China or anti-Morey answers. On October 10, government censors instructed Chinese websites to remove reports on the NBA from their homepages and to not “hype” topics related to the ongoing controversy.
Persistent public anger in China directed at Morey, Silver, and the NBA in response to Morey’s comments and the subsequent fallout, is due also in part to China’s notoriously closed media landscape, which has been awash with state disinformation about the Hong Kong protests. Among other smears, participants have been routinely derided as “terrorists” and “cockroaches,” as detailed in last month’s China Media Bulletin. Still, from netizen responses to the People’s Daily survey, it is also clear that at least some Chinese fans remain unconvinced by Chinese state propaganda. In one case, a Chinese Rockets fan posted an emotional video in support of his team in which he set fire to China’s national flag. However, despite the fan’s efforts to cover his face and hide his identity, police were able to track him down and arrest him, sending a chilling message to would-be outspoken fans.
Foreign and Chinese brands under increased pressure to aid government censorship
Online travel platforms covered by new censorship rules: New regulations drafted by China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism will increase censorship of content posted on the platforms of online travel providers. The 42 draft regulations, posted October 10, require the platforms to preemptively review content published in order to prevent information deemed problematic by the government from spreading. The applications will also be required to store information on people posting on their platforms, and to cooperate with authorities in any investigations related to these people. The rules come on the heels of several other sets of restrictions and content-monitoring efforts imposed over the past year on apolitical platforms like live-streaming, dating, and celebrity gossip applications.
South Park “Band in China” episode banned in China: Chinese government censors have ordered the popular US animated series South Park scrubbed from the internet after a recent episode of the show took satirical aim at the Chinese government. Officials ordered websites to add the show’s name to a banned keyword search list, according to a leaked directive published by China Digital Times. The episode mocked Chinese censorship and American companies that attempt to appease the Chinese government through self-censorship, while also including politically sensitive references like a scene of Winnie the Pooh being imprisoned in a labor camp because of his use as a meme for Chinese president Xi Jinping. Following the ban, creators Trey Parker and Matt Stone issued on Twitter a faux apology praising the Communist Party and welcoming “Chinese censors into our home and into our hearts.” Others have also felt the impact of Chinese government ire at South Park, with musician Zedd announcing on Twitter that he had been banned from performing in China after liking a Tweet from the show’s official Twitter account.
Apple takes new steps to aid Chinese government censorship: Numerous reports indicate that tech giant Apple continues to assist Chinese state authorities in censoring content within and outside China. In early October, Quartz’s mobile news app was removed from the Chinese version of the App Store due to its coverage of continuing protests in Hong Kong. An app that helps crowdsource data on the location of police in Hong Kong was also removed from the store in early October at the request of local authorities, a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times. Apple chief executive Tim Cook defended the move on that grounds that the app was being used to target police officers for violence, but subsequent statements from Hong Kong police indicate that despite official fears, the app had not yet been used in such a way. Buzzfeed has also reported that as early as 2018, Apple was warning show developers for Apple TV+ to avoid topics that might anger the Chinese government. Even emojis have not been spared, with recent updates to iPhone’s iOS 13.1 in Macau and Hong Kong removing the Taiwanese flag emoji. In other cases, while Apple itself has not been complicit in government repression, its minimal response has nonetheless concerned critics. According to security researchers at Google Project Zero, the Chinese government has reportedly launched malicious attacks on Uyghur Muslim iPhone users in Xinjiang and abroad in an effort to gain access to the users’ location and files. Apple reportedly closed the vulnerability, but declined to comment on the scope or target of the attacks.
Surveillance updates: Study app backdoor, facial scans for internet registration, “Super camera” unveiled, facial recognition on subways
Study reveals government-backed study app’s surveillance capabilities: A report by the Open Technology Fund released October 12 provides evidence that a Chinese government app, “Study the Great Nation,” can potentially be used for surveillance of users. The app, designed by Chinese tech giant Alibaba, is promoted as a resource through which users can study Communist Party ideology, follow the news, and learn about Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, through backdoors in the app, Chinese authorities can view a user’s internet history, text messages, and photos; review their contacts; and even turn on the phone’s audio recorder. The app has reportedly been downloaded over 100 million times, and many government employees are required to spend free time accruing points awarded on its programs. In September, regulators announced that journalists’ accreditation for 2019 would be based on reporters’ performance on an exam drawn in part on the app’s content.
Facial scans required for internet and phone registration starting in December: On September 27, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced that starting December 1, all telecommunications companies must obtain facial scans of all new internet or mobile phone users. Under this same regulation, Chinese citizens would also be prohibited from transferring cell phone numbers to other people. The move, which is being justified in the name of safeguarding the rights and interests of Chinese citizens, marks a further expansion of domestic surveillance and real-name registration requirements for telecommunications customers and netizens—developments that have already discouraged online discussion.
“Super camera” unveiled at industry fair: A team of Chinese scientists unveiled a camera with 500 megapixel resolution capable of capturing detailed still and moving images of faces within panoramic shots of thousands of people. Unveiled in late September at China’s International Industry Fair, images from the camera can be uploaded to cloud storage and analyzed in real time. Given the Chinese government’s embrace of domestic surveillance, voices in China and abroad have raised serious privacy concerns, asking how such technology could be used in coordination with facial recognition enabled cameras.
Free subway ride for facial recognition registration: In late September, it was reported that Shenzhen has become the latest Chinese city to roll out facial recognition systems for subway commuters. Using technology designed by Huawei, people over the age of 60 who register for the system will be able to gain access to stations for free by scanning their faces. Similar experimental systems have been tested out in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao, Nanjing, and Nanning. While facial recognition could facilitate the quick passage of people through station barriers, the program could easily give way to broader use by private companies and the government of the facial scans obtained, as surveillance systems in China become increasingly integrated.
Hong Kong: Face masks ban, more attacks on journalists signal declining press freedom
Police violence against journalists in Hong Kong has underscored the worsening climate for press freedom in the Special Administrative Region in recent months, as have scattered attacks on reporters by both protesters and pro-Beijing sympathizers. On October 3, the Hong Kong Journalists Association filed an application for a judicial review against the Commissioner of Police due to his failure to curb police violence, interference, and misconduct directed at journalists. The following are three key developments reflecting deteriorating press freedom in Hong Kong over the previous month:
Face mask ban: On October 4, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam invoked a colonial-era emergency ordinance to issue a ban on face coverings, a move that was decried by many international observers. On October 8, the Hong Kong Journalists Association sought clarification from the government on how the prohibition would affect the work of journalists covering protest activity, as well as whether journalists wearing face masks would be in violation of the regulations. Reporters Without Borders has claimed the ban endangers journalists, many of whom wear goggles and gas masks to protect themselves from police tear gas and pepper spray. In response, police say they have the right to ask reporters to remove face masks and arrest those who refuse.
More physical attacks on local, foreign journalists: On September 30, a police officer was caught on camera smiling as he pepper sprayed Initium Media journalist Lam Chun Tung, who was attacked despite displaying his press card and wearing a helmet emblazoned with the word “Press.” On October 3, Indonesian journalist Veby Indah was left blind in one eye after being struck by a rubber bullet fired by police—the most serious injury to date sustained by members of the media covering the ongoing protests. A few days later on October 6, US journalist Suzanne Salatine was filmed being pushed against a wall and struck with riot shields by police officers; she was subsequently detained but then released without charge. That same day, a journalist for public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) was struck by a Molotov cocktail thrown by protesters, causing burns on his face. On October 13, a driver for NowTV was hit with a police projectile outside Mong Kok police station and later detained for two hours and beaten by police officers while in custody.
Outlets recall reporters covering National Day protests: In the face of rising violence, RTHK, the South China Morning Post, and Baptist University’s student newspaper decided to recall journalists from the frontlines after several incurred injuries during police efforts to disperse protests held on National Day on October 1. Police had used water cannons, pepper spray, and tear gas against protesters, some of whom responded with Molotov cocktails and bricks, during the demonstrations that took place on the sensitive political anniversary. The Hong Kong Journalists Association reported that scores of journalists were injured by rubber bullets and sponge rounds fired by police, while others were treated for acid attacks, and called on all sides to refrain from interfering with the work of the city’s reporters.
Beyond China: Blizzard sanctions pro-Hong Kong gamers, TikTok censorship, US limits Chinese tech exports, academic freedom threats
Blizzard controversy, boycott: US gaming firm Blizzard has come under fire for sanctioning a player of the popular game Hearthstone who expressed support for the ongoing protests in Hong Kong. During a post-match press conference announcing a gaming victory on October 6, Hong Kong player Chung Ng Wai voiced the popular protest slogan, “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” In response, Blizzard stripped Chung of his prize money and banned him from competing for a year. After an outcry from other players, his winnings were later reinstated and his ban reduced to six months. Nevertheless, calls for a boycott of Blizzard arose, and intensified following the subsequent banning of three US-based Hearthstone players on October 16 for holding up a sign reading “free Hong Kong, boycott Blizz” during a live-streamed match. Seemingly in response to the growing controversy, Blizzard cancelled a product launch in New York City scheduled for October 16. While Blizzard’s user base in China is small, the company is seeking to expand in the lucrative software market to make up for lost revenues elsewhere.
TikTok censorship of Hong Kong protests and more: Evidence is growing that the popular social media network TikTok regularly censors material considered sensitive by the Chinese government. The video-sharing platform has emerged as one of the most downloaded and popular applications globally in 2019, especially among teenage users. According to internal documents obtained by the Guardian, employees of the company, which is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance, are required to remove content related to such topics as the Tiananmen Square massacre and the persecuted Falun Gong spiritual group. Searches for “Hong Kong” on the site also return surprisingly few results related to the ongoing protests in the city compared to other popular social media platforms. Amid these revelations, on October 9, Senator Marco Rubio requested that the Treasury Department look into the national security implications of the acquisition of the music-based social media service Musical.ly by TikTok, while on October 17 Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg criticized the Chinese company for censoring content. In response, TikTok has hired former US lawmakers now working at law firm K&L Gates to revise its company policies.
US places export restrictions on Chinese tech firms aiding repression in Xinjiang: On October 7, the US Commerce Department announced it would place 28 Chinese entities on a government export blacklist due to their complicity in the Chinese government’s ongoing campaign of repression in Xinjiang. Included in the so-called Entity List are eight Chinese tech companies: Dahua Technology; Hikvision; iFlytek; Megvii Technology; Sense Time; Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Company; Yitu Technologies; and Yixin Science and Technology. In light of the sanctions, two of the largest US public pension funds, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System and the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, are said to be reexamining their holdings in Hikvision. Other observers have questioned the impact of the sanctions, and called for stronger measures.
New research on Confucius Institutes, Chinese extraterritorial impact on academic freedom: The impact of Chinese government intimidation and influence on scholarly activity inside China and beyond continues to be a source of concern. On September 24, Scholars at Risk published Obstacles to Excellence, a detailed report on challenges to academic freedom linked to activities undertaken by the Chinese government. The report noted a worsening academic environment on both the Chinese mainland as well as in Hong Kong and Macau. The report also examined the extraterritorial reach of Chinese government influence, including via Confucius Institutes operating on campuses across the globe, as well as Chinese government-backed surveillance and intimidation efforts directed at Chinese students and scholars overseas. Separately, Freedom House researcher Sarah Cook and University of Washington student Flora Yan wrote in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief about the intersection between Confucius Institutes and the corporate sector, in particular the increasing efforts by Confucius Institutes to offer courses on Chinese language, politics, and economics to multinational corporations. Their piece also highlights a new partnership program between Hanban—the Confucius Institute Headquarters—and Chinese companies, including tech firms Tencent and iFlytek, both of which are already known for their high level of collaboration with the Chinese government in surveillance and censorship. These revelations raise new concerns about the impact of Confucius Institutes on free expression on campuses, and the potential for these establishments to act as intelligence-gathering organs for the Chinese state.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: Uighurs use video-sharing apps to break through information blockade
Amid a massive campaign of detention, reeducation, and forced labor, China’s northwest region of Xinjiang is arguably one of the most tightly controlled information environments in the world. Efforts by Uighur and other Muslim residents of the region to communicate their plight, even to family members overseas, can result in long-term extralegal detention.
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.It was all the more surprising then to observers of the crisis to see in late August the emergence of dozens of short videos by Uighurs on Douyin, a video-sharing application owned by Chinese firm ByteDance. The clips, often just a few seconds long, typically showed an ethnic Uighur with a photo of a loved one—who had presumably been taken away to a reeducation camp or state-run orphanage—crying or making other gestures of mourning. Experts who have viewed the videos say they appear to have been filmed and posted from within Xinjiang.
The videos’ ambiguity appears to have helped them slip past censors initially. It remains unclear how many views the clips received within China—or how long they survived before being deleted, as many were. But the images and videos have spread globally as overseas Uighur activists have reposted them on Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram (all of which are blocked in China). Meanwhile, dozens of international media outlets have published articles about the phenomenon, including the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, and publications in France and Australia. Snapshot of an unnamed Uighur woman appearing to mourn missing family members from a video on Douyin.
Meanwhile, Douyin and its international counterpart Tiktok have emerged as an important, if unlikely, source of video evidence of the Xinjiang crackdown and of the whereabouts of the province’s missing children. Despite the difficulty of verifying their accuracy, clips posted by official government or state media accounts have enabled overseas observers and relatives to identify and preserve footage of orphanages for Uighur children whose parents are in detention, instances of mosques being demolished, and images of heavily armed police in training or pro-Communist Party loyalty-building sessions.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Trial and treatment of rights defender Chen Jianfang: Chen was detained in March 2019, apparently for publishing an online essay paying tribute to the United Nations–oriented activist Cao Shunli on the fifth anniversary of her death in custody. On August 30, Shanghai prosecutorsindicted Chen on charges of “subversion of state power,” a serious offense often used to impose long prison sentences on activists, but news of the charges only emerged this month. Chen is a long-time vocal human rights advocate, and UN human rights experts and international human rights groups have written to the Chinese government to express concern about her arrest and denial of due process. Watch for updates on her trial and possible sentencing, whether international pressure on her behalf impacts the outcome of her case, including whether she is granted the legal counsel of her choice, which to date she has been denied.
Impact of foreign tech firm attendance at Wuzhen “World Internet Conference”: From October 20 to 22, the Chinese government hosted its sixth annual internet conference in the town of Wuzhen, in Zhejiang. Chinese state mediareported that 1,500 people from 80 countries joined. As in past years, the Communist Party had a strong presence at the event, including a keynote speech by Huang Kunming, a member of the Politburo and head of the party’s powerful propaganda department, who also read a congratulatory message from Xi Jinping. Several major US tech firms, including Google and Facebook did not attend—possibly because they sought to avoid the blowback that Apple and Google faced in 2017 after sending top executives, and thereby conferring some legitimacy upon the Chinese Communist Party’s model of restrictive internet control. But a number of notable hardware, semiconductor, and cloud service companies sent representatives, including Qualcomm, Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco; they joined Chinese tech executives from Alibaba and Baidu. Amid heightened US-China trade tensions and renewed concerns over how Chinese economic ties affect free speech abroad, watch for any fallout for these companies as a result of their participation, or examples of how their attendance influences their business practices.
China-Russia treaty on combating “illegal” content online: On October 8, Reuters reported that China and Russia were planning to sign a treaty later in the month aimed at joining efforts to combat “illegal” content online, based on reports from a Russian state communications agency. Watch for confirmation that the treaty had been signed, any details on its provisions, and emerging evidence of its implementation, including increased Russian efforts to censor political and religious content within its borders on topics that might be deemed sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party.
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Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.這些產品的五花八門— 以及其針對的人群— 反映了中國警察去中心化的警務操作。普遍來說，執行警務包含對於特定的人群進行全國規模的監控，且冀求透過高科技監視手段來加強「社會穩定」。然而，該優先處置哪些人口，則因時間、地理位置而有所不同。當地政府的各式公告顯示，退伍軍人上訪並要求改善待遇，自2017年開始成為全國關注焦點；在2018年中共第十九屆全國代表大會前夕，在社區登記的重點人口、精神病患者和上訪者則成為前沿鎖定對象。根據當地宗教信眾人數的多寡，目標人群也會有所不同：在浙江，警衛對基督徒的監視較嚴密，在新疆則針對穆斯林，東北省份則多關注法輪功學員，在西藏、四川和青海則是更針對藏傳佛教徒。不僅系統有多種多樣的操作，更因為相關技術並沒有被特定公司壟斷，導致產品的市場的競爭也相對較強。
南方公園「中國樂隊」節目在中國被禁：在廣受好評的美國動漫系列「南方公園」最近劇目中諷刺中國政府後，中國政府的審查者已命令將其節目從網上刪除。據《中國數字時代》洩漏的一則指令，官方命令網站將該節目的名稱加入被禁的關鍵詞搜尋名單。該其內容諷刺了中國的審查制度，以及和試圖通過自我審查來討好中國政府的美國公司，並包含了政治敏感性的隱喻，譬如其中一個場景展示小熊維尼（Winnie the Pooh），因模仿了中國主席習近平，而被關押在一個勞改營中。被禁之後，南方公園的創始人派克（Trey Parker）與史東（Matt Stone）發表推文反諷式「道歉」，稱讚中共，並歡迎「中國的審查人員到我們的家和心中」。其他人也感受到了中國政府對南方公園的怒火，音樂人泽德（Zedd）在推特上聲明， 他因對「南方公園」官方推特帳戶上的一則推文點讚，而被中國封殺。
蘋果採取新措施協助中共政府進行審查：大量報導表明，科技巨頭蘋果公司繼續協助中共當局針對國內外進行內容審查。十月初，因報導在香港的持續抗議，Quartz手機新聞應用程式被蘋果從其中文應用程式app商店中移除。應當局要求，一個以群眾外包蒐集資料來定位香港警察的app也在10月除被蘋果移除，此決定受到了官方媒體《環球時報》的表揚（a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times）。蘋果總裁提姆•庫克（Tim Cook）為其舉措辯護，說該app被用來對警察施暴行，但隨後從香港警方發佈的聲明中顯示，儘管恐懼瀰漫，事實上該 app並未做此用。Buzzfeed 也早在2018年就有報導，說蘋果警告其在蘋果電視+平台上的節目開發者，避免開發可能惹怒中國政府的主題。連表情符號都沒被放過，iPhone最新升級的iOS 13.1系統，在香港和澳門地區的版本就刪除了台灣的國旗符號。在其它案例中，雖然蘋果還沒有參與中共政府打壓，但他們的低調反應仍飽受批評。根據谷歌Project Zero的安全研究人員發現，報導顯示中國政府已針對新疆和海外維吾爾族人 iPhone 使用者發動了惡意攻擊，以取得這些用戶的位置和文件信息。 據報導，蘋果已修正了漏洞，但卻不願對被攻擊的範圍和對象多作評論。
監控更新：學習 app後門，網絡註冊需面部掃描，「超級攝像頭」亮相，地鐵上的面部識別
研究揭示政府支持的學習應用程式兼具監控功能：10月12日，一份「開放技術基金」（the Open Technology Fund）發佈的報告提出證據，指中國政府「學習強國」應用程式app 可被用來監控用戶。該 app由中國科技公司阿里巴巴設計，被以讓用戶學習中共意識形態的用途作推廣，跟進新聞，和認識中國主席習近平。然而，通過該應用程式的後門，中國當局可以檢視用戶的上網紀錄、短信和圖片，查看他們的通訊錄，甚至開啟用戶手機的錄音功能。據報導該應用程式已被下載1億多次，許多政府工作人員被要求在業餘時間使用此軟件，累積分數。9月份，監管部門宣佈，2019年記者的證照將基於該記者的考試成績，而試卷中的題目部分來自該應用程式的內容。
12月起網路和手機註冊要求面部掃描：9月27日，中國工業和信息化部（China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology）宣佈，從12月1日起，所有的電信公司必須對新的網絡和手機用戶，進行面部掃描。在此相同規定下，中國公民將被禁止將手機號碼轉給他人。此舉名為保護中國公民的權益，實則是對電信用戶和網民們國內監控，以及進一步擴大實名制的要求—意圖遏止網絡討論的發展。
媒體召回報導國慶抗議的記者：隨著暴力日益升級，在10月1日國慶日警察在驅散抗議者造成了幾起受傷事件後，香港電台（RTHK），《南華早報》（South China Morning Post）和《香港浸會大學學生報》決定從前方召回他們的記者。值此政治敏感日，在抗議期間，警察對抗議者動用了水炮車、辣椒噴霧和催淚瓦斯，有些抗議者以燃燒彈和磚頭回應。香港記者協會報導，有數十名記者被警察連珠發射的橡膠子彈和海棉彈擊傷，還有其他人在受到酸液攻擊後正在治療，並呼籲各方不要干擾城市中記者的工作。
中國之外：暴雪制裁支持香港的遊戲玩家，抖音審查，美國限制中國的技術出口，學術自由遭受威脅
暴雪爭議與抵制：一名熱門遊戲《爐石戰記(Hearthstone)》的玩家因表達對當下香港抗議的支持，而受到美國遊戲公司暴雪的制裁，暴雪因此受到各方批評。10月6日，在一場遊戲後宣佈勝利的新聞發佈會中，香港玩家職業選手吳偉聰（ Chung Ng Wai） 說出了抗議中盛行的口號：「光復香港，時代革命」，隨後，暴雪收回了給吳偉聰的獎金，並懲罰禁賽一年。在此舉遭到其它玩家強烈抗議後，其贏家身份後來被恢復，禁賽期則減為6個月。即便如此，呼籲抵制暴雪的呼聲響起，並由於隨後在10月16日，在三個美國《爐石戰記》的玩家在網上進行的遊戲中舉起一個寫著「香港自由，抵制暴雪」的標語、暴雪進而對這三位玩家禁賽後，抵制暴雪的呼聲更強烈。似乎因爭議越來越多，暴雪取消了原定10月16日於紐約市舉行的一場產品發佈會。儘管暴雪在中國的用戶群還少，該公司正在尋求擴展這一有利可圖的中國市場，來彌補在其它地方的虧損。
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.這類視頻的模稜兩可似乎幫助它們躲過了過去最初的審查。但尚不清楚在中國這些視頻有多少瀏覽量—或在被刪除前（它們許多是被刪除了）能存留多久 。但是這些圖像和視頻已經在海外全球傳播，維族維權人士在推特（Twitter）、YouTube和 Instagram上轉貼，（這些平台在中國都是被封的）。同時，數十個國際媒體都發表刊登了這些現象的相關文章，包括《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）、《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）和法國（France）以及澳大利亞（Australia）刊物。
Image may be NSFW. Clik here to view.这些产品的五花八门— 以及其针对的人群— 反映了中国警察去中心化的警务操作。普遍来说，执行警务包含对于特定的人群进行全国规模的监控，且冀求透过高科技监视手段来加强「社会稳定」。然而，该优先处置哪些人口，则因时间、地理位置而有所不同。当地政府的各式公告显示，退伍军人上访并要求改善待遇，自2017年开始成为全国关注焦点；在2018年中共第十九届全国代表大会前夕，在社区登记的重点人口、精神病患者和上访者则成为前沿锁定对象。根据当地宗教信众人数的多寡，目标人群也会有所不同：在浙江，警卫对基督徒的监视较严密，在新疆则针对穆斯林，东北省份则多关注法轮功学员，在西藏、四川和青海则是更针对藏传佛教徒。不仅系统有多种多样的操作，更因为相关技术并没有被特定公司垄断，导致产品的市场的竞争也相对较强。
南方公园「中国乐队」节目在中国被禁：在广受好评的美国动漫系列「南方公园」最近剧目中讽刺中国政府后，中国政府的审查者已命令将其节目从网上删除。据《中国数字时代》透漏的一则指令，官方命令网站将该节目的名称加入被禁的关键词搜寻名单。该其内容讽刺了中国的审查制度和试图通过自我审查来讨好中国政府的美国公司，并包含了政治敏感性的所指，譬如其中有一个场景是温尼普尔（Winnie the Pooh）（注：节目中的角色）因模仿了中国主席习近平，而被关押在一个劳改营中。被禁之后，南方公园的创始人派克（Trey Parker）与史东（Matt Stone）发表推文反讽式「道歉」，称赞中共，并欢迎「中国的审查人员到我们的家和心中」。其他人也感受到了中国政府对南方公园的怒火，音乐人泽德（Zedd）在推特上声明， 他因对「南方公园」官方推特帐户上的一则推文点赞，而被禁在中国演出。
苹果采取新举措，帮助中共政府进行审查：大量报导表明，科技巨头苹果公司继续协助中共当局在国内外进行内容审查。十月初，因报导在香港的持续抗议，Quartz手机新闻软件被苹果从其中文软件app商店中移除。应当局要求，一个帮助以群众外包形式来定位香港警察的app也在10月除被苹果移除，此决定受到了官方媒体《环球时报》的表扬（a decision praised by the state-owned Global Times） 。苹果总裁提姆•库克（Tim Cook）为其举措辩护，说该app是用来对准警察的暴行，但随后从香港警方发布的声明中显示，尽管警察害怕，事实上该app并未做此用。 Buzzfeed 也早在2018年就有报导，说苹果警告其在苹果电视+平台上的节目开发者，要避免开发可能惹怒中国政府的主题。甚至连表情符号都未能幸免，iPhone最新升级的曹族系统iOS 13.1 版，在香港和澳门地区就删除了台湾国旗符号。在其它案例中，虽然苹果还没有同谋中共政府打压，但其最小的反应仍得到关注的批评。根据谷歌「零工程」的安全研究人员发现，中国政府已被报道发动了对在新疆和海外维吾尔族人 iPhone 使用者的恶意攻击，意在得到这些用户的位置和文件信息。据报道苹果已关闭了此漏洞，但是没有对被攻击的范围和对象评论。
监控更新：学习 app后门，网络注册面部扫描，「超级摄像头」揭幕，地铁上的面部识别
研究揭示政府支持的学习软件兼具监控功能：10月12日，一份「开放技术基金」（report by the Open Technology Fund）发布的报告提出证据，指中国政府「学习强国」软件app 可被用来监控用户。该 app是由中国科技公司阿里巴巴设计的，被推广让用户学习中共意识形态，跟进新闻和学习中国主席习近平。然而，通过该软件的后门，中国当局可以看到用户的上网纪录、短信和图片，看他们的通讯录，甚至开启用户手机的录音功能。据报导该软件已被下载1亿多次，许多政府工作人员被要求在业余时间使用此软件，累积分数。 9月份，监管部门宣布，2019年记者的证照将基于该记者的考试成绩，而试卷中的题目部分来自该软件的内容。
12月起网络和手机注册要求面部扫描：9月27日，中国工业和信息化部（China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology）宣布，从12月1日起，所有的电信公司必须对新的网络和手机用户，进行面部扫描。在此相同规定下（Under this same regulation） (Note: 该英文部分找不到链结网址，只能全部copy此链接)，中国公民将不许将手机号码转给他人。此举名为保护中国公民的权益，实则是对电信用户和网民们国内监控和实名制要求的进一步扩大—此措施已经不鼓励在网络上讨论。
媒体召回报导国庆抗议的记者：随着暴力日益升级，在10月1日国庆日警察在驱散抗议者造成了几起受伤事件后，香港电台（RTHK），《南华早报》（South China Morning Post）和《香港浸会大学学生报》决定从前方召回他们的记者。值此政治敏感日，在抗议期间，警察对抗议者动用了水炮车、辣椒喷雾和催泪瓦斯，有些抗议者以燃烧弹和砖头回应。 「香港记者协会」报导说，有数十名记者被警察连珠发射的橡胶子弹和海棉弹击伤，还有其他人在受到酸性物攻击后得到治疗，并呼吁各方不要干扰城市记者的工作。
中国之外：暴雪制裁支持香港的游戏者，抖音审查，美国限制中国的技术出口，对学术自由的威胁
暴雪争议，抵制：一名热门游戏《炉石战记(Hearthstone)》的选手因表达对当下香港抗议的支持，而受到美国游戏公司暴雪的制裁，因此暴雪受到各方批评。 10月6日，在一场游戏后宣布胜利的新闻发布会中，香港玩家职业选手吴伟聪（ Chung Ng Wai） 说出了抗议中盛行的口号：「光复香港，时代革命」，随后，暴雪收回了对Chung的奖金，并罚其禁赛一年。在此举遭到其它玩家强烈抗议后，其赢家身份后来被恢复，禁赛期减为6个月。即便如此，呼吁抵制暴雪的呼声响起，并由于随后在10月16日，因三个美国《炉石战记》的选手在网上进行的游戏中举起一个写着「香港自由，抵制暴雪」的标语，暴雪对这三位选手禁赛后，抵制暴雪的呼声更强。看似是因对越来越多的争议，暴雪取消了原定10月16日于纽约市举行的一场产品发布会。尽管暴雪在中国的用户群还少，该公司正在寻求扩展这一有利可图的中国市场，来弥补在其它地方的亏损。
Late last month, public security agencies and a school in Hebei Province“seriously criticized” a 15-year-old student for accessing blocked websites and browsing information that was deemed “antagonistic toward China.” A few days earlier, another Chinese netizen had reported that his account on Tencent’s social media platform WeChat had been suspended for “spreading malicious rumors” after he posted a comment about Winnie the Pooh, whose likeness is often used to mock President Xi Jinping. It will soon be even easier for authorities to track down such individuals: as of December 1, all telecommunications companies will be required to obtain facial scans of new internet or mobile phone users as part of the real-name registration process.
These are just a few recent examples of the daunting growth in restrictions on expression, privacy, and access to information in China. Indeed, the newly released edition of Freedom House’s annual global assessment of internet freedom, Freedom on the Net, identified the Chinese government as the world’s worst abuser of internet freedom for the fourth consecutive year. But even by China’s own poor track record, the past year stood out, as the country’s score reached its lowest point since the inception of the report a decade ago.
Extreme censorship and penalties for once-tolerated activities
Driven by official paranoia surrounding the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, persistent antigovernment protests in Hong Kong, and an ongoing trade war with the United States, information controls in China reached exceptional levels over the past year. The scale of content removals, website closures, and social media account deletions expanded, affecting tens of thousands of individual users and institutional content providers. Platforms focused on apolitical topics, including entertainment, dating, and celebrity gossip applications, faced new restrictions, particularly on their real-time communication features. Information on subjects like economic news that have traditionally been given freer rein became more systematically and permanently censored.
Chinese citizens’ risk of being detained or imprisoned for accessing or sharing information online has increased considerably in recent years. During the past year alone, several new categories of individuals were targeted with legal and extralegal reprisals for their online activity. These included users of Twitter, which is blocked in China but still accessible via circumvention tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs). Numerous Twitter users were harassed, detained, interrogated by police, and forced to delete their past posts. Some users and sellers of VPNs faced similar reprisals, although on a smaller scale.
Ordinary users of WeChat increasingly faced detention and prosecution. Among others who were jailed during 2019, the moderator of a popular WeChat account that shared news from outside China was sentenced in July to two years in prison, a professor from Guangdong Province was jailed for three and a half years after posting images related to the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, and a 22-year-old Tibetan monk from Sichuan Province was arrested for expressing concern over Beijing’s policies that are reducing use of the Tibetan language. Several activists who operated websites about civil society and human rights issues also faced pretrial detention and long prison sentences. The most prominent was Huang Qi, founder of the human rights website 64 Tianwang, who was sentenced in July to 12 years in prison for “intentionally leaking state secrets.”
Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region increasingly faced severe penalties and long-term detention for mundane online activities like communicating with relatives who live abroad. Erpat Ablekrem, a 24-year-old aspiring professional soccer player, was sent to a reeducation camp in January 2019 for using WeChat to contact family members who had fled the country. Rapid advances in surveillance technology and greater police access to user data have helped facilitate this rise in arrests and prosecutions. In some instances, tools that were first deployed by police in Xinjiang have now spread to other parts of China, such as hand-held devices used for extracting data from mobile phones.
Impact on user communication
In response to the escalation of real-world reprisals and legal penalties for online commentary, self-censorship has become more pervasive. The risk of losing one’s personal WeChat account is a particularly strong deterrent, since the multifaceted application—used for everything from banking to ordering food—is now regarded as essential to everyday life in China.
The space for online mobilization has also narrowed. The effects of the Chinese government’s multiyear crackdown on civil society and nongovernmental organizations are visible in the online sphere, as previously outspoken activists have gone silent following arrests or the closure of their social media accounts.
Several platforms that still provided alternative means of communication on routinely censored topics—such as video-sharing, live-streaming, and blockchain applications—faced new restrictions during the year, indicating that the authorities were determined to plug gaps in the system. For example, blockchain platforms were required to enforce real-name registration and censor their content, and artificial intelligence was deployed to screen images for banned material.
Global implications
Foreigners visiting China should not expect to be exempt from the government’s ever-expanding web of surveillance and censorship. Recent Freedom House research on police use of advanced databases to track “key individuals” throughout China found that foreigners are one of the targeted populations. At least one foreign journalist reporting from China said he was barred from his WeChat account for “spreading rumors” about the Tiananmen Square massacre. He had to admit to the offense and provide a face scan before access could be restored. Ongoing restrictions on VPNs and implementation of the facial-scan requirement for SIM card registration may also disproportionately affect foreign visitors to the country.
Meanwhile, international companies and investors must grapple with the increasing censorship of economic news, US government sanctions on Chinese technology firms linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and the prominent role of social media giants like Tencent in helping to detect and penalize users for engaging in legitimate political, religious, or simply humorous speech. Foreign firms like Apple, Microsoft, and LinkedIn have already complied with government censorship in China, and they could be forced to play a part in user arrests as well.
Even as it increases internet controls at home, the Chinese government and affiliated private companies are affecting internet freedom in other countries around the world. In the 2018 edition of Freedom on the Net, Freedom House found that 36 out of 65 countries under study had sent personnel to China for training on new media or information management, while 18 had purchased artificial intelligence–enabled surveillance systems. New research published in 2019 by the Open Technology Fund shows that both fields of activity have continued to expand, with Chinese-made internet control equipment and official training reaching more than 70 countries.
The 2019 edition of Freedom on the Net noted that China has emerged as a leader in developing, employing, and exporting automated tools for mass surveillance of social media. The Chinese firm Knowlesys, for example, is planning to provide live demonstrations at an upcoming trade show in Dubai on how to “monitor your targets’ messages, profiles, locations, behaviors, relationships, and more,” and how to “monitor public opinion” for elections. Mass surveillance of social media was identified in 40 of the 65 countries assessed in 2019, though not all employed Chinese technology.
This year featured a series of especially sensitive anniversaries that motivated the escalation in censorship and surveillance in China, but there is no reason to believe that the new restrictions will be rolled back. On the contrary, the leadership appears determined to ratchet up its repression indefinitely as it pursues the impossible goal of ideological conformity and social control in a globally engaged nation of 1.4 billion people. In fact, it is increasingly obvious that Beijing’s efforts are, by necessity, global in scope, and that the rest of the world will have to choose between resistance and complicity.
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin. Mai Truong is Freedom House’s research director for strategy and management.
This article was also published in the Diplomat on November 18, 2019.
Communist Party Fourth Plenum: Xi Jinping governance model affirmed, tech innovation emphasized, Hong Kong warning issued
Last month, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee completed its fourth plenum. The meeting of top leaders, held in the military-run Jingxi Hotel in Beijing from October 28 to 31, was long delayed; the previous plenum had taken place in February 2018. The final bulletin and resolution called on the party to increase its role in society, but advocated few major changes. The outcome was considered by many to be anticlimactic when compared with the last plenum’s announcement of a constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits. Perhaps for this reason, there was neither a public outcry nor increase in state censorship following the close of the plenum as had happened in 2018.
With regard to media, internet, and academic freedom, there are three main takeaways from the plenum:
Continuing support for Xi and his policies of increasing political and ideological control: This year’s plenum reaffirmed President Xi Jinping’s particular brand of authoritarianism. Xi’s 65-page-long speech was replete with references to the tenets of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—the full name of the ideology commonly known as “Xi Jinping Thought,” which undergirds party policies and is increasingly incorporated into schools, workplaces, media, public spaces, and other components of everyday life. The plenum’s bulletin stressed the need to reconsolidate the power of the Communist Party, extend party control over all levels of Chinese society, and strengthen people’s faith in China’s socialist system, while managing domestic risks and improving ideological purity. The strong show of support for Xi deflated some earlier speculation that the plenum’s delay had been due to party infighting and challenges to Xi’s leadership.
Tech investment and innovation: This year, tech innovation was emphasized, with the plenum calling for a national system to master new “core technologies.”According to the Elsa Kania, a research fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, the bulletin used the word “innovation” 31 times. This comes after calls made by President Xi prior to the plenum for China to invest in further development of blockchain technologies, the technology behind Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. However, after the price of bitcoins and blockchain shares began to rise in the plenum’s wake, state media like the People’s Daily tried to rein in investor enthusiasm, urging them to “remain rational.”
Hard-line stance on Hong Kong, Taiwan: Although no specific mention was made of the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, the plenum’s bulletin included calls to uphold the “one country, two systems” arrangement governing Hong Kong, and to promote Taiwan’s unification with China. It urged creation of an improved mechanism for “safeguarding national security” in Hong Kong, where prodemocracy protests have now entered their sixth month, as well as the deepening of cross-strait integration. It further called for new policies aimed at fostering sentiments favorable to reunification among the Taiwanese public. Statements to the media by officials after the end of the meeting further signaled Beijing’s intention to take a more active role in Hong Kong’s affairs, including by more frequently exercising its power to interpret the territory’s Basic Law, increasing patriotic education, and exercising greater scrutiny over the selection of future chief executives.
Censorship Updates: Shutterstock, YouTube celebrity, iPhone browsers use Tencent blacklist
Shutterstock censoring search results in China: Last month, stock image supplier Shutterstock began censoring search results in mainland China, according to a November 6 report by the Intercept, after engineers received instructions in September to implement the changes. Banned keywords reportedly include “President Xi,” “dictator,” and “yellow umbrella,” a symbol of 2014 prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong. A petition signed by 180 Shutterstock employees called on the company to reject Chinese government demands that search results be censored, referencing in part the many company employees from around the world who have “experienced government oppression firsthand.” Employees further expressed concern about the slippery slope the change entails, be it in terms of future demands from China, or similar requests from other restrictive governments. Shutterstock chief executive Jon Oringer admitted that the company would filter search results in China, but defended the decision as being in line with the company’s “brand promise” by enabling Chinese storytellers to still access a wide range of creative content. Shutterstock has been distributing its images in China since 2014, but its involvement grew last year with a $15 million investment in the tech platform ZCool—a partnership that grants Shutterstock greater access to widely used platforms like Tencent Social Ads.
PewDiePie censored in China after discussion of Hong Kong protests: Popular YouTube personality Felix Kjellberg—known as PewDiePie—has claimed that the Chinese government censored online references to him after he recorded a video commenting on the Hong Kong protest movement. With more than 100 million subscribers to his video-sharing channel, PewDiePie is the world's second-most popular YouTube personality. In an October 16 video, PewDiePie referred to the Chinese government’s response to overseas media personalities’ expressions of support for Hong Kong protesters and shared memes about the protests, as well as memes mocking Xi Jinping. Shortly after, media outlets and Chinese internet users reported that references to him had been scrubbed from Baidu’s Tieba, an online forum similar to Reddit. According to one Twitter user, PewDiePie has 600,000 fans in China, who know him mostly through reposts of his content on domestic video-sharing and social media platforms.
Apple using Tencent blacklist for iPhone web-browsing filter:An October 31 report by Quartz revealed that Apple is working with Chinese tech giant Tencent to identify websites for blocking by the Safari web browser in China. Outside of China, Apple cooperates with Google’s “safe browsing service” to provide Safari with a blacklist of sites with malware or phishing content. Inside China, where Google is blocked, Apple is partnering with Tencent for the same functionality. However, along with malicious malware sites, Tencent’s blacklist includes websites containing political material the Chinese government considers harmful. Apple has repeatedly complied with Chinese government censorship demands in an effort to retain market access, although some of its most revenue-rich services like Apple TV+, Apple Books, and iTunes movie rentals remain unavilable in China.
Facial recognition upgrades and US sanctions fuel citizen complaints, lawsuit, and scrutiny of international collaboration
Facial recognition systems continue to expand in use and location: Authorities have continued to expand use of facial recognition technologies, with some cases triggering public concerns over privacy. At the Urban Rail Transit Operation and Development Forum held in Beijing on October 29, it was announced that the city’s metro would implement facial recognition technology to classify passengers, as part of a security screening system. In Xiangyang, Hubei Province, local authorities have used facial recognition cameras at a downtown crosswalk to identify jaywalkers and broadcast their images, names, and national ID numbers on a large electronic screen, according to recent footage uploaded to video sharing platform Douyin. Over the past two months, similar initiatives have reportedly been introduced in Zhenjiang (Jiangsu Province), Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), and Xining (Qinghai Province). In Shanghai, facial recognition equipment has been installed in a third of the city’s apartment complexes as of this May, in some instances drawing complaints from residents who had not been alerted. Emotion-recognition camera systems were advertised widely at China’s Public Security Expo held in Shenzhen in late October. These systems are reportedly being tested in Xinjiang, though experts suggest the technology is still in its infancy. Other technology displayed at the expo included prison surveillance systems, eyeglasses with hidden cameras, and devices which could read all Chinese- and foreign-language material on a user’s personal computer or phone.
Chinese professor files lawsuit against the use of facial recognition at wildlife park: A professor from Zhejiang University of Science and Technology has taken legal action against a Hangzhou safari park which requires visitors to scan their faces in order to gain entrance. In a complaint accepted by a Hangzhou court on November 1, Professor Guo Bing accused the park of infringing on customer privacy and questioned how visitor information was being stored after members with annual passes like himself were told that they would not be allowed to enter if they refused to provide a facial scan. He is seeking modest financial compensation, but reportedly hopes the case will encourage increased regulation of biometric data collection. According to the Guardian, the case has the potential to “open wider debate in China over the use of such technology by businesses and the government.”
Increased scrutiny of international collaboration with banned Chinese firms: Companies and institutions outside China have come under greater scrutiny for their ties with Chinese firms that have been blacklisted by the US government for their involvement in human rights abuses and surveillance in Xinjiang. An October 14 report by Australia’s national broadcaster ABC found that leading Australian universities have potentially assisted the Chinese government in the development of surveillance and military technologies, including through partnerships with two entities on the US government’s entities list. Buzzfeed reports that as of early November, tech firms Google, Apple, and Amazon continue to distribute physical products and apps produced by three companies—Hikvision, Dahua Technology, and iFlytek—that have been placed on the entities list. On November 8, Pittsburgh’s local Action News 4 reported that dozens of the city’s surveillance cameras purchased by the local district attorney are manufactured by Dahua, a Chinese firm banned by the US government from selling to federal agencies, and whose equipment is reportedly vulnerable to hacking.
Hong Kong: Government, airport, “testing waters” of internet censorship
Censorship of the sort seen within China has long been absent in Hong Kong, even as local authorities have adopted increasingly repressive measures to deter prodemocracy protests. But 24 weeks into the current protest movement, signs have emerged that this may be changing.
On November 1, Hong Kong’s High Court granted a temporary injunction to block incitement to violence or property damage on “any internet-based platform or medium.” These included but were not limited to messaging app Telegram and online forum LIHKG—platforms popular among protesters, which the Hong Kong government has accused of facilitating “unlawful activities.” The move apparently came in response to, among other things, activity on the Telegram channels “dadfindboy” and “tanakayotsuba.” Each with large followings, the channels have been used to collect and share personal information about police officers. As of November 7, “dadfindboy” had reportedly been shuttered because it violated Telegram’s terms of service. Police are now reportedly also seeking to break the app’s encryption protocol in order to reveal the identity of the channels’ administrators, as well as those of other protesters using the app.
Responses from legislators and international rights groups to the injunction was swift. Legislative Council Chairman of Information Technology Charles Mok expressed concern that the injunction is “just testing the waters,” and may presage further government censorship. In an open letter to Chief Executive Carrie Lam, digital rights organization Access Now and other international groups including Freedom House said the injunction “enables overly broad restrictions on the freedom of expression of Hong Kong residents and interferes with access to popular forums…in violation of fundamental rights,” and asked the government to withdraw it.
The international and local pressure may have had some impact. While the injunction was extended on November 15—the day it was to expire—the renewed version reportedly had a narrowed scope, relaying that online platforms themselves would not be liable for violence-inciting content on their services. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Internet Society expressed disappointment with the extension, and Mok voiced concern over the chilling effect it creates for internet users.
Online censorship has also extended to the government-operated Hong Kong International Airport. In late October, a Reddit user reported that the Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP) website had been blocked on the airport's public ASUS internet terminals, though it remained accessible at non-ASUS terminals and through the airport's Wi-Fi. HKFP is an independent, English-language digital news outlet that has reported extensively on the protests and police violence against them.
As protests show no sign of abating, comments from Chinese Vice Premier Han Zheng on November 6 calling for the imposition of national security laws in the city suggest that government censorship may increase in the future.
Beyond China: Huawei “safe cities,” Chinese cameras at US military facilities, university influence, Taiwan elections
New report finds Huawei “safe cities” have spread to 52 countries: A November report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that more than 73 cities in 52 countries around the world have entered into “safe city” agreements with Huawei. Through these agreements, the Chinese tech firm provides local authorities with surveillance technology, including facial and license plate recognition cameras and social media monitoring tools. Of these agreements, 71 percent were concluded with administrations in countries rated Not Free or Partly Free by Freedom House; 59 percent are with governments in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa; and 71 percent with those in middle-income countries. The CSIS analysis also questions the supposed benefits of the technology in reducing crime, saying that Huawei’s “solutions are difficult to verify and appear grossly exaggerated in some cases.” By contrast, reports have already emerged of the systems being used to suppress political opponents in recipient countries. In a recent example, the Associated Press (AP) reported on October 16 that police in Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, leaked footage of antigovernment protesters taken from Huawei cameras to progovernment media, which then published the images alongside the names of the participants.
New York firm sold Chinese cameras to military facilities, claiming they were US-made: In early November, federal prosecutors filed fraud charges against seven current and former employers of the New York-based Aventura Technologies. They accused the company of selling tens of millions of dollars of Chinese security equipment—goods Aventura falsely claimed were US-made—to American government facilities. The firm reportedly relabeled the items to hide their Chinese origin. Federal prosecutors claim that purchasers included military bases, US Department of Energy facilities, and even a Navy aircraft carrier, and that individuals in China were reportedly aware of the deception.
Canadian Chinese student association decertified: Universities continue to struggle with how to respond to growing Chinese presence on their campuses, and the impact on academic freedom, but one potentially fruitful approach is fair enforcement of school regulations when violations by Chinese students or officials occur. On November 3, the student union of McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada, upheld its September 22 decision to decertify the Chinese Student and Scholars Association (CSSA) for having violating school guidelines. The initial decision was made after members of the CSSA disrupted a February talk by a Uighur activist, and after the revelation of messages in the CSSA’s WeChat group that indicated that photographs of the event had been supplied to the Chinese consulate in Toronto. Similar worries have been raised in the United Kingdom, where a November 5 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report cited several scholars who expressed concern about the negative impact of Chinese government influence on academic freedom across British universities.
FEATURED PUSHBACK: European rights prizes awarded to political prisoners in China
Over the past two months, European organizations have awarded three prestigious human rights and free speech prizes to political prisoners in China. These came despite threats and Chinese government reprisals for similar actions in the past, such as a series of retaliatory steps taken against Norway in 2010 after prodemocracy advocate Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
In late October, the European Parliament announced that the 2019 Sakharov Prize, the European Union’s prestigious human rights prize, was being awarded to Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti. Earlier in the month, Tohti was the recipient of the Council of Europe’s Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize. Tohti, an academic, is serving a life sentence for “separatism” due to his efforts to foster dialogue between Han and Uighur citizens, and to speak out against violations of Uighur rights. Activists have been touting Tohti as a deserving recipient of such prizes since his initial arrest in 2014. The current timing of the awards speaks to both his own plight and his symbolism as a voice silenced for speaking up on behalf of an ethnic minority; an estimated one million Uighurs are in detention in China due to their religious beliefs and ethnic identity.
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Additionally, on November 15, Sweden’s branch of PEN International awarded its Tucholsky Prize for a persecuted writer or publisher to Swedish citizen and bookseller Gui Minhai, who has been held in Chinese police custody since his 2015 abduction from Thailand. In advance of the ceremony, Chinese diplomats reportedly threatened consequences for Swedish-Chinese relations, and implied that any government representatives attending the event would be barred from entering China in the future. Despite the threats, Swedish culture and democracy minister Amanda Lind attended the ceremony to present the award. Earlier in the day, Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven told local television, “We are not going to give in to this type of threat. Never. We have freedom of expression in Sweden, and that’s how it is, period.”
Photo caption: Swedish culture and democracy minister Amanda Lind announces the Tucholsky prize to Gui Minhai in Stockholm. Credit: IBL/Rex/Shutterstock
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Political prosecutions relying on facial recognition tools: As facial recognition technologies spread throughout China—including on public transportation and in private residential units—and are also integrated with other police surveillance databases of “key individuals,” watch for emerging examples of the technology being used as a trigger for arrests, or as evidence in the prosecution of political activists, ethnic minorities, and religious dissidents.
Escalating Hong Kong crackdown amid winter holidays: The Chinese Communist Party has a long track record of timing politicized arrests and prosecutions of prominent activists within China to occur around Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s Eve—a holiday period when many Americans and other international observers take time off to spend with family, and may be slower to respond to heightened repression. As tensions and unrest escalate in Hong Kong after six months of protests, watch for whether the CCP will apply this playbook in the territory to deploy paramilitary forces to violently suppress the demonstrations.
Outcome and impact of US national security review of Tiktok acquisition: On November 1, Reuters and other news outlets reported that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) had initiated a national security review of the 2017, $1 billion acquisition of Musical.ly by Tiktok, which is owned by the Chinese company Bytedance. The review was triggered in part by bipartisan congressional calls for greater scrutiny of the app after recent reports of Tiktok’s popularity among American teenagers, evidence of the app censoring content that would be deemed undesirable by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and concerns about the status of Americans’ online data accessed by the Chinese tech firm. As the review proceeds, watch for how the committee addresses these concerns, the impact of its final decision on Tiktok’s operations in the United States and globally (about 60 percent of the app’s monthly active users reportedly are US residents), and whether the process sets a precedent for future reviews of other Chinese tech acquisitions—including Tencent, which has stakes in online forum Reddit and the gaming company Blizzard.
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